• Pronouns and Gender

    sex, gender or sexual orientation is it's own fact about a person itself. A truth not given by properties (e.g. "I'm a man because I have a penis"), but rather one given in itself (e.g. "I am a man") which occurs alongside their properties (whatever those might be, be they a penis or a vagina, burly or scrawny, short hair or long, etc.)TheWillowOfDarkness
    What is the truth of belonging to identity itself? What kind of identity do you use here?
    Do we need the principle of identity to define gender or sexual orientation? Butler claims that categories themselves, as products of regimes of power, produce the identity they are deemed to be simply representing.
    "A genealogical critique refuses to search for the origins of
    gender, the inner truth of female desire, a genuine or authentic
    sexual identity that repression has kept from view; rather
    genealogy investigates the political stakes in designating as
    an origin and cause those identity categories that are in fact
    the effects of institutions, practices, discourses with multiple
    and diffuse points of origin."
  • We are responsible ONLY for what we do NOT control
    Responsibility enters precisely at the point at which our actions exceed us.StreetlightX
    Doubtless, Butler and Arendt accounts of responsibility are correct. Nevertheless,
    they are incomplete: Sartre laid out a different outlook on what is under our control. Each of our actions has two levels: the first one maintains our intimate tie with action, and what makes it our possibility is an ability to interrupt the action, stop ourselves. “This possibility of interrupting the action is rejected on a second level by the fact that the action which discovers itself to me through my act tends to crystallize as a transcendent, relatively independent form. The consciousness of man in action is non-reflective consciousness. It is consciousness of something, and the transcendent which discloses itself to this consciousness is of a particular nature: it is a structure of exigency in the world, and the world correlatively discloses in it complex relations of instrumentality”. While acting, we inevitably contain ourselves within the unforeseen chain of consequences, relations, or commitments, which are definitely out of our control. Yet, we are still responsible for our behavioral patterns. It does not mean that we have to make an explicit decision at every moment about how to behave. Instead, the ability to interrupt our actions manifests our control over the motives that we find ourselves within. The character, existing through our given or chosen projects, forms the motives.
  • Let's Talk About Meaning
    A person can think about anything in a meaningful way. And they can also refrain from thinking about anything in a meaningful way.Terrapin Station
    Meaning is something mental that we do. Namely, it's the mental process of associative thinking, of thinking about something so that it implies, refers to, connotes, denotes, suggests or "pushes" or "leans towards", etc. other things.Terrapin Station

    When we have a dream – does it satisfy your definition of meaningful mental activity? Is it a process of associative thinking? And what about fits of delirium? Also, it is not clear if your understanding of “the mental process of associative thinking” includes just verbal thinking.
  • Haddocks' Eyes
    I tried to give myself some wiggle room here by speaking of such variables as modular, but it's true that one could go alot further here. One thing that comes to mind here is that tracking the variations of such changes (of 'dimensions') through time might correspond to the practice of conceptual genealogy, in the sense practised by Nietzsche and Foucault.StreetlightX
    It may look like Foucault’s genealogy is the development of Nietzsche’s one. Yet, he could not avoid the influence of Austin’s
    discovery of performativity. Further, the problematization of the Foucault’s encounter of “words” and “things” become a central theme of Deleuze’s reading of Foucault, as well as of his philosophy of language. Accordingly, both two Pitkin’s dimensions are taken as the two form-substance complexes. Pitkin’s “Delicious,” as well as “green,” can be considered as related to the state of mind and the state of things expressions. As per the state of mind, “delicious” would designate a variable of particular uses, having more social-collective, than an individual, cognitive character. As per the state of things, “green” would express the complex of bodily effects and perceptions, also having the collectively shared functions. And, according to Deleuze, the third dimension of “just-ification” is necessitated with the enunciation of any sentence; it is a diagram that acts as an immanent cause, coextensive with the whole social field.
    When we say: “It is delicious,” or “Green,” we effectuate the three dimensions simultaneously. The expression has an ultimate performative character. If we say what we should, or ought to, or must (Cavell’s just-ification), our minds and bodies are becoming related and activated by the regimes of social, collective, and individuating presuppositions. We continuously “do things with words,” practicing the illocutionary force of language.
    “The transformation applies to bodies but is itself incorporeal, internal to enunciation. In expressing the noncorporeal attribute, and by that token attributing it to the body, one is not representing or referring but intervening in a way; it is a speech act. The warp of the instantaneous transformations is always inserted into the woof of the continuous modifications.”
  • Haddocks' Eyes

    Yeah, the point I was making (via Pitkin) is different from Cavell's, but different by way of what I understand as an elaboration and extention of what he says. Cavell's general point is that yes, language and world are always elaborated together, and that we bring the world to our words (or vice versa). What I take Pitkin to add is that words and world are themselves plurivocal, and that exactly which bits of the world, and how it is that our words come to bear on it are essential to pay attention to. This is what I take from her idea of 'axes' or dimentions of meaning, which can be comprised of other words, bits of the world, standards of justification, or whatnot. This allows one to bring out, in a way not possible with Cavell's general point, the idea of differing kinds of words (although of course Cavell goes into this sort of thing elsewhere and at length).StreetlightX
    It could be interesting to compare Cavell's project with Pitkin’s one in more details.
    (Though, it is possible that my understanding of your account of Pitkin's approach is quite distorted). It looks like Pitkin wants to stress out
    that different words can be classified according to their proximity and direction towards the poles of "meaning" and "thing." (Both terms are ambiguous; therefore, Cavell and Pitkin probably apply them differently). Pitkin's
    "meaning" could be apprehended as an intellectual, cognitive operation
    of thinking or an act of perception; whereas "thing" would designate an independently existing object ("the fact of the world"). Your example of the word "green" could affirm the correctness of this account: "the meaning of green is tied directly to what is green." In short, some words directly point to activity of mind, and there are words, firmly tied with "things." The relation between the two categories is maintained by the third dimension of just-ification, relating "the meanings of the words with the facts of the world." One could easily find all the three dimensions at the center of Cavell's project: "We need to remind ourselves of what we should say when. When the philosopher asks, "What should we say here?" "What would be the normal thing to say here?" or perhaps, "What is the most natural thing we could say here?" …the point of the question is this: answering it is sometimes the only way to tell others and tell for ourselves what the situation is." For Cavell, the meaning is our state of mind,
    when we face a particular context (and not a single "thing"). And, "should" functions as the Pitkin's third dimension of justification, it is an ethical-political imperative of what must be said. The essential linguistic element of analysis is not a single word, but a sentence, articulating the encounter between the "dictionary" and the "world." Pitkin could effectively articulate the existence of the three dimensions. Yet, the task of classifying and categorizing single words could be exhausting, unproductive, and static. At the same time, Cavell's philosophy combines the most general notions with the rigorous analyses of ordinary language
  • Haddocks' Eyes
    One potentially interesting philosophical puzzle is the distinction and connection between what a thing is called, and what a thing is. This roughly accords to the distinction between language (what a thing is called) and world (what a thing 'is'), but things are slightly more complicated, as we will see. Stanley Cavell raises the question thus: when we encounter something new we've never seen before (a distinctive Inuit boat, say), what do we want to know? What it is, or what it is called? If one says: "oh, that's an umiak", what kind of answer is this? An answer about how we use our words, or an answer about things in the world?StreetlightX

    I think that Cavell’s intention is different. “What seemed like finding the world in a dictionary was really a case of bringing the world to the dictionary. We had the world with us all the time, in that armchair; but we felt the weight of it only when we felt a lack in it. Sometimes we will
    need to bring the dictionary to the world. That will happen when
    (say) we run across a small boat in Alaska of a sort we have never
    seen and wonder-what? What it is, or what it is called? In either
    case, the learning is a question of aligning language and the world.”
    Our permanent position is to have the world in a dictionary while sitting
    in the armchair. So, we need to bring “our dictionary” to the world. Further, the relation between an unknown (single) thing and a meaning of a corresponding hidden word (while traveling) has just preliminary importance. All in all, Cavell’s question is about problematization of what we need to say in a particular ordinary context.
  • Fake news

    He uses the word "collusion" again, which is not a crime anyone was actually looking to charge him withNKBJ

    Hasn’t Mueller been appointed to investigate the alleged collusion of Trump’s campaign with Russia? And, hasn’t it been the alleged crime?

    Passive voice in the first sentence hides the details of who's asking Mueller to testify.
    He points out that Mueller "must" stick to the report. The way he says it, implies that it Mueller does so, then Trump will look good. But anyone familiar with the report knows that it implies that Trump has been linked to a large number of crimes. But Trump bets on his followers not looking, and so he presents it in this positive light for himself.
    He uses the metaphor of a witch hunt to imply that the accusers are baseless and fanatical.

    Personification of the "Great Hoax" as some (presumably) evil creature which is now dead.
    He uses (ungrammatical) capitalization to emphasize words.
    He uses incomplete sentences for emphasis and simplicity.
    He's ungrammatical on purpose, because it makes him look less intellectually elitist and his followers like a leader who's not too much smarter than they are. They want to think that they could be him, that he's one of them.
    And finally, he uses ampersands, in part because they help with the character count for tweets, but also because they look official and business.

