What is the truth of belonging to identity itself? What kind of identity do you use here?sex, gender or sexual orientation is it's own fact about a person itself. A truth not given by properties (e.g. "I'm a man because I have a penis"), but rather one given in itself (e.g. "I am a man") which occurs alongside their properties (whatever those might be, be they a penis or a vagina, burly or scrawny, short hair or long, etc.) — TheWillowOfDarkness
Doubtless, Butler and Arendt accounts of responsibility are correct. Nevertheless,Responsibility enters precisely at the point at which our actions exceed us. — StreetlightX
A person can think about anything in a meaningful way. And they can also refrain from thinking about anything in a meaningful way. — Terrapin Station
Meaning is something mental that we do. Namely, it's the mental process of associative thinking, of thinking about something so that it implies, refers to, connotes, denotes, suggests or "pushes" or "leans towards", etc. other things. — Terrapin Station
It may look like Foucault’s genealogy is the development of Nietzsche’s one. Yet, he could not avoid the influence of Austin’sI tried to give myself some wiggle room here by speaking of such variables as modular, but it's true that one could go alot further here. One thing that comes to mind here is that tracking the variations of such changes (of 'dimensions') through time might correspond to the practice of conceptual genealogy, in the sense practised by Nietzsche and Foucault. — StreetlightX
It could be interesting to compare Cavell's project with Pitkin’s one in more details.Yeah, the point I was making (via Pitkin) is different from Cavell's, but different by way of what I understand as an elaboration and extention of what he says. Cavell's general point is that yes, language and world are always elaborated together, and that we bring the world to our words (or vice versa). What I take Pitkin to add is that words and world are themselves plurivocal, and that exactly which bits of the world, and how it is that our words come to bear on it are essential to pay attention to. This is what I take from her idea of 'axes' or dimentions of meaning, which can be comprised of other words, bits of the world, standards of justification, or whatnot. This allows one to bring out, in a way not possible with Cavell's general point, the idea of differing kinds of words (although of course Cavell goes into this sort of thing elsewhere and at length). — StreetlightX
One potentially interesting philosophical puzzle is the distinction and connection between what a thing is called, and what a thing is. This roughly accords to the distinction between language (what a thing is called) and world (what a thing 'is'), but things are slightly more complicated, as we will see. Stanley Cavell raises the question thus: when we encounter something new we've never seen before (a distinctive Inuit boat, say), what do we want to know? What it is, or what it is called? If one says: "oh, that's an umiak", what kind of answer is this? An answer about how we use our words, or an answer about things in the world? — StreetlightX
He uses the word "collusion" again, which is not a crime anyone was actually looking to charge him with — NKBJ
Passive voice in the first sentence hides the details of who's asking Mueller to testify.
He points out that Mueller "must" stick to the report. The way he says it, implies that it Mueller does so, then Trump will look good. But anyone familiar with the report knows that it implies that Trump has been linked to a large number of crimes. But Trump bets on his followers not looking, and so he presents it in this positive light for himself.
He uses the metaphor of a witch hunt to imply that the accusers are baseless and fanatical. — NKBJ
Personification of the "Great Hoax" as some (presumably) evil creature which is now dead.
He uses (ungrammatical) capitalization to emphasize words.
He uses incomplete sentences for emphasis and simplicity.
He's ungrammatical on purpose, because it makes him look less intellectually elitist and his followers like a leader who's not too much smarter than they are. They want to think that they could be him, that he's one of them.
And finally, he uses ampersands, in part because they help with the character count for tweets, but also because they look official and business. — NKBJ
Moreover, Trump's rhetoric and his oratorical style are not prominent at all, they are quite modest and monotonic.
And yet effective. Hence the usage of rhetoric to examine them.
Narratives that are going viral in social media usually have simple and poor structure, so that literary
criticism would not be an appropriate research tool here.
