I know enough about logic to know that the way you feel about a logical proof is irrelevant to it.

What you "feel' about something is irrelevant as to whether that thing is a logical proof or not. You didn't address the proof in that post, so as far as I know you didn't understand it or perhaps didn't even read it. So what you feel about it is completely irrelevant

Mu, if you don't know the difference between simply observing someone's normal behavior to acquire knowledge, and beating someone to make them do your bidding, then you have bigger problems that can't be helped on a philosophy forum. You need to go to a psychology forum. You observe other people everyday in order to acquire information or knowledge about them. If you think that is any where close to being morally equivalent to owning slaves then I just don't know about you. — Harry Hindu

The problem is, that in order to maintain that culture for the purpose of observation it would require denying the members of that culture the right to leave that culture and join the culture of the observers instead. This would be the same sort of oppression forced on slaves, denying them the right to leave the culture of the enslaved to join instead the enslaving culture.

The problem with both of you is that you both don't seem to understand that this simply a revamp of the nature vs. nature debate in which I already showed that nature and nuture are the same. An individual is an amlgam of culture and its genes. — Harry Hindu

A mixture of two distinct things makes a mixture of two distinct things, each of the two distinct things forming a part of the mixture. It does not make the two distinct things one and the same thing. Mixing water and salt will produce a solution, but it does not make water and salt the same thing.

It's very simple to prove it logically, (as logical possibilities are very simple to prove as logical possibilities). And I did prove it logically, it's in that post where you focused on what I claimed physicists have demonstrated, rather than on the content of the my post. And the fact is that logical possibilities are meaningful. So the concept of time passing without any change by which that time could be measured, as a logical possibility, is meaningful.

When we're talking about measuring time, we choose some changes as the basis. I already explained this.

We then measure other changes relative to the changes we chose as our measurement basis. We could use the relatively twice as fast wheel as the measurement basis. We could use any changes as the measurement basis. — Terrapin Station

If it can be proven logically that it is possible for time to pass without any changes occurring, therefore no means of measuring that time, then by the impact of that logic, this "possible" time, during which no changes are occurring, is meaningful. Logical possibilities are meaningful.

Suppose the mores of your society are that Christian colonial racism that finds it moral to keep slaves and has a moralistic talk that justifies that. but you see past the economic convenience of the thing and reject it because you are enamoured of the dignity of the person or universal human rights. So you campaign, perhaps you are part of the underground railroad, and you do what you can. Now you surely understand that when you say 'slavery is wrong', and your neighbour says 'slavery is fine' you are both taking a moral stand, and that you are opposed. Now if you are truly alone in your opposition, you will likely be ignored, reviled, locked up or killed - as mad sad or bad. You will be in this regard external to the culture, and if there are others to form a resistance, you will be part of a counter-culture. — unenlightened

I have nothing to oppose here. What I oppose is identifying the individual in reference to the existing culture. So consider the individual in this example, who is alone in opposition to the norms of society. That person has an identity which is distinct from the culture. We do not know that person's values so we cannot even discuss them, it's just been stipulated in the example that the values are distinct from those of the culture. This person is known in the example as distinct from the culture. That person has the choice of remaining silent, having one's values which are distinct from the culture, never come to light, or, the person may associate with others, to build support. If that person chooses to associate, the identity of that person is built upon the ideas expressed. The person, is the starting point of identity, and this is the same for any person. The person expresses ideas and an identity is produced accordingly. We may compare those ideas to the values of the culture, if we desire.

Let's go back to the beginning, where I said 'the individual is made of social relations'. All this means is that the campaigner against slavery - the very descriptive definitional term - describes the person's relations to his society. It defines the society he lives in and his relation to it (opposition). — unenlightened

The problem here is that the person has an identity even prior to being "the campaigner against slavery". This identity is associated with the values that the person holds, and it is very important to identify the person as "campaigner for X values" rather than "campaigner against our culture". The difference is very evident, and well documented, if you consider someone like Jesus. You might identify Jesus as the campaigner against Jewish culture. But if you supported his cause, you would not identify him in this way, you'd identify with the values and ideas that he professed, and he would be known to you by what he promoted, rather than by what he was against. Looking back posteriorly, we can identify Jesus according to the culture which came from him, Christianity, but at the time when he was campaigning against the Jewish culture, that later culture Christianity, did not exist. So there was not such an option. At that time you could either identify him as campaigner against the Jewish culture, or campaigner for X values. The difference is magnificent, and only Saul (Paul), in an epiphany, saw the means for reconciliation. The problem though is that the reconciliation is not real, as there is no real reconciliation for that difference of identity. The two identities are magnificently distinct. So Saul's reconciliation raises Jesus to the level of divinity, assigning to Jesus the false identity of Son of God.

