Such misinformation is good reason for outrage.

People thought the purchase of Alaska was stupid. The Danes sold the Virgin Islands to the US for $25 million. These aren’t stupid ideas and the outrage about it was misinformed. — NOS4A2

The stupidity is in the method, making it publicly known that I want to buy Greenland, instead of discussing this possibility with those who currently govern that land. How would you feel if the rich guy from a couple of neighbourhoods over, was going around telling everyone that he was intending to buy you out of your house? Any misinformation here is the fault of the president. But why would the president misinform his own people?

Reasoning from first principles in the context of the real, physical world looks like a serious epistemic mismatch to me. That is why I reject the practice of metaphysics. — alcontali

But metaphysics is reasoning toward first principles, not reasoning from first principles.

For example, the axiomatic method certainly does an excellent job in mathematics; but it also does an excellent job in morality, where axiomatic derivation from basic rules is also the method of choice. — alcontali

Here is evidence of your mistake. Morality, in the sense of being moral, acting morally, may be described as a matter of behaving within the confines of some rules of ethics. But to study morality, as a field of study within philosophy, is a process by which we seek to determine those rules. The same is the case with metaphysics, many people, including physicists and other scientists, will reason from first principles in their endeavours, just like many people behave morally, but the metaphysician reasons toward determining first principles.

I don't see how that is relevant to absolute rest.

Why then the emphasis on stillness? — TheMadFool

As I said, it's an exercise of will power.

I think the ‘misunderstanding’ is due to equating ‘leisure’ with ‘freedom’ — I like sushi

I didn't equate leisure with freedom, that's another example of your misunderstanding. What I implied is that one must have leisure in order to act freely, if "leisure" is defined as "free time".

I think freedom is the capacity to carry out free acts. Since time is necessary for activity, free time is an essential aspect of freedom. What did you have in mind as a definition of "freedom"?

Sensations, incongruous feelings, memory, anticipation, planning, the observed passage of cause and effect... These are all what past and future 'really' are because they are all what we use the terms 'past' and 'future' to describe. — Isaac

This is randomly composed nonsense. The observed passage of cause and effect refers to the past only. That is the point of the op, empirical knowledge, knowledge based in observation, refers only to the past. If we want to apply this knowledge to the future, through the application of prediction, we must employ some other principles. These principles are not derived from observation. This is because there is a difference between future and past which cannot be understood through observation.

Past and future are just words. We can use them to describe whatever phenomenon we like, so long as we're understood. — Isaac

This is blatant contradiction. If being understood is a condition which restricts how we use these words, then we cannot use them however we want.

How are you going to demonstrate that anyone has the answer right? — Isaac

This is philosophy, why must one be looking to find "the right answer"? I'm looking for suggestions, possibilities, not the right answer. I don't believe that any human being is capable of giving the right answer because I believe that this is something unknown to all human beings. But why should this prevent me from investigating, looking for ways to proceed into the unknown. Isn't that what philosophy is?

But you still have not provide a coherent definition of absolute rest. As I explained earlier, there could be something which everything else is in motion relative to, but is not itself in motion, and this is absolute rest. How do you show that this is impossible?

The point of it is that we have to give up individual freedoms in order to live together in harmony. — I like sushi

Actually, I think that this is where the misunderstanding lies, not in the conditions of "social contract", but in the misunderstanding of "individual freedom". In actuality, living together under a social contract produces freedom, through the process commonly represented as the division of labour. To act freely requires time not dedicated to providing for the necessities of living. There is no fundamental difference in individual freedoms between life with or without a social contract, but the social contract provides people with the capacity (time) to act freely.

Very recently I saw a tiny praying mantis and as I approached it it sensed my presence and immediately froze. It stopped moving completely. This is, if I'm correct, death mimicry. Dead or lifeless things don't move. — TheMadFool

Suzuki-roshi, in his well-known book Zen Mind Beginners' Mind, indeed says that the practice of zazen is to sit perfectly still, but completely alert, like a frog waiting for a fly to appear. — Wayfarer

There is a difference between being still to avoid being preyed upon, and being still in order to prey, but neither involves an inactive mind. Both, I see as an exercising of will.

Is it possible to describe the origin of the material world in materialistic terms only? — Gregory

Materialism conceives of the world strictly in terms of material objects. The problem which this comes up against is that we see that all material objects have a beginning and end in time, and they also require a reason for their existence, a cause. If we take the whole of material existence, and look at it as an object, the universe, then we see that there must be a cause of it which is immaterial. This is represented in a more comprehensive way as the cosmological argument.

Modern physics takes us beyond materialism by understanding the world in terms of energy. Acceptance of the terms of modern physics renders materialism as obsolete, so physicalism has superseded materialism. The problem which physicalism has, is that "physical", just like "energy", is a property of things. In relation to the universe then, as a thing, energy is a property of the universe. And, it is impossible to adequately describe a thing by referring to a single property, nor is it possible to determine a thing's origin through reference to a single property.

