Yeah, someone could stipulate that they're only going to use the word "moral" when people have in mind something like a categorical imperative--and if that's the way they insist on using the term, there's probably little we could do to change their mind, but people think about what they call morality in a much broader way than that.

It's very curious that you'd think that if something only occurs in our minds, in our way of thinking about things, then we'd not be able to do the thing in question.

You missed it. Terrapin Station was most insistent. — Banno

I was demanding evidence not that that kicking puppies is wrong, but that "kicking puppies is wrong" is not only a preference that people have, a way that people feel, etc. In particular, people had claimed that "kicking puppies is wrong" is somehow in "the act itself" of kicking puppies. So I challenged that claim by asking for any evidence of it. What I'm really looking for is evidence of any moral property (or whatever we want to say moral 'stuff' is) being anywhere other than in our judgments, our feelings, our preferences, etc. It doesn't matter what the moral property would be. Folks could use anything as their example--whatever they think is easiest to demonstrate.

You have a strange understanding/confusion about nominalism then. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I wasn't characterizing that last bit as nominalism. But lol at the idea of you adopting a "teaching position" when you're not even familiar with natural kinds.

Just lots of entirely different instances of marks with their own numerical identity. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's not real that there are different things and not just one.

The fact there are seven "!" marks present. — TheWillowOfDarkness

First, per nominalism, there aren't any two of the same mark (re them literally being the same), are there?

What makes this: !!!!!!! not one mark, for example?

does the statement above have a truth value? — Banno

No.

True/false has to do with whether something matches facts or not.

Not quite, — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, quite. I take it you buy natural kinds?

Look instead for just the ought. It's right there. — Banno

You mean that it obtains somehow without being a property? :meh:

Yet, yet instance of seven marks is, itself, objectively seven marks. Nominalism doesn't get you past the identity of a given thing itself. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's not objectively "seven marks"--that's a way of thinking about the marks.

But here it is: the broken pup. What do you think? — Banno

I think I'm looking for the ought property.

And yet, objectively, here are seven exclamation marks: !!!!!! — Banno

Aren't you familiar with nominalism? No two numerically distinct things are identical. (Re there objectively being "seven" of something)

After decades of discussions with tens if not hundreds of different people about this, I'm desperate for anyone to actually provide the evidence they claim to be able to provide. Again, it's frustrating that no one ever does.

If you want to show that it fails, then provide the evidence that the two (a fact of there being or not being "broken pups" and a nonmental fact about "oughts") are the same thing somehow.

So mathematics is somewhere between objective and subjective. — Banno

No, I didn't say anything like that. It's subjective. Again, mathematics is NOT identical to any objective relations. I explicitly said that mathematics is a way we think. Thought is not objective by definition.

The evidence, presumably, would be the absence of kicked pups. — Banno

That's evidence of no kicked pups. It's not evidence of any mind-independent "ought" property.

It seems as if you don't understand the distinction, but it's very weird that you do not.

So is "seven" is mind-independent, or only subjective? — Banno

In my view numbers, mathematical objects in general, do not occur mind-independently. I'm a nominalist in various senses, including that I reject the notion of any real (or objective) abstracts. Mathematics is a way that we think about relations, with most of it an abstracted extrapolation of thought about some basic relations we experience. Mathematics is not identical to any objective relations.

So it is not true that one ought not kick pups. — Banno

It's neither true nor false. Truth value is a category error for moral claims. (See noncognitivism.)

You want to make a distinction between moral statements and empirical statements based on the evidence - is that right? — Banno

I don't want to. This has nothing at all to do with what I want. It's simply a fact that moral properties or whatever we want to call them only occur via mental activity, while other properties, other phenomena, occur independent of minds.

the difference is in the direction of fit, — Banno

I honestly have no idea what that's saying. If that's a common phrase I'm not familiar with it.

One says how things are, the other how things ought be? — Banno

Yes. But some folks want to claim that how things are can BE identical to how they ought to be. I'm inquiring just how that would be the case, just what the evidence would be for it.

Moral claims aren't true or false.