None of this privileges society as the moral priority, or removes the freedom of the individual, which I think is what you are objecting to, it simply points out that these relations of opposition and conformity, of resistance and cooperation are the substance of individuality. From my point of view it is as banal as saying that the human body is formed by the environment it inhabits. if we lived in the sea, we'd have flippers not legs. One cannot be a dodo hunter when there are no dodos to hunt. — unenlightened

What I am objecting to is the false identity which identifying the individual in relation to the existing culture, rather than identifying the individual according to the values and ideas which one holds, creates.

I'll put it as plainly as I can. The will of the person is one thing that pertains to the individual, whereas the will of the people is a plurality or aggregate of wills and therefore pertains to a culture. — unenlightened

OK, since you clearly acknowledge a distinction between "the will of the person", and "the will of the people", then how can you identify the individual through reference to the group, in relation to moral issues? Moral issues involve matters of will. The "will of the person" cannot be identified within "the will of the people" so "the person", in the context of morality, cannot be defined through reference to the culture.

An individual has no power at all without society, since the individual is born helpless. — unenlightened

I agree.

With the relevant society the individual has the power to own slaves, just as with the relevant society and not otherwise, the individual has the power to paint a cave, or open a facebook account. — unenlightened

Do you agree that the individual has freedom of choice to decide whether or not owning a slave, or opening a facebook account is a good thing to do, regardless of whether or not the person proceeds in such activities. In other words, a person could live within a culture which strictly forbids owning slaves, the state declaring it a bad thing and illegal to own slaves, yet the person still believes it's a good thing to own slaves, in the mind, disagreeing with the culture.

I want to characterise law and punishment and the will of the people as aspects of the culture along with the moral principles and negotiations that 'we' need, according to you. — unenlightened

If you agree with the principle I sated above, that the person's belief could run counter to the person's culture, how can you characterize the will of the people as aspects of the culture? The person chooses to believe, of one's own free will, moral principles which are contrary to one's own culture. For instance, imagine a person born and raised within a particular culture, being taught that slavery is not good. That person at a later age, in adulthood, may read various materials, or be exposed to other believes with elements of "counter-culture", and decide that slavery is good. The person need not act on this belief, but still the will of that person is not consistent with the culture, having chosen to believe principles contrary to those of the culture, so the will of that person cannot be characterized as an aspect of the culture.

Well it couldn't, any more than the protection of people from slavery could be successful without suppressing the will of the people to own slaves. — unenlightened

Right, maybe you're starting to understand. Notice in your example of slavery, the individual who has the will to own slaves does not actually have the power to own slaves. So we don't really need to suppress the will to own slaves, that desire is already suppressed by natural conditions. Slavery is only a problem if it is culturally sanctioned. It requires a like-minded group, with power, to enslave others. So removing slavery is not a matter of suppressing the will to own slaves, it is a matter of annihilating that cultural. The will to own slaves might always exist in some impotent form. suppressed by natural circumstances, when it is not sanctioned by a culture.

If you want to characterize law and punishment as suppressing the will of the people, for the sake of "the culture", then we would need to negotiate moral principles to justify such suppression. But where would we start, the good of the individual people, or the good of the culture? Individual people have solid material needs. What kind of needs does a "culture" have, other than needing people?

It seems to me that a more advanced culture would want to preserve a more primitive one for the purpose of science - something a more primitive society might not understand. — Harry Hindu

Of course this all becomes an issue of moral principles. How would preserving a primitive culture for the purpose of science be fundamentally different from keeping slaves?

You identify with the culture rather than with the individual, and this justifies oppression of the individual for the sake of the culture.

