What about higher/lower... more/less... — bongo fury

Those are quantitative. "Quantitative" doesn't have to refer to an exact/known quantity.

"Same/different" is qualitative.

It takes a particular kind of abstraction to think that we perceive things in their neutrality first, — StreetlightX

You can't perceive how we think about something, how we value it, etc.

"Perception" has a connotation of "sensing information from outside of us." How we think about things, value them, etc. isn't something that exists outside of us for us to perceive.

This is not to suggest that we don't think about things however we do, value them however we do, etc. at whatever stage in the process, but it's not perceiving those things.

No, although I could easily be. I think there is external matter. It's the division of some of it into 'table' I think is arbitrary. — Isaac

In order to refer to the external matter, we have to use a type term, since that's how language works. So you're again getting confused here because you're conflating concepts and what they're in response to/about/of.

No one is saying that the external matter is a table a la the concept of a table. But we have to refer to it some way to talk about it in a setting like this. So we have to use terms like "table."

I don't think there's any one 'kind of thing' we see. I mean, I'm mostly on board the embodied cognition train that says we see for the most part "affordances", opportunities for action, sites of relief and rest, goals to arrive at, hazards and safety, speed and rest, and so on. Perception understood in a bodily sense, according to categories that matter to living, moving, metabolizing beings. We perceive significance far more than we perceive things and stuff (phenomenology teaches us this: perception is normative). We're animals before we're anything else. — StreetlightX

So in other words, you're conflating how we think about things, how we evaluate and value them, etc., with what we're perceiving.

I don't think there is such a thing as a 'table' outside of our experience of it, — Isaac

So you're an idealist?

"Property" doesn't imply "universal" or "type," by the way.

I hope that this isn't a matter of once again confusing our concepts qua concepts and what the concepts are in response to or of.

What do you think that properties are? I'm asking because apparently you think they're something separate from other things that somehow can "attach" to them.

I'm a nominalist, so you're going wrong somewhere.

You believe that objects wouldn't have various ways they are, various characteristics, etc.? How would that make any sense?

What you'd think we see other than properties, who knows?

What does "from the perspective of the experience" mean here? — Isaac

As opposed to talking about the table as the table. Or from the perspective of the table, using "perspective" in the sense it's used in the visual arts.

(In other words, what I just explained above re the post with (a) and (b) where I explained that (b) are qualia.)

It almost seems like you're intentionally trying to not understand this, because you don't want to, or because you want to be difficult or something like that, because it's difficult to believe that it would be this difficult for you to grasp these relatively simple ideas.

ou were referring to any property of experience that isn't a numerical? — Isaac

Yes.

So the property of judgement — Isaac

Qualia talk is typically focused on experiencing things-in-the-world, not our own mental content per se. So in other words, experiencing sights and sounds and tactile sensations and so on, and not our judgments and desires and emotions and so on.

Could we talk about our own mental content in terms of qualia? Sure, but that's kind of redundant, because the whole issue is focused on properties per experience being non-identical to objective properties.

So if one were an ontological idealist or a solipsist, the whole issue would be moot, because you'd think that there's no difference between a table and the table in your experience. You'd think that everything IS your experience, or at least is experience without necessarily being yours. (Although possibly in the latter case this would still be an issue, since there would be no way to know that different experiences were similar).

It's not a complicated idea, by the way. It's just that some people deny qualia, partially because they don't want it to be the case that there's something about mentality that's inherently third-person-inaccessible, because that's a problem for tackling mentality from a scientific perspective.

This whole issue grew out of attempting to devise scientific theories of mind/mentality, as well as functional theories, and practically, out of working on AI, etc.

A table was brought up earlier as an example.

(a) "The properties of the table"

are different than

(b) "The properties of the table as you experience it"

If for no other reason simply because your experience doesn't literally have a table in it.

(b) are qualia

The issue here is trying to define in more precise terms what the expression /question "what it's like" is referring to, or being used to communicate. — Isaac

It's referring to the properties of experience, or we could say "the things in experience," from the perspective of that experience.

So,if not attitudinal, then what kind of property are qualitative properties, — Isaac

All properties that are not quantities (that are not simply numerical).

In other words, all properties are exhausted by the qualitative/quantitative dichotomy.

'Qualitative' properties, by my definition, are attitudinal responses - like/dislike, positive/negative. — Isaac

???

I even addressed this before. "Qualities" are properties. But qualitative properties are different than quantitative properties. In other words there are properties that are qualities and properties that are quantities. Hence why I'm specifying qualitative properties, because usually when we're talking about qualia we're not talking about quantities.

It's not saying anything at all about attitudes, preferences, valuations, etc.

