? Using "transmute" instead doesn't change anything except we'd substitute that word. The materials in question are transmuted (not from nothing). "One" is those transmuted materials once that occurs.

The general idea here is that there is a world, and there is non-existence. Prior to ones birth into the world, one was in a state of non-existence, and was somehow plucked or pulled out of that state into being. — Inyenzi

Actually the idea is that prior to conception, there is no "one" in any state. Conception creates one. It doesn't create one "out of nothing." It creates one out of sperm and an egg. That's not nothing.

"Random" typically has a connotation of "equiprobable." If there are two options and a random selection on many iterations, theory has it that option A would be chosen about 50% of the time and option B about 50% of the time. Likewise, if there are three options, A, B and C would all be chosen about 33% of the time.

On the other hand, if determinism is the case, then there aren't really two options, and given antecedent state x, then immediately consequent state y must follow 100% of the time, and any other scenario is actually impossible--it has zero chance of occurring at any stage, even though we may believe or be able to conceive otherwise.

Well, there's another possibility. It could be the case that there are two options, but there's something/some way to bias things so that they're not equiprobable. That could involve anything from a 99-point something chance that one is chosen rather than the other (where the other still has a non-zero possibility of being chosen), to just over a 50% chance that one will be chosen over the other.

Free will could typically involve such biasing.

But patterns are not physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

You'd have to explain that if you mean it literally. If you're saying that physical laws per se aren't physical things, that would be more understandable. Surely you're not claiming that, say, a pattern on a checkered shirt isn't physical?

Just to re-focus: the discussion about whether only particular things are real, or whether universals are also real, is not an empirical question, because it's *not* about existing phenomena. — Wayfarer

This is incorrect. It is about what phenomena exist, what those phenomena are like. That's empirical and metaphysical.

No, you are right...

Cameras freeze three dimensional fields of color onto two dimensional a surface.

...so, yes, you are wrong. — Merkwurdichliebe

Re the principle of charity, I'm trying to figure out any way your comment might make sense in the context of understanding my comment and . . . well, I just can't figure out a way.

as soon as you argue about ‘what kinds of things exist’ then you’re no longer talking empiricism but philosophy — Wayfarer

The two aren't mutually exclusive.

How many species of X there are, how many types of Y, what causes A to happen - they’re empirical questions. — Wayfarer

And that's how many species of x exist, how many types of y exist, etc.

How is nominalism an empirical argument, then? — Wayfarer

We're talking about what the world is like factually, empirically. Either only particulars exist or universals exist too (or instead). That's a matter of what sorts of things there are, just like any other empirical matter.

First - your argument is not empirical, but metaphysical. — Wayfarer

No, first, I'm not forwarding an argument in the sense of premises implying some conclusion.

Secondly, it is empirical, and metaphysical and empirical are not distinct in the manner in which you're trying to suggest.

Let's sort through those two things before moving on.

But, you haven't given any argument for it. You've simply said 'Because of nominalism, it can't be true'. — Wayfarer

So, nominalism isn't the case because of an argument for it. It's the case because it's what the world is like factually.

It's just like the surface of the Earth being 75% water isn't the case because of an argument for it. It's the case because that's what the Earth is like factually.

Now, if someone doesn't believe that the surface of the Earth is 75% water, we'd have to figure out why they believe something other than that, and we can try to find ways to convince them otherwise, which might include something like deductive arguments, but that's all about trying to persuade someone. The facts in no way hinge on an argument.

To say that it has anything to do with what I like or dislike is comical. I don't like/dislike that the Earth is 75% water. It's just a fact that it is. By the same token, I don't like or dislike that nominalism is the case. It just is. Those are the facts. It's what the world is like whether we are fond of the fact or not, whether we're aware of it or not, etc.

If your principles are challenged by an argument, then you've either got to defeat the argument or change your principles. — Wayfarer

It's not my "principles," per se, it's the way the world factually happens to be (on this view, of course, but it's an empirical matter). The argument is defeated because it's positing something false about the world.

A motor would require intelligence to construct it. — Devans99

Intelligence would require a motor to run it.

The Establishment of Religion clause in the U.S. constitution was a result of centuries of people attempting to stop certain expressions of religious thought.
The thought in the clause is to permit everything but not let any of those expressions become the basis of civil discourse in the formation of law.
It may not be perfect but may be better than the state acting upon opinions regarding religious expression. — Valentinus

Good post.

I thought you were trying to say something, — bert1

lol

offering evidence for a conclusion.

Exactly. Which doesn't imply anything like a deductive argument.

The premises do not mention consciousness, yet consciousness appears in the conclusion.
The conclusion is a general statement about consciousness, but the premises are all about experiences in humans. — bert1

Is that addressing my question?

First off, I'm not forwarding anything in the manner of a deductive argument. Why would you be reading it that way?

...there's too much missing. I'm not insisting on a strictly deductively valid argument, but I'd like to see some of the gaps filled in. — bert1

Gaps such as?

Look in the cupboard for a red cup. Inside it you will find coffee. You cannot dip your finger into that red cup of coffee. — creativesoul

No idea what that's supposed to be referring to.