Are you familiar with the Inquisition?

Unfortunately, you seem to think that the solution is to abandon the principle. — unenlightened

Yes I think that this idea of "protecting" is just a veiled form of oppression. When you see that there is a natural will of the individual human being to learn and understand alternative cultural principles, and diversify oneself, then you'll see that any attempts to protect a culture cannot get beyond the fundamental requirement of denying its members the freedom to choose otherwise.

Take the example of the Welsh government "protecting" the Welsh language for example. I am not familiar with this practise, but how could it possibly be successful without some form of suppressing the will of the people to use other languages?

Here's something to consider unenlightened. There is a natural human tendency to learn other cultures. You and I, with education and resources can pick up books, or travel, and expose ourselves to the vast variety. Some people are denied this capacity due to natural circumstances, lack of resources, or the power of authority. But if you accept this basic premise, that this tendency exists as a natural will of human beings, you may see where the problem is in the op.

So where do you get this idea to "protect" an isolated culture? What would be the purpose of maintaining this distinct and isolated culture, as exemplified in the op? You seem to be considering the idea that it's a good thing to keep particular cultures, like the Sentinelese, excluded and living in their own isolated little way, without integrating with other cultures. How could this be a good thing? Isn't this contrary to the human will explained above? I believe this is where the problem is. There is no reason why such exclusion could be good, because it's a matter of going against the will of the people. The only way that such a culture could be maintained would be to deny the freedom and rights of the individuals within that culture to learn and practise what is available to them from other cultures. So this idea of protecting a culture is part of the very same ideology of building walls. To maintain that culture would require denying its individuals the freedom of access to other cultures.

Specifically the notion that you can divide a quantity up into infinite parts.

Problem: How big are those individual parts? — albie

The parts are infinitely small.

don't need your contradictions, I have my own. — unenlightened

See how we have similar culture, but different identity. How could two people have the very same culture, such that we could identity a person by classing one in a group determined as "a culture"?

That's awfully big of you and Plato, but in my culture Plato is the original colonialist, secure in the knowledge of his own superiority and the primitive blindness all but 'philosophers'. — unenlightened

Oh I see, you're laying claim to the culture now, excluding me from your "culture" just because I interpret Plato differently from you. You're the one expressing superiority with your exclusionary tactics.. And not only are you expressing superiority, but you're also intimidating me, implying that you have the backing of a group, your "culture". Your intimidation won't work though. I know that you are just an individual, and you are not expressing the will of any group. You remind me of a whiny child: "play the game my way or my daddy will kick your daddy in the arse".

Ask yourself, what is "a culture", what differentiates one culture from another. Unless you're an archeologist who only has physical artifacts to go by, you'll most likely refer to some ideologies. Culture is a reflection of ideology. Don't ignore Plato's Republic. Get yourself out of that dank world of darkness, the cave, and we'll welcome you to the world of philosophy. (Where the sun shines brightly every day.)

Within a particular "culture", there are varying ideologies. The supporters of one ideology may relate to the supporters of another ideology in a variety of different ways. They may seek to compromise, and minimize differences, or they may enhance differences. One may seek to oppress or annihilate the other. The importance of these differences which lie within any particular culture, make cultural identity a non-valuable form of identity, as unreliable.

So we must turn to ideology to find a form of identity with veracity. Ideologies, based in ideas, arise from the individual, so an ideology is created by an individual, not vise versa. The ideology does not create the individual, the individual creates the ideology. That is the nature of free will.

Namby-Pambies are a human culture. But what makes our culture different is that only our culture is aware that it is a culture. — unenlightened

Namby-Pambism is more of an ideology than a culture. it pervades many cultures and is not proper to one. Perhaps your "culture", in being "aware that it is a culture", is mistaken, and is not really a culture at all.

What's the difference between Superdeterminism and plain old determinism?

So you loosely agree that time without change is not meaningful, but here you say time can pass without any change. — noAxioms

Yes, I wouldn't exactly say that time without change is meaningless. If that were the case there wouldn't be much point to saying it. I would say that for most, if not all practical purposes, such a thing is useless. But as a logical possibility, and an aid toward understanding the nature of temporal reality, I think it's meaningful.