    Thank you for the comprehensive analyses! (I think that Trump himself would be
    surprised to learn how sophisticated his communicative devices are :smile: ). I would like to tackle a few key points of your account. The most important one is about the regime of truth, effectuated in this tweet, in Fake news, and, probably, in contemporary politics. When you say that Trump lies, (and, we can substitute a lot of other politicians
    for him), your basic premise is that objective truth exists, and there is a solid frame of reference and verification methods. You wrote: “But anyone familiar with the report knows that it implies that Trump has been linked to a large number of crimes.” What do you mean by the expression “familiar with the report”? Do you actually expect Trump audience to read a redacted version of 448 pages report? Of course, they are familiar with the report, but through a partisan interpretation and hermeneutics, taking place in a space absolutely different from an academic field. The vast majority of people who are talking, writing, and judging about the report did not read it. Yet, we are not in the world of the endless exegesis, where the sacred text (The Bible, or Marx’s “Capital”) has been continuously reinterpreted. Trump’s audience got familiar with the report even before it was published! Social media, as well as Mainstream media,
    have transformed Mueller’s investigation into an object of a new kind, where “the real and the imaginary, the actual and the virtual, chase after each other, exchange their roles and become indiscernible.” Deleuze differentiates between two regimes of truth: there are an “organic” regime and a “crystalline” regime. In an “organic” regime, descriptions and narrations presuppose a pre-existing external reality.
    In contrast, a crystalline description or narration stands for its object, replaces it, both creates and erases it. Deleuze’s ideas are indispensable for understanding and explaining Fake news! While an organic regime requires the clear difference between truth and false, a crystalline regime has been grounded on endless metamorphosis, the power of the false. Does Deleuzian crystalline image (or Trump, or a talk show host) lie? Jeffrey Nealon: “The time image’s direct power of the false does not work through the mediation of the true (by interpreting, deconstructing, or the questioning the objectivist truth – (they are still major tasks of literary criticism)), but gives another account of the real altogether…There is a shift from a focus on understanding something to a concern with manipulating it, from meaning to usage”.
  • Fake news

    Moreover, Trump's rhetoric and his oratorical style are not prominent at all, they are quite modest and monotonic.
    — Number2018

    And yet effective. Hence the usage of rhetoric to examine them.

    Narratives that are going viral in social media usually have simple and poor structure, so that literary
    criticism would not be an appropriate research tool here.
    — Number2018

    And yet effective. Hence the usage of literary criticism to examine them.

    Trump's tweeting hyperactivity by many people has been considered as one of the examples of Fake News. Apparently, they are functional and effective! Nevertheless, I doubt that their textual or literary analyses (though it could be helpful) can fully explain their effectiveness. (The same is right about the subway graffitis)
    They are short, simple, and rough literary devices. Therefore, we need to evolve various contextual factors, maintaining and ensuring their success. The analyses of the overall situation on social media could be useful. While in literature, as well as in our lives, there is not a black and white message, but a far more nuanced one, the public Internet sphere is primarily occupied by trivial and oversimplified "meme" that "resonates" with a person's prejudices, so gets sent around the globe in an instant. The people who are posting complete rubbish on social media, day in and day out, as a sort of obsession in life, are not able to make timely efforts to get focused and sit down for hours to analyze and reflect on the problems we face.

    From ancient mythology to Hemingway to subway graffiti, literary criticism has not let the simplicity of a text deter it from fulfilling its job.NKBJ
    I do not argue that literary criticism is not a relevant tool for analyzing Fake News. However, I would appreciate it if you could provide an example of its application. :smile:
  • Fake news
    Literary criticism covers the analysis of rhetoric. That's most of what fake news is. Ergo, literary analysis would be helpful to the analysis of fake news.NKBJ
    Rhetoric! That would relate the phenomenon of Fake news to the art of affecting the audience. Further, it could imply the oversimplification, explaining its emergence by outstanding qualities of a few leaders (Trump, Farage, Johnson…). Of course, one could examine their rhetorical devices; yet, one would find a lot of better contemporary or past speakers or politicians. Moreover, Trump's rhetoric and his oratorical style are not prominent at all, they are quite modest and monotonic.

    I'd go so far as to say any close analysis of the wording of fake news is literary criticism, whether intentional or not.NKBJ
    Narratives that are going viral in social media usually have simple and poor structure, so that literary
    criticism would not be an appropriate research tool here.
    Getting back to literature: There was a quote from Neil Postman, "Amusing Ourselves To Death."
    I started thinking that interpretation of some Kafka’s texts ("The giant Mole," and "The Burrow"), could become relevant for understanding Fake news.
  • Fake news

    Fake news is when the establishment sells big lies to the public. It's NOT when little alt-websites question the establishment. Fake news is the Big Lie that the government sells to the people. That's the point, which in retrospect I should have just said right up front several posts ago. Fake news is how the powers that be keep everyone frightened and compliant. That's what fake news is.fishfry
    In Pakistan, the vast majority of people are completely convinced that the entire story of Bin Laden’s killing was fabricated by the Obama administration. In Russia, almost the whole population believes that 9/11 was wholly prepared and organized by the CIA to create the pretext for invasion into Afghanistan. Numerous Russian political analysts and various experts support this narrative. Yet, most likely, these false narratives have become dominant without governments’ involvement. Apparently, these examples do not comply with your understanding of Fake news.
  • Fake news

    Both Huxley and Orwell grounded their narrations on simple ideas of utopia and dystopia, and both are in perfect fit with regimes of the truth of grand narratives of modernity. Within our postmodern conditions, grand narratives have been wholly compromised and transformed.
    — Number2018

    That does not answer my question. In fact, it kind of suggests literary criticism would be pretty helpful, if you know anything at all about literary criticism.

    Well, say that you are right, and I don't know. But what is your vision? How would you apply
    literary criticism for analyzing Fake news?
  • Fake news
    I've been depressed to notice that many friends and people I respect, are now convinced that 'climate change is not established by the science', and that 'there's nothing Australia can do to combat climate change' - the kinds of fake news memes that merchants of doubt have been disseminating since Al Gore came out with Inconvenient Truth.Wayfarer
    So, how are you going to convince your friends to change their minds? What is the
    non-partisan, common ground for dialog?

    the role of Fox News in manipulating both the electorate, and Donald J. Trump, is one of the (many) current scandals of the administration and prime examples of "pushing an agenda". Fox News routinely peddles misinformation, parrots Trump's untruths, and feeds inflammatory content to the Watcher in Chief, with whom it enjoys a symbiotic relationship. There have been numerous articles in the so-called 'liberal media' about this fact. So they're really trying, and succeeding, to shape the agenda; as do many of the Chinese state media, and sections of the Russian media, and many other players, large and small, in this hyper-connected age.Wayfarer

    There is a deep abyss between CNN viewers and Fox ones. Both sides are sure that they possess the truth and blame the opponents' media for imposing agenda, fabrication, propaganda, and manipulation. And this state of affairs also contributes to the explosion of Fake news.
  • Fake news
    There is a distinction between "fake news" and false information. The intent of fake news is to deceive. Without that intent it is simple false information. Although it may not be the intent of someone who repeats fake news to deceive, the information was still manufactured with the intent to deceive. When Trump accuses news sources of being fake news he deliberately blurs the distinction. There is always the implication that the story is manufactured with the intent to deceive, to lie, but this implication hides behind the more benign accusation that the information is simply false.Fooloso4

    I do not think that the phenomenon of “Fake news” could be explained by someone’s
    intentional fabrication and/or manipulation.
    Michael Sawer writes:
    "Regimes of post-truth seem to depend upon establishing an archive
    (that is accessible to and understandable by the public) of self-referential
    data points that are not verifiable through other methods of establishing
    objective facts... Social media becomes an apparatus that implodes the concept of “truth”
    and allows the creation of regimes of discourse (political conversation as
    just one instantiation of this phenomenon) that are potentially purposefully
    at a distance from what is traditionally framed as “facts” in that they
    were dependent upon being part of a produced and hierarchical media
    The era of post-truth is related to the evolution of
    the media to “social” media…Donald Trump rode
    the wave of this transitional space into the presidency.
    “Trump Phenomenon” has been uniquely positioned
    to take advantage of the seismic shift in the manner in which
    individuals receive news and understand the presentation of this material
    to represent something like facts."
  • Expression

    Magritte said that a painting of a weeping face does not express grief. To believe so, he thought, would be as naive as believing that a cake expresses what the baker was thinking when she created it.frank
    We should not understand his words literally.
    Magritte’s entire project was about the deconstruction of the ordinary, conventional perceptions and the building of a new frame of reference, where visible, ostensible, and sayable would function differently.
  • Fake news

    Differently, Zizek assumes that “Fake news” has been the indispensable result of our
    post-modern conditions; implicitly, he involves the emergence of new regimes of truth (“post-facts” and “post-truth”
    — Number2018
    And this is why I don't believe in Post-Modernism. It's criticized from both left and right. It simply is bullshit.
    Unfortunately, this is the state of affairs; it does not depend on yours or my personal
    beliefs. We can call it variously if you don’t like Post-Modernism. Nietzsche called it
    "will to power," and Deleuze – "the power of the false."

