If it's just a matter of getting the categorization straight, I'd concentrate on showing the alien differences between humans and other species, especially closely-related species.

If it's a matter of the alien wanting to understand the gist of human traits, I'd focus on presenting a wide variety of biological and behavioral expressions, with both a concentration on some of the most common traits and various outliers, especially on the extremes. It would be more difficult with more time or content limitations, and if there are too many time or content limitations, it just wouldn't be possible to summarize characteristics in any reasonable way. The broader/more varied the picture you can present the more on-target it would be.

I did a masters in applied ethics but I kind of regret voting and divulging that here. — Mark Dennis

Yeah, as I wrote earlier: "People have a tendency online, especially in anonymous contexts, to be skeptical of any claims of achievement or status . . . It's rather pointless to claim . . . The vast majority of the time people either just ignore it or they get pissy about it."

What would you say a verb refers too? Let's consider "run". — Banno

So one way to know what "run" refers to is to use a dictionary; "Run," in one sense of the term, refers to "moving at a speed faster than a walk, while never having both or all the feet on the ground at the same time."

Can we stop pretending that you're a toddler now?

Kant is considered the start of the division a la being the first continental-style philosopher, where other continental philosophy carried on in his wake, at least initially.

The schools I went to and that I'm familiar with, even though they're analytic-oriented, require you to be familiar with Kant, Hegel, Marx, Husserl, Heidegger, etc. They're not a huge focus, but they're too historically important to just ignore altogether.

Nothing; it's a verb, not a noun. — Banno

Verbs do not refer to anything in your view?

(What did I say earlier about this being like interacting with children who are trying to find creative ways to be difficult?)

There's no way to map third-person observable data to first-person subjective data to make a statement to the effect of "there is no area that could encode this detailed information."

Not that I was saying something about the relationship between external data and mental representations of it in my comment anyway. I was saying something about the idea that the "sense of self" is something different than certain states that one's brain is in.

At least offer objections and criticisms that stem from understanding what I wrote/what I was saying in the first place. Otherwise you're just wasting my time.

Kant isn't a Continental philosopher, — Pfhorrest

Kant is commonly considered the start of the division.

Here's a practical example reflecting that: see the first section of this anthology--
https://www.amazon.com/Companion-Continental-Philosophy-Simon-Critchley/dp/0631218505 (You can use the "Look Inside" function)

That's pretty weak. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It's weak to say that a property of nonphysicals, akin to a property like location for molecules, is that you "notice" them (at least when they're thoughts that you happen to have).

Please explain in what way you've noticed an atom. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It's the same way that you've noticed a thought.

Atoms are present to mind--when you think about them, for example, right?

If you don't know, then yes, you do explain what you know better by admitting that you don't know... — Banno

What does "explain" refer to here then?

When in your life have you noticed an atom — ZzzoneiroCosm

Again, how do you have any idea about atoms if you don't notice them in the same way that you notice a thought?

I'll gladly be half a philosopher if it means I don't write like Hegel . . . or Heidegger . . . or Derrida . . . etc.

That doesn't;t seem right - isn't it wise to admit sometimes that there is stuff you don't know? — Banno

The context is one of explaining things. You don't explain something better by saying, "This is some mysterious who knows what"

A table is noticeable. An atom isn't. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Again, note that we're NOT talking about perception in the sense of receiving data via your senses here (sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch). Because you weren't saying that thought is perceived via your senses. You said you just "notice" it. If you don't notice atoms in the same way, how do you even have any idea about them?

It's not a property of atoms, molecules, particles. — ZzzoneiroCosm

How are they not noticeable? Note that we're not saying that we can't perceive them with our senses, because that's not what you're saying about thoughts, either.

Your definition of analytic philosophy is much too narrow--you seem to basically be equating it with logical positivism/the Vienna Circle as a movement, while your definition of continental philosophy is too broad. It suggests a bias to say the least.