It's not using the word "quality" in the colloquial, evaluative sense as in when you'd ask, "Is this a quality computer?" (Just as "like" in "what's it's like" isn't using that term to refer to analogies or similes, which papers that you linked to, such as the Hacker paper, emphasize--that "like" isn't being used in the sense of or to refer to comparisons.)

I wasn't trying to persuade you to adopt a different view. I gave my opinion on the initial post, that led to a brief back and forth, you asked some questions about that, and I gave my opinion on some of what you were saying in response. I'm happy to give my view about things and to explain it, especially in contradistinction to other views, especially if someone is curious about it, or if they want to suggest that only their view is workable or anything like that.

The reason I buy moral noncognitivism/subjectivism is that I want to get right what the world is like, and it's clear to me, via empirical and logical/reasoned means, that morality is simply dispostions that people have about interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette. Moral stances aren't found in the extramental world, so there's nothing there to match or fail to match (so that utterances can be true or false).

If you have a different view that's fine. Hopefully you're also not looking to persuade me to your view, or you really have your work cut out for you.

You do realise that subjectivism and noncognitivism are contradictory views right? — Mark Dennis

No. I don't realize that. Because they're not contradictory.

What do you believe the P is that one is affirming and the other denying by the way?

You said you were specifically a subjectivist yet you didn’t answer those questions the way a subjectivist would — Mark Dennis

Since I'm a subjectivist, this isn't the case. Obviously I answered them the way a subjectivist would.

Also, if you’re a subjectivist how can you claim that subjectivism is factually correct when subjectivists don’t believe in facts? — Mark Dennis

Oy vey. We're talking about ethics.

Which of them is speaking the truth? — Mark Dennis

Neither. Moral utterances are not true or false. Again, I'm a noncognitivist on ethics. So the same for the second question.

So how can subjectivism be taken seriously? — Mark Dennis

Because it's what's the case ontologically. It's factually correct.

You should read up on moral psychology as a field. — Mark Dennis

You should not be patronizing.

not if you have a handful in mind — Mark Dennis

Sure, if you have specific theories in mind and exclude others, you can say something about less common theories.

So you’re trying to say sleep walking disorder isn’t real and that we should ignore sleepwalkers as evidence of sleepwalking? — Mark Dennis

I'm not trying to say anything other than I'm saying. I simply asked you a question. There's no need to get upset over a question.

By very definition of sleep they are not conscious because we are not conscious when we sleep. — Mark Dennis

So if we defined sleep as occurring during consciousness would they be conscious? Surely it's not just a matter of definition, right? We must be saying something different about the ontological facts. The terms are just a name for those facts.

I don't agree that we're not conscious when we're sleeping. For example, when we dream, we're aware of dreaming. Normally we name mental states that we have an awareness of "consciousness." It's not identical to waking consciousness--we're not processing sensory or perceptual information in the same way, although we could say that it's very similar to fantasizing or daydreaming consciousness.

So would it be fair to say you are a moral relativist? — Mark Dennis

I'm a moral relativist, yes. A noncognitivist, and more specifically, a subjectivist.

One of the other questions I asked which you conveniently ignored — Mark Dennis

I didn't see that post.

So if you’re suggesting that we are only allowed to discuss the moral theories of long dead people that you respect, — Mark Dennis

lol--I only mentioned common moral theories because uncommon ones could be anything imaginable. So it's difficult to say anything in general about those.

You're moving towards being very patronizing and pompous. There's no need for that. How about just having an honest, good faith discussion and not getting pissy about anything?

You can't be getting offended that I'm challenging anything from a philosophical perspective, right? You're one of the people who did philosophy at university. Surely you're used to views being challenged.

The only question I noticed that you asked that I didn't answer (I just searched for it--I found a post I overlooked) was about common moral theories. I mean that literally. So not something highly idiosyncratic--something unique to one person, or to some small cult or something. Common moral theories include contractarianism, divine command theory, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, etc.

Re the question above that you feel needs to be clarified:

The idea is that we have someone who is sleepwalking and who says something while sleepwalking. You said that this is indicative of unconscious mental content. I'm asking how we're checking whether they're conscious or not when they say something while sleepwalking. If you're positing that they're unconscious, presumably we'd have some evidential support of that, no?

what in this experience furnishes the distinction between the shape and the colour of the table? — fdrake

Not that any of this matters for whether there are qualia, by the way, but one is extensional relations and the other is an electromagnetic frequency. Those aren't the same thing experientially.

How do we check whether they're conscious while they're saying something?

