Here is my proof of your argument:
1. If we have two hypotheses and some evidence is not improbable under the first hypothesis but is improbable under the second, then that evidence counts as evidence for the first hypothesis.
2. The beauty of the universe is improbable under atheism.
3. The beauty of the universe is not improbable under theism.
4. Therefore, the beauty in the universe counts as evidence for God’s existence. (MP 1,2,3)

In regards to the second premise, I propose that beauty is not improbable under atheism. Atheism denies the existence of God, but beauty can be explained without belief in God. For instance, the beauty in the universe can be attributed to coincidental natural occurrences or evolutionary causes. A theist could attribute a sunset to God’s omnipotence, while an atheist could explain the sunset as a natural process independent of any conscious mind. There’s no objective measurement to determine whether a beautiful thing was created consciously. In regards to the beauty man creates, one can argue that it is a mimicry and manipulation of the beauty observed in the natural world. As a result, we can conclude that beauty is not improbable under atheism. By rejecting the initial premise, we can disregard the conclusion. Therefore, the beauty in the universe does not necessarily count as evidence for the existence of a divine creator.

In response to the second objection you proposed, you said that the universe could be more or less beautiful. However, your response doesn’t support the second premise. If the universe was less beautiful, we would still say things could be less beautiful or more beautiful. At what point is beauty so scarce that God’s existence is improbable? Or is the mere existence of beauty proof of God’s existence? I’m curious about your response!

Here is the proof of your argument:
1. Morality comes from natural selection.
2. If morality comes from natural selection, then morality must be universal.
3. Morality is not universal.
4. Therefore, morality did not come from natural selection. (MT 2,3)

In opposition to the second premise, I propose that morality is both evolutionary and circumstantial, in which setting-dependent moral action maximizes survival. According to this line of reasoning, your solider-criminal example is accounted for. You explained that a soldier defending their country from invasion would be honored for weakening the enemy, but a sociopath who killed children would be punished. In this example, we see that morality is dependent on the circumstances and not actions. It must be noted that accepting the existence of circumstantial morality is not a denial of morals born from natural selection. You assume that natural selection exclusively benefits the individual, but I argue that it benefits both the individual and the community which accounts for altruistic morality and the lack of “dog-eat-dog morality” you mentioned. However, the individual still remains the ultimate priority as a result of reciprocity. Sociologically, reciprocity is rewarding kind action with kind action. These exchanges provide the individual with resources and social alliances, which reveals altruistic morality to be ultimately self-serving because it contributes to maximizing the chance for survival of both the individual and the community. The soldier is a perfect example of reciprocity. In return for protecting their country and killing lives of the enemy, the soldier receives domestic benefits, things like healthcare and discounts. Additionally, the soldier kills to protect not only themself, but also their community. This is all to say that I don’t see altruism as a threat to the idea that morality is constructed through natural selection. In fact, taking certain moral action in response to a particular setting maximizes chance for survival.

You propose two perspectives that hold implicit assumptions. They’re missing premises, so I added the assumptions to the your arguments:

First argument:
1. Without God, life is absurd.
2. God does not exist.
3. So, life is absurd. (MP 1, 2)

Second argument:
1. Without God, life is absurd.
2. Life is not absurd.
3. So, God exists. (MT 1, 2)

I want to address your definition of absurdity. You consider absurdity as the inexplicability of existence without God. But even if God exists, life is still absurd, or inexplicable. Consider the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco. 3, 000 people died and over 80% of the city was destroyed. Or even something as simple as waking up before your alarm. We could attempt at explaining these horrors, but God merely existing would not be a sufficient reason. In fact, the existence of these horrors and God taint God’s character. If God allows these horrors, or absurdities, then he isn’t entirely good, but if he can’t control these horrors, then he isn’t entirely powerful. As a result, these absurdities remain inexplicable even after assuming God’s existence and also introduce components to God’s character that cannot be explained. So given that life is absurd regardless of God’s existence, the conclusion of the second argument is no longer secure. Instead, we would conclude that God does not exist because life is absurd. With this alteration to the second proof, both arguments now promote the nonexistence of God because of the absurdity that exists. According to your reasoning, once we acknowledge that inexplicability exists, we must believe that God doesn’t exist.

