"Let's use the symbol 'dog' to mean those furry things with four legs that bark". Once the meaning in the language has been set, then that's that. That's what it means.

This part is the most important bit to start thinking about. Imagine that we had to write an account covering in detail exactly how this part works. It must work some way, or, well, it wouldn't work.

So leading up to it, as a bit of a caricatured/oversimplified description, since there's no dispute about this part, we've got Joe and Betty and Pete and Jane and so on all suggesting words for the language, just what the words are going to refer to in terms of other words, in terms of pointing at things and so on (this aspect we might have to get back to and detail a bit with respect to meaning, but we'll just skim over that for the moment), and they reach agreements about all of this and so on. One of the terms they reach an agreement on is "dog."

Then along comes Frank, say. Maybe he's Joe and Betty's kid, maybe he's an immigrant--whatever. He's new to our milieu. So Frank needs to learn the language. Let's first detail how he learns "dog"/what "dog" means. (And I'll have some questions as we detail this, but let's just start with how the process proceeds.)

What is required for free will.

Actually, was it even will at all? Is there such a thing as ‘will’ that ‘you’ ‘have’? — unforeseen

Isn't "will" simply the term for "I'm choosing a number," "I'm intending to do x," etc.? And if that phenomena, when it occurs, isn't of you, what is it of?

What would you say is required other than (a) will, and (b) a lack of determinism in conjunction with will?

There must be something fundamental about ethics else how does anyone ever learn what good is? — frank

One thing that happens for people to arrive at ethical stances is that most people have empathy. They observe Joey hitting Eddie, and they have a gut-level reaction against this--"Hey! Don't hit Eddie! That's not cool!"

Another thing that happens is that people observe or imagine behavior and then they intuit not only whether they're okay with letting Joey and Eddie act that way towards each other in itself, but they also can think about things like, "Okay, if we let Joey and Eddie behave that way towards each other, it's likely to lead to x (which is likely to lead to y (which is likely to lead to z etc.)), and then they intuit whether they're okay with x (and/or y (and/or z etc.)).

Usually people don't just think these sorts of things about Joey and Eddie. They apply them to a much broader population. They generalize how they feel.

And of course, society has a lot of influence on these things, as other people express the results of their own intuitions, whether individually or per the statistical norm in some culture, and as people react to behavior, including your own . . . but moral stances, to be moral stances someone actually holds, are still going to be the result of intuitions about behavior and its upshots.

Okay thanks for the answer.

Re the physical stuff, I'm a physicalist, obviously, so I think that everything is physical, including mental phenomena, including abstractions, etc. I have beliefs about what's going on with things like meaning in ontological terms (which is then a physicalist account for me). When I encounter a different, "competing" view, I'm curious what the details are, so that's why I push for that.

It depends what exactly you mean. Do you even know yourself? There's physical stuff involved. That's for sure. But I am sceptical that that provides a complete picture. If you think otherwise, you'd have to actually try to convince me - if you cared enough about my thoughts on the matter, that is. — S

Basically, the idea, very broadly--I'm not specifying my views, here, is (presumably) that were talking about things that exist or obtain somehow, and things that work via some set of (ontological) relations, perhaps interacting with each other. I was assuming that you would have a view of what's going on in this regard when it comes to meaning. So I was trying to poke/prod that out of you. If it's not something you've thought about much, so you don't really have a view on it, that's fine. It might be something worth thinking about though.

I thought that the usual approach was that God knows everything there is to know, but that doesn't include freely willed choices that you'll make, since those don't obtain prior to you making them, and they're not a causal consequence of previous states of the world.

Good. So hopefully you'll also understand me when I say that I'm a sceptic beyond the kind of answers that I've already given you. And, with that in mind, hopefully you'll restrict yourself to asking me questions of a more sensible nature, given what I've just explained. — S

So are you a skeptic that there's something going on ontologically? Or do you mean that you think there's something going on ontologically, but you have no idea what, exactly?

You use y however you use it. Let's say there's no example where I'd use y in any different way.

Then, I say, "I use x so that it's identical to y." You don't at all use x that way.

That doesn't give you any grounds to say that we use y in any different way. You only know that you don't at all use x in the same way.

First of all, do you understand what scepticism is? — S

Sure.

Okay, so you're just talking about whether x is part of a long causal chain or not.

What would that have to do with being an "eterenal being"?

Say that some phenomena can happen acasually. You'd say that it can only happen acausally via an "eternal being" I suppose. Why would you say that?

The apple question had everything to do with how feelings are not equivalent to thought/belief. — creativesoul

Not in my view. But I answered it anyway. So how about not being a rude jerk?

What difference does that make? — creativesoul

If there's no example of you using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" then there's no reason to believe that you're using "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" differently than I'm using "feelings"

I answered the apple question right? Didn't have anything to do with anything. But I answered, because you asked. If I ask you a question, answer it, whether you think it has anything to do with anything else or not.