Well, there you go. Your intuition tells you they are different. The fact that we can't measure that difference is unproblematic for you because you already believe that not all knowledge is measurable. I'm not seeing the problem you're trying to resolve. — Isaac

I don't really think it's known by intuition, I used intuition as an example of knowledge without measurement. If it's intuition, then what type of knowledge is intuition? I think many would say that intuition doesn't even qualify as knowledge. Do you think that intuition qualifies as knowledge? Why is it so often wrong if it's knowledge? I said it was self-evident. And self-evidence gives us certainty, intuition does not.

Supposing that each of us always carried a mobile phone and that we agreed to eliminate "the present", "now", " currently" etc. from public discourse by replacing each of their uses with the exact current reading of the International Atomic Time supplemented with the Gregorian calendar. Likewise, we respectively do the same for "the past" and "the future" by replacing their use with time-intervals that are before or after the exact current TAI time.

Doesn't this elimination of temporal indexicals also eliminate all talk of change, and therefore reduce MacTaggart's A series to his B series? — sime

I see a problem with this scenario. If it eliminates talk of change, then it denies us the capacity to talk about, and understand, this aspect of reality, change. Furthermore, it creates a very artificial "time" which is not consistent with what we experience. What we experience is that if we want to be precise, then by the time we say what time it is, it is no longer that time. And if we limit ourselves to very vague designations of the time, like "it's a little after six", or, "it's Tuesday", we rob ourselves of the precision which is needed in some instances. So doing this would be making a move away from understanding time.

Actually, it is my opinion that looking at this as a question concerning "time" is a mistake. I am not looking at any type of series, as described by McTaggart, what I am looking at is what is evident to us, and this is that there is a past, and there is a future. If it is the case, that we have to turn to a series, some sort of ordering of events, to understand this future and past, then I would like to see the logic behind that. But right now I see no need for this. I understand that there is a future for me and a past for me, and I apprehend these as radically different, so this necessitates an assumption of something that separates them, that is the present. Until I validate this difference between future and past, I have no claim on any "present", and no principles for talking about the present being extended in "time". Isn't that all that "time" is, the extension of the present?

The only possible method by which to study temporality is to approach it as a totality, as an original synthesis, which dominates its secondary structures and which confers on them their meaning. — Number2018

My method for studying things is analysis, dividing things into parts and trying to see what makes the parts fit together as a unity. What makes you think that this method is not suited for studying temporal issues?

Human consciousness, when it pays attention, experiences that its present is always transitioning into its past at exactly the same rate as its future is always transitioning into its present. All is movement, nothing lasts!

The distinction between past and future does not appear to be the present. Instead, human consciousness, when it pays attention, appears to be that which constantly distinguishes between the three (past, present, and future) phenomenologically, as described. — charles ferraro

I can't agree with this charles. If when paying attention, human consciousness experiences these things, and it is only human consciousness which produces a difference between past present and future, then my present should not transform into the past when I am not paying attention, yet it does.

If what you mean to ask is "by what measure can we know if some knowledge indeed corresponds with 'reality'?" then why make this about past and future, that just confuses things. — Isaac

If the only way that we can know things is by measuring them, then I might be asking that. But I think that we can know things by means other than by measuring them, like intuition for example. So I am not asking "by what measure" can we know this. But some people might not consider intuition as knowledge. The reason I made this about past and future is because it appears extremely obvious that past is different from future, yet we cannot measure these things.

In a way, I think the whole question is misguided. How can I tell the difference between the posts that come before this one, and the posts that come after it? Well I can read the ones that come before. and the ones that come after are blank. In terms of orientation, one faces the past and walks backwards into the future, anxious that the next post will be unkind or make one look foolish, or worst of all, that there will be none. Spatially, one can look where one is going, but temporally one sees only where one has been, so I think one is oriented one way and travels the opposite way. — unenlightened

The question might be misguided, and I think that's what Isaac is getting at, but I like your answer in this post. However, you haven't mentioned the other option. Perhaps we are actually facing into the future, walking that way, and oriented in that direction, and we only look backwards into the past. That would explain why anxiety is common. This is what I feel, like the vast majority of my "being", all my internal systems, which are mostly operating in the non-conscious level, are all oriented toward the future, and these systems create anxiety which is not produced by my conscious being. It appears like it might be only my consciousness, which comprises a very small part of my overall being, which is oriented toward the past. For some reason my brain has an extensive memory system and my consciousness is supported by this activity of looking at the past.

Now my consciousness is misguided, thinking that I, as a being, am facing the past, and walking backward into the future, when in reality my being is facing the future and only a small part of it, my consciousness, is looking backward at the past. So I have a serious inconsistency between my being and my consciousness with respect to orientation, and this is causing me to be completely disoriented, and probably the reason why I ask misguided questions.

Any question of what 'really' is must have within it your means by which you propose to establish how we'd know such a thing