Can you give a clue re a few words that the explanation started with so that I can look it up again? — Terrapin Station

It's the post where you focused on my claims as to what physicists have determined rather than on the content of the post. Here's the specifics. "Change" and "motion" refer to activities of physical things. As per my explanation in that other post, time can be passing (proceeding) without any change or motion occurring. Therefore "pass" and "proceed" (as in what time does) do not necessarily imply change or motion.

If you want to insist that "pass" and "proceed" (as in what time does) necessarily implies change, then we'll have to allow that "change" doesn't necessarily refer to physical things, and a non-physical thing (time) could change

Otherwise, re "pass" and "proceed" you'd have to explain the definition you're using that doesn't involve change or motion. — Terrapin Station

What kind of nonsense is this? First you asked me to define "pass", so I did with reference to "proceed". Now you want me to define "proceed". I think this will be a never ending (continuous) adventure, as you seem to have difficulty understanding the English language. Nevertheless, I'll oblige you, I mean "proceed" in the sense of "continue".

First, if you can hold to the notion "...that an individual is made of social relations", then it will sound less strange to talk about what a culture is aware of, rather than what an individual is aware of. (The cult of the individual is a culture) — unenlightened

Until you recognize that the identity of the individual is proper to the individual, qua individual, rather than as a member of any particular group, the existence of divisions and boundaries within the population will remain unintelligible to you. That is because the only real boundary or division within the population is the one that separates the individual from everyone else. The boundaries which separate groups are ideological boundaries. To identify an individual by designating one as part of a group, culture, or whatever, is an identity based in the ideology of the person doing the identifying, rather than in the true identity of the individual. The individual is not "made of social relations", ideologies are made of social relations.

The problem is that "pass" and "proceed" are terms that imply change or motion, unless you have some novel definition of them that you'd need to explain for the idea of time not requiring change or motion to make any sense. — Terrapin Station

Those terms do not necessarily imply change or motion, that's just what your claim is. I've already explained to you how time can pass or proceed without any change or motion. So you simply have a faulty understanding of those terms if you think that they necessarily imply change or motion.

I didn't actually specify "physical change" in anything I said, by the way. Just change. So if you want to posit "nonphysical change"--whatever that would be--okay, but it's still change. — Terrapin Station

I suggested non-physical change as a compromise, a way of resolving our impasse. I would allow that time is a type of change, if you would allow that the type of change which is time is, is non-physical.

Time may require change to be meaningful, but change is not what it is. — noAxioms

That's pretty close to what I've been trying to tell Terrapin, change requires time, but change is not what time is.

Another fallacious mistake. I said you cannot assert that a change has not taken place just because it cannot be measured. But you are asserting exactly that. — noAxioms

I was not asserting that. I've been saying that time is not change. It's Terrapin's assumption, that time is change, which leads to the conclusion that change which cannot be measured has occurred.

I have the same problem with "proceed." You'd have to explain how we could have something proceed without changing. — Terrapin Station

As per my explanation, time may pass, or "proceeds" without any physical change. That was my explanation. Don't create the illusion of circular reasoning by asking me to repeat the explanation I've already made. Remember when I made the explanation, you had difficulty distinguishing between the part of the explanation which I said physicists had demonstrated and the part which was my conception.

You just won't accept my explanation because you refuse to consider the possibility of proceeding without change, even though I explained it as time passing without change. If this is too difficult for you, then let's consider the possibility of non-physical change. Then we might create compatibility between you assertion "time is change", and my description of something (time) proceeding without any physical change. What do you think, will this make "non-physical change" coherent, if we say that time is change, yet we allow that time can pass without physical change occurring?

I think that you cannot truthfully state that a change has taken place unless that change has been measured. To judge that a change has occurred is to have performed some kind of measurement. To say that a change has occurred, but it cannot be measured is contradictory, because to determine change is to make some sort of measurement.

don't know what nonphysical anything would be. But who knows what you'd claim, and you specified physical change, as if there might be some other sort of change. — Terrapin Station

That's the point, you're the one arguing time is change. Why would I accept time is a non-physical change as justification of your claim? You would need to explain what you mean by that.