You propose two perspectives that hold implicit assumptions. They’re missing premises, so I added the assumptions to the your arguments:

First argument:
1. Without God, life is absurd.
2. God does not exist.
3. So, life is absurd. (MP 1, 2)

Second argument:
1. Without God, life is absurd.
2. Life is not absurd.
3. So, God exists. (MT 1, 2)

I want to address your definition of absurdity. You consider absurdity as the inexplicability of existence without God. But even if God exists, life is still absurd, or inexplicable. Consider the 1906 earthquake in San Francisco. 3, 000 people died and over 80% of the city was destroyed. Or even something as simple as waking up before your alarm. We could attempt at explaining these horrors, but God merely existing would not be a sufficient reason. In fact, the existence of these horrors and God taint God’s character. If God allows these horrors, or absurdities, then he isn’t entirely good, but if he can’t control these horrors, then he isn’t entirely powerful. As a result, these absurdities remain inexplicable even after assuming God’s existence and also introduce components to God’s character that cannot be explained. So given that life is absurd regardless of God’s existence, the conclusion of the second argument is no longer secure. Instead, we would conclude that God does not exist because life is absurd. With this alteration to the second proof, both arguments now promote the nonexistence of God because of the absurdity that exists. According to your reasoning, once we acknowledge that inexplicability exists, we must believe that God doesn’t exist.

Below is your argument for God’s existence:
1. For God to exist, God must have an effect on other things that unequivocally exist.
2. God has an effect on people.
3. Therefore, God exists.

The argument doesn’t follow a rule of implication, which creates space for counterarguments. The ambiguity of the initial premise poses a threat to the entire argument. How would someone know that a thing unequivocally existed? Beyond individual consciousness, there is nothing that undoubtedly exists. If you parked your car in the garage, walked into your home, and I asked you where your car was you’d likely say, “Oh, I just parked it in the garage.” Then, if I asked you if you were certain that your car was in the garage, you couldn’t reasonably say yes because maybe someone stole it after you parked it or maybe you forgot that you actually parked it on the street. This lack of certainty disables our ability to determine effects, so according to your argument, there is no way to determine whether something exists or not. Even if we assume that the second premise is true, we have no way to measure it because we cannot identify the things that undoubtedly exist.

But let’s assume that the first premise is true and that humanity is affected by some entity. You suggest that this entity is God, but it could very well be an invisible alien or and evil demon. The effects may even be simulations and we’re all just brains in vats. You also said that God has an effect on the ways people conduct themselves, but that can simply be explained by sociology. Humans react to the expectations of their social context, so a child may behave well in the presence of their teacher and behave badly around their parents. In both social settings, a human presence affects certain behavior and there is no reason that this catalyst must be divine. Even if we agree with the initial premise, we cannot arrive at the conclusion because we cannot be sure that God is the entity causing these effects on people.

@Agustino
You argue man’s weakness supports the belief that God exists. You explain man as “fundamentally weak,” which I interpreted as a lack of happiness that can only be fixed by God. I deconstructed your argument into this proof:

1) Man is fundamentally weak.
2) Man cannot be happy by relying on his own power.
3) If man cannot rely on his own power for happiness, then he needs a power greater than him to provide happiness.
4) God is the greater power that can bring man happiness.

You intended to support theism with this argument, but I think your premises can also support atheism. Even if you assume that the first three premises are true, they do not secure the conclusion that asserts God as the greater power that provides happiness. According to the third premise, a power outside of man’s control is necessary for full happiness and the conclusion asserts that the power must be God. To find a contradiction to the third premise, we must find a power other than God that is greater than man and also provides happiness. According to this criteria, love or drugs could also be the power providing man happiness beyond what he can provide for himself. This argument doesn’t obviously support or confirm theism because an atheist could agree to the first three premises but come to a different, non-theistic conclusion. Therefore, man’s weakness doesn’t support God’s existence.

@Panzerfaust
It sounds like you are concerned about the seemingly obscure evidence for God’s existence and questioning whether the higher power explained by religion even exists. Here is the proof of your argument:

1) If God exists, then only one religion explains God’s existence.
2) If this religion exists, it should be obviously different from the other religions.
3) No single religion is obviously different from the others.
4) No single religion is obviously different from the others, so this religion doesn’t exist (MT 2, 3).
5) This religion that explains God’s existence doesn’t exist, so God doesn’t exist (MT 1, 4).

In my response, I will assume your observation that no obvious differences exist between religions is true and propose other potential explanations for the lack of obvious differences you’ve observed:

1. God does exist and is explained by one religion, like you proposed.
2. God does exist, but cannot be explained by religion.
3. God does exist and is explained by multiple religions.
4. God does not exist and cannot be explained by religion.

According to the initial premise that assumes God’s existence is explainable by religion, options one and three are the only possibilities to be concerned with because God cannot be explained by religion in the other options. However, options one and three contradict the second premise that assumes a single religion would explain God’s existence and also be obviously different from other religions. The premises are not satisfied by any of the options, so you are left with two options: 1) deny God’s existence because one religion doesn’t appear to be obviously different from other religions or 2) accept that God does exist, but is not confined to a single religion. For a more full discussion, I think the premises of your argument should be altered.