So they admit it's irrational? Good. Discussion over. — NKBJ

They'd probably say arational, not irrational.

Rationality isn't even everything in terms of rationality.

There is a lot of disagreement on many aspects of rationality, with that often being fundamentally irreconcilable.

If that weren't the case, we wouldn't have tons of longstanding academic disputes, we wouldn't have academic developments outside of empirical discoveries, etc.

I can't help but think that some of this stems from misunderstandings--namely, believing that relativists and/or subjectivists are more or less saying that morality is wildly divergent from person to person, and that it's essentially arbitrary. But no one is actually claiming anything like that.

What I'm saying is that morality/moral stances are something that occurs in minds only (which I believe are brains functioning in particular ways). I'm saying that moral stances do not occur outside of minds. I'm not saying anything suggestive of moral stances being arbitrary, being necessarily widlly divergent, etc.

I'm essentially making a claim about the location of a phenomenon.

There are upshots to what I'm saying, upshots where it makes a difference if we're saying that something only occurs in brains functioning in mental ways versus elsewhere, but the core idea is that moral stances only occur in brains functioning in mental ways.

Except for the last question above, it's not clear to me what you're asking in this thread, Wallows, or what specific point you'd be making.

I think my criteria is a supremely good one for the specific problem at hand. — SteveKlinko

If you have different "what counts as an explanation" criteria for different contexts, you'd need to justify that. Part of justifying it would involve being explicit about the differing criteria, so you'd still need to present "what counts as an explanation" criteria in general and not just for one context.

What we still need to figure out, but you won't answer is why you believe that if something is a "product" of our bodies, then it would be inexplicable for that thing to be significantly similar from person to person.

Not to mention that you seem to be inconsistent in your belief about this, because you think that we all significantly similarly perceive objective moral stances . . . unless somehow you believe that perception is not of our bodies. But then how do you get to acknowledgement of objective moral stances, etc.? At some point I'd think you'd have to involve our bodies.

This point is nonsense. — Rank Amateur

I really wish you'd read it and remember it, though. That you and others won't is why I have to explain it tens, if not hundreds of times, and why I'll continue to have to do so.

I have given you all a challenge, show that relative morality is a better explanation than some degree of objective morality for the near universal moral judgments on some actions. — Rank Amateur

Here's a very simple reason why:

Under subjectivist morality, the only explanation that we need for near-universal moral judgments is that our bodies develop in similar ways--a notion that's quite uncontroversial for most things (otherwise medicine wouldn't work, we'd not be able to explain why almost everyone has ten fingers and ten toes, etc.).

Under objectivist morality, we need to both posit (1) that moral stances somehow occur independently of us, and (2) that we perceive them, cognize them, etc. significantly similarly, which we'd still only solve by positing that our bodies develop in similar ways (due to genetics, environmental influences, etc., just as above).

So per Occam's razor, subjectivist morality is the simpler approach; it doesn't posit unnecessary (and frankly unsupportable) entities. Objectivist morality has to posit the same thing that subjectivist morality posits (bodies thinking things, expressing moral stances, etc.), and it would have to explain commonality on that end via the same approach (bodies developing similarly, with similar abilities, etc., due to genetics, common environmental factors, etc.); but it posits things additional to that, too. The only way it could avoid doing this is by attempting to take bodies out of the equation, but I don't know how you'd do that and still talk about people agreeing on moral stances, people behaving morally, etc.

By the way, I'm saying "subjective" above, not "relative," because we keep using "relative" in contexts where that's not really what we're saying (and I really mean "we" there--I've done this many times, too, in the guise of going with the flow of the thread). Relative ethics/morality is broader than subjectivist ethics/morality (and not even necessarily overlapping with it). Relativists can be objectivists. They can believe that something occurs independently of persons. They'd just say that the thing in question can differ due to differing relations. All of that can be independent of persons on a relativist view. It's subjectivists who say that the thing in question is dependent on persons. Also, subjectivists are usually relativists (as I am), but they wouldn't have to be. A subjectivist could say that something depends on persons, but that it's invariable as such, and thus not relative at all.

