I disagree. Our present time is composed of primarily cinematographic, telecommunicational duration.367
↪Number2018 "How could one present “present”? When we write or say something about our current present, we must think of the time of the occurrence of our sentences, which is our present time. This present time cannot be grasped as such: it is not yet or no longer present. It is always too soon or too late to grasp the presentation itself and present it. Such is the specific and paradoxical constitution of the event."
Heidegger does a good job of explaining this. Each of the steps you mention, bringing something into view as something new, having it present, presenting it, grasping it, identifying it, using and referring to it, these are all further articulations which do refer back to that which they articulate , but in articulating further they subtly change what they articulate , by bringing out something new about it. This isn't a problem for us because such steps are experienced as dealing with, examining, having, pointing to, positing something present. Each transforms what it deals with in its own way, as bringing it into view in THIS or THAT manner. — Joshs
In other words, they reduce the ontological difference to a difference between two ontic determinations. Being conceived as the performative difference between schematism and existence is a difference between two ontic determinations and therefore is itself on the ontic plane of propositionality. It is a present to hand thinking masquerading as post-metaphysical.
When one begins from the subjectivism of representationality, the way of out of Kantian a priorism must stand as the absolute other to representation, that is to say, it must arrive in the guise of the performance of the differentiation between Subjective structuring and Objective determination. Only in this way can the empirically conditioned and contingent beginning of thought avoid being mistaken for a Kantian unconditioned ground of possibility. Heidegger and Derrida give us a way to avoid grounding fundamental ontology in the performative difference between schematism and existence as its condition of possibility. — Joshs
“Man is something that shall be overcome. Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman — a rope over an abyss. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end.” — Avro
Let's call then No name No Aim .... Sin nombre sin objectivo. — Avro
The French -- or at least some French -- seem to have a history of collective action which American workers don't seem to manifest. One thinks of the much more frequent strikes in France, of student demonstrations, ands so on. I don't think the French state differs all that much from other states -- they are in business to arrange the affairs of the bourgeoisie, as Marx said -- and if they have been generous with working class benefits, well, that is probably in the past. — Bitter Crank
One can hope that Americans will take a hint and follow the suit with the gilets jaunes, but I wouldn't count on it. The memory of active resistance to the power of corporation and state has, I think, become too distant for most Americans. — Bitter Crank
If one agrees with you that this is the key question, it is worth considering your answer(s):As James(1978) wrote:”...earlier and later are present to each other in an experience that feels either only on condition of feeling both together” ( p.77).
The key question is how this ‘both together’ is to be construed. Is the basis of change within a bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself, the function of a collision between a separately constituted context and present entities? Or does my dynamic ‘now’ consist of a very different form of intentionality, a strange coupling of a past and present already changed by each other, radically interbled or interaffected such that it can no longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all? — Joshs
I don't agree with Trump's policies regarding the Mexican border. — fishfry
This is not a Trump or anti-Trump post. This is about the politics of the US-Mexico border. — fishfry
Gallagher writes:” a set of cultural norms is learned through practice such that these become second nature. By this means common expectations that are meant to apply to all, equally, are established. By learning how I ought to behave in such and such a circumstance, I learn how you ought to behave as well. And this supplies a ready guide to your behavior in so far as you do not behave abnormally. Such learning does not take the form of internalizing explicit rules (at least not as a set of theoretical propositions), nor does it depend on applying ones that are somehow built-in sub-personally. It involves becoming accustomed to local norms, coming to embody them, as it were, through habit and practice. “ Ratcliffe(2007) suggests that “many thoughts, interpretations and viewpoints ...belong to nobody in particular and are shared products of interaction”(Rethinking Commonsense Psychology: A Critique of Folk Psychology, Theory of Mind and Simulation, Palgrave Macmillan, p..175).
