Meister Eckhardt and the Jewish Tradition
Albert H. Friedlander

European Judaism: A Journal for the New Europe
Vol. 27, No. 2 (Autumn 94), pp. 78-90 (13 pages)

"Eckhart" is the more common though not the only spelling.

in contemporary philosophy, to be included in the book of the real requires that an entity be able to manifest in some way to consciousness. And therein is today's primary leveler of "degrees" of reality (as opposed to exist/not-exist). An object of consciousness is an object of consciousness is an object of consciousness. . .

This argument just comes down to our definition of real. This definition of real is that anything that exists is real. Both fake and real are real because they exist. — Hyper

All fake things are real but not all real things are fake. That certainly suggests some sort of "meaningful" difference, does it not?

I own a phone (smart phone), but I have this same experience. I chuckle constantly to and from the bus in my city watching for people walking into things, and each other. — AmadeusD

I primarily use my phone to blue-tooth music to my stereo. I never answer it and make about 1 call a month. I do return texts from friends but even that is only about 10 a month.

In a way, the Cartesian self belongs to both religion and science. — frank

Interesting and I agree. However, it seems to me that science is more deeply rooted in and more focused upon the "res extensa" than is religion. But of course there is nether science nor religion in the absence of the "res cogitans." I suspect Descartes would be uncomfortable with the contemporary radical separation of subject/object.

before and after is an idea and the separable is an idea. ideas and minds are inseparable.

Assuming MH takes the position above, including the example about stone, lets make it his own, why is it we must view MH as describing the Reality (of) such entities; I.e. a stone coming at me as present to hand or ready to hand, as if these are the Real natures of the stone? — ENOAH

Heidegger is not describing the "nature" of the stone. Instead, Heidegger is describing how the stone shows up for Dasein as ready-to-hand or present-to-hand. Had Dasein not already had an understanding of the "nature" of the stone as hard and as dense and as weighty enough to be tossed the appropriate distance, then the stone would not show up as ready-to-hand for the purpose of tossing toward the skunk in order to divert the skunk from its apparent path.

Had the stone been a feather, then the feather would not have shown up for Dasein as ready-to-hand. Indeed, it is possible the feather would not have "shown up" at all.

Heidegger is happy to leave your idea of the "nature" of the stone to science.

I suggest it would be more helpful to describe him as presenting an interpretation — Ludwig V

Heidegger would have no issue with that. Heidegger is big on hermeneutics. But then interpretations, like descriptions, are judged by accuracy rather than truth. And just as with descriptions, the accuracy of interpretation is checked against the phenomenon. Heidegger is asking no one to accept as truth either his descriptions or interpretations.

But I think "interpretation" carries more terminological baggage than "description."

I think of Being and Time as describing how Dasein interprets being-in-the-world.

And yet, there is no existence, no present to hand or ready to hand without Being. — Joshs

This morning I went for a walk with my dog and being. Neither my dog nor I could have went for a walk without it. :smile:

And yet, there is no existence, no present to hand or ready to hand without Being. — Joshs

No doubt. All of Being and Time is articulated within the context of the being of being.

There are the modes of being, so we need to understand, not only the three modes, but what they are modes of? — Ludwig V

Yes.
1. Existence is the mode of being of Dasein. It is my mode of being. It is your mode of being.

2. Ready-to-Hand is the mode of being of such entities as lamps, stereos, keyboards. If I look around my office, most of the entities I see are entities that I use in my regular and ongoing involvements such as turning on the lamp so I can turn on the stereo and then grab my keyboard in order to respond to Ludwig V on thePhilosophy Forum.

3. Present-to-hand is the mode of being of entities that are generally not used in a Dasein’s regular and ongoing involvements in the world. If I sit on my front porch and look around I see trees, rocks, grass and other entities that are just sort of present.

We have existence, ready-to-hand, present-at-hand and being. The last of these is common to the other three — Ludwig V

Not really. Had Kant said “being” (instead of existence) is not a real predicate, Heidegger may have agreed. Additionally, just as it would be odd for a Cartesian to assert there is thinking substance, extended substance, and being, so too would it be odd for a Heideggerian to assert there is existence, ready-to-hand, present-to-hand, and being. You need not think of the modes of being and being any more than you need think of Dasein and being or being-in-the-world and being. and being adds little, if anything, to the understanding of Heidegger's modes of being.