An easy way to remember that relativists can be objectivists is to think of physics. Special and general relativity in physics aren't conventionally positing subjective phenomena. They're conventionally seen as claims about objective reality--ways that objective reality is relativistic.

I don't see how any of that says anything that shows relative morality is a better explanation of near unanimous moral judgments — Rank Amateur

Why do you believe that if something is a "product" of our bodies, then it would be inexplicable for that thing to be significantly similar from person to person?

Non-sequiturs won't do here. — creativesoul

Aren't non-sequiturs only pertinent to arguments? I wasn't forwarding an argument in what you quoted relative to this response. I was simply making some comments.

There's an argument. You are objecting to the primary premiss. The primary premiss is both true and verifiable. — creativesoul

I don't know what argument you're talking about there, but it must be obvious that I don't agree that the primary premise of whatever argument is true.

Moral agency is existentially dependent upon thinking about the rules of behaviour. The rules of behaviour are statements of thought/belief. — creativesoul

Wait so insofar as my ontology of ethics/morality goes, where exactly do you disagree with me?

I might disagree with the nose analogy — Rank Amateur

You mean that you do not believe that noses are "of bodies"?

Do they grow behind rocks and then travel to your face?

It does seem a tad ironic that the group who argue relative and subjective in regard to morality, act as if this particular view of morality is objectively true. — Rank Amateur

You're probably reading "Morality is subjective" as me saying something other than "Morality is of bodies" in the sense that "Noses are of bodies," despite the fact that I've tried to correct that misunderstanding tens of times (if not hundreds in general on the board)

Gosh, I never thought of that! Imagine that: there are preferences, and, what they are, are preferences. I'm glad to have that information! Move on. — tim wood

Yet you and others continually suppose that per relativist ethics, when an individual is confronted with a different moral stance than their own, they will suddenly be incapable of having or expressing a preference. So how do we explain your cognitive difficulties here?

Good point. I think the process happens in reverse too. Lots of things I liked when younger are impossible to enjoy now. — old

I've never been able to relate to "outgrowing" any artworks. My tastes have always just broadened. I still like everything I used to like.

It's like we have to keep repeating the same kindergartenish explanations over and over in response to the same "Let's play stupid" straw men.

Philosophy can't be just about pretending to be learning disabled.

Like you, I tried to show on some moral questions there would be a near universal view. The only relativinist answer to this is an amazing coincidence — Rank Amateur

I actually explained this to you a couple times already. It's no more a coincidence than the fact that we all have noses above our mouths. We don't have to say that noses above our mouths are NOT something that our bodies do, do we?

hen it should be easy as pie for you to present something - — tim wood

We're explained to you many times that the fact that moral stances are preference-based doesn't imply that one doesn't have preferences--that's pretty obvious, isn't it? They wouldn't be preferences otherwise.

If you're strictly focusing on "reasons that might persuade someone else," how in the world are you arriving at a notion that just in case something is an extramental fact and can be supported with non-personal reason(s), then other people have to be persuaded by it? You could only think something like that if you've been living in a bubble all your life.

I think the idea is that mental phenomena are subject to bias and subjective limitations which weaken conclusions while if something can be confirmed seperate from those bias’s and subjective limitations then its a stronger conclusion. — DingoJones

The whole notion that we'd be confirming everything independently of mentality is already the bias though.

In other words, if something exists only as mental phenomena, then all we need to confirm is that someone has whatever mental phenomenon. The notion that it should be (or needs to be or whatever) something additional is already the bias against mental phenomena.

You'd think that we'd simply want to peg what things really are, and not be biased against simple facts.

Definitely valuable in my opinion to spend time with someone who knows some artform inside and out. They can help you understand it better, help you tune in to its nuances, etc.