    Besides, false propaganda has existed for a long time, no matter what Trump says. Social media has just given it some credibility, because people want to hear what they want to hear.ssu

    You are right. Yet, Zizek also points out that there are positive aspects of "fake news":
    spontaneity, uncontrollability, and freedom of expression.
  • Fake news

    unlike genuine fake news (!), the NYT at least publishes corrections, listens to criticism, and tries to correct the record.Wayfarer

    It could be interesting to compare the “two kinds of news”: “genuine fake news,” and that of mainstream media. From the one side, mainstream media has institutional, legal, and professional restrains, comparing to independent and almost unregulated social media. From another side, we can doubt that mainstream media report things because they’re true, they talk about them because of their importance, and they write articles because “the public need to know.” The MSM primarily report things that serve an agenda, true or false, real or imaginary. The narrative matters much more than the facts. Further, the (in)compatibility and interchangeability of narratives, their short life and high speed of their circulation create a ground for what we call “genuine fake news.”

    fake news memes that merchants of doubt have been disseminating since Al Gore came out with Inconvenient Truth.Wayfarer
    Al Gore made a remarkable presentation; unfortunately, I lost its tracks. Yet, its merits,
    style, and form, so different from academic research, could be taken up by opposite narratives.
  • Fake news
    As it turned out in the fullness of time, those articles were lies. To be absolutely clear, they were not well-intended mistakes. They were deliberate fabrications for the purpose of lying the country into war.fishfry

    The problem with your example that you make the judgment "in the fullness of time".
    Yet, maybe at the time of publication, those articles relied on plausible information.

    Now, would you or would you not define that as Fake News?fishfry
    To answer your question, we need a well formulated and operative definition of fake news. The following definitions are insufficient:

    "false news stories, often of a sensational nature, created to be widely shared or distributed for the purpose of generating revenue, oor promoting or discrediting a public figure, political movement, company, etc."
    "false stories that appear to be news, spread on the internet or using other media, usually created to influence political views or as a joke"
    "Fake news, also known as junk news or pseudo-news, is a type of yellow journalism or propaganda that consists of deliberate disinformation or hoaxes spread via traditional news media (print and broadcast) or online social media. ... The relevance of fake news has increased in post-truth politics."
  • Fake news

    It doesn't take a news junkie to recognise that "MOON WILL CRASH INTO EARTH NEXT WEEK" is fake news.Bitter Crank
    What was October 30, 1938 Orson Welles’s radio broadcast about? “The War of the Worlds”
    included “news alerts” that led the listener to believe that the show was
    presenting actual events. This was not because of the content (which was
    ridiculous) but authoritative because of the format of the presentation.
  • Fake news
    I do not think literature or literary criticism could be relevant to understand fake news.
    — Number2018

    Both Huxley and Orwell grounded their narrations on simple ideas of utopia and dystopia, and both are in perfect fit with regimes of the truth of grand narratives of modernity. Within our postmodern conditions, grand narratives have been wholly compromised and transformed.
  • Fake news
    And I am NOT suggesting it is simply "opinion", but that it is typically just "opinion".ZhouBoTong
    Any private opinion, after all, appears to be a typical, common opinion. Further, taken up by mass media or social media, it acquires some attributes of truthful knowledge.
  • Fake news

    Fake news has both components of the agreement as well as disagreement, and it does not express merely someone’s private opinion.
  • Fake news

    Both books are great, but I do not think literature or literary criticism could be relevant to understand fake news.
  • Truth and consequences
    The alienation of people from their government representatives mirrors the alienation of the political class from international vectors of power. One way to address this issue is to replace non-compliance with structurally conditioned indifference; the 'non-linear' part of Russian propagandist Surkov's non-linear warfare:

    In his enforcement of Putin’s will — or his own interpretation of it — Surkov carefully constructed and presided over a system in which Russians could play-act an intricate imitation of democracy. Every persuasion on the political spectrum was given a Kremlin-backed voice within the system as Surkov ensured that the Kremlin organized and funded a wide range of political groups and movements, from liberal to Communist to conservative, sowing confusion and cynicism in the public while at the same time co-opting any genuine opposition. The messengers differed, but the message was the same — the Kremlin was always in control. Under Surkov’s simulation of politics, dissent wasn’t crushed: it was managed.

    The key part of this management strategy is the creation of supported avenues for dissent which stymie the formation of effective popular movements. These are gatekeepers for political action, moving the goalposts or hiding them.

    It has the perhaps intentional side effect of alienating honest citizens from politics by denying the efficacy or applicability of their votes and petitions.

    The media management of outrage interacts with our modern day equation of politics=political discourse to play a role here, the contours of acceptable opinion are rarely perturbed, and the well known alliance between powerful corporations and media outlets (cough Murdoch and Koch cough) project the voice of the ruling class from the institutions which help shape the terms of debate in which popular opinion is formed. Politics on social media is typically sound and fury organising nothing except the convenience of our ruling class.

    An emerging role for 'influencers' is taking place, acting as pseudo-servants of the ruling classes by embodying acceptable opinions which are near the contours of acceptable opinion. The communities which support influencers also necessarily become associated with a consumer identity through the algorithms which shape the medium they are in: these algorithms also watch their every move, and our governments have almost unrestricted access. Here we can see the role of ideological echo-chambers, discretising identity into a panopticon of conflicting units that in reality have far more shared political interest than their antipodal role in discourse suggests.

    This promotes a second level of apathy and indifference, there are people who can 'see through' this shit, which includes many liberal commentators, but this is still within the narrows of acceptable opinion; it is fashionable to bemoan the degradation of discourse, and this too is organised over influencer communities.

    Thank you for the interesting analysis of some totalitarian aspects of our societies. I just want to add a few points. I think that it will be beneficial to reconsider the concept of alienation that you applied. To better explain it, I like to bring one of the Zizek' assertions in the debate with Peterson. He said (based on his own personal experience - he was born and grew up in totalitarian Eastern Europe) that people could be happy while living in a totalitarian society. Further, to strengthen his argument, Zizek a few times pointed out at China. And, his great concern was that a kind of totalitarianism can become our own future. So, Zizek assumes the essential compatibility of "happiness" with various totalitarian regimes: being self-identified with an external transcendental unity, people experience not alienation, but happiness. The concept of alienation (as opposing to totality) implies a set of classical liberal political premises of the existence of the rational subject, the agent of rights, choices, and interests. However, there is no rational subject outside of the media megamachine, the role of which is not just that "of ideological echo-chambers, discretizing
    identity into a panopticon of conflicting units." And, it is much more politically effective, than just "Politics on social media is typically sound and fury organizing nothing except the convenience of our ruling class." Each mass media platform produces, organizes, and reproduces not just the frame of essential public opinions and discourses, but also the chain of social and cultural codes, inseparable from corresponding values, positions, perspectives, views, etc.
    Even when mass media looks like reporting the essential local news, first of all, they reproduce their own self-referential communicative machinic reality. "Real" facts and narratives in themselves have nothing substantial (= "identical") about them, but merely have to be identified in the context of being reviewed, selected, and retained for purposes of reference, of recursive use, and only for that purpose. Consequently, the media localizes and structures socio-psychological patterns, created by its mass action that just later may appear as "real" socially independent autonomic groups. It is most likely that Surkov's simulation of politics in Russia could be possible only through an intensive utilization of mass media processes and developments. Yet, in our societies, without an apparent external organizer, are they able to generate autonomously their totalitarian effects? I do not deny the well
    known effects of alienation from politics, I just think that there are much more ways of political engagement than it is usually considered.
  • Houses are Turning Into Flowers

    But what kind of significance does saying 'it is false that houses turn into flowers' have? How, even in principle, does one go about rendering any sense of significance to this? Think again of the child who affirms the truth of this statement ("mumma! houses turn into flowers!): one's immediate (adult?) response is something like: 'this child doesn't know what truth is'; or, 'this child doesn't quite understand how houses, or flowers, or change works', or "how adorable". This child doesn't understand concepts and how they relate to other concepts - at least, not like we do. Her language is in error (according to our standards). That's the immediate adult response, not: 'No darling, houses do not turn into flowers' (at least, it's not the response parent who isn't tired and just wants to get through lunchtime with bub; or, the adult could say this, but she's being somewhat pedagogically irresponsible).StreetlightX

    distinctions with significance require asymmetry of response: if anything is possible, then anything follows, and one cannot say anything significant about anything at all.

    Constraints need to be placed on our grammar such that one responds this way to a truth and this way to a falsehood: this asymmetry is the condition for language to function at all. But no such asymmetry exists in the case of 'it is false that houses turn into flowers'.