I don't care at the moment if it does or not. I asked you a question. If you're to not be a rude a-hole, you'll answer.

Which is why I've been at pains to explain to you how your use of "feelings" is not equivalent to my use of "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour". Those two uses do not have the same referent. — creativesoul

What's an example where you'd use "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behavior" where I wouldn't use "feelings" (in this moral context)?

How about answering what I asked you now?

When we're talking about thought/belief in any context, it is never equivalent to feelings. — creativesoul

It is re the way I'm using "feelings" in this context. That's the whole point I've been making.

Say we have a gambler who owes a lot of money to a loan shark. The loan shark tells the gambler "Since you owe me and cannot pay, I promise you that your family will suffer"...

Anyone who knows what the meaning of that is knows that it ought be the case that the family will suffer. — creativesoul

How much would you wager on this:

We take 1,000 random people and tell them the first paragraph. They can't have knowledge of the test we're doing prior to this.

We then ask them, "Agree or disagree: it ought to be the case that the family will suffer"?

There's more to this, but what would you wager on the the majority of respondents saying "agree"? We can talk about why after you answer that.

You are mixing "originate" with "ultimately originate" in this discussion. "Ultimately originate" is the root cause . . . Vinegar and soda are not the root cause of mixture they produce, because they are created entities themselves, which means that there was a root cause for their creation that existed before they were created. — Henri

What are the definitions you're using of "originate," "ultimately originate," and "root cause"?

Feelings, like apples to apple pies, are necessary but insufficient for thought/belief. — creativesoul

When we're talking about thought/belief in a moral context, we're talking about ways that people feel about behavior. This has nothing to do with apples/apple fritters.

That's not a good translation. A prediction need not take if/then form. — creativesoul

I agree with that (that a prediction need not take if/then form). However, what you described was an if/then relation, and one that had nothing to do with morality.

She promised to do X. X ought be done. — creativesoul

That's a preference that someone has about behavior in relation to promises. It's a way they feel. If it's moral to them, they approve of following through with promises and do not approve of not following through.

Is an apple equivalent to an apple fritter? — creativesoul

Not in my usage.

I wouldn't go to an archeologist to find out in detail about the physical properties of an object. — S

You should if you want to know the physical properties of, say, a particular piece of pottery relative to a particular culture. Those are physical properties (as indeed all properties are).

I think that your question in terms of the physical seems inappropriate, because it contains a controversial assumption, and we should examine that controversial assumption, but your constant evasive manoeuvres - for which you've gained notoriety - make that difficult, if not impossible. — S

If you think what's going on ontologically is something nonphysical, or supernatural, or whatever, that's fine. Why can't we just plainly state your view about just what's going on ontologically, just how it works, etc.? It's difficult to address just what you think is going on ontologically, just how you think it works, if you won't tell us.

If it does then we can remove all your use of "feelings" and replace them with "thought/belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour" and not lose any meaning. — creativesoul

Yes, which, grammatical conventions aside, we could do in a context of talking about morality.

Funny. Your question was put in terms of the physical. Who knows about that better than a physicist? That's why I specifically brought up a physicist. — S

Do you think that archaeology deals with physical stuff? Do physicists know archaeology better than archaeologists? Does biology/medicine deal with physical stuff? There aren't many physicists I'd hire to take care of a cyst, say.

I go where good sense leads me. I don't put the cart before the horse by assuming physicalism and then end up grasping at straws when I hit a bump in the road. There's a problem here, but like I said, it may well be a problem with what you assume or a problem with the way you put your question. Until that's ruled out, I don't accept that it's a problem on my end rather than on yours. — S

Do you think that there are some things that don't work some way in terms of what's going on ontologically?

New mixture originates from the vinegar/soda mixture, on surface level, or on first level. Honey in my tea originates from a jar, but it doesn't mean that honey ultimately originates from a jar. — Henri

Huh? That reads like gobbledygook to me.

Reality has to have real quality of being able to produce what we see as something new, before the act of creation. If it didn't have that real quality, "new" thing would not be produced. — Henri

Again, huh?

You'd have to explain all of this so it makes any sense. Let's start with this since it's already a lot of work you'd have to do.

You agree that sodium acetate is produced in the example above, right? Does that process originate sodium acetate? If not, what's the requirement for "origination" that's not being met?

It's not something a physicist could find through science. — S

First, we're not talking about whether physicists, specifically, would work on this.

But are you claiming that what's going on is somehow "beyond science"? Do you believe that somehow it's not the case that something is going on physically here? Are you saying that you believe there are nonphysical phenomena? Is something supernatural going on?

The notion that we have free will is, in essence, an idea that willful act can ultimately originate within us. — Henri

I believe that willful acts can only originate within us, and that this is the case whether free will is possible or whether determinism is true.