"Constitutive" is an interesting idea here. Aristotle draws a distinction (I don't have a reference ready to hand) between components of something that have an independent existence and can actually be separated out - laid on a bench beside each other, for example - and components that cannot be separated out, except "in thought". So, we can think of a single shape as both convex or concave, and we cannot think of a concave shape, without also thinking of a convex shape. I can see the relationship between existence and Dasein in the latter way rather than the former. Does that capture what you are saying? — Ludwig V

Yes. Heidegger is big on Aristotle.

What I find much more helpful is his conceptions of Ready-to-hand and Present-at-hand and some of his remarks about rivers, bridges, temples in a landscape. Yet even there, I have difficulty. I don't quite see why everything that exists must be one or the other. — Ludwig V

Heidegger’s modes of being are not intended for organizing the universe. Instead, they are intended to capture the manner by which entities come at us. If I am on my morning walk and I look down and happen to see a stone, then the stone is coming at me as a present-to-hand entity. On the other hand, if a skunk is coming my way and I see that same stone, it might come at me as a ready-to-hand entity that I can throw toward the skunk in the hope he scurries off.

Nonetheless, if you describe what Heidegger presents as a description, you allow the question of truth or falsity to arise. — Ludwig V

Even if true, that is as it should be. . . However, I disagree. The appropriate standard for a phenomenological description is accuracy. And Heidegger is not asking anyone to take his word for the accuracy of his descriptions. Instead, all you need do is look at the phenomena described. And when I look at the phenomena, I find Heidegger's descriptions to be generally accurate.

:lol:

I'd like to understand that notion, cuz I think that's the only thing we can really do on a philosophy forum -- understand one another. — Moliere

I agree. But that is something that many (including me) have to continually remind ourselves. Next to understanding, agreeing/disagreeing is trivial. Thanks for the reminder.

without being bound to your word, who knows what is going to come out of your mouth. — Antony Nickles

but I am the only one who can bind me to my word. if you bind me to my word, you still do not know what is going to come out of my mouth.

The biggest problem is that it is so speculative, with no real clear evidence, which is why so many people do not believe in an afterlife at all, — Jack Cummins

I think it odd to expect evidence "in life" regarding any state of being "after life." What would be the basis upon which to expect any such evidence? And if there is no basis upon which to expect such evidence, then what would be the basis for forming any conclusions regarding the absence of such evidence? To say there is no evidence of a type we cannot have is to say nothing at all.

As such, I argue that, given certain premises in this post, we should expect an afterlife that plays closer to our ideals than the aforementioned bottomless pit of fire - or an arbitrary eternity in heaven. — ToothyMaw

Presumably with "No Exit."

I think I understand the rest of what you say. But this suggests to me that applying any entity having the characteristics of Dasein will cause that entity to exist. ??? — Ludwig V

Existence is constitutive of Dasein much as roundness is constitutive of a circle. You cannot add existence to Dasein any more than you can add roundness to a circle. Existence belongs to Dasein much as roundness belongs to a circle. Dasein is a unitary phenomenon rather than a collection of parts. Any entity to which you could apply the characteristics of Dasein is already a Dasein and any entity that is already a Dasein is already existing or it would not already be a Dasein. There is no wiggle room.

acknowledges only three modes of being, one of which is true of everything that is. (Is that the right word to use here?
That's makes it all clear enough. Take it or leave it. — Ludwig V

I am not really certain of what you mean by that. Unlike Descartes, Heidegger is not describing a substance ontology. Heidegger is making no claim to the self-sufficiency of any of the three modes of being. Instead, he is describing the manner (the modes) in which being comes at us, the manner (the modes) in which we experience entities. We experience (encounter?) our own existence, we experience (encounter?) entities that are ready to hand, and we experience (encounter?) entities that are present to hand.

I am confident Heidegger intended the three modes to be inclusive of every manner in which we encounter entities, including our own existence. But he was relatively young when he wrote Being and Time and the later Heidegger made no claims to having gotten it all right.

Assuming we allow every other philosopher the same license, it seems that each philosophy exists in its own silo. How does an outsider choose between them? On grounds of internal consistency? Is that enough? — Ludwig V

Interesting question. Every philosopher already has the same license and the greatest of them have made good use of it. And the question itself neither begins nor ends with Heidegger. But Heidegger did choose the phenomenological method because it is descriptive. You can decide whether you agree with Heidegger by looking at the description he gives to the phenomena he describes. For example, it you examine his description of Dasein and recognize yourself in it, then why in the world would you not keep going?

Nobody has to choose between philosophers. And being internally consistent does not make a philosopher any more or less correct than any other philosopher. But it does make it easier to understand what they are saying.

And besides, it is more important to understand what Heidegger has to say than it is to agree or disagree with him. And as difficult as it may be, it is worth understanding what Heidegger has to say.

if we have anonymity, we don’t have any incentive to check ourselves — Antony Nickles

Even if that were true. . .