Notice that the claim by Gallagher and others that individual behavior in social situations is guided by narrative norms, reciprocities, shared practices and social constraints implies the belief that essentially the same social signs are available to all who interrelate within a particular community, that there are such things as non-person-specific meanings, originating in an impersonal expressive agency . — Joshs
But, what is “a priory"The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priori, even without taking into account that this
identity can only determine or delimit itself through differential relations to other elements and hence that it bears the mark of this difference. It is because this iterability is differential, within each individual
"element" as well as between "elements", because it splits each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, that the remainder, although indispensable, is never that of a full or
fulfilling presence; it is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence..(LI53)." — Joshs
I think that your apprehension of “A Foucaultian-Deleuzian account” is not completely correct, especially when you attribute to both Foucault and Deleuze that “We are 'shaped by,' 'adjust to,' 'conditioned by' the affect, social, physical worlds.A Foucaultian-Deleuzian account
avoids the moralistic-blame of emancipatory positions because it doesnt try to organize thought around a developmental telos. And yet, it still blames in the sense of pointing a finger at arbitrary sources of conditioning. We are 'shaped by', 'adjust to', 'conditioned by' the affect, social, physical worlds.
Relevance, significance is not what conditions you and me , but what you and I interpret uniquely within what would supposedly 'condition' us. — Joshs
I think that the concept of “community” is too often overused. In your previous posts, you wrote: “Consciousness, far from being the self- knowing commander, is besieged from unconscious processes and bodily affects that interact with and shape consciousness outside of its awareness. So the notion of the agent is a bit of an illusion, there is no ghost in the machine, it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents.” Or,” “Such institutions go beyond individual cognitive processes or habits: they include communicative practices, and more established institutions include rituals and traditions that generate actions, preserve memories, solve problems. These are distributed processes supported by artifacts, tools, technologies, environments, institutional structures, etc.”The understanding of the norms themselves differ from person to person, but normally so subtly that it appears as though those of us within a particular community(urban vs rural) united by those norms believes that we just assimilate them automatically. But even within a community of supposedly shared norms, even within a single family, there can be violent disagreements over the meaning of those 'norms'. — Joshs
If subjectivity is machinic activity and machinic activity always mutates and changes, where how does ongoing style emerge? — Joshs
IF I engage with my friend according to my understanding that there is an ongoing worldview(a worldview that is alwasy changing but maintains an overall thread of internal consistency) including political, religious and ethical outlook that guides their thinking , then I may slip intricately into his outlook , merging my dance with his, in such a way as to anticipate his joys and suffering, what causes him guilt , anger , anxiety.
My prediction is if one attempts to engage with him such the interaction itself is thought as a mobile environment of shifting machinic processes with no thread of consistency, I will have no way to be with him intimately in his affective-intelellectual modulaltions. His behavior will appear somewhat arbitrary to me rather than flowing out of itself. — Joshs
Do the ongoing concerns of the person driving a car not interaffect the supposed purely 'automatic' act of driving? Do the pieces not interaffect each such as to form a relational totality unified according to what matters to the person? — Joshs
If subjectivity is machinic activity and machinic activity always mutates and changes, where how does ongoing style emerge? — Joshs
The difference is not an essence or an absolute. It is a matter of choice and workability. Yet, most of the differences are not arbitrary; they need to be chosenare these notions derived from the arbitrary chaos of dfference, or is difference itself to be understood as always RELEVANT difference? — Joshs
If the harmony prevails, there is no place for questioning and problematization.:smile:One could point out the way that over time, of the old woman, the dog, you and I and the child all become friends, we all interaffect each other as one larger subjectivity. But the dog will still maintain its own affective rhythms and attitudes , and all the humans in the room, regardless of how many years they spend together, will maintain separate ongoing threads in style. — Joshs