And yet effective. Hence the usage of literary criticism to examine them. — NKBJ
I do not argue that literary criticism is not a relevant tool for analyzing Fake News. However, I would appreciate it if you could provide an example of its application. :smile:From ancient mythology to Hemingway to subway graffiti, literary criticism has not let the simplicity of a text deter it from fulfilling its job. — NKBJ
Rhetoric! That would relate the phenomenon of Fake news to the art of affecting the audience. Further, it could imply the oversimplification, explaining its emergence by outstanding qualities of a few leaders (Trump, Farage, Johnson…). Of course, one could examine their rhetorical devices; yet, one would find a lot of better contemporary or past speakers or politicians. Moreover, Trump's rhetoric and his oratorical style are not prominent at all, they are quite modest and monotonic.Literary criticism covers the analysis of rhetoric. That's most of what fake news is. Ergo, literary analysis would be helpful to the analysis of fake news. — NKBJ
Narratives that are going viral in social media usually have simple and poor structure, so that literaryI'd go so far as to say any close analysis of the wording of fake news is literary criticism, whether intentional or not. — NKBJ
In Pakistan, the vast majority of people are completely convinced that the entire story of Bin Laden’s killing was fabricated by the Obama administration. In Russia, almost the whole population believes that 9/11 was wholly prepared and organized by the CIA to create the pretext for invasion into Afghanistan. Numerous Russian political analysts and various experts support this narrative. Yet, most likely, these false narratives have become dominant without governments’ involvement. Apparently, these examples do not comply with your understanding of Fake news.Fake news is when the establishment sells big lies to the public. It's NOT when little alt-websites question the establishment. Fake news is the Big Lie that the government sells to the people. That's the point, which in retrospect I should have just said right up front several posts ago. Fake news is how the powers that be keep everyone frightened and compliant. That's what fake news is. — fishfry
Both Huxley and Orwell grounded their narrations on simple ideas of utopia and dystopia, and both are in perfect fit with regimes of the truth of grand narratives of modernity. Within our postmodern conditions, grand narratives have been wholly compromised and transformed.
That does not answer my question. In fact, it kind of suggests literary criticism would be pretty helpful, if you know anything at all about literary criticism. — NKBJ
So, how are you going to convince your friends to change their minds? What is theI've been depressed to notice that many friends and people I respect, are now convinced that 'climate change is not established by the science', and that 'there's nothing Australia can do to combat climate change' - the kinds of fake news memes that merchants of doubt have been disseminating since Al Gore came out with Inconvenient Truth. — Wayfarer
the role of Fox News in manipulating both the electorate, and Donald J. Trump, is one of the (many) current scandals of the administration and prime examples of "pushing an agenda". Fox News routinely peddles misinformation, parrots Trump's untruths, and feeds inflammatory content to the Watcher in Chief, with whom it enjoys a symbiotic relationship. There have been numerous articles in the so-called 'liberal media' about this fact. So they're really trying, and succeeding, to shape the agenda; as do many of the Chinese state media, and sections of the Russian media, and many other players, large and small, in this hyper-connected age. — Wayfarer
There is a distinction between "fake news" and false information. The intent of fake news is to deceive. Without that intent it is simple false information. Although it may not be the intent of someone who repeats fake news to deceive, the information was still manufactured with the intent to deceive. When Trump accuses news sources of being fake news he deliberately blurs the distinction. There is always the implication that the story is manufactured with the intent to deceive, to lie, but this implication hides behind the more benign accusation that the information is simply false. — Fooloso4
We should not understand his words literally.Magritte said that a painting of a weeping face does not express grief. To believe so, he thought, would be as naive as believing that a cake expresses what the baker was thinking when she created it. — frank
Unfortunately, this is the state of affairs; it does not depend on yours or my personalDifferently, Zizek assumes that “Fake news” has been the indispensable result of our
post-modern conditions; implicitly, he involves the emergence of new regimes of truth (“post-facts” and “post-truth”
And this is why I don't believe in Post-Modernism. It's criticized from both left and right. It simply is bullshit. — ssu
Besides, false propaganda has existed for a long time, no matter what Trump says. Social media has just given it some credibility, because people want to hear what they want to hear. — ssu
unlike genuine fake news (!), the NYT at least publishes corrections, listens to criticism, and tries to correct the record. — Wayfarer
Al Gore made a remarkable presentation; unfortunately, I lost its tracks. Yet, its merits,fake news memes that merchants of doubt have been disseminating since Al Gore came out with Inconvenient Truth. — Wayfarer
As it turned out in the fullness of time, those articles were lies. To be absolutely clear, they were not well-intended mistakes. They were deliberate fabrications for the purpose of lying the country into war. — fishfry
To answer your question, we need a well formulated and operative definition of fake news. The following definitions are insufficient:Now, would you or would you not define that as Fake News? — fishfry
What was October 30, 1938 Orson Welles’s radio broadcast about? “The War of the Worlds”It doesn't take a news junkie to recognise that "MOON WILL CRASH INTO EARTH NEXT WEEK" is fake news. — Bitter Crank
Both Huxley and Orwell grounded their narrations on simple ideas of utopia and dystopia, and both are in perfect fit with regimes of the truth of grand narratives of modernity. Within our postmodern conditions, grand narratives have been wholly compromised and transformed.I do not think literature or literary criticism could be relevant to understand fake news.