    Indeed, Cavell’s claim can be interpreted as an assertion of a fundamental asymmetry, grounding the condition for language to function at all. When Cavell writes that “I am asserting, rather, that we do not yet know what verification for or against it would be … both [the denial and assertion] rest on the same concept of what knowledge is, or must be … Both, in a word, use absolutely conclusive verification out of its ordinary context,” he means that he refutes all possible empirical processes of the verification of the given proposition “houses turn/do not turn into flowers.” Houses, flowers, the turn may have meaning from our ordinary context. Further, instead of real houses and flowers, we can consider our notions of these objects, but it is still possible to organize a process of verification. The utterance “houses turn into flowers” can have
    different functions – it could be a proposition about real, imaginary, or symbolic objects. Or, it could be a grammatically correct/incorrect phrase - which is still an object for a kind of verification or an automatic rejection/acceptance within
    the ordinary context. Another possibility is to assume that the utterance is merely a statement that just later can bear an assigned meaning and become a meaningful sentence or a true/false
    proposition. Therefore, it has not yet confronted by a correlate or the absence of a correlate, as a proposition has (or has not) a referent. When the child says ("mumma! houses turn into flowers!), maybe she affirms the truth of this statement, but most likely she just exercises a fundamental ability of enouncing significant sentences; if it were just a random or mechanical combination of sounds, there would not be any significant adult response. A faculty to produce and differentiate significant and non-significant expressions can operate as “absolutely conclusive verification out of its ordinary context.”
  • Propositions and the meaning of speech acts.
    Where does the association between the request and the equivalence relation take place? Does it occur in the use of language? Is it an event?fdrake

    A few additional dimensions ground the association between the request and the equivalence relation. First, there is the intention (desire) to speak, which is an affectively determined vector of the production of subjectivity, of the process of self-affirmation. Next, there is a set of ethico-political values and choices that are manifested through the accomplishment of any speech act. Therefore, the association between the request and the equivalence, as well as words and grammatical forms, provide the necessary logical and technical possibilities for
    a potential linguistic performance. Yet, they are not sufficient. The speech act that occurs “here and now” is an event; it is the individuation, singularization, and actualization of the potentiality of language, whereas the pre-personal affective forces and post-personal ethico-political social forces are crucial determinants.
  • Technology: Heidegger vs Simondon
    In spite of the apparent divergence of their accounts of technology, Heidegger and Simondon reveal the affinity of their understandings of an event, whereas Simondon’s notion of Transindividual is quite close to Heidegger’s Being. Heidegger: "the manner in which the matter of thinking-Being-comports itself, remains a unique state of affairs. The inauthentic modes of the ready-to-hand, the present-to-hand, average everydayness, authentic Being, Ereignis all mark different factical experiences. Yet what is common to all possible modes of Being is certain radical mobility”.
    Muriel Combes writes in her book about Simondon: "the domain of psychological individuality has no proper space; it exists
    as something superimposed upon the physical and biological domains."
    (IPC, 152; IL, 278). Psychological individuality is constituted as a relation
    to the physical world and biological world, as a "relation to the world and to
    self," because it is turned as a whole toward the collective: we must thus
    understand that a separate "psychological world" does not exist, but only,
    and always already, a "transindividual universe" (IPC, 153; IL, 279). As such,
    psychological individuality appears to be essentially transitional in nature,
    covering an ensemble of specific processes organizing the passage from the
    level due to physical and biological individuation, populated with physical
    and living individuals, to the level of the collective resulting”.
    Further, formally, it is possible to show that the Simondon’s individualizing operation grounds the genesis of being similarly as the Heideggerian radical mobility does. (“Within and beyond states, forms and structures, lies a universe of barely self-exceeding accents, modulations, aspects, variations, ways of working”). Yet, there are fundamental differences in the Simondon vs. Heidegger ways of working, of operating.
  • Technology, Complexity, Science- No Bastion for Meaning Either
    ↪Number2018 What do you make of that quote?schopenhauer1

    The gent scholar types want to think that understanding principles of science, and applications in technology provide some inherent meaning. Thus, by edifying themselves in the immersions in these topics, they feel they are participating in something grander or important. The fact that the world works in such a way as applying mathematically-derived, precise scientific principles to materials, processes, functionalities, etc. makes it such that their work is really "doing something", perhaps above and more so than those who are not engaged in these activities.schopenhauer1

    I mean that for Heidegger scientists themselves in principle cannot give a full and correct account on what are they doing. Farther, if one embraces this assertion, one can conclude that scholars undoubtedly are “doing something”; nevertheless, it is unknown in what they are taking part.
    Of course, any scholar can have a kind of a feeling and tell stories about their personal experience; yet, all these accounts will always remain ungrounded and opened to a constant process of different interpretations.
  • Technology, Complexity, Science- No Bastion for Meaning Either
    I guess the big question is, WHY is it meaningful to create technologies?schopenhauer1

    The gent scholar types want to think that understanding principles of science, and applications in technology provide some inherent meaning. Thus, by edifying themselves in the immersions in these topics, they feel they are participating in something grander or important.schopenhauer1

    “modern science, as the theory of the real, is not anything
    self-evident. It is neither a mere construct of man nor something
    extorted from the real. Quite to the contrary, the essence of
    science is rendered necessary by the presencing of what presences at the moment
    when presencing sets itself forth into the objectness of the real. This moment remains mysterious,
    as does every moment of its kind. ..The sciences are not in a position
    at any time to represent themselves to themselves, to set themselves
    before themselves, by means of their theory and through
    the modes of procedure belonging to theory.
    If it is entirely denied to science scientifically to arrive at its
    own essence, then the sciences are utterly incapable of gaining
    access to that which is not to be gotten around holding sway in
    their essence. Here something disturbing manifests itself.”
    If we accept that science itself “remains mysterious” it is possible
    to challenge a variety of meaningful anthropomorphic narratives describing science.
  • Is consciousness a multiplicity?

    We see the same reductive tendency in Massumi to begin from self-centered algorithmic iterations which only later interaffect, resonate or disrupt each other. Whta’s lacking is a more radical thinking of interactivity. Non-linearity isn’t enough because it still operates as a deterministic metaphor.Joshs
    I think that these fragments show how brilliant Massumi’s account of an event is. I’d like to pay your attention to the contemporary political developments in the US since November 2016, when Trump was elected. We can witness the rise and the fall
    of numerous attempts to explain what happened, ranging from political philosophies (Badieu and Bifo Berardi, for example) to mass media and simply conspiracy (it is often difficult to distinguish between them). Theories, models, explanations, and narratives have replaced each other with vertiginous speed. Moreover, today, the absolute majority of writers and their listeners (readers) do not remember (and do not reflect on)
    what was in the center of their attention 24-27 month ago, being wholly preoccupied with current events. Can we conclude, that affect was at the core of these discursive surges?
    Therefore, we definitely must agree with Massumi, when he wrote:
    “Our “habit of dwelling upon the long future and the long past” is a“literary” effort of “purely abstract imagination, devoid of any direct observation of particular fact. “In considering our direct observation of past, or of future, we should confine ourselves to time-spans of the order of magnitude of a second, or even fractions of a second.”
    “It is not the forecasting or back-casting of the critical observer who places emphasis on. There is no overlook allowing an emphasis to be laid on from outside or above. Rather, Whitehead says, the observer, is on the “utmost verge” of events’ taking shape in their own “process of self-completion.” On the verge of history, past and future are “immanent” to the present and, in that interval, to each other. The critique of history has nowhere to be but in the reciprocal immanence that is the verging toward the self-completion of events in the making. The fraction of a second-scale is where we must mark the singularity of events, and grasp their return. This is no easy task: because the verge of history is also events’ lacuna point, the moment they have not taken place. This is why Nietzsche argues that what history is most intensely about is the “untimely.”
    This is why Foucault asserts the need for an effective history that is a “history of the present”… “Effective history . . . shortens its vision to the things nearest it—the body, the nervous system . . . energies”. Only an immanent critique can effectively “observe” what is energetically not taking place, coeval with a moment’s effective self-completion: in the interval of history’s in-the-making.”
    To become the observer on the “utmost verge” of history, one must discover the exact point
    of indiscernibility, where the intensity of the event, bodily affects, and energies, are not separated yet from the fabulated narratives and discourses.
    Further, one can discover that intensive becoming, the Nietzschean “untimely” doubles history; that there are endless circuits of the actual physical real and virtual intensive real, which carries everything, continually following each other, running behind each other and referring back to each other around a point of emergency.
    “There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only
    a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together.”
    What we need to understand is how our primary and unrecognizable affects and patterns are
    built “in between.” Between an intensive-virtual-social-politic, and individual-personal-actual-formed. The unconscious drives, desires, and impetuses are enclosed within the one circuit,
    so that “Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all
    of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any
    meaning whatsoever.”

    That is why Massumi wrote:
    "Intensity is beside that loop, a nonconscious, never-to-be-conscious autonomic
    remainder. It is outside expectation and adaptation, as disconnected from meaningful sequencing,
    from narration, as it is from a vital function. It is narratively de-localized, spreading over the generalized body surface…
    When on the other hand language doubles a sequence of movements to add
    something to it in the way of meaningful progression – in this case, a sense of futurity,
    expectation, an intimation of what comes next in a conventional progression – then it runs counter to and dampens the intensity. "
    Getting back to the events of November 2016 (and, in general, considering how mass media work, or New York Stock Exchange functions) , one should conclude, that on the “utmost verge” of the event is affect,
    condensed to the striking intensity of shock; the unresistable request to get involved, to get a response of any kind.