I see conscious activity, but I’m having trouble pinning independent and autonomous to that conscious activity. Independent how, with respect to what? Conscious activity is independent from the outside empirical data? — Mww
Felix Guattari wrote: “When we drive, we activate subjectivity and a multiplicity of partial consciousness connected to the car ‘s technological mechanisms. There is no “individuated subject” that is in control of the driving. If one knows how to drive, one acts without thinking about it, without engaging reflexive consciousness…We are guided by the car’s machinic assemblage. Our actions and subjective components (memory, attention, perception, etc.) are “automatized,” they are a part of the machinic, hydraulic, electronic, etc. apparatuses, constituting non-human parts of the assemblage. Driving mobilizes different processes of conscientization, one succeeding the next, superimposing one onto the other, connecting or disconnecting according to the current events of driving.”I suspect you’re going to elucidate by taking the next step. — Mww
If one is working as the financial trader at the stock market, one’s mind is preoccupied with a multiplicity of heterogeneous realities: the reality of the “real” economy, the reality of forecasts about the economy, and the reality of expectations of these prices rising or falling. All of above are given through diagrams, curves, other ways of presenting data and various flows of information. So, being conscious while multitasking processing information, trader’s mind operates according to pre-designed and pre-constructed schemes and algorithms. Can we say that this is an independent, autonomous, and conscious activity?What is meant by technological, social assemblages? Within the context of being a working part in a multiplicity of conscious states, I mean. — Mww
I disagree. Deleuze wrote that: ““Self, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the “I think” cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought.”Deleuze begins from objects, paired down and relational, as polarities, as fundamentally arbitrary. I am alienated from myself every moment because the 'I' is nothing but arbitrary, polarized and polarizing vectors, gestures, signs. — Joshs
If so, where can one find it? For me, it looks utterly mysterious, or (using your term) arbitrary.Derrida's notion of the trace begins before language as human speech, before any notion of consciousness or humanity or animality or the biological. — Joshs
It could be useful to consider this gesture, this power to differ purely.To say otherwise is to uphold a claim of difference that needs to be deconstructed. What gives something the power to differ purely? So neither the Cartesian unity nor the Deleuzian difference, but a gesture more primordial, already divided within itself before it can simply be the same or different, — Joshs
For James the 'I' is not self-identical but self-consistent in time, due to the fact that intended meanings refer back to previous intentions as part of their own sense. — Joshs
I agree with this. I just want to question the nature of “community of participants in an activity.” Who are these participants? For some thinkers, they are machines or some automatic processes. As Felix Guattari wrote: “When we drive, we activate subjectivity and a multiplicity of partial consciousness connected to the car ‘s technological mechanisms. There is no “individuated subject” that is in control of the driving. If one knows how to drive, one acts without thinking about it, without engaging reflexive consciousness…We are guided by the car’s machinic assemblage. Our actions and subjective components (memory, attention, perception, etc.) are “automatized,” they are a part of the machinic, hydraulic, electronic, etc. apparatuses, constituting non-human parts of the assemblage. Driving mobilizes different processes of conscientization, one succeeding the next, superimposing one onto the other, connecting or disconnecting according to the current events of driving.”Shaun Gallagher talks about socially distributed cognition:
“Such institutions go beyond individual cognitive
processes or habits: they include communicative practices, and more established institutions include rituals and traditions that generate actions, preserve memories, solve problems. These are distributed processes supported by artifacts, tools, technologies,
environments, institutional structures, etc.”
Such processes don’t originate in individual minds but are shared among a community of participants in an activity. — Joshs
The traditional apprehension with respect to the conception of consciousness is that it is a singular faculty, or functionality, or rational enterprise.....or this thing that does this something.
