First, I’d have to have a reason for so doing, — Mww

Well, what was the reason for adopting the theory you adopted in the first place?

Oh, I understand, but I want to get us to do some philosophy rather than focusing just on your personality quirks.

Correct. The support is in the theory. Or, the support is the theory. And, as we all know, good theory must be falsifiable. — Mww

You could just as well posit a contradictory theory. Why not believe that one instead?

The point being that it's a dubious empirical claim, Probably due to psychological projection from the author.

Are you aware of all the options within the given amount of time? If you were, then how could you ever make the wrong choice? — Harry Hindu

Make a wrong choice about something like what bread you're choosing or what album you're putting on? I wouldn't say I could make a wrong choice about things like that. The only choices I'd call wrong would be something like an answer in a multiple choice quiz, where there's a correct answer.

I don't see how that is possible — Harry Hindu

Weird (that you wouldn't see how that's possible).

A very simple example: I'm riding my bike. I come to point where I need to make a choice to go right or left. I pick on a whim, doing the mental equivalent of "flipping a coin."

The naturally occurring information impressed on sense as appearance is a different form than the procedural information in the brain that gives representation of the appearance. — Mww

That's the claim, isn't it? It's not a support of the claim.

I'm saying that it is because you can only choose options you are aware of. — Harry Hindu

I don't know what sort of determinism that's supposed to be. It seems odd to call making a choice from a pool of many thousands of things things, say (if one is choosing an album to listen to, for example), "determinism."

As I've pointed out many times, I make some choices that are phenomenally random--no reason for them, just pure whim.

But if you could somehow see space-time...but couldn't see matter, could you put it the other way, ie
'matter isn't a thing in itself, it just supervenes on space-time and its relationships' ? — wax

I don't know how that would make sense, though. I can't make sense of there being anything that's not matter or some relation of matter.

2. We assume N and only N. (= ex nihilo)
3. We assume (hypothetically) some (existing) object. (creatio ex nihilo) — Pippen

The problem with this is that you're contradicting yourself. It doesn't say anything about ontology. If you're assuming N and only N, you can't assume something else too.

You're rather not understanding because you want the discussion to go in a manner that you've already prepared for. I'm not arguing with you about "nothing creates appearances" being an appearance. I'm asking you what that appearance looks like (or sounds like, or whatever sense is appropriate).

There's a difference between only being aware of a representation/a mental creation of a basketball and being directly aware of the basketball. The latter doesn't imply that a basketball is literally in your head.

You're saying that "they came from nothing" is an appearance. I'm wondering what that appearance looks like. It doesn't look like my dreams, because they look like something, not like "they came from nothing."

But my dreams look like something, not like nothing creating something.

So what does "nothing is creating it" look like?

But you had just said that it's not an appearance: "no. It is nothing not a something. Which means it is not created."

So where is the claim that literally nothing created it coming from if that's not an appearance?

"Literally nothing is creating it" is the appearance?

Why would we settle on representationalism as the theory rather than alternatives?

In dreams, that which appears is the contents of consciousness.

In conscious awareness, that which appears are intuitions representing sensory impressions — Mww

Isn't that theoretical?

Presumably it seems I'm something your mind is creating? That's the only experience of me?

You either have a medical problem or you're stuck in some juvenile theorizing.

In my world, the experience is not normally of me watching a TV. There's just the TV.

To think that there always has to be me perceiving other things in some relation to them, I have to posit the other things, which defeats the argument you're attempting. (Or otherwise experience has to be different than it is in my world, so that it's always experience of perception qua perception or something like that . . . which would make me wonder if something isn't going on medically)

Maybe it's being self-centered. You see everything as you somehow? In my world, there's often just a TV or whatever. It's not a phenomenon of me perceiving a TV. Sometimes I have a phenomenon of me perceiving a TV, especially if something unusual is going on, like it gets blurry, but normally, no.

There's just a TV. With no experiential phenomenon of it being a perception of a TV.

In your world, there's only direct experience of perceptions qua perceptions?

Interesting, so I'd have to wonder if maybe something unusual is going on with you medically.

They're not saying something about people agreeing with "objective fact"

Again, are you saying you're unfamiliar with direct experience of things like TVs?

There is direct experience of a television set, say. Are you not familiar with this?

I guess it's more the idea that the faster we develop various avenues, the faster we get weary of it.. — schopenhauer1

Otherwise known as "speaking for everyone."

Direct experience or first person subjective. Which is the only thing there is. — Nobody

There is direct experience of a lot of different things, including objective things. So that would suggest the opposite of your conclusion.

There is only one reference frame. The frame of the observer. — Nobody

What do you count as an empirical support of this?

Are you basically referring to the "social contract" idea in your own words?

A simple definition is "an implicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for social benefits, for example by sacrificing some individual freedom for state protection. Theories of a social contract became popular in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries among theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, as a means of explaining the origin of government and the obligations of subjects."

And here's a more in-depth explanation:
https://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/

We assume that there is appearances in one hand and in the other hand there is objective medium sourcing these appearances..but what are this so called objective medium but another appearance!. — Nobody

"But what is this so-called objective medium . . . from the reference frame of being a person observing it" do you mean? Because from a different reference frame, for example, the reference frame of the objective medium, how would it be an appearance in the same sense of "appearance"?

A way to think of it is that we don't perceive form or matter, we perceive substances (like apples, people, etc.) Those substance have properties (form) that can be identified. But a substance is more than a formalism, it is also material - the substance pushes back when you push on it. This is Aristotle's hylomorphism. — Andrew M

A problem with this is we perceive properties. So if properties are form, we perceive form. Also "pushes back when you push on it" is a property, a property that we perceive.

Space and time aren't "things in themselves," they supervene on matter and its relations.

I do not think that what you have said actually is in accordance with common usage of "rule". A rule is a principle, so to learn a rule is to learn a principle. When one person imitates another, that person is copying. To copy another is not to learn the rule, we learn this in grade school. That's why copying is not allowed. We must each learn the rules, the principles involved in what we are being taught, and copying from another does not qualify as learning the rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a good point in that there's a lot of conventional behavior that people do not condone. For example, it's a convention to acquire alcohol and drink in excess at parties organized by high schoolers. Is that thus a rule? It has to be if being conventional is sufficient to be a rule.

It's conventional if a girl gets pregnant in high school to have an abortion. Is it a rule, then, that if you get pregnant in high school that you're to have an abortion?

According to normal usage conventionally established patterns of behavior are rules. Think of the road rule: drive on the left hand side of the road (in Australia). If one consistently drives on the left hand side of the road merely on account of following what everyone else does; that is following a rule. Standing in queues is another example. — Janus

I'm not saying you can't use "rule" however you want to use it, but I can't recall anyone using it simply for conventions. Everyone I've encountered uses "rule" with a stronger connotation than that. Driving on a particular side of the road is indeed a rule, because it's a law, and if you break it, you'll be ticketed, etc. If simply being a convention is enough to be a rule, then it's a "rule" that during slow songs at a concert, you engage and hold high your lighter (or now your phone). I just never knew anyone who would call that a rule.

But seriously, csalisbury has a point. Why build a philosophical theory of language without consulting history to see whether there is evidence humans actually acquired language that way? — Marchesk

Well, it seems pretty obvious. As Baden noted, "It's trivially true that language originated in humans."

And I do not expect you to agree with me. This is, after all, philosophy. However I think we can both see that we're at the point where we basically believe or do not believe a proposition, and we're kind of at the part where we're just asserting our belief -- we have tried to show the other what we mean, but failed. — Moliere

Isn't there any way to discover which side is correct?