Okay, so you're using the word "pass" to refer to an absence of change? Could you explain that sense of "pass," as I'm unfamiliar with it. — Terrapin Station

No, "pass" is not necessarily an absence of change, it can occur, as in the case of time, with an absence of change. I mean it in the sense of to proceed. Time may proceed without physical change.
If you insist that this procedure is some sort of change, then we'd have to consider the possibility of non-physical change. But that would require some explaining.

I don't know what you would mean by "nonphysical change". You'd have to explain how such a thing could be possible.

I have explained, and distinguished, between what has been determined by physicist, that change occurs in quantum units, and what I have conceived of, a period of time shorter than that required for a quantum of change.

I am sorry for any ambiguity, it was unintentional.

Can we proceed to the justification of your assertion, that time is change?

I explained what I meant. Now you're just changing the subject because you have no defense for your assertion.

I told you, this is my conception. to prove your assertion you need to demonstrate that my conception is impossible.

Physicists have determined that physical change occurs in quantum units. I can conceive of a period of time shorter than the amount of time required for a quanta of physical change. This short period of time must pass without any physical change.

I said:
"Physicists have determined that no physical change can occur in a shorter period of time."
My conclusion is that in a shorter period of time change does not occur.

Wikipedia:
"The Planck time is by many physicists considered to be the shortest possible measurable time interval; however, this is still a matter of debate."

No, of course not. And obviously I'd say that if I'm saying that time and change are identical. — Terrapin Station

OK, that's you're assertion. Can you justify it? I see no problem conceiving of time passing without any change. Imagine a very short period of time, Planck length or shorter. Physicists have determined that no physical change can occur in a shorter period of time. However, that short period of time must pass, and this time must pass without any physical change, according to what the physicists have determined. Therefore time passes without any change. To justify your assertion you need to demonstrate that this conception is impossible.

Of course. "Changes that haven't happened yet change into changes that already happened" is incoherent, isn't it? — Terrapin Station

Right, the difference between "changes that haven't happened yet" (future) and "changes that already happened" (past), is something other than a change. Therefore time is other than change.

I'm not denying temporal differences, so pointing out that I'm specifying temporal differences isn't an argument against what I'm saying, it's a feature of what I'm saying. Yes, those are temporal differences. That's the whole point. — Terrapin Station

"Time is change" is incompatible with "the difference between future and past is temporal", because this difference which is an aspect of time, is not itself a change. Future never changes into past. So, yes it is an argument against what you've said.

Let's try it this way: could you have a change or motion if one "thing" didn't happen after another "thing"? — Terrapin Station

I agree that change requires time, but this does not imply that time is change. To support your claim that time is change, I think you need to demonstrate that change is required for time. So let's try it this way. Could time pass without any change occurring?

To tell you the truth, I don't know what you're denying. You have claimed time is change, and that's nonsense to me, so I'm trying to figure out exactly what you mean by this.

Time has different aspects, change is one, the difference between future and past is another. The two are not the same.

OK, then I agree, if A changes to B, that is a uniquely particular event which cannot be exactly replicated.

No two instances of something are actually identical. (I'm a nominalist.) — Terrapin Station

I agree, identical ought to mean one and the same. If they are two, then they are not identical. This is expressed by Leibniz as the identity of indiscernibles.

You just said the difference. Changes that happened are different than changes that haven't happened. One thing happened. One has not. (And a third option is that it's a change that's happening.) — Terrapin Station

OK, but if there is a difference between changes which have happened and changes which have not yet happened, then this is a temporal difference. Therefore time is something other than change. Or, is it your claim that the difference between future and past is not temporal?

And size is not something different than an object, either. — Terrapin Station

What? "Size" has the same meaning as "object"?

I don't think you need a notion of "past change" in order to hold that when you change 1)A to B, 2)B to A and then 3) A to B again 1) is not identical to 3), unless the state you change is the state of the entire universe. Because under that condition, — Echarmion

1) and 3) are identical unless "A changes to B" does not mean the same thing as "A changes to B". But that would be nonsense if it didn't.

Because under that condition, 1) happens in a different universe from 3), and so the full descriptions of the states would not be identical. If you did change the entire state of the universe, then you would time travel, but since this presumably includes your internal state, you wouldn't notice. — Echarmion

I don't see where you get the premise that it would be a different universe. Anyway, "A changes to B" means the same thing as "A changes to B", and whatever universe your referring to is irrelevant unless you allow for violation of the law of identity..