We just have to be careful to not veer towards thinking that their aesthetic assessments--re what's good, bad, better, worse, etc.--are anything like facts, or that they can be correct or incorrect.

And we can gain just as much spending time with someone who knows Michael Bay-type films inside and out, or commercial pop music a la Britney Spears, Kesha, Pitbull, etc. Those folks can also help you understand that stuff better, help you tune in to its nuances, etc.

But it's impossible for a numeric property — Devans99

If the age of the universe is infinite, it's not a numeric property. I'm repeating what I just said.

And that claim, or at least the claim that his movies are garbage, can be rationally argued on the basis of a number of criteria including characterization, plot, use of language, imagery, quality of acting, etc. etc. In other words, we're talking of opinions, but not just opinions. Some opinions matter more than others because they're supported better. — Baden

How would you rationally support an opinion that x characteriation is better than y characterization, a plot elements are better than b plot elements, etc.?

Just as with ethics, it's all going to simply come down to preferences that some individual(s) has.

If you agree infinity is not a number then you must also agree that properties of reality of a numeric nature (such as age of the universe) cannot take infinity as their value. — Devans99

If the universe if infinitely old, then the age of the universe is not numeric, by definition.

The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number.
2. Which is a contradiction; can’t be a number and greater than any number — Devans99

"The number of events in an infinite regress" -- there is no number of events in an infinite regress. Infinity is not a number.

"It's greater than any number" -- yes, but it's not itself a number. Again, infinity is not a number.

"Which is a contradiction--can't be a number and greater than any number" --a number can't be greater than any number, but infinity is not a number.

That's the error there.

You are agreeing with me. — Devans99

No, I'm not. Your argument is based on conceiving of an infinite regress as a number. Infinity is not a number. Hence your argument is flawed from the start. There's no logical contradiction if infinity is not a number.

Why are we teaching opinions in school? — ZhouBoTong

There are a lot of value objectivists around, even in academia.

Some of it might be due to people mistaking strongly stated opinions, where the bearer realizes that it's just an opinion, as objective claims, but definitely there are some value objectivists in academia.

It would appear, then, that if the persons of the relativists on this thread were gathered away somewhere and informed that the lord of the castle intended to murder them, the best they could do is say, "Are you sure that he wants to?" And on being answered in the affirmative, would have to reply, "Ok, then, we just needed to know that he wants to. As long as he wants to, then, we have no complaint."

Is that about right? — tim wood

Are you voluntarily trying to come across as stupid?

It would be possible to have a good discussion about this sort of stuff where the discussion isn't solely fueled by straw men and playing stupid.

For any infinite regress, you can number off the events sequentially so there is no error. — Devans99

Yes there is an error:

The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number. — Devans99

Suggests that you do not understand the concept of infinity. Infinity is not a number.

You talk about using reason to persuade people of both methods and perhaps moral values they might actually prefer if only they tried them — Isaac

Reason is important in figuring out how to appeal to someone, but re the present topic, you have to know the moral stances that person already holds, especially their core/foundational stances. Particularly if you can find some apparent conflict with other stances they hold, you can try to persuade them to another stance via an appeal to consistency. That might not work, but it can, and does often enough, that it can be worth trying.

This is interesting, to say the least. Did you come up with emotivism? Except for those who happen to be rah rah conformity, you say? Why should we equate what's right with what feels right, and vice versa? — creativesoul

Have I ever suggested that any view should be adopted because it's popular?

You should adopt a view akin to emotivism because it's factually correct, it's what the world is like.

Moral agency is thinking about morality. — creativesoul

Aren't you using the "capacity to act" definition of "agency"?

What's weird about it? — creativesoul

What's weird about it is that it's difficult to understand where anyone got the idea that there's something inherently inferior about mental phenomena. Especially since mental phenomena are so central to us as sentient beings. The need to place (almost) all phenomena outside of us, so that mentality is, at best, always just perception, is ridiculous. (And in fact, some people want to even do away with perception being mental, or want to do away with minds altogether.)

