I see philosophy more as a kind of 'second-order sense making': a practice of 'making-explicit', where we make sense of... how we make sense of things. An effort of re/framing frames, as it were. — StreetlightX

I agree.

That certainly would flow from our brain function, since the primary function of the brain is "reactive". The secondary, which we would describe as "conscious experience" is a "post-evaluation" of that reaction in context of a wider array of sensory and contextual experience. Since the second one takes time to "compute" it's not what tends to drive our immediate actions, but it's important to formalize and "adjust" the reactive part.

The broader problem is that we tend to categorize too much. Certainly, specialization is important, but we tend to divide and label thought process into categories of activities, which as a whole are same thing.

Thus, there is abstract demarcation of science, religion, and art, when in reality these are mean of brain to post-analyze and connect facts, form some models, and communicate these to the rest of us.

To make the matters even worse, the language is axiomatic. We can argue to what extend it forms some "first principles" and subsequently copies off previous patters, but it's an arbitrary pattern that has no bearing on nature of reality that it supposed to communicate. There's no escaping this problem using mere nominal communication.

I'm a fan of Tarkovski. It's unfortunate that he didn't get to write and create more, but his concept of a philosopher/artist is similar in terms of "framing metaphors".

A quote from Sculpting In Time:

“We can express our feelings regarding the world around us either by poetic or by descriptive means. I prefer to express myself metaphorically. Let me stress: metaphorically, not symbolically. A symbol contains within itself a definite meaning, certain intellectual formula, while metaphor is an image. An image possessing the same distinguishing features as the world it represents. An image — as opposed to a symbol — is indefinite in meaning. One cannot speak of the infinite world by applying tools that are definite and finite. We can analyse the formula that constitutes a symbol, while metaphor is a being-within-itself, it's a monomial. It falls apart at any attempt of touching it.”

The way I understand the above is that "nominal verbal" will always be a very limited "digital abstraction". Something either a chair or it is not a chair. Something is either a number 1 or it is number 2. It's very rigid in achieving precision, and yet it's imprecise when we attempt to map it to nature. Thus, Newton had to lock himself up and come up with Calculus, or means of mathematical approximation.

Thus, it seems like we would like to map "truth" to some absolute, instead of understanding that truth is a principle that's best left to the realm of a metaphor. A principle (or a metaphor) will map to a variety of contexts, which our "nominal" understanding of truth can't.

Thus, it seems to me that truth is always an approximation, at least in the way that we work with it, and the broader and less-precise the approximation, the broader and more applicable the truth we are talking about in terms of how it maps to reality out there.

Example, 2 + 2 = 4 is true in context of our nominal language of mathematics, and how we map that language to reality, but there's no 2 in nature. 2 would be a projection on some similar patterns of reality. It's useful in our assessment of "quantity", but it doesn't go any further than that. Thus, it is only true, because we call it true. It's a nominal truth derived through abstraction for purpose of deriving ratios.

What Tarkovski points out is that "truth" is instead a mirror-reflection of actuality. It's not something you can always verbalize apart from describing some broader "truism" packaged as metaphor. In such truth is not "is", truth "is like".

One last consequence of this is that to then speak of philosophies as being 'wrong' - in any way other than as a figure of speech - is to misunderstand totally the vocation of philosophy. Philosophies are only more or less useful, more or less interesting, more or less significant. As Bryant says, those who hold philosophy to the criterion are truth are nothing less then cretins. — StreetlightX

I think that we typically don't have enough meta-cognitive perception in order to recognize that our brain mechanism works through finding patterns in otherwise "noisy" environments. Philosophy in such context would be the attempt by the brain to fill the gaps and find some pragmatic meaning where there may be none, or where it's difficult to assign meaning.

I really don't think that "framing" would be adequate-enough analogy to describe what is happening.

Perhaps analogy may be that of a Lego set with no manual. There's a bunch of pieces of difference colors. Let's call these facts, and each philosopher takes the exact same "existential lego facts" and molds these into something that he proposes has a name and some purpose.

One takes and builds something and calls it a robot. It walks this way, and these round things are eyes. The other builds a "car" and claims that the round thins are wheels that it rolls on, etc.

The point being is that we can connect various patterns that we observe in reality into some coherent whole in a wide variety of ways. I think that philosophy is exploration into giving facts possible meaning.

Weapons and technology does not make a civilized society. Non-violent, truthful, reasoned political and social processes do. So what is to love about Wakanda? Who would aspire to such a society? — Edward Knox

I'm guessing Wakandans would. I think the whole point of this imaginary country is to ponder what would happen if you've mixed African tribalism with isolationist policies and technological achievements.

The better question would be if you actually be able to recognize the very thing you did given that you were born there and likely taught that Wakanda is a heaven on Earth.

The things you are talking about make up a complexly interacting system of beliefs, attitudes, and practices. — T Clark

individual beliefs, attitudes and practices are directed by cultural presets, which in turn perpetuate cultural loops. In such, the differences between people's attitudes, beliefs and practices are always limited by axioms outlined by memetic presets.

To paint a loose analogy, culture is an OS software for the "hardware" of human brains. While computers may perform various functions and run additional software, that software must be compatible with the "cultural OS" that it runs.

In that sense, the differences when it comes to core cultural axioms are generally minimal from person to person.

I don't think intentionality applies to what we're talking about. Society doesn't intend things.... I don't see that as a particularly ominous thing. — T Clark

Again, the whole point of this is the axiomatic preferences in context of mutual agreement. Any post-judgement would be rendered using these as a context.

Next - I recommend you take a look at "An Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood. ....

Next - take a look at StreetlightX's recent thread "The Poverty of Truth." ..... — T Clark

Thank you for these. Will check these out.

I guess my first comment is on your use of "totalitarian" in relation to the underlying assumptions. They're not totalitarian, they're just established and yes, also more or less enforced. How could that be any other way. And yes, you're right, they are rarely examined and that leads to problems. — T Clark

By "totalitarian" I mean a cultural preset that intentionally narrows individual perception of choices in order to harness preferred actions of individuals, which essentially is a goal of any totalitarian regime - robotic obedience to axiomatic "societal program".

I think that the alternative to that would be the adequate education and a societal structure that's more open to a wider range of communities that operate in context of "localized axiomatic agreements".

Of course, the first step forwards that would be awareness of axiomatic presuppositions that underline our societal structures.

Nothing is a verbal abstraction that signifies absence. It exists for a narrow range of utility, and I think that philosophers take it way too far when they extent the utility of the word to a meaning where it becomes absurd.

For example, you can say colloquially "What do you want from me?", and someone would say "Nothing". You could also answer "I don't need anything from you". The meaning is the same.

When we twist linguistic label and attempt to reify it becomes absurd. You can't give an example of nothing :). It's an self-negating term that only exists as a fictional preponderance if you take it and use it in some philosophical context that assumes that there is some "state of reality" where things are absent.

In physics and some viable philosophical thought, "nothing" is more synonymous with "chaos", meaning that there is no consistently identifiable structure that you can examine and identify as consistent. It's nothing, because you can't identify it as something.