That comment simply makes no sense. I'm not saying anything like "There is no time." I'm in no way eliminating time. There is time. I'm simply saying what time is ontologically. Time is change. Past time is changes that have happened.

You completely ignored the entire content of the post explaining the issues by the way. — Terrapin Station

I read your post, but it's not relevant to your premise that time is change, which is what I am interested in. So if time is change, and past time is changes that have happened, then how do we differentiate between changes which have already happened and changes which have not yet happened? You can't refer to time to make that differentiation, because time is simply change.

Would your premise be something like "If time isn't different than change/motion, then there would be no difference between motion/changes that are occurring, motion/changes that occurred, and motion/changes that have yet to occur"?

If that's your premise, you'd have to explain how you arrived at it, as it makes no sense to me. — Terrapin Station

I thought that it was obvious. Time is change, and nothing else. By what principle then would you differentiate between past changes, present changes and future changes. You cannot refer to time to differentiate these categories of change because time is change. That would be like differentiating the categories of change by referring to change. We can't do that we need a means for defining different types of change, past, present, and future. If time defines the types of change, then it is not simply change, but a defining aspect of change.

To differentiate categories of change (past, present and future), by referring to time, time must be something other than change. For example, to differentiate categories of objects according to size, size must be something other than an object.

So you could have identified yourself as a member of some commune or tribe, and you might not have known who your parents were or your date of birth. But as it happens, you did identify yourself as the child of particular parents and thus as a member of a family, and not a member of a tribe or commune. — unenlightened

Yes, this is the means of identity which is commonly enforced in today's society, In contrast, the commune I described attempts to enforce a different form of identity by denying public knowledge of one's parents. And, in today's societies, many people choose to identify by one's citizenry, race or other types of group. There's profiling, stereotyping, and all sorts of ways of identifying a person by positioning the person as within a particular group.

Whoever said it was the only way? But I really don't want to labour this point, which is just preventing the discussion I want to have, by calling into question what should be obvious. So I am going to presume you are wrong without engaging further, and if you want to start a thread on the nature of identity I may contribute there. — unenlightened

I'm wrong about what? I don't see what you're disagreeing with. The point is that you can either identify a person as the individual which one is, or as a member of a group. The latter method leads to all sorts of societal boundaries, exclusionary ideologies and attitudes like racism and bigotry. The "paradox" you speak of in the op, which is better described as hypocrisy, is the result of the common practise of identifying people as members of a group, when we say that individuals ought to be judged as the individual which one is. How can you judge a person as an individual when you can only identify that individual as a member of a group?

You mentioned your mother and father. Another term for that is "family." — Terrapin Station

No it isn't. "Family" has many meanings. None of them is "mother", nor "father". I stated the relevant facts, that I have a mother and a father, and you've drawn the conclusion that I have a family.



If you've read Plato's Republic you'll understand that he suggests a type of community in which the identity of an individual's mother and father are not revealed to that child. The child is a baby of the commune, and is identified as a member of that group, not so and so's daughter or son. (There may be a noble lie required here). Now if you look into naming traditions, it hasn't always been the case that a person's family name is representative of that person's father (or mother). That is a relatively recent trend. If you look back into some family name histories, you'll find some instances where the family name means member of such and such tribe, or group, rather than son or daughter of so and so. The modern rendition of one's identity, where the family name signifies son or daughter of so and so is only one of a number of possible forms of identity.

I didn't say anything about a family. See, you're already using my identity information to classify me into a group, "a family", for some ideological purpose.

Now, no matter what we do, A was five feet to the right of B — Terrapin Station

Your premise is that time is change. So "was" in the sense of "past time" is meaningless by that premise. You have nothing to differentiate past change from future change. All we have is either A is five feet to the right of B, or A is not five feet to the right of B. And either of these can be changed through time, which is change.

If you want to introduce a premise which states that something which has occurred in the past cannot be changed, then you need to allow that time is more than just change. You need a premise which gives past changes special status over future changes, as being unchangeable.