Yes, when we're talking about objective color. That's the whole point of objectivity. Objective things are not at all dependent on anyone's judgment, perception, etc. They obtain independently of us.

You're saying the blue is in the cup, — Banno

No, I'm saying its in the way electromagnetic radiation is reflected from the cup. How anyone judges a color is irrelevant to this. We can check the color objectively via a variety of instruments. It's a property of nonmental stuff.

So, this should be "So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't feel any compassion?" — Janus

Right, and if you feel compassion, and that's the sort of thing that we're talking about, then why is anyone arguing against these things being ways that individuals feel about the stuff in question?

Again, what is the baggage behind your adding "itself"? — Banno

You're saying the MORAL stuff is IN the broken pup. You're saying that it's not just a judgment that people make about the broken pup. So that's what I'm referring to with it being IN the broken pup (itself) and not elsewhere (such as how people feel about it), simply about the broken pup.

Why is kicking pups bad? — Banno

Because people FEEL that it's bad.

One person could say, "There's a broken pup. Producing broken pups is morally recommendable."

Another could say, "There's a broken pup. Producing broken pups is morally reprehensible."

You want to claim that one is getting correct properties in the broken pup itself. What properties? How do they obtain, exactly? How do we check who is getting the properties in the broken pup itself correct?

So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't see the moral import. — Banno

You're supposed to be providing EVIDENCE of the moral stuff occurring in the broken pup itself.

Saying "you don't see the moral importance?" isn't providing evidence. Where is the moral stuff IN the broken pup itself? The broken pup is a broken pup. Where is the moral stuff?

A statements of preference says what the speaker prefers for themselves. A moral statements says what the speaker prefers for everyone. — Banno

"I prefer x" is not a statement of preference? LOL

How could you claim that these "don't have anything to do with morality"? — Banno

Because it's just a broken pup and a crying child. It's not "It's good to have a broken pup" or "It's bad to have a broken pup" or "It's (morally) permissible to have a crying child" or "It's (morally) prohibited to have a crying child" or anything like that.

The MORAL part is the "It's good"/"It's bad"/etc.stuff. A broken pup is a broken pup. Absent persons' preferences/feelings/etc. the broken pup in itself doesn't say anything whatsoever about/it's not any evidence at all of anything MORAL. It's just a fact that there's a broken pup. You were supposed to be providing evidence of the MORAL part, not what the moral part is a judgment about. There's no dispute that the moral stuff is a judgment about something that's not itself a preference or feeling. The issue is whether the MORAL stuff is just preferences/feelings. To provide evidence that the moral stuff is not just preferences of feelings, you need to provide evidence of the MORAL stuff occurring outside of preferences/feelings.

Well, first I'm not arguing for an objective morality. I'm saying the objective/subjective distinction is a non-starter. — Banno

You're arguing that it's not just preferences/feelings.

And second, I have presented evidence, but for some reason you don't appear to recognise it — Banno

It can't just be any old bullshit that won't be critically challenged. You have to be able to meet the critical challenges. Everyone can just say some usually vague bs that can't meet any objections/challenges.

You listed two things that don't have anything at all to do with morality in themselves. One was listing stuff that we make moral judgments about, and the other ("avoidance") was vague, especially if it was supposed to refer to something that's not preferences/feelings--which is what you were arguing morality is not.

Here is the broken pup. Here, the crying child. These are consequences of the pup being kicked; and these are not good. — Banno

"These are not good" is a judgment you're making about the evidence you presented.

You were supposed to be presenting evidence that "These are not good" (or just "not good") is not just a statement of preferences/feelings.

It's more just annoying. I wish that one time someone who argues objective morality would follow through and present what they take to be evidence of objective moral whatevers, where they don't turn out to just be speaking so loosely that they're not actually claiming objective morality at all after all (while not wanting to admit that) or where they don't just snake off once you critically press them at all (and especially where they snake off to start the same rigamarole from the start later, in another context)

It has the flavor of dealing with conmen or sleazy salesmen. That's not how philosophical or scientific dialog should go. I've done the same stupid dance with others tens or hundreds of times over decades. Not one person has ever followed it through. But people still keep spouting the same nonsense.