Haven't you ever taken an action that you thought/believed and/or strongly felt was good, right. and/or moral at the time only to later find out that you were sorely mistaken? — creativesoul

I've had different views at different times, sure. That's one thing that moral stances are relative to--time.

The number of events in an infinite regress is greater than any number. — Devans99

The error there would be that you're calling it a number in the first instance-- "The number of events."

Morality is codified rules of behaviour. Code is language. — creativesoul

(1) that would amount to ignoring a significant portion of the phenomena that people typically characterize as morality, moral stances, etc.,

(2) it either ignores or gets wrong what meaning is/how meaning works,

and

(3) it ignores that someone feeling one way or the other about interpersonal behavior--assessments of permissibility, etc. is a unique phenomenon, contra for example behaving in a way that doesn't upset the apple cart in relation to other persons' behavior precipitated by their feelings about interpersonal behavior. In other words, there's an important difference between Joe feeling that it's wrong for him as a 40 year-old to have sex with eager 13 year-olds and Joe behaving in accordance with the prohibition of such sex because of the social repercussions of it should he engage in that activity and be found out.

I think religion (using the exact words from the OP title) is "better for us", because it encourages us to behave better. — Pattern-chaser

What if you don't agree with a lot of the ethical stances of the major religions?

otherwise you have an infinite regress which is impossible. — Devans99

It's not impossible, it's just counterintuitive.

One common way to use the term "impossible" is to refer to something that would amount to a logical contradiction--an instance of P & ~P. I presume you're not using the term that way, though. What sense are you using instead?

Well, for one, it's not as if it's simply the case of an authority imposing some rule or other than almost all of the citizenry opposes uniformly. Different people agree/disagree with different things.

Not wanting to be imprisoned is one of the big reasons. That at least motivates providing the appearance of following authority when one is most at risk.

We'd be over-run with cranks and crackpot theories. — unenlightened

I'd have to see some evidence that we're getting tens of "crank and crackpot" threads that moderators are deleting daily. It's a pretty dubious claim.

I'm a relativist in general, so . . .

Also, re a term like "absolute honesty," I'd want to even clarify just what that's supposed to amount to.

If God was in charge, we could all rest easy in our armchairs, but alas moderators always have to make judgements they are not qualified for, and so we have feedback for their education and improvement. — unenlightened

How about they just don't make (philosophical, scientific, etc.) content decisions? There's no need for that, especially because the board is relatively slow as it is.

Brilliant idea for everyone--including moderators, to can the thread but nevertheless start debating about it in this thread instead, as if it's worthwhile to spend time on. lol

Truth/falsehood is different idea than honesty/dishonesty.

Truth/falsehood have to do with whether a proposition has a specific relation, such as correspondence, to the way the world is (facts).

Honesty/dishonesty have to do with whether someone is accurately reporting what they believe, what they feel, etc. If they're accurately reporting this, they're being honest.

If your neighbor believes that he's really Count Dracula, he's being honest with you when he tells you as much--"I'm really Count Dracula."

But most people are not going to think that it's true that he's Count Dracula. So honesty and truth are different.

It's problematic to have moderators make moderation judgments about content--that is, the philosophical, scientific, etc. merit of anything--even if there's reason to believe that they're qualified to do so.

It's more problematic when there's no good reason to believe that they're qualified to do so.

Let the participants sort out for themselves whether they feel anything has merit. The moderators should be primarily getting rid of spam a la advertising, things like people flooding the board with threads, etc.

To exist you must first start existing. — Devans99

Not if something always existed.

It's like you don't even understand how English works. Stop repeating the same nonsense over and over after we correct it

or there was a start to it' which leads to a start of time. Which rules out presentism. — Devans99

No it doesn't, because presentism doesn't posit that time didn't start. Again, this has been pointed out to you again and again.