    Note here that beginning from system as logical procedure creates a sharp oppositionality between structure and change, rule and paradox, the cognitive and the affective.Joshs

    Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to apply to unconscious intensity the nature/culture opposition, the dichotomy between chaotic and disastrous affective flows, and a cultural, civilized, and rational symbolic order. If we turn to Guattari’s basic scheme of a general contemporary assemblage, we can find
    there that signifier, labor, libido, and Capital are united under the rubric
    The economy of flows. Practically, it means that any intensity of the event, taken up by mass media, would be immediately converted into the individual libido and desires, simultaneously transformed into appropriate discourses, will become the flow of “immaterial labor,” and, finally will be appropriate as the surplice value in some form of
    Capital. All these processes should maintain an endless motion and acceleration. Yet, our contemporary societies are not built to entirely control and manage the event. Massumi: “"Nothing is prefigured in the event. It is the collapse of structured distinction into intensity, of rules into paradox. A tinge of the unexpected, the lateral, the unmotivated, to lines of action and reaction. A change in the rules. The expression-event is the system of the inexplicable... The affect is to be modulated by a variety of strategic improvisational techniques, they modulate an unfolding of the event on the fly, but they cannot completely control the outcome. Affective techniques apply to situations more directly than to persons. They are directly collective. They are fundamentally participatory, since they are activated in a situation, couched singularly in the occurrence of that encounter. They are event factors, not intentions.”

  • Is consciousness a multiplicity?

    Protevi has spent that past few decades trying to convince us that his reading of DG gives him a method of analyzing notorious affective-socio-political situations such as Columbine that can supplement 4ea accounts. I think the details of his method give us a good opportunity to judge the usefulness of his ordering strategy, particularly with regard to affect and motivation.

    I have selected what I think are pertiment passages from Protevi's 'AFFECT, AGENCY AND
    difference operates via assemblages for him:
    Thank you for doing the work and making this case of "a cool blood killer.” It was interesting reading. DG’s concept of “an assemblage” is one of the most difficult ones; but it is a key notion to understand better “the varieties of fascism, that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives.” (Foucault). The political and ethical implications of different assemblages are significant – what is at stake is the question of the essence of the subject of action – is that a conscious, responsible individual or a collective impersonal agent of some kind?
    It looks like for Thompson there is no problem, whereas Protevi could find and pose one. Could you explain the status of “problem” of consciousness in the cognitive psychology and neuroscience field?
    Does the 4EA - model have some social – political implications?

    I think Protevi’s approach belongs to the larger framework of enactivism, based on his numerous analyses of Gallagher, Thompson, Merleau-Ponty and Varela. But I also suspect it represents a less sophisticated, more reductive version than that of Thompson or Gallagher, in spite of its claims to situate subjectivity within a wider realm of the bio-political.
    Whereas Protevi thinks his view is wider in scope, it may simply be more fragmented, lacking the extent of integrative impetus in Thompson-Varela’s thinking. Proteiv’s reliance on dynamical systems metaphors seems to too often begin from algorithmicly-themed and internally centered machinic processes(near-reflexive affect modules, cognitive programs). Then creativity and transformation consists of the clashing, interruption and intgerating among such independent flows, machines, algorithms..
    After looking through Protevi’s books, I started thinking that you are right in your critique. He tries to
    combine 4-e model with DG’s approach, but in spite of his claims, he could not formulate the problem
    quite in the spirit of DG’s thought. So it is not just about “more reductive version than that of Thompson or Gallagher,” but also of DG.
    Nevertheless, he could formulate his thesis: "there is another sense of “agent” as nonsubjective controller of bodily action, either reflex or basic emotion, and (2) that in some cases, the military unit and nonsubjective reflexes and basic emotions are intertwined in such a way as to bypass the soldiers’ subjectivity qua controlled intentional action. In these cases, the practical agent of the act of killing is not the individual person or subject but the emergent assemblage of a military unit and nonsubjective reflex or equally nonsubjective affect program… though we could argue that the practical agent of the massacre was the assemblage of the unit and the distributed nonsubjective rage agents…"

    It is a more reductive version of DG’s definition of assemblage: “it has two sides – it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, and it is a machinic assemblage of desire…It is a social machine, taking man and women into its gears, or, rather, having men and women as part of its gears
    along with things, structures, metals, materials.” So, there are two sides of the same assemblage –
    expressive one, including all possible ways of collective expression, and desire’s one, including
    a variety of bodily affects, taken together and connected with technical machines, mechanisms, materials, etc. DG’s understanding implies that the real subject of a statement as well as of an action is the particular assemblage. The question is how general is their definition? Should it be applied to some particular situations (in Protevi’s case, one might think that when the solder comes to normal life, he starts regretting what he did)? Should we assume that the notion of assemblage applies to some extreme situations, but in general, there is still a place for a rationally thinking normal individual?) It could be beneficial to check how DG’s approach is compatible with Judith Butler’s one: “Assembly only makes sense if bodies can and do gather or connect in some way, and speech acts that unfold from there articulate something that is already happening at the level of the plural body. But let us remember that a vocalization is also a bodily act, as is sign language, and this means that there is no speaking without body signifying something, and sometimes the body signifies something quite different what a person actually says…
    If the plural subject (of assembly) is constituted in the course of its performative action, then it is not already constituted; whatever form it has prior to its performative exercise is not the same as the form it takes as it acts, and after it has acted. So how do we understand this movement of gathering, which is durational, and implies occasional, periodic, or definitive forms of scattering? It is not one act, but a convergence of actions different from one another…Temporal seriality and coordination, bodily
    proximity, auditory range, coordinated vocalization – all of these constitute essential dimensions
    of assembly and demonstration”.
    I do not want to critique Butler’s approach, trying to find out
    how her model is different from the known theories of Le Bon, Sorel, and Canetti. What is important here is that the essential emergent, performative components, necessary for maintaining an assemblage do not require the physical proximity and the abruptness of gathering (the main points for Butler), or some special circumstances (battlefield, or war for Protevi). The communicative-expressive components, as well as bodily constellations, mentioned by Butler, are constitutive even for some virtual Internet communities. Further, “speech acts that unfold from there articulate something that is already happening at the level of plural body”- in Protevi’s case, the military training complex, plying an essential role in “dehumanizing the solder’s actions,” functions as a generative matrix, as a diagram of intensities and crucial thresholds.
    However unexpected and spontaneous Butler’s assembly looks like, one could find a virtual prototype of the event, and map its crucial intensive components.
    If we consider some bureaucratic agency, the conventional theory is that it has an authority structure, in which rights and obligations are distributed in a hierarchical way, as well as clearly defined roles and positions. Further, the exercise of authority is backed by legitimacy, so that the personal beliefs of a member of an organization or her knowledge of the cost of a breach of the agency’s written regulations. Definitely, one could find these primary structural constituents. Nevertheless,
    cannot we also discover here all the essential components of Butler’s model? There are two interdependent regimes – an expressive (including linguistic one), as well as a bodily one (including
    a set of behavioral patterns, working techniques, interactions with machines and colleagues). All employees gather together, speak the same organizational jargon, reflecting and effectualazing a process of their bodily transactions. Apparently, assemblage’s performative acting components are much more important for employee’s functionality, than an organization’s authority structure, ethics code, its written rules, employee’s values or beliefs. Therefore, in principle, it has satisfied the DG’s definition of assemblage. Further, getting back to Guattari’s general model, one could locate the agency on a general map of intensive flows of information, money, libidos’ investments and interactions, essential existential territories, and virtual discursive communities.
    There are a few more critical remaining questions: the degree of the independence of an employee,
    of her own agency, related to the assemblage’s plural subject; her sense of her own agency, homogeneity, and heterogeneity of practices through consequential social fragments.
    Going back to Protevi’s case – when a soldier comes home to normal life, he experiences remorse and regret.
    Does it mean that he is coming back to possession of an ordinary subjectivity? If yes, the assemblage theory should be reserved just for individual cases.
    DG’s answer: the social field is comprised of blocks, fragments (assemblages) that are located on
    “a continuous and unlimited line, with their doors far from each other, and contiguous back doors
    that make the blocks themselves contiguous.” Probably, it could be an interesting and challenging task to show how assemblages, comprising the solder’s normal life, are contiguous to his last military
  • Is consciousness a multiplicity?