What do you think? How would you fill in the blanks? — Mww
I think that James did not define consciousness rigorously, but he brought a lot of clarifying examples, even of someone sleeping, or in the state of delirium. As far as I understood, he posed the problem of continuity, but not of a multiplicity of consciousness.Not being all that familiar with James, does he say what he thinks consciousness to be? Without that, how can it said whether or not it is discontinuous? Given the general conception of it, it is easy to say consciousness is continuously interrupted, merely from the mind being in a state of deep sleep, and by association, recommencing upon the attaining the state of awareness. — Mww
James did not thinkBut that in itself being sufficient reason with respect to a specific conception, says nothing about consciousness as a “multiplicity”, — Mww
it remains the purview of the respondant to conceptualize consciousness in his own terms, theorize the possibility of it being capable of obtaining to a multiplicity, — Mww
I think it has to be continuous and discontinuous, both have to be aspects of consciousness. I am not really sure how to clarify the two or how to understand how both exist together. The mind permits for both, though. — Josh Alfred
I don't see how this is even a question really. Consciousness is obviously a bunch of different things, different processes working in different ways, and it's obviously not always "on." — Terrapin Station
I think that neither Lacan nor Zizec reflects what we deal withWhat’s your attitude toward paychoanalytically influenced positikns(Lacan, Zizek)? — Joshs
I am not sure about Marion,I need to check it.What about use of theological tropes by writers like Zizek, Vattimo, Jean-Luc Marion, Caputo? — Joshs
May be I will reread some texts of Adorno (is his aesthetics still working?), not of Habermas.Or Marxist influenced approaches(Habermas, Adorno)? — Joshs
I think it is not the matter of deconstruction. (By the way, the easiest way to nullify Deleuze is to start identifying and classifying him).It is a matter of taking account of our time.Some would argue that Deleuzian thinking deconstructs theological, psychoanalytic and Marxist critical theory. — Joshs
In my opinion, Guattari is not less important than Deleuze. Also, I found that Massumi, Lazarotto, Goodchild, Raunig and de Landa are interesting. Goodchild, Smith, and Sauvagnargues are indispensable for anyone who wants to understand Deleuzian thinking. Foucault, Lyotard, Luhmann are still relevant.I’m wondering what other philosophers and approaches you find particularly relevant to you. — Joshs
For me, Massumi is one of the leading thinkers of our time, but one should read his texts with great caution.Ruth Leys says Massumi argues the affects must be viewed as independent of, and in an important sense prior to, ideology—that is, prior to intentions, meanings, reasons, and beliefs—because they are non-signifying, autonomic processes that take place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning. Affects are “inhuman,” “pre-subjective,” “visceral” forces and intensities that influence our thinking and judgments but are separate from these. Whatever else may be meant by the terms affect and emotion, the affects must be noncognitive, corporeal processes or states. Affect is, as Massumi asserts, “irreducibly bodilyand autonomic”(PV,). — Joshs
In principle, Deleuze avoided using this kind of discourse. His project was to consider things in their interdependency, endless variation, and immanence.Merleau-Ponty’s chiasmatic intertwining approach to affect is a corrective to this dualism.
He and the enactivists recognize a certain self-consistency to the organism in its interaction with environment that is missing from Deleuze. How does Deleuze explain stable personality features? — Joshs
I agree with all this, and I do not see how the quote and your commentary contradict with what I wrote about “inside” and “outside.”"Simondon notes the connection between self-reflection and affect. He even extends the capacity for self-reflection to all living things– although it is hard to see why his own analysis does not constrain him to extend it to all things (is not resonation a kind of self-reflection?). "At this point, the impression may have grown that affect is being touted here as if the whole world could be packed into it. In a way, it can, and is."
Notice that the “inside” here is the self-consistent pattern of perceptual perspective that is disrupted from without. You could say that the ‘without’ as affect is already alongside as background, keeping perception from being purely self-enclosed, and therefore the inside is already outside itself. — Joshs
Question: when Deleuze talks about the effect of cinema on our understanding of time, does he mean that it makes us realize what was always already true about time that we just never realized before, or does he mean that technologies like cinema create an absolutely new experience of time?
I think he means the former. — Joshs
Thank you for your advice! Definitely, Marleau-Pontu is a great thinker.He understands it in a different way than Merleau-Ponty does. If youve never read him, he was bot5h a philosopher and psychologist. His Phenomeology of Perception offers a detailed account of memory, language , consciousness, perception and affect. There are currently a host of psychological writers who are using his ideas in their embodied, enactive approaches to cognitive phenomena. Its a burgeoning field. Check out the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. — Joshs
the new is the place where an inside is exposed to an outside to challenge, destabilise and transform that inside. Bodliy affect serves that role for Deleuze in relation to linguistic consciousness. It exposes a self-enclosed schematism to a radical otherness./quote]
As far as I know, Deleuze avoided using opposition of terms “inside,” and “outside.” So, he did not just propose that “the bodily affect exposes a self-enclosed schematism to radical otherness,” but he went much further.