I understand the value in finding some way to better ensure "responsibility" for those engaged in the process. But the argument as a whole seems built upon questionable claims regarding how "we" behave. And maybe that is ok. But then your argument seems reducible to putting safeguards in place so we can all sleep better at night. . . and relieve ourselves of any moral responsibility for the results of bad actors. We let the genie out of the bottle,we opened the can of worms, we let the cat out of the bag. Collective action to avoid responsibility for the now perhaps inevitable results of our already existing and arguably irresponsible collective decisions is at best an illusion.

I suspect we will probably have to wait for 'AGI' to decide for itself whether or not to self-impose moral norms and/or legal constraints and what kind of ethics and/or laws it may create for itself – superceding human ethics & legal theories? – if it decides it needs them in order to 'optimally function' within (or without) human civilization. — 180 Proof

I suspect we no longer have a choice, it we ever had one to begin with.

But if it is a truly moral situation, we do not know what to do and no one has more authority to say what is right, so without the (predetermined, certain) means to judge what “acting poorly” in this situation would be. But AI cannot hold itself up as an example in stepping forward into the unknown in the way a person can. Or run from such a moment; could we even say: cowardly? — Antony Nickles

Well said.

In moral philosophy, historically there was a desire to externalize ethical behavior to make it determined, like a law—even if just a law I give myself (with Kant). . .
Now I’m not an AI expert, but we can’t seem to create rules or goals because AI is too unpredictable (and we want rules to tell us what will be right). — Antony Nickles

You go from externalizing ethical behaviour via rules as a desire historically to "we want the rules to tell us what will be right". That is a huge leap and ignores the equally historical rejection of the notion that morality is reducible to a set of rules.

I don't want the rules to tell me "what will be right". Do you?

Good OP.

I wish it could be abolished in favour of "there is". But it would make it a lot harder to formulate a lot of philosophy. Perhaps that's a good thing. — Ludwig V

Exactly. And that is why Heidegger went to great lengths to give existence a precise meaning within the context of his philosophy. And so long as Heidegger tells you "this" is what I mean by existence and he then employs existence consistent with what he means by existence, then there is no confusion regarding existence as used within the context of his philosophy. Existence is Dasein's and only Dasein's mode of being. All entities not having the characteristics of Dasein have a mode of being other than Existence.

I'm clutching at straws here. At first sight, you may be saying that existence is the "is" in any predicate.
Do you mean something like "existence is the possibility of attaching any predicate to something" or maybe something along the lines that if you apply any predicate to something, that something exists. — Ludwig V

No. Existence is a mode of being always belonging to and only belonging to Dasein. Applying any predicate to any entity not having the characteristics of Dasein will not cause that entity to "exist."

Does that mean that Dasein is the only thing that exists? — Ludwig V

Yes. Dasein is the only entity that "exists" within the Heideggerian sense of the term. The ontological status of entities not having the characteristics of Dasein are ready-to-hand or present to hand.

Thinking about it, I'm inclined to understand Sartre's "precedes" as a metaphor; — Ludwig V

I agree. And it may be something he would rather not have said. It neither adds to nor detracts from his fundamental argument. But it does distract.

I've always wondered whether the Kantian claim that existence is not a predicate is consistent with the way that we talk about essence and existence in the context of existentialism. I can't believe that either Heidegger or Sartre were unaware of Kant. Are they contradicting him? — Ludwig V

Heidegger was well aware of Kant. However, Heidegger defines existence in a non-traditional manner. For Heidegger, "existence" is one of three modes of being (existence, ready (or unready) to hand, and present to hand.). In turn, existence is that mode of being that belongs to Dasein and only to Dasein There is no such thing as a non-existing Dasein and no such thing as an existing entity that is not a Dasein. So the least we can say is that Heidegger does not mean the same thing as Kant when he uses the term "existence." And Sartre uses the term in much the same way as Heidegger. And I am unaware of the degree to which Sartre was aware of Kant.

So for existentialism in general, "existence" applies to a much smaller domain of entities than it does for Kant. And even if Heidegger, Sartre, and Nietzsche agree in what they mean by existence, they do not agree regarding the ontological bottom line for those entities whose mode of being is existence. Though Being-in-the-world (Heidegger) freedom (Sartre), and will to power (Nietzsche) are respective ontological bottom lines, they are not the same.

In some sense and for existentialists, existence is the predicate.

On the contrary: if determinism is true, then we are determined to assign moral culpability to everyone — 180 Proof

And some are determined to accept it while some are determined to not accept it.