    First, a couple of questions. Who are the primary references for the vocabulary you are using here? Deleuze-Guartari? Does ‘mimetic emulation’ come from them or Rene Girard? Where does the term ‘conscientious universes’ come from?Joshs
    • I’ve taken most vocabulary from Guattari’s book “Schiizoanalytic cartographies”; mimetic emulation is from Girard; I used Guattari’s model on pg. 27:

    Machinic Consciential
    Phyla Universes

    The economy of Flows Territories of virtual real
    (signifier, labor)
    libido, Capital)

    Sorry, not conscientious, but consciental. DG used in “A Thousand Plateaus” another term instead of this one - incorporeal transformations.
    Guattari attempts to lay down the general model of an assemblage. There are a few organizing principles:
    a separation between subjectivity and consciousness; mutual interdependence and interrelation of the four domains; their materialistic ontological status, the endless process of motion and variation, described in terms of deterritorization and territorization; verification and application through comparison with differently established models.
    I could begin with a warning. While it sounds impressive to throw in every conceivable source of input, information, flow, both signifying and a-signifying, as possible impingments upon and definers of subjectivity, we don’t end up with anything interesting or useful except as such impingements can be seen in the light of ordering structurations and patterns. Without minimal coherence and consistency there is only pure randomness. If we are to choose a DG account of affectivity and subjectivity over other philosophies and psychologies, it must be because it is more useful to us, more clarifying and , in some overall sense, more effectively ordered, not because it offers a laundry list of infinite sources of random impingement. That large list you gave me (room, psychology, signifying and a-signifying flows, etc, etc,) is less significant in and of itself than in how it is specifically understood in its orders of relationship. We know that all these impingements jostle, form and reform subjectivity, but how do we make sure that we don’t end up reifying them such that the subject is nothing but an endless sequence of random operant conditionings? I have no problem in embracing DG in this regard as preferable to Freudian, stimulus-response and first generation cognitive models of the subject, because while at a micro level DG abandons the ordered structures and processes that define these approaches, at a metalevel it is posits a less arbitrary and less polarized model of experiential change. All that stuff coming at subjectivty from above, below and within that dissolves, ovewhelms and displaces psychodynamic id, ego and superego has a more radically intricate kind of order or logic to it that persuades us that we understand persons better through it that via Freudianism.Joshs

    I think that DG’s project is going far beyond the critique of psychoanalysis. Foucault noted:
    “Anti-Oedipus is a book of ethics… How does one keep from being fascist, even
    (especially) when one believes oneself to be a revolutionary militant?
    How do we rid our speech and our acts, our hearts and our pleasures, of
    fascism? How do we ferret out the fascism that is ingrained in our
    behavior? The book is about the tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from
    the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that
    constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives.”

    Foucault’s evaluation of DG’s thought is still entirely relevant. The ethical-political dimension
    helps to find a way out of an impression that DG intended to show that “the subject is nothing but an endless sequence of random operant conditionings.” Subject’s operating conditions are not random, they are primarily the same as the operating assemblages, maintaining the essential, power relations of our societies. Therefore, “the sequence of random operant conditionings” is not endless; it is finite and well defined. Further, whereas you wrote that “rather than a single linear causal intentional vector, consciousness can more accurately be described as a site of competing streams offragmented perceptions and conceptualizations jostling for attention,” for DG “the site of consciousness” is the place where the economy of the power’s interventions and strategies is applied. (The faciality machine that we used to discuss is one of the examples).
    Further, these “competing streams offragmented perceptions and conceptualizations jostling for attention” – aren’t they are already ready-made - images of images, perceptions of perceptions, arriving at the site of consciousness after being intensively processed not by some uncertain environment, but by our essential social-political machines?
    If the “subject” has become primarily determined by implicit and hidden forces and social
    presuppositions, so that its most intimate desires and motivations are just working parts of the dominating system (in spite of seemingly different “conscious” subject’s own declarations) – don’t we deal with the kind of fascism in Foucault’s sense? That is why Foucault pointed out that DG’s thought provides ethical guidance - when one, following DG, finds his/her own “operating conditions,” one gets a chance to exercise freedom, to practice becoming.
    “If we are to choose a DG account of affectivity and subjectivity over other philosophies and psychologies, it must be because it is more useful to us, more clarifying and, in some overall sense, more effectively ordered, not because it offers a laundry list of infinite sources of random impingement.” I agree with you, DG’s project is not effectively ordered – they were busy with so many challenges so that they often did not put the clearance as their first priority. Further, they often disorganized their work deliberately, as the way to distinguish themselves and to invent the new forms of expression, as well as due to militant and provocative aims. That is one of the reasons
    why after so many years of intensive scholarship, there is still room for further problematization and application of their thought.

    "all these impingements jostle, form and reform subjectivity, but how do we make sure that we don’t end up reifying them such that the subject is nothing but an endless sequence of random operant conditionings?"
    DG's account on the subjects and subjectivity can be found in their assemblage theory.
  • Is consciousness a multiplicity?

    We can discuss my model of consciousness.Joshs

    I’d like to get back to the first post of this thread. The financial trader in the trade room may represent a good case to check the appropriateness of different models of consciousness. She looks at diagrams, curves, and various types of data, surrounded by computer’s screens, assisted by numerous machines, makes decisions about price-setting in real time. It is possible to distinguish four separate heterogenic domains, playing a decisive role for her conscious processes and synthesis. First, there is the room itself. It is the part of the office, the working place. Yet, it is an existential, habitual territory – it has
    some personal belonging, reminding an ordinary human milieu. Second, there is the domain of the trader psychological processes: her desires, pre-personal affective mimetic perceptions, reactions, involvements, motivations, and individual
    cognitive acts. Third, there is the domain of conscientious universes: groups, lobbies,
    interested economic and political parties, schools of economic thought, working rules, and labor ethics express themselves through her mind. Fourth, there are intensive a-signified as well as signified sign flows: financial flows of “real economy ”, informational flows of forecasts about the economy, flows of share prices, and informational flows of expectations of these prices rising or falling. Each domain has its own and autonomous temporality: first, there are regular rhythms of human existential territory.
    Second, there is the time of an a-personal affective, mimetic emulation, of an extremely competitive trading environment. Thirdly, there is a highly elaborated field of discursive rationalities, presupposing sets of roles, ethical-political and social positions, and strong performative functions.
    Each speech act, said, written, or even reproduced in the trader’s mind is engaged in a variety of virtual professional, social, or scientific “communities.”
    The final domain is completely machinic - there is an endless automated process of generation and translation of various financial, economic, scientific and analytic information as well as a self-supported flow of various material transactions. This machinic phylum has a decisive role, maintaining the accelerating growth, an endless renovation, and interrelation of all other temporalities. The differentials, composed by the third and second domain, often affect the trader’s mind instantaneously, even without recognizing virtually existing real factors. Therefore, we need to reconsider the essence of time synthesis that can be used to explain the trader’s conscious as well as unconscious acts.
    Probably, your model -“consciousness can more accurately be described as a site of competing streams of fragmented perceptions and conceptualizations jostling for attention. Consciousness, far from being the self-knowing commander, is besieged from unconscious processes and bodily affects that interact with and shape consciousness outside of its awareness… it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents. Consciousness performs a momentary synthetic function, making it appear that this community is a single 'I.'”- should be regarded as an undoubtedly correct, but a limited and isolated phenomenological model. "Consciousness, far from being the self-knowing commander, is besieged from unconscious processes and bodily affects that interact with and shape consciousness outside of its awareness"- most of these
    unconscious processes are caused by direct involvement in a-signifying subjective agencies.
  • Is consciousness a multiplicity?

    I would like to set up a dichotomy and see what you think of it. On the one side would be discourses which follow upon Hegel-Marx. These would include Adorno, Habermas, Badiou, Jameson, Althusser and Zizek. On the other would be post-structuralists such as Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard and Nancy.Joshs

    Definitely, in spite of enormous differences within each group, it is possible to set up this dichotomy. Maybe, one could add Baudrillard to the second group.

    While there is a shared interest uniting the Marxist and poststructurlist thinkers regarding the need to subvert representational norms, ideologies, network of significations, what would unite the Marxist group is the use of a dialectics(negative for Marx and Adorno, affirmative for Badiou) that thinks history in terms of an emancipatory telos. That is to say , while they reject an enlightenment notion of progress, they maintain a certain messianism in their faith in radical progressive political becoming. This marks the modernist element in their thinking.Joshs

    I agree.

    The post-structuralists, in contrast, make the postmodern philosophical move of putting into question the justification of any notion of emancipation. They read Nietzsche as determining a trajectory of emancipation as originating in a Will to emancipation, which must be subordinate to Will to Power, which has no emancipatory or any other telos. The only trajectory of Will to Power is difference. For them , political history is not diaelctically emancipatory but incimmensurably geneological.Joshs

    I am not sure that Nietzsche inspired Lyotard or Baudrillard, and I doubt that “The only trajectory of Will to Power is difference” is the essential principle for all “post-structuralists”. Yet, I agree with the general meaning of your formula. I would add to your account that for both Deleuze and Foucault it was essential to convert their thought into their becoming, to transform it into their own experimental de-individualized emancipation of a new kind. (even though both projects of becoming were entirely different)

    I think its important to recognize a distinction between what a writer like Deleuze is trying to do
    and what radical post-marxist emanciaptory thinkers like Zizek and Badiou are aiming at.

    I agree. I do not entirely understand what Zizek does. Sometimes it looks like he does not take his Marxism seriously; being eclectic and inconsistent, he makes an appearance of a kind of Nietzschean-Dionysian becoming. Or, is it just a simulation?
  • Is consciousness a multiplicity?

    Let's talk about Adorno. . Have you found his writing to be particularly useful to you?Joshs
    Yes, I want to talk about Adorno’s Aesthetics. This work is fundamental and encyclopedic.So, lt
    could be interesting to try to apply his aesthetics to contemporary art. (maybe performance art) I use his writing as a counterexample, as an experiment - why his great thought does not work anymore? I love "Dialectic of Enlightenment".

    Concerning time as duration, may be you could talk a little about how you understand Deleuze's concept of duration. Do you see it as similar to Bergson's?Joshs

    Instead,I would prefer to come back to your model of counscessness,
    and during this discussion I would lay out my understanding.