For him, the “inner,” (intimate subjective qualities of self), constituting a person, is no more than effects, produced by “a community.of interaffecting agents.” Accordingly, this is how I understand this quote: ”The active synthesis of the future results in the I which is fractured according to the order of time and the Self which is divided according to the temporal series correspond and find a common descendant in the man without a name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, the already-Overman.”
The I, the self is no more than an assemblage of interacting impersonal instances (agents). For me, it has precisely the same meaning as yours “the momentary synthetic synthesis of competing streams of fragmented perceptions and conceptualizations.“ I was wondering if the future that Deleuze wrote about in 1968 has already become our reality?
Future present and past interprenetrate in the same way.
The past is repeatedly recast by a future that can never be anticipated in a
present that cannot be fixed. Anticipation re-figures recollection as much
as recollection shapes expectation. — Joshs
I could not open this link.
A few things remain unclear in this model. First, its explanatory power is not evident: can it be applied to explain the known theories of consciousness and memory? Second, the role of time looks like a metaphorical description instead of a rigorous elaboration. When one describes the present as the interface of the interaction between the past and the future (or “the place of the clash between the forces of the future and the past”), one makes a mistake of confusing and equaling the ontological status of both. As a result, there won’t be any place for the creation of the new, and there will be just repetitions and reiterations, obeying the casual patterns. Therefore, the transcendental as an external creator (or as a universal casual principal) could have imposed again.So the notion of agent is a bit of an illusion, there is no ghost in the machine, it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents. Consciousness performs a momentary synthetic function, making it appear that this community is a single 'I' . But the unfolding of time for this constructed 'I' is always a bit disjointed, a past that is always reconstructed by the present that it is supposed to frame, and a futuring that pulls the present into an anticipative orientation ahead of itself. There is no room for the transcendental in this model. — Joshs
I agree with all this, I just want to add to your definition of self and consciousness, that our bodies and unconscious processes are far more complicated, than it can be understood from biology or from classical psychoanalysis. We take part, often without knowing about it, in numerous technical and social assemblages, so when you write: “Consciousness, far from being the self-knowing commander, is besieged from unconscious processes and bodily affects that interact with and shape consciousness outside of its awareness”, it is absolutely necessary to describe the nature of terms used.The mind functions as an inseparable interaction with environment and body. It is nothing but this interaction. There is no self-identical self in this model. Self is a bi-product of the constant constructive interactive activity of the organism-envirnmental interaction. Consciousness is not self-conscious in the sense of being able to turn back on itself and grasp itself identically. To reflect back on the self is to alter what one turns back to. The impression we get of consciousness as the commander of decision, as unfolding meaning as a linear causal sequence of nows (one damn thing after another), is the result of the way linguistic grammar is constructed , But rather than a single linear causal intentional vector, consciousness can more accurately de described as a site of competing streams of fragmented perceptions and conceptualizations jostling for attention. Consciousness, far from being the self-knowing commander, is besieged from unconscious processes and bodily affects that interact with and shape consciousness outside of its awareness. So the notion of agent is a bit of an illusion, there is no ghost in the machine, it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents. Consciousness performs a momentary synthetic function, making it appear that this community is a single 'I' — Joshs
I am not sure if the whole notion of the authentic temporality presupposes a kind of transcendentalism. Could you clarify it?The past is always a new past, a past prefigured by the present and the future. "Primordial and authentic temporality temporalizes
itself out of the authentic future, and indeed in such a way that, futurally having-been, it first arouses the present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future. — Joshs
This is a perfectly logical analysis; nevertheless, I entirely disagree! Logical analysis of time lays out the past, the present, and the future at the same plain, created by fewThis comes about from a logical analysis of the nature of time. Time is passing. And with the passing of time, there is past time which is coming into existence. This is a "becoming". A becoming requires a cause. The cause of past time cannot be the present, because if the present were actively creating past time there would be no future, just the present creating the past. So it must be the future which is the cause of past time. Imagine the present like a static membrane, a plane or something, The future is being forced through, or forcing itself through, the present to create the past. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, nevertheless it is fundamental that the subjective time occurs in mind.this is a defining aspect of consciousness, not a defining aspect of time. The dual present you described might be fundamental to consciousness, but if you deduce that it is therefore fundamental to time — Metaphysician Undercover