Which I'm noticing more because for the most part I think that continental philosophy sucks. ;-)

The distinction is not just one of subject matter or the overall approach to subject matter, but very importantly, it's a difference of style, of methodological focus, and of expression preferences. Analytic philosophy tends towards tackling things with a relatively narrow focus, one thing at a time, with a preference for a plain, usually rather dry, more or less scientific and/or logical approach. Continental philosophy tends towards a much broader, "holistic" focus, where it tries to tie together many threads at once, with a preference for a far more decorative, looser/playful approach to language. Both sides tend to see the other side as approaching things in a way that doesn't really work/doesn't really accomplish what we're trying to accomplish as philosophers. Those with a continental preference tend to see analytic philosophy as too dry, too boring, too narrow, pointless, mind-numbingly laborious, etc. Those with an analytic preference tend to see continental philosophy as too flowery, inexact, sometimes incoherent, too ready to make unjustified assumptions, etc.

Most regulars here are far more continental-leaning. That jibes with most people here being self-taught (per another recent poll). A handful of continental philosophers--Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Sartre, for example, are far more well-known in general than any analytic philosophers. (Although Wittgenstein is the weirdo--he's basically a continental philosopher who got mixed up with the Vienna Circle). Part of the reason for the popularity is that continental philosophy has more of a "literary" or poetic quality to it--which is one of the problems with it in many analytic opinions. People with some interest in philosophy who are looking to guide themselves to philosophers to read will usually stumble on those famous continental folks first (well, in addition to Plato and Aristotle), and that leads them to other continental philosophers.

However, admitting that you have a continental leaning is like admitting that you're a hipster--the stock move is to deny the term even really picks anything out, so we're unlikely to have many people select that answer.

It's a dogmatic leap to reduce the thought-tree to a property. — ZzzoneiroCosm

It's much more far-fetched to just say that you don't know what it is, exactly, but it is.

At any rate, there isn't anything that's not properties.

So you're not using "perception" in the conventional sense, because that has a connotation of information obtained via our senses. You're just saying that you can be aware of something, it's "noticeable," and that's a property of nonphysical things. Being noticeable isn't a property of physical things though?

"able to be seen or noticed" — ZzzoneiroCosm

Are you saying that you literally see thoughts with your eyes?

So the thought-tree is a property of a molecule or atom? — ZzzoneiroCosm

As I said above: "They're properties of molecules/atoms in particular relations (structures), undergoing particular processes (so the structures are dynamic)."

Are you using "perception" in a way that doesn't refer to becoming aware of information via our senses?

So with molecules, for example, we can give their location at a particular time.

What's an example of a property we can specify like that of a vague nonphysical >>whatever<<?

duplicate post

Yes. Thoughts, desires, emotions, memories, etc. are physical. They're properties of molecules/atoms in particular relations (structures), undergoing particular processes (so the structures are dynamic).

Why would it seem more plausible to you to say that thoughts are vague "nonphysical" > >whatevers<< ?

"Some brain content is unconscious" is the closest we can get to an agreement. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Right, we agree that some brain states, activities etc. are unconscious.

Yes, mental content is brain content. Just like dog behavior is animal behavior. It doesn't follow from this that all brain states are mental states. Just like it doesn't follow that all animal behavior is dog behavior.

Dogs are animals. Therefore if x is an animal, x is a dog?

I love big, sprawling sandbox games where you can spend a lot of time being entertained by just experimenting/dicking around to see what various things will do. But also because I like the long, convoluted stories, the characters, etc.

Huge fan of the Grand Theft Auto series, the Saints Row series, the two recent Red Dead games (and the zombie offshoot), etc.

I also like racing games a lot, although I prefer them more arcade-style or more cartoony. I don't care about realism in racing games. I don't care about realism in games period. (And the same with fiction and artworks in general.)

I also play a lot of console pinball. There are a couple great console pinball companies that between them have made hundreds of different machines to play. I always loved pinball when I was a kid, too, and we had a few pinball machines when I was growing up (plus I used to play in arcades, etc.)

I never cared very much for most first-person shooters--I just don't like the mechanics of them very much. I prefer third-person games. Although I like the Sniper series a lot, and I periodically give other first-person shooters a try.

I also don't care for the RPGs I've played and I've found online play with other people extremely underwhelming. Most of the RPGs I've played have seemed really clunky and slow to me, and all the stat stuff seems like nonsense to me.