    "The mind functions as an inseparable interaction with environment and body. It is nothing but this interaction. There is no self-identical self in this model. Self is a bi-product of the constant constructive interactive activity of the organism-envirnmental interaction. Consciousness is not self-conscious in the sense of being able to turn back on itself and grasp itself identically. To reflect back on the self is to alter what one turns back to. The impression we get of consciousness as the commander of decision, as unfolding meaning as a linear causal sequence of nows (one damn thing after another), is the result of the way linguistic grammar is constructed , But rather than a single linear causal intentional vector, consciousness can more accurately de described as a site of competing streams offragmented perceptions and conceptualizations jostling for attention. Consciousness, far from being the self-knowing commander, is besieged from unconscious processes and bodily affects that interact with and shape consciousnessoutside of its awareness. So the notion of agent is a bit of an illusion, there is no ghost in the machine, it is more of a community.of interaffecting agents. Consciousness performs a momentary synthetic function, making it appear that this community is a single 'I'." When you write: “Consciousness performs a momentary synthetic function”, how do you understand this operation? What does it mean “Consciousness performs”? And -" a momentary synthetic function"? There are some approches trying to apply the notion of autopoiesis.
    I am afraid that you will again try to apply Heideggerian-Derrida’s temporalities. What about Merleu-Pontu? Or, anything different?
  • Is consciousness a multiplicity?
    If you really endorse Adorno's reading of Heidegger you've got a got of a conflict on your hands.Joshs
    First, I do not endorse. Second, it was not just about Adorno’s reading of Heidegger. As far as I see it, this book reflected his existential position,his fight, and "Jurgon of Authenticity" is the least dialectical, and the most concrete Adorno's book. Later, Bordieu further developed
    Adorno's ideas, without any support of "Kierkegardian reading". I think that "Jargon" attempted
    to tie German existentializm (not just Heidegger)with the general spirit of that time. The book is not a "reading", it is not about interpretarion or hermeneutics.
    Let's look at the alignments.Deleuze never wrote about Heidegger, but we know Derrida is very close to Heidegger. We also know that Derrida wrote he didnt find anything objectionalble in deleuze's ideas. We also know that a community of post-structuralists including Foucault, Deleuze, Jean-Luc Nancy, Lyotard and Derrida were united in their reading of Nietzsche against
    existentialist interpretations of him. We also know that Nancy talked of his close proximity in thinking to both Derrida and Deleuze, and his debt to Heideger as another post-Nietzschean thinker. My assumption is that neither Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard or Nancy would agree with Adorno's Kierkegaardian reading of Heidegger.

    As far as I know, Lyotard adopted Adorno's ideas from "Negative dialectic" in his book about Heidegger.
    I think that this kind of discussion is not constructive, since it is always possible to ground any
    favourable opinion. We can point out names, schools, opinions, and interpretations; yet we do not improve our understanding, and we do not solve problems that preoccupy us. But, I could point out that both Foucault and Deleuze developed their own “reading” of Nietzsche, utterly different from Heidegger’s. If Deleuze or Foucault did not mention him, that means that they did not find it useful and relevant.
    Lyotard (“Heidegger and Jews”), Bourdieu (“Political ontology of Martin Heidegger”), and Derrida (“Of Spirit: “Heidegger and Question”) took an active role in the discussion about Heidegger.
    I think that this topic can consume too much time .

    the post-structuralists were united in rejecting Adorno's Hegelian emancipatory thinking, and none of them would likely refer to Derrida's approach as negative theology.Joshs

    Ok, in principle, I don't mind Derrida or Heidegger, they simply do not help me right now.
    I feel that I cannot solve my problems applying their thought.
  • Is consciousness a multiplicity?

    I disagree. Our present time is composed of primarily cinematographic, telecommunicational duration.
    — Number2018

    What is "cinematographic, telecommunicational duration"?
    Terrapin Station

    When you come to the cinema, or when you watch the news or a show, or when you get
    exposed to a multiplicity of communicational, computerized factors at the office, you become an object of a tremendous number of forces and manipulating techniques. They are wrapped up, contracted, and operate instantaneously. Most of us experience these situations as entirely natural and adequate. Yet, it is known and well documented how shocking could be the first encounter with the cinema, a computer, or a cell phone.

    “This man—the sanitary
    inspector—made a moving picture, in very slow time, very slow technique,
    of what would be required of the ordinary household in a primitive African
    village in getting rid of standing water—draining pools, picking up all empty
    tins and putting them away, and so forth. We showed this film to an audience and asked them what they had seen, and they said they had seen a chicken, a fowl, and we didn't know that there was a fowl in it! So we very carefully scanned the frames one by one for this fowl, and, sure enough, for about a second, a fowl went over the corner of the frame.
    Someone had frightened the fowl and it had taken flight, through the right hand, bottom segment of the frame. This was all that had been seen. The other things he had hoped they would pick up from the film they had not picked up at all, and they had picked frame. This was all that had been seen. The other things he had hoped they would pick up from the film they had not picked up at all, and they had picked up something, which we didn't know was in the film until we inspected it
    minutely. Why? We developed all sorts of theories. Perhaps it was the sudden movement of the chicken. Everything else was done in slow technique - people going forward slowly picking up the tin, demonstrating and all the rest of it, and the bird was apparently the one bit of reality for them. For them there was another theory that the fowl had religious significance, which we rather dismissed.

    Our private senses are not closed systems but are endlessly
    translated into each other in that experience which we call consciousness.
    Our extended senses, tools, technologies, through the ages, have been closed systems incapable of interplay or collective awareness. Now, in the electric age, the very instantaneous nature of co-existence among our technological instruments has created a crisis quite new in human history. Our extended faculties and senses now constitute a single field of experience which demands faculties and senses now constitute a single field of experience which demands that they become collectively conscious. Our technologies, like our private senses, now demand an interplay and ratio that makes rational co-existence possible.”
  • Is consciousness a multiplicity?

    ↪Number2018 "How could one present “present”? When we write or say something about our current present, we must think of the time of the occurrence of our sentences, which is our present time. This present time cannot be grasped as such: it is not yet or no longer present. It is always too soon or too late to grasp the presentation itself and present it. Such is the specific and paradoxical constitution of the event."

    Heidegger does a good job of explaining this. Each of the steps you mention, bringing something into view as something new, having it present, presenting it, grasping it, identifying it, using and referring to it, these are all further articulations which do refer back to that which they articulate , but in articulating further they subtly change what they articulate , by bringing out something new about it. This isn't a problem for us because such steps are experienced as dealing with, examining, having, pointing to, positing something present. Each transforms what it deals with in its own way, as bringing it into view in THIS or THAT manner.
    I disagree. Our present time is composed of primarily cinematographic, telecommunicational duration.
    The problem is that in most cases we do not realize how we perceive as well how we are perceived while being part of this radical novelty of our temporality.

    “In the Time Image, “time is out of joint;” movement subordinates itself to time: time causes aberration or normalization in movement, the objects are not acting to cause change, but time inflicts change on them. The images are experienced as pure “opsigns” and “sonsigns,” images that are not going anywhere, but “empty, disconnected, abandoned spaces” that instead of inspiring the question “what is there to see in the next image,” make us ask, “what is there to see in the image?” These disconnected images link up (or “re-link”) with “recollection images” and “dream images” unlike the “action images” and “affection images” of the Movement Image. Again, Deleuze’s concepts for the new cinema resonate with those developed in new media. For Deleuze, these images are moving towards a more open whole: recollection images expand the present (through metonymy), dream images expand the whole or world (through metamorphosis or metaphor). These images embody both the actual and virtual, and make indiscernable the real from the imaginary, the outside and inside, the out of set/frame and in set. This shock or confusion inspires around our perceiving senory-motor schema (which Deleuze sees as the seat of ideology) to create new thought.
    When Deleuze speaks of bringing about a direct representation of time, he seems to be speaking about realization beyond the pro-filmic world, but a realization of time within the audience, an experience of stepping out of language and actually experiencing a duration. Deleuze describes the Time Image as something which may not exist in perfection (or even abundance) within cinema, but a limit that cinema can approach.”

    In other words, they reduce the ontological difference to a difference between two ontic determinations. Being conceived as the performative difference between schematism and existence is a difference between two ontic determinations and therefore is itself on the ontic plane of propositionality. It is a present to hand thinking masquerading as post-metaphysical.

    When one begins from the subjectivism of representationality, the way of out of Kantian a priorism must stand as the absolute other to representation, that is to say, it must arrive in the guise of the performance of the differentiation between Subjective structuring and Objective determination. Only in this way can the empirically conditioned and contingent beginning of thought avoid being mistaken for a Kantian unconditioned ground of possibility. Heidegger and Derrida give us a way to avoid grounding fundamental ontology in the performative difference between schematism and existence as its condition of possibility.

    I doubt that Heidegger and Derrida are able to give us a way out. Derrida’s differance is impossible without negative theology, which
    definitely belongs to “schematism.”
    As Adorno showed, Heidegger’s primary distinction between ontic
    and ontological is profoundly controversial and applies a variety of linguistic manipulations. Therefore, both gestures, however attractive they look, are not the absolute other to representation.