.you have an invalid deduction because you have no premise to state the relation between consciousness and time — Metaphysician Undercover
The relations between “objective, idealized time,” and “the subjective time of mind”The present may be fundamental to time. And the dual present is fundamental to consciousness. That's why I say the impression that the dual present is an aspect of time is an illusion, it's consciousness wrongly imposing itself on time. — Metaphysician Undercover
If so, instead of philosophy, we need to go to wizards, magicians, or augurs.:smile: :smile:how we make distinctions is a secret of the soul itself. No one knows exactly how we differentiate. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree with you.According to this comprehension of the active synthesis of memory,
each conscious act of mind has the dimensions of reproduction and
reflection. The problem now is that the activity of mind has been
pre-designed and pre-constructed, so that the Past has become
the dominating instance, so that “present” and “future” has converted into the dimensions of this time, and the active synthesis of the mind
has become the transcendental a priory of the Past.
Yes, I see this as a problem, because what has been described is reducible to an everlasting, eternal cycle of repetition of moments. It's really a circle. — Metaphysician Undercover
I understand your “continuity and inertia” fas the fundamental power of the transcendental Past over our way of being and thought. The problem is that when we need “to recognize something, how can we differentiate, make any distinctions within ourselves?We can begin with the assumption, for argument sake, that every new moment coming from the future is completely different, and there is nothing to make anything the same from one moment to the next. Each moment the future could be throwing us something completely new. Then, recognize that there actually is continuity, inertia, and seek the reason for this. The reason for it is that some things in the past, (massive things) have the power to act in the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
So when the future is forcing a new moment upon us, the massive existence which we've observed in the past appearing as a continuity distinct from the repetition of different moments, is acting within the imposition of that future moment, such that it acts upon us from the future, as a force from within the moment of the future which is now upon us — Metaphysician Undercover
You state this truth as an evident and common knowledge!If you look closely at the nature of time, you will see that it is the future which causes the present to pass. A new moment is always pushing in, from the future, to take the place of the existing moment, at the present, and this forces that present moment into the past — Metaphysician Undercover
The present and former presents are not,
therefore, as two successive instants on the line of time; rather, the present one necessarily contains an extra dimension in which it represents the former and also represents itself. The present present is treated not as the future object of memory but as that which reflects itself at the same time as it forms the memory of the former present.
I believe that there is a problem in this passage, which is a conflation of the being which is experiencing the passing of time, with the passing of time itself. It is only the conscious being which brings back the past moments of present to have them continue existing at the present. This is what creates the illusion of a double present. — Metaphysician Undercover
in order for an ideality to continue to exist as itself it has to repeat itself. What happens when you try to repeat a thought in consciousness? — Joshs
Is “my intention” the source of repetition?? What is the relation between time and my thought?As soon as a concept is animated with the intention to say something, it exposes itself to context. — Joshs
There are ideal instance all the time. But in order for an ideality to continue to exist as itself it has to repeat itself. What happens when you try to repeat a thought in consciousness? The very sense of its subtly changes, because time means exposure to context, and context is always changing context. This is the fundamental underpinning of time. — Joshs
The thunder itself we believe to abolish and exclude the silence;
but the feeling of the thunder is also a feeling of the silence as just gone, and it would be difficult to find
in the actual concrete consciousness of man a feeling so limited to the present as not to have an
inkling of anything that went before. — Joshs
Even my intention to say something is no more than a simple repetition of the similar past intention.As soon as a concept is animated with the intention to say something, it exposes itself to context. — Joshs