But I do like games that have more of a story to them.

The online play I've done with other people has seemed very boring/repetitive, even for GTA and Red Dead. They need to figure out a way to simply have people group up to do story-based missions rather than stupid "capture the flag" etc.

Anyway, there's lots of other stuff I've enjoyed for video games, too, including platformers, (non-sandbox) adventure games, etc.

I'm pretty much just a console gamer. A lot of my professional activities as a musician are done via computer, so I try to keep my computers pretty clean/streamlined software-wise to minimize issues with music software I use.

"You can't square a circle" isn't simple about the shapes/definitions of the shapes of squares and circles.

That saying is rather about the challenge of constructing a square with the same area as a given circle by using only a finite number of steps with compass and straightedge.

Per Wikipedia: "In 1882, the task was proven to be impossible, as a consequence of the Lindemann–Weierstrass theorem which proves that pi (π) is a transcendental, rather than an algebraic irrational number; that is, it is not the root of any polynomial with rational coefficients. It had been known for decades that the construction would be impossible if π were transcendental, but π was not proven transcendental until 1882. Approximate squaring to any given non-perfect accuracy, in contrast, is possible in a finite number of steps, since there are rational numbers arbitrarily close to π.

"The expression 'squaring the circle' is sometimes used as a metaphor for trying to do the impossible"

I don't think that anything has intrinsic value, of course, but I do value all human life, as well as most other animal life (although I'm not against eating meat, even). I'm not in favor of the death penalty. I don't care for the way we run our prison systems, either. I don't think we're justified in locking people up the way we do. I agree that we need to separate some people from mainstream society, but I think we should do so in a way that doesn't at all resemble prisons. It should simply be a physical separation--put those folks on an island or something. Or send them to Australia. ;-)

There's a lot of ego in that attitude. — ZzzoneiroCosm

There had better be a lot of ego in folks acting like children and trying to be "difficult," because the other option(s) is less attractive.

Maybe something in your unconsciousness affecting your perception of reality. Stranger things. — ZzzoneiroCosm

Maybe, although there would be no reason to believe that it's unconscious mental content.

I don't think that the goal of ToE research is to retool physics and/or mathematics. — alcontali

Yeah, definitely not. That's why I said "without having to retool . . ."--folks want to avoid that.

I always feel like I'm dealing with children (well, or teens/people with a teen mentality) who are trying to find creative ways to be "difficult," and that's all I'm doing. I'd rather have what I'd consider a good faith conversation with an adult.

It wasted my time. I'm still looking for an honest, straightorward conversation with someone who won't resort to bullshit tactics.

Tegmark's approach may have its problems, but the Theory of Everything is actually a very legitimate mathematical and scientific subject: — alcontali

Just as an instrumental way to try to reconcile quantum mechanics and general relativity without having to retool physics and/or mathematics, sure. But that's a very specific task with a misleading name if one isn't familiar with the specific issues we're trying to solve and why.

How would you even attempt to formalize it? You've got a bunch of terms like "noting similarities" that have no standard formalization.

Without bogging down the discussion by filling in variables, is there something you take issue with in the logical form of the abstraction? — ZzzoneiroCosm

I just pointed out the problems with it. If you want to just ignore that, I guess you can. That would suck from any sort of conversational or philosophical standpoint though.

If it's supposed to be someone noting the similarities of the brain states from a third-person observational perspective, then we could specify that easily enough, but we'd have to justify how they're warranted in making a conclusion about there being mental content at T1 when the person with the brain in question wasn't aware of mental content at T1.

"You note the similarities between T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 " -- it can't be the person who had the conscious thoughts at T2, T3, etc. noting similarities of the conscious thoughts and X at T1, because they're not similar.

I'm sorry this logical abstraction doesn't make sense to you. I don't think we can go any further. — ZzzoneiroCosm

So you're incapable of specifying any sort of similarity we could be noting?

We're looking at a logical abstraction. It isn't necessary to know what the similarities are. — ZzzoneiroCosm

The scenario doesn't make any sense without specifying some sort of similarities we're noting.

First off, "x is similar to y" is a judgment that an individual has to make.