    How deeply rooted are the societal elements in
    Heidegger's analysis of authenticity is involuntarily
    revealed by his use of language. As is well known,
    Heidegger supplants the tradition al category of subjectivity
    by Dasein , whose essence is existence . Being,
    however, which "is an issue for this entity in its very
    Being, is in each case mine . " This is mean t to distinguish
    subjectivity from all other existent beings. It
    intends, furthermore, to prohibit existence from being
    "taken ontologically as an instance or special case of
    some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand.”
    This construction, which is inspired by Kierkegaard's
    doctrine of the "transparency" of the self ,
    would like to make possible a starting out from some
    element of being. This latter is valued as the immediate
    givenness of the facts of consciousness in traditional
    epistemology; yet, at the same time, this element of
    being is supposed to be more than mere fact, in the
    same manner as the ego of speculative idealism once
    was. Behind the apersonal "is concerned," nothing
    more is hidden than the fact that Dasein is consciousness.
    The entrance of this formula is Heidegger's scene
    a faire . From an abstract concept Being turns into
    something absolute and primary, which is not merely
    posited. The reason for this lies in the fact that Heidegger
    reveals an element of Being and calls it Dasein,
    which would be not just some element of Being, but
    the pure condition of Being-all this without losing
    any of the characteristics of individuation, fullness,
    bodiliness . This is the scheme that the jargon follows ,
    intentionally or unintentionally, to the point of nausea.
    The jargon cures Dasein from the wound of meaninglessness
    and summons salvation from the world of
    ideas into Dasein. Heidegger lays this down once and
    for all in the title deed, which declares that the person
    owns himself. The fact that Dasein belongs to itself,
    that it is "in each case mine," is picked out from individuation
    as the only general definition that is left
    over after the dismantling of the transcendental subject
    and its metaphysics . The principium individuation’s
    stands as a principle over and against any particular
    individual element. At the same time it is that
    essence . In the case of the former element, the
    Hegelian dialectical unity of the general and the particular
    is turned into a relation of possession. Then it
    is given the rank and rights of the philosophical
    a priori. "Because Dasein has in each case mineness
    one must always use a personal pronoun when
    one addresses it." The distinction between authenticity
    and inauthenticity-the real Kierkegaardian one
    -depends on whether or not this element
    of being,
    Dasein, chooses itself, its mineness . Until further
    notice, authenticity and inauthenticity have as their
    criterion the decision in which the individual subject
    chooses itself as its own possession . The subject, the
    concept of which was once created in contrast to reification,
    thus becomes reified . Yet at the same time
    reification is s c offed at objectively in a form of language
    which simultaneously commits the same crime .
    The general concept o f mineness , in which this language
    institutes subjectivity as a possession of itself,
    sounds like a variant of meanness in Berlin slang .
    Whatever formerly went under the name o f existential
    and existentiell now insists on this new title deed of
    possession . By the fact that it is ontological , the alternative
    of authenticity and inauthenticity directs itself
    according to whether someone decides for himself or
    not. I t take s its directive, beyond real states of affairs,
    from the highly form al sense of belonging to oneself.
    Yet its consequences in reality are extremely grave.
    Once such an ontology of what is most on tic h a s been
    achieved, philosophy no longer has to bother about
    the societal and natural-historical origin of this title
    deed, which declares that the individual own s himself .
    Such a philosophy need no longer be concerned with
    how far society and psychology allow a man to b e himself
    or become himself, or whether in the concept of
    such selfness the old evil is concentrated one more
    time . The societal relation, which seals itself off in
    the identity of the subject, is de-societalized into an
    in-itself. The individual, who himself can no longer
    rely on any firm possession, holds on to himself in his
    extreme abstractness as the last, the supposedly unlosable
    possession. Metaphysics ends in a miserable
    Consolation : after all, one still remains what one is.
    Since men do not remain what they are b y any means,
    neither socially nor biologically, they gratify themselves
    with the stale remainder of self-identity as
    something which gives distinction, both in regard to
    being and meaning. This unlosable element, which
    has no substratum but its own concept, the tautological
    selfness of the self, is to provide the ground, as Heidegger
    calls it, which the authentic possess and the
    inauthentic lack. The essence of Dasein , i. e . , what is
    more than its mere existence is nothing but its selfness
    : it is itself. The quarrel with Heidegger's language
    is not the fact that it is permeated, like any
    philosophical language, with figures from an empirical
    reality which it would like to transcend, but that it
    transforms a bad empirical reality into transcendence."
  • Nietzsche and the Abyss
    “Man is something that shall be overcome. Man is a rope, tied between beast and overman — a rope over an abyss. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not an end.”Avro

    Nietzsche’s vision reflected how he grasped the essence of his time. Further, it served as a grounding point for such thinkers as Foucault and Deleuze. Man is no more than an artificial
    construction, oscillating between the two substantial poles, between self and the thought from outside. In “I think; therefore I am,” “therefore” is no more than the abyss, covered by a rope or a bridge.

    “Self, the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the “I think” cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being,
    but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought.”
    ”The I which is fractured according to the order of time and the Self which is divided according to the temporal series correspond and find a common descendant in the man without a name, without family, without qualities, without self or I, the already-Overman.”
  • Yellow vests movement

    Let's call then No name No Aim .... Sin nombre sin objectivo.Avro

    Christophe Guilluy argued that there is “a new class conflict” in France. According to
    Guilluy, “No name No Aim .... Sin nombre sin objective” movement has deep cultural, economic, and political roots.
  • Yellow vests movement

    The French -- or at least some French -- seem to have a history of collective action which American workers don't seem to manifest. One thinks of the much more frequent strikes in France, of student demonstrations, ands so on. I don't think the French state differs all that much from other states -- they are in business to arrange the affairs of the bourgeoisie, as Marx said -- and if they have been generous with working class benefits, well, that is probably in the past.Bitter Crank

    One can hope that Americans will take a hint and follow the suit with the gilets jaunes, but I wouldn't count on it. The memory of active resistance to the power of corporation and state has, I think, become too distant for most Americans.Bitter Crank

    It looks like you think that collective memories (therefore, contemporary temporalities) are the main reason as well as the explanatory model, explaining the phenomenon of Yellow vests movement. I am not sure that it is an entirely Marxist approach.
    Considering France’s May 1968 uprising, Jean Baudrillard proposed that the revolutionary event’s temporality, being mediated by mass media, loses its explosive potential:

    “The contemporary eruption of tabloid trivia and natural disaster in the political sphere (which converges with Benjamin’s notion of the graduation of the art object to the political stage by virtue of its reproducibility). There is a tidal wave in Pakistan, a black title fight in the U.S.; a youth is shot by a bistro owner, etc. These sorts of events, once minor and apolitical, suddenly find themselves invested with a power of diffusion that lends them a social and “historic” aura. New forms of political action have crystallized around this conflictualization of incidents that were hitherto consigned to the social columns. There is no doubt that, to a large extent, the new meanings they have taken on are largely the doing of the media. Such faits divers are like undeliberated “symbolic actions,” but they take part in the same process of political signification. Doubtless, their reception is ambiguous and mixed; and if, thanks to the media, the political re-emerges under the category of faits divers, thanks to the same media the category of faits divers has totally invaded politics. Furthermore, it has changed status with the extension of the mass media: from a parallel category (descended from almanacs and popular chronicles), it has it has evolved into a total system of mythological interpretation, a closed system of models of signification from which no event escapes. Mass mediatization: that is its quintessence. It is no ensemble of techniques for broadcasting messages; it is the imposition of models. McLuhan’s formula is worth re- examining here: “The medium is the message” operates a transfer of meaning onto the medium itself qua technological structure. The general strike itself, this insurrectional myth of so many generations, has become a schematic reducing agent. That of May ’68, to which the media significantly contributed by exporting the strike to all corners of France, was in appearance the culminating point of the crisis. In fact, it was the moment of its decompression, of its asphyxiation by extension, and of its defeat. To be sure, millions of workers went on strike. But no one knew what to do with this “mediatized” strike, transmitted and received as a model of action (whether via the media or the unions). Reduced to a single meaning, it neutralized the local, transversal, spontaneous forms of action (though not all). The Grenelle accords24 hardly betrayed this tendency. They sanctioned this passage to the generality of political action, which puts an end to the singularity of revolutionary action. Today it has become (in the form of the calculated extension of the strike) the absolute weapon of the unions against wildcat strikes. The general strike itself, this insurrectional myth of so many generations, has become a schematic reducing agent. That of May ’68, to which the media significantly contributed by exporting the strike to all corners of France, was in appearance the culminating point of the crisis. In fact, it was the moment of its decompression, of its asphyxiation by extension, and of its defeat. To be sure, millions of workers went on strike. But no one knew what to do with this “mediatized” strike, transmitted and received as a model of action (whether via the media or the unions). Reduced to a single meaning, it neutralized the local, transversal, spontaneous forms of action (though not all). The Grenelle accords24 hardly betrayed this tendency. They sanctioned this passage to the generality of political action, which puts an end to the singularity of revolutionary action. Today it has become (in the form of the calculated extension of the strike) the absolute weapon of the unions against wildcat strikes.”
    Nevertheless, so far, in spite of the intensive media coverage, Yellow vests movement is still alive. Has Baudrillard’s thesis become outdated?