But physics is the study of the mathematic principles which determine the behavior of these material objects. — Dusty of Sky

lol

It's not enough for a more general conclusion, such as the one you give: — bert1

Why not? It seems to be more than enough for that. You'd have to try to support why you feel otherwise

Have you come up with a coherent account of shared meaning yet? — creativesoul

I've had a coherent account of how meaning works for decades. I don't know if I explained it to you in any detail or not in the past.

We need to clarify, by the way, just how you're using "shared" there. We'd not be talking about different instances of the same (exact, logically identical) thing, because there are no such things in general (I'm a nominalist).

What is it that assigns phenomenological significance to my immediate sensory experience? The mind. — Merkwurdichliebe

Assigning significance is something that minds do, sure.

That's just switching the topic.

Again, it's switching to "what is it that changes focal lengths?" so that we're suddenly talking about cameras qua cameras instead.

Just think about the argument on its merits. If you can demonstrate something wrong about it, then I'll revise my view. — Wayfarer

The problem with it on my view is that you're positing numerically distinct identicals (as in different instances of "the same (exact/identical) thing"), and there are no such things on my view (as I'm a nominalist).

One argument for this is that exactly the same ideas can be represented in completely different symbolic forms. — Wayfarer

Don't you have to not be a nominalist to believe that that can be literally true?

What I'm struggling with is what you can conclude from these, other than such and such experience in humans is dependent on such and such brain function in humans. — bert1

Why isn't that enough? What else are you looking for?

According to the physical world. — praxis

You'd have to explain how that's working in your view, because it just seems like a completely random thing to say.

My imagination? — praxis

lol

The entire world of the camera in your analogy is comprised of photographs. — praxis

According to what?

It means that only photographs exist... — praxis

Obviously not only photographs exist. But a camera is necessary to take photographs of things. Not everything is a photograph, obviously. A photograph is a specific thing that a camera does.

That's just not obviously not only minds exist. But minds are necessary to conceive things. Not everything is a concept, obviously. Concepts are specific things that minds do.

all phenomena is a product of the mind. — Merkwurdichliebe

This is false.

Terrible analogy. — Merkwurdichliebe

Because?

That's like saying that anything requires a camera to photograph it. Yeah, but that doesn't mean that only cameras exist.

You could if you wanted to be wrong. ;-)

I think a multi-varied analysis from the perspective of many disciplines can reveal a lot about any topic. We just need to refrain from committing the reductionist error of equating the explanation with the thing we are trying to explain. — Merkwurdichliebe

What we need to be more careful about is equating arbitrary causes with the phenomenon in question.

Good article about the 'me,' the 'self,' self awareness, and consciousness. https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg23931940-100-the-me-illusion-how-your-brain-conjures-up-your-sense-of-self/ — julian kroin

I don't understand why they're calling it an "illusion" in that article.

Sure, once you build up a big enough database then you can infer meaning from the data, but what is the nature of 'that which infers meaning'? — Wayfarer

I don't think I understand what you're asking there. If I read the question literally, you're asking "what is the nature of "individuals thinking about x in a semantic manner," but then I'm not sure why you'd be asking that.

At any rate, the example I gave is just one example. Other sorts of examples include people ingesting substances that have effects on their consciousness or thinking, brain injuries having effects on the same, etc.

There's no disagreement concerning how we come to adopt our first morals(original language acquisition). — creativesoul

Actually, there's definitely disagreement over that. There's no way that language (especially about morals) would come before morals.

In general, human thought/belief about morals has grown in complexity — creativesoul

I don't agree with that, either.

Morals aren't just physical. — creativesoul

Or that. With that one, I don't believe that anything exists that isn't just physical.

Not when we're talking about it. — Merkwurdichliebe

We shouldn't focus on x qua x when we're talking about it. We should focus on the preconditions for x. Ohhhkay.

Shouldn't we focus at least as much on a phenomenon as the phenomenon rather than just talking about preconditions for it?

Should we list all of the causes/preconditions? Wouldn't that be encyclopedia-length?

The big bang is a cosmological event. How are you using it to explain the source of morality? Explain yourself. — Merkwurdichliebe

The point is that it's exactly the same thing as you're doing by talking about social stuff. The social things mentioned aren't identical to morality by any means. They were given as causes, as necessary conditions for morality to arise. Well, the big bang is just as much a cause, a necessary condition for morality to arise. How in the world is the social stuff supposed to explain morality in a way that the big bang doesn't? Neither is morality itself. They're just preconditions for it.

I'm not sure what makes a cause adequate or not. What would an adequate cause look like? — Merkwurdichliebe

Why are you asking me? It was your idea. Don't you know what you meant when you wrote "although it is a necessary factor in such explanation, as it stands, it is detrimentally inadequate for explaining the source of morals"? What makes something adequate or not?

I do know, however, that which makes an explanation adequate is coherence, consequence, and maybe a little authority. — Merkwurdichliebe

So "the big bang" isn't coherent, has no consequence or authority? I must not know what those words refer to very well.