Are they distinct in the phenomenal character? — fdrake

Yes, otherwise there would be no way to make a distinction between them experientially. You'd not be able to experience the same shape with a different color or the same color with a different shape. That makes them necessarily distinct in phenomenal character/properties/qualia.

But who knows, maybe all sleepwalkers are faking it and are all awake the whole time. — Mark Dennis

Sure, so take sleepwalking. Evidence that sleepwalkers have mental content that isn't conscious? What would count as that?

Yes, obviously shape and color are distinct. You can have the same shape table where it's a different color or vice versa.

Right! And in the quale is there some corresponding shape property of the table? — fdrake

The shape as you experience it is a property of your experience. Whether there's a corresponding shape of the table, as a property of the table, is kind of irrelevant to the qualia question.

"There's some shape to the table, as a property of the table" - when you experience the table, are you saying you experience the shape of the table as a distinct part of the experience? When you experience and attend to your experience is the shape of the table distinct from the table? — fdrake

No. I'm not saying that. The distinction is between the shape of the table as a property of the table, and the shape of the table as you experience it.

The only way for you to have the shape of the table as a property of the table in your experience is for your experience to be identical to the table--so that your experience is made of wood, can hold a cup of coffee, etc.

What do you think would count as evidence that we have unconscious mental content?

I don't buy the idea that we have "subconscious" (or unconscious) mental content, such as desires.

A common view is that there's some shape to the table, as a property of the table (whether we're talking about a "totality" of the shape of the table or not--that doesn't matter), AND that that shape of the table, as a property of the table, is different than the shape of the table as you experience it, or via your perception.

Or in other words, there's a common view that there is a table, but you don't literally have a table in your perception--that is, your perception is not made out of wood, you can't set a coffee cup on your perception etc. as you can with the literal table.

So on this view, the shape of the table, and the wood texture of the table, and so on, are not literally the same properties as your perception of the table.

Do you agree with that?

And I did. No. The shape of the table isn't experienced as a totality. — fdrake

Again, this is a problem, because it suggests that you do not understand what I'm asking. I'm not asking anything about a "totality." That's completely irrelevant to what I'm asking you.

what an outlandish interpretation of law. — Mark Dennis

It was a question. I was asking if that's what he was suggesting.

Sorry I hadn't addressed your posts yet:

So first, re this:

If we anthropologically state that humans use ethics and moral values for the biologically driven purpose — Mark Dennis

Are you suggesting a purpose that might not be consciously present in individual humans, or are you saying that contingently, due to biology, that purpose is consciously present in all individual humans?

"Is not technical talk" in no way amounts to "does not make sense in terms of conscious experience"

Sure, and in a discussion, you'd answer a simple question like "Do you agree that the shape of the table, as a property of the table, is different than the shape of the table in your experience or as part of your perception of the table"?

Especially when the aim is explaining something to you that you apparently do not understand/apparently are not familiar with.

If you respond without answering that, as if you didn't even understand what you were being asked, then I'd clarify with respect to your response and ask again.

In a discussion, you'd not just ignore it and ask your own question and then get pissy about not moving on until you've answered the first question. That's rude behavior, not a discussion.

For Christ's sake, stop answering everything by telling me what you didn't mean, it's not a fucking guessing game. If you didn't mean the thing I interpreted you as saying, why can't you just say what you did mean in response? What on earth is prompting you to give half a response all the time? — Isaac

I wrote what I meant initially. I didn't write anything about physicalism in that post. No matter what I write, you read it with weird reading comprehension, so it's not as if it's a simple matter to clear that up. Any clearing-up attempt is going to be read with reading comprehension problems.(Based on a lot of experience.)

I'm not referring to qualia in any unusual manner.

Okay, so I'm guessing that you mean Hacker's "Is There Anything It Is Like to Be a Bat"? I'll have to read through that again, but I don't recall him saying anything that amounts to "What it's like' does not make sense in terms of conscious experience"

Again, I'm asking if you agree that the shape of the table, as a property of the table, is different than the shape of the table in your experience or as part of your perception of the table.

If you disagree, you're saying that the two are identical.

What I asked about has nothing to do with the underside of the table.

Disagreeing with what I said would amount to you believing that the shape of the table in your experience IS identical with the shape of the table as a property of the table.

In other words, a moral system in which everything is morally permissible unless we specify that it's morally prohibited?

I don't think that trying to parse it in terms of formal logic is going to be helpful at this point.

First, most people would say that the shape of the table (let's use shape for a minute so we don't get sidetracked with the usual discussions regarding colors and whether they're secondary properties, etc.), as a property of the table, isn't identical (as in literally the same thing) to the shape of the table in your experience (or we could say in your perception of the table).

Do you agree with that?