Yeah, big surprise that you'd bow out without being able to support your view. Unfortunately, that won't stop you from repeating the same vague nonsense the next time this comes up.

That's a pretty gross oversimplification. — Banno

We can detail what's going on objectively in a lot more detail, but you need to do that, too.

First, you need to start by even settling on anything that you're claiming morality is objectively. Is it identical to a "broken pup"? To a non-preferential/non-intentional avoidance of broken pups (which says nothing about avoiding breaking them), or what?

Firstly, we used the word "blue" with great success before we knew that definition. — Banno

What does that have to do with anything? Blue is an electromagnetic frequency. It's just like lightning is an electrical discharge between clouds and the ground. You don't have to know that that's what lightning is in order for it to be that.

Secondly, why not say that this is what we are referring to with the term "good" - actions that avoid broken pups and crying children. — Banno

When I asked you for the evidence of something being morally wrong, you said "Here is the broken pup. Here is the crying owner." Now you've changed that to avoidance of the broken pup and crying owner. To start with re that suggestion, presumably, re arguing that this isn't just a way that anyone feels, you're not talking about someone intentionally avoiding broken pups and crying owners, you're talking about something that would count as avoidance where that's not due to a preference, right?

Where's the evidence of any blue in "the light is of such-and-such a frequency"? — Banno

That's what we're referring to with the term "blue"--light of that frequency.

Here is the broken pup. Here is the crying owner. — Banno

Where's evidence of any moral properties there?

So, does that mean that you disagree with TheWIllowOfDarkness? — Harry Hindu

I haven't read any of Willow's posts in this thread. I'd have to go back and read them. But I'd at least disagree with the idea that biological sex is a social construct, if that's something that Willow is claiming.

I'm not going to type thousands of words in one post to address a bunch of different points. One thing at a time. So from the beginning:

The signified object which I seek to convey through “Mind” is that which perceives itself as itself, and has come to recognize itself as “I”. Mind, most importantly, is the sole entity that knows-itself, through only itself. — Fobidium

I don't define "mind" as something that only involves self-awareness/an idea of an "I." Simple consciousness is sufficient, as is any emotion, desire, etc.

TheWillowOfDarkness claims that sex is just another social construct. — Harry Hindu

Hence why I wrote "(at least in the broader, conventional conversation in society)"

The logical inconsistency is in how you are conflating social construct and some personal preference. — Harry Hindu

Where am I doing anything like that? What I said was "People can feel they are different than their biological sex says they are, especially in relation to the social norms that become associated with biological sex."

That's not a conflation of the two. It simply mentions a relation between the two.

If gender is a social construct and a stereotype, then abolishing those stereotypes effectively abolishes gender. Gender would then be a non-existent thing. — Harry Hindu

Yeah, I've commented a few times in the thread now, in response to people who seemed to be denying the social aspects, that the idea of gender (re a way that someone feels) wouldn't make much sense if there weren't social norms about behavior in relation to this stuff.

Wearing jackets that say "Fuck the Draft" in court. Exhibitions of depravity as art. — tim wood

Re the first, I'd agree that wasn't done in the 18th century, but whenever I've been in court, there were restrictions on what people were allowed to wear--you'd be booted out for certain things, even in the juror pool room. That's not to say that people haven't worn whatever on some occasions, but has it ever been the case that people could routinely wear whatever they want in court? Aside from that, is clothing typically parsed as speech legally? There are a lot of clothing restrictions and laws in a lot of contexts, and I can't recall those restrictions being challenged as a freedom of speech issue (mainly because if they were, how did they hold up as freedom of speech restrictions)?

The the second, I'm not sure what you're talking about. What sort of art are we talking about re offending anyone via "exhibitions of 'depravity'"?

it can because you don't know if this universe isn't contained from other universes; — kill jepetto

The way I know that is because of the way that I use the word "universe." There can't be multiple universes. Whatever exists is the universe. I'm not saying anything other than "if x exists in any manner whatsoever, whatever its nature, whatever its relation to anything else, x is (part of) the universe (because that's what I call it)."