But that's not possible since we are not eternal beings, but beings who were created at certain point in time. So, nothing can ultimately originate within us. — Henri

When you combine vinegar and baking soda, one of the things you produce is sodium acetate (NaC2H3O2). The sodium acetate originates in the vinegar/baking soda combination. Neither vinegar nor baking soda are eternal. They were created at a certain point in time. Yet something originated within the combination of the two. The sodium acetate wasn't present prior to combining the baking soda and vinegar we combined.

You, unfortunately, given what you're asserting here, would have to claim that it's not possible for sodium acetate to originate in the vinegar/baking soda combo.

How you gonna do necessity without PWS? What is necessity if not being true in all possible worlds? — Banno

If there's only one possible world . . .

Although we could still say that then we're talking about all possible worlds when we talk about the one.

Determinism amounts to there only being one possible world, by the way.

Again, the problem is that you're refraining from this "weird question." That's leading you to untenable ontological stances about it.

Alright, so when you say, "let's use x to mean y," how, exactly, in terms of what's going on physically, does that create x meaning y? (If you think you need to start somewhere else in the process, feel free to start wherever you need to)

What the word means is already established in English. — S

How does that happen physically?

Your subjectivism is getting in the way, causing problems. — S

The fact that you won't analyze just what's going on ontologically is the problem here.

Judge claims and other work on their own merit. Don't judge them on unrelated factors. As pointed out above, that's the genetic fallacy.

Intuition is how you figure out what your preferences are.

I don't see how it would be possible for pumpernickel to be chosen if they arent aware of it. — Harry Hindu

I'm guessing because you're conflating possibility and actuality. Is it impossible for the person to know about pumpernickel/to know that it's available? In actuality, contingently, they may now know about it, may not know that it's available, but is it impossible for them to know?

Ironically, this was your type of error from earlier on, when I was stating the meaning of "boat", and in response, you were talking about a definition.

A small vessel for travelling over water, propelled by oars, sails, or an engine. That's not a definition. A small vessel isn't composed of words. — S

The error you're making is that the only way to connect "boat" to the referent is to engage in the mental activity of associating the sound or text mark with the referent.

Correct. Agreement does not make it objective. However, if objective is "something that occurs independently of us" (I am fine with that) then surely having agreement from outside "myself" implies my subjective experience is more likely to be objectively correct - right? Isn't that why scientists have to publish? — ZhouBoTong

Isn't there pretty widespread agreement about, say, characteristics of Santa Claus or vampires? Or pretty widespread agreement about the Beatles being a good band?

Neither is any closer to being correct, especially not objectively so.

think I am fine with all of that. I would say that any single experience I have is subjective, but it can be made more objective by comparing it to other people who have had similar experiences. — ZhouBoTong

Re the way I use the terms, what makes something objective is that it occurs independently of us. Comparing, agreeing with others doesn't make something objective, and disagreeing, not comparing doesn't make something subjective.

This is a confusing example, because isn't it your position that ALL utterances are subjective? If definitions are subjective can anything be said that is NOT subjective? — ZhouBoTong

We can talk about language per se (a la utterances qua utterances, for example) or we can talk about what language is referring to, what it's about. "All utterances are subjective"--sounds like we're talking about utterances qua utterances. Above, though, we were talking about what we're referring to, what the utterances are about. If we say something about a river, we're not talking about something that is itself language, that depends on us to obtain, etc. That's only if we focus on the utterance as an utterance. "The river" is something we can say, but the river itself doesn't depend on us saying anything--it just depends on there being water in a channel, etc. Basically, this is the use/mention distinction. "The river" has two words, eight letters, two of the letter e, etc. The river, on the other hand, has no words or letters, but water, fish, etc.

In some cases, what we're referring to is something that doesn't obtain independently of us.

In other cases, what we're referring to does obtain independently of us.

So since religious people take certain claims to be objective, that is the "exact same" as someone claiming that words have consistent meaning? — ZhouBoTong

We weren't talking about whether words have "consistent meaning." The topic has been whether meaning obtains independently of us.

But surely you do not do so arbitrarily. — ZhouBoTong

No. I don't do so arbitrarily. That doesn't imply that the only alternative is to literally receive meaning from outside of me.

Why should a student NOT be allowed to argue (and actually win / get credit) any wrong answer on a test, because that is what the question "meant" to them? — ZhouBoTong

If we're talking about something like grammar, say--something where there is nothing that's objectively correct or incorrect, what we're teaching are conventions. And it's objectively correct or incorrect that such and such is the convention. (For example, it's objectively correct that there's a convention to end a sentence with a period. It's not objectively correct that there's a convention to end a sentence with an open parentheses sign.)

If we're asking for definitions, we're asking for conventional definitions. And so on.