Because....? — NKBJ
The alienation of people from their government representatives mirrors the alienation of the political class from international vectors of power. One way to address this issue is to replace non-compliance with structurally conditioned indifference; the 'non-linear' part of Russian propagandist Surkov's non-linear warfare:
In his enforcement of Putin’s will — or his own interpretation of it — Surkov carefully constructed and presided over a system in which Russians could play-act an intricate imitation of democracy. Every persuasion on the political spectrum was given a Kremlin-backed voice within the system as Surkov ensured that the Kremlin organized and funded a wide range of political groups and movements, from liberal to Communist to conservative, sowing confusion and cynicism in the public while at the same time co-opting any genuine opposition. The messengers differed, but the message was the same — the Kremlin was always in control. Under Surkov’s simulation of politics, dissent wasn’t crushed: it was managed.
The key part of this management strategy is the creation of supported avenues for dissent which stymie the formation of effective popular movements. These are gatekeepers for political action, moving the goalposts or hiding them.
It has the perhaps intentional side effect of alienating honest citizens from politics by denying the efficacy or applicability of their votes and petitions.
The media management of outrage interacts with our modern day equation of politics=political discourse to play a role here, the contours of acceptable opinion are rarely perturbed, and the well known alliance between powerful corporations and media outlets (cough Murdoch and Koch cough) project the voice of the ruling class from the institutions which help shape the terms of debate in which popular opinion is formed. Politics on social media is typically sound and fury organising nothing except the convenience of our ruling class.
An emerging role for 'influencers' is taking place, acting as pseudo-servants of the ruling classes by embodying acceptable opinions which are near the contours of acceptable opinion. The communities which support influencers also necessarily become associated with a consumer identity through the algorithms which shape the medium they are in: these algorithms also watch their every move, and our governments have almost unrestricted access. Here we can see the role of ideological echo-chambers, discretising identity into a panopticon of conflicting units that in reality have far more shared political interest than their antipodal role in discourse suggests.
This promotes a second level of apathy and indifference, there are people who can 'see through' this shit, which includes many liberal commentators, but this is still within the narrows of acceptable opinion; it is fashionable to bemoan the degradation of discourse, and this too is organised over influencer communities. — fdrake
But what kind of significance does saying 'it is false that houses turn into flowers' have? How, even in principle, does one go about rendering any sense of significance to this? Think again of the child who affirms the truth of this statement ("mumma! houses turn into flowers!): one's immediate (adult?) response is something like: 'this child doesn't know what truth is'; or, 'this child doesn't quite understand how houses, or flowers, or change works', or "how adorable". This child doesn't understand concepts and how they relate to other concepts - at least, not like we do. Her language is in error (according to our standards). That's the immediate adult response, not: 'No darling, houses do not turn into flowers' (at least, it's not the response parent who isn't tired and just wants to get through lunchtime with bub; or, the adult could say this, but she's being somewhat pedagogically irresponsible). — StreetlightX
distinctions with significance require asymmetry of response: if anything is possible, then anything follows, and one cannot say anything significant about anything at all.
Constraints need to be placed on our grammar such that one responds this way to a truth and this way to a falsehood: this asymmetry is the condition for language to function at all. But no such asymmetry exists in the case of 'it is false that houses turn into flowers'. — StreetlightX
Where does the association between the request and the equivalence relation take place? Does it occur in the use of language? Is it an event? — fdrake
↪Number2018 What do you make of that quote? — schopenhauer1
The gent scholar types want to think that understanding principles of science, and applications in technology provide some inherent meaning. Thus, by edifying themselves in the immersions in these topics, they feel they are participating in something grander or important. The fact that the world works in such a way as applying mathematically-derived, precise scientific principles to materials, processes, functionalities, etc. makes it such that their work is really "doing something", perhaps above and more so than those who are not engaged in these activities. — schopenhauer1
I guess the big question is, WHY is it meaningful to create technologies? — schopenhauer1
The gent scholar types want to think that understanding principles of science, and applications in technology provide some inherent meaning. Thus, by edifying themselves in the immersions in these topics, they feel they are participating in something grander or important. — schopenhauer1
I think that these fragments show how brilliant Massumi’s account of an event is. I’d like to pay your attention to the contemporary political developments in the US since November 2016, when Trump was elected. We can witness the rise and the fallWe see the same reductive tendency in Massumi to begin from self-centered algorithmic iterations which only later interaffect, resonate or disrupt each other. Whta’s lacking is a more radical thinking of interactivity. Non-linearity isn’t enough because it still operates as a deterministic metaphor. — Joshs
Note here that beginning from system as logical procedure creates a sharp oppositionality between structure and change, rule and paradox, the cognitive and the affective. — Joshs
Thank you for doing the work and making this case of "a cool blood killer.” It was interesting reading. DG’s concept of “an assemblage” is one of the most difficult ones; but it is a key notion to understand better “the varieties of fascism, that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives.” (Foucault). The political and ethical implications of different assemblages are significant – what is at stake is the question of the essence of the subject of action – is that a conscious, responsible individual or a collective impersonal agent of some kind?Protevi has spent that past few decades trying to convince us that his reading of DG gives him a method of analyzing notorious affective-socio-political situations such as Columbine that can supplement 4ea accounts. I think the details of his method give us a good opportunity to judge the usefulness of his ordering strategy, particularly with regard to affect and motivation.