How do you know this to be true? — Truth Seeker

I know it to be the truth of me. Its truth value beyond that matters not to me.

So you're more saying "these are not fundamental" -- which I hope you see we agree on. — Moliere

That is correct. I was being hyperbolic with the "pop psychology" and should have said to the effect "the notion that existence precedes essence is not a fundamental tenet of existentialism". I should save the hyperbole for Facebook.

I was caught up on the notion that Sartre misinterprets Heidegger. — Moliere

The idea that existence precedes essence stands on its own as does Sartre's philosophy insofar is it relies upon the idea that existence precedes essence. Whether the idea is an accurate interpretation of Heidegger is relevant only to whether the idea is fundamental to existentialism per se. And I suspect that is an issue that would interest neither Sartre nor Heidegger.

someone who is trying to understand all that is existentialism — Rob J Kennedy

I don't think it's a misinterpretation -- at least no more a misinterpretation than what Heidegger does with Aletheia; the man got criticized for not representing the notion historically correctly, — Moliere

I agree that all misinterpret. But Heidegger's interpretation of Aletheia is irrelevant to whether "existence precedes essence" is a fundamental tenet of existentialism.

And I make my argument for the sole purpose of cautioning "someone who is trying to understand all that is existentialism." Please see original OP.

The notion that existence precedes essence is pop-psychology. Heidegger says our existence is our essence and Sartre misinterprets Heidegger as saying existence precedes essence and now all proceed as if if "existence precedes essence" is an existential given. It is not!

And I suspect Nietzsche would argue that "essence" is just another version of an Apollonian value framework grafted on to being in order to sublimate manifestations of will to power in a seemingly reasonable manner.

I am.

WHAT is known of stillness — Kizzy

It is clearly not infinite. Arguably, the big bang is the annihilation of the "stillness".

Free will and choice are the only essence in existence. We make far too much of some things. But it is true that evolution drives the formation, the integration, of entities with more and more moral agency. — Chet Hawkins

I agree. The notion of essence as qualities grafted on to existence is a rationalizing of moral agency in a light we consider most favorable.

INSTEAD OF that fish making the same effort. — Chet Hawkins

Being a Dasein is not a social status conferred upon selected biological organisms and comes with no entitlements.

The fish is entitled to do as it may.

eventually, though, they do react, and space, and particles, etc. came to be, with time still existing from the original set. — 013zen

Good stuff. Infinite amount of forces X, Y and whatever in an infinitely small space and all at rest. The only finite element of the scenario is the at rest.

you implied that Dasein was reserved for humans — Chet Hawkins

I made no such implication. Instead, I did and do assert that Heidegger is better situated to describe the fundamental ontological structure of a human than of a fish. It matters not to Heidegger if fish turn out to have the same fundamental ontological structure as human. But how would he know? He doesn't experience being as a fish.

Dasein is the term given to any and all beings having the characteristics of Dasein. Being a Dasein is not a social status among biological organisms and it comes with no entitlements.

Why say that? I am not pretending to be Heidegger. That's a very confusing reply. — Chet Hawkins

Being-in-the-world is a fundamental state, not a social status. It doesn't make anybody special.

YES there are! That is the metaphysical hurdle we are just beginning to come to grips with as a species. Granted a few of us have always been a bit saucy and into caviar of the spirit, wisdom. But these days the love of wisdom is being translated into 'My self-indulgent grift for the unwary' — Chet Hawkins

As true as all of that may be, it is important to keep in mind that those are your claims and not Heidegger's.

I agree. But Heidegger's concern is to describe the only entity that any of us really can describe from the inside, ourselves. If it turned out that some other species had the characteristics of Dasein, Heidegger would probably find it interesting but it would make no difference to his philosophy as set out in Being and Time. If some unknown species anywhere in the universe had the characteristics of Dasein, then they would be "in" the world.
— Arne

I mean ... it's confusing that you say this. You say you agree and then disagree. — Chet Hawkins

I agree with you that some philosophers suggest Heidegger is using Dasein as a way to give some sort of normative status to humans and I disagree with those philosophers.

Heidegger is not making normative claims. A bird is in the unique position of being a bird. A fish is in the unique position of being a fish. A human being is in the unique position of being a human. And it is from that position that he is describing being a human.

Heidegger is unable to describe being a bird or being a fish in the same way that he is able describe being a human, i.e., from the inside. Heidegger is not handing out any awards. Being-in-the-world is not a privileged status. It is a fundamental state of being for that being whose mode of being is existence. It comes with no rewards.