I have selected what I think are pertiment passages from Protevi's 'AFFECT, AGENCY AND
RESPONSIBILITY:THE ACT OF KILLING IN THE AGE OF CYBORGS' to demonstrate how
difference operates via assemblages for him: — Joshs
After looking through Protevi’s books, I started thinking that you are right in your critique. He tries toI think Protevi’s approach belongs to the larger framework of enactivism, based on his numerous analyses of Gallagher, Thompson, Merleau-Ponty and Varela. But I also suspect it represents a less sophisticated, more reductive version than that of Thompson or Gallagher, in spite of its claims to situate subjectivity within a wider realm of the bio-political.
Whereas Protevi thinks his view is wider in scope, it may simply be more fragmented, lacking the extent of integrative impetus in Thompson-Varela’s thinking. Proteiv’s reliance on dynamical systems metaphors seems to too often begin from algorithmicly-themed and internally centered machinic processes(near-reflexive affect modules, cognitive programs). Then creativity and transformation consists of the clashing, interruption and intgerating among such independent flows, machines, algorithms.. — Joshs
• I’ve taken most vocabulary from Guattari’s book “Schiizoanalytic cartographies”; mimetic emulation is from Girard; I used Guattari’s model on pg. 27:First, a couple of questions. Who are the primary references for the vocabulary you are using here? Deleuze-Guartari? Does ‘mimetic emulation’ come from them or Rene Girard? Where does the term ‘conscientious universes’ come from? — Joshs
I could begin with a warning. While it sounds impressive to throw in every conceivable source of input, information, flow, both signifying and a-signifying, as possible impingments upon and definers of subjectivity, we don’t end up with anything interesting or useful except as such impingements can be seen in the light of ordering structurations and patterns. Without minimal coherence and consistency there is only pure randomness. If we are to choose a DG account of affectivity and subjectivity over other philosophies and psychologies, it must be because it is more useful to us, more clarifying and , in some overall sense, more effectively ordered, not because it offers a laundry list of infinite sources of random impingement. That large list you gave me (room, psychology, signifying and a-signifying flows, etc, etc,) is less significant in and of itself than in how it is specifically understood in its orders of relationship. We know that all these impingements jostle, form and reform subjectivity, but how do we make sure that we don’t end up reifying them such that the subject is nothing but an endless sequence of random operant conditionings? I have no problem in embracing DG in this regard as preferable to Freudian, stimulus-response and first generation cognitive models of the subject, because while at a micro level DG abandons the ordered structures and processes that define these approaches, at a metalevel it is posits a less arbitrary and less polarized model of experiential change. All that stuff coming at subjectivty from above, below and within that dissolves, ovewhelms and displaces psychodynamic id, ego and superego has a more radically intricate kind of order or logic to it that persuades us that we understand persons better through it that via Freudianism. — Joshs
We can discuss my model of consciousness. — Joshs
I would like to set up a dichotomy and see what you think of it. On the one side would be discourses which follow upon Hegel-Marx. These would include Adorno, Habermas, Badiou, Jameson, Althusser and Zizek. On the other would be post-structuralists such as Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard and Nancy. — Joshs
While there is a shared interest uniting the Marxist and poststructurlist thinkers regarding the need to subvert representational norms, ideologies, network of significations, what would unite the Marxist group is the use of a dialectics(negative for Marx and Adorno, affirmative for Badiou) that thinks history in terms of an emancipatory telos. That is to say , while they reject an enlightenment notion of progress, they maintain a certain messianism in their faith in radical progressive political becoming. This marks the modernist element in their thinking. — Joshs
The post-structuralists, in contrast, make the postmodern philosophical move of putting into question the justification of any notion of emancipation. They read Nietzsche as determining a trajectory of emancipation as originating in a Will to emancipation, which must be subordinate to Will to Power, which has no emancipatory or any other telos. The only trajectory of Will to Power is difference. For them , political history is not diaelctically emancipatory but incimmensurably geneological. — Joshs
I think its important to recognize a distinction between what a writer like Deleuze is trying to do
and what radical post-marxist emanciaptory thinkers like Zizek and Badiou are aiming at. — Joshs
Yes, I want to talk about Adorno’s Aesthetics. This work is fundamental and encyclopedic.So, ltLet's talk about Adorno. . Have you found his writing to be particularly useful to you? — Joshs
Concerning time as duration, may be you could talk a little about how you understand Deleuze's concept of duration. Do you see it as similar to Bergson's? — Joshs
First, I do not endorse. Second, it was not just about Adorno’s reading of Heidegger. As far as I see it, this book reflected his existential position,his fight, and "Jurgon of Authenticity" is the least dialectical, and the most concrete Adorno's book. Later, Bordieu further developedIf you really endorse Adorno's reading of Heidegger you've got a got of a conflict on your hands. — Joshs
Let's look at the alignments.Deleuze never wrote about Heidegger, but we know Derrida is very close to Heidegger. We also know that Derrida wrote he didnt find anything objectionalble in deleuze's ideas. We also know that a community of post-structuralists including Foucault, Deleuze, Jean-Luc Nancy, Lyotard and Derrida were united in their reading of Nietzsche against
existentialist interpretations of him. We also know that Nancy talked of his close proximity in thinking to both Derrida and Deleuze, and his debt to Heideger as another post-Nietzschean thinker. My assumption is that neither Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard or Nancy would agree with Adorno's Kierkegaardian reading of Heidegger. — Joshs
the post-structuralists were united in rejecting Adorno's Hegelian emancipatory thinking, and none of them would likely refer to Derrida's approach as negative theology. — Joshs
I disagree. Our present time is composed of primarily cinematographic, telecommunicational duration.
What is "cinematographic, telecommunicational duration"? — Terrapin Station
I disagree. Our present time is composed of primarily cinematographic, telecommunicational duration.367
↪Number2018 "How could one present “present”? When we write or say something about our current present, we must think of the time of the occurrence of our sentences, which is our present time. This present time cannot be grasped as such: it is not yet or no longer present. It is always too soon or too late to grasp the presentation itself and present it. Such is the specific and paradoxical constitution of the event."
Heidegger does a good job of explaining this. Each of the steps you mention, bringing something into view as something new, having it present, presenting it, grasping it, identifying it, using and referring to it, these are all further articulations which do refer back to that which they articulate , but in articulating further they subtly change what they articulate , by bringing out something new about it. This isn't a problem for us because such steps are experienced as dealing with, examining, having, pointing to, positing something present. Each transforms what it deals with in its own way, as bringing it into view in THIS or THAT manner. — Joshs
In other words, they reduce the ontological difference to a difference between two ontic determinations. Being conceived as the performative difference between schematism and existence is a difference between two ontic determinations and therefore is itself on the ontic plane of propositionality. It is a present to hand thinking masquerading as post-metaphysical.
When one begins from the subjectivism of representationality, the way of out of Kantian a priorism must stand as the absolute other to representation, that is to say, it must arrive in the guise of the performance of the differentiation between Subjective structuring and Objective determination. Only in this way can the empirically conditioned and contingent beginning of thought avoid being mistaken for a Kantian unconditioned ground of possibility. Heidegger and Derrida give us a way to avoid grounding fundamental ontology in the performative difference between schematism and existence as its condition of possibility. — Joshs
“Man is something that shall be overcome. Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman — a rope over an abyss. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end.” — Avro
Let's call then No name No Aim .... Sin nombre sin objectivo. — Avro
The French -- or at least some French -- seem to have a history of collective action which American workers don't seem to manifest. One thinks of the much more frequent strikes in France, of student demonstrations, ands so on. I don't think the French state differs all that much from other states -- they are in business to arrange the affairs of the bourgeoisie, as Marx said -- and if they have been generous with working class benefits, well, that is probably in the past. — Bitter Crank
One can hope that Americans will take a hint and follow the suit with the gilets jaunes, but I wouldn't count on it. The memory of active resistance to the power of corporation and state has, I think, become too distant for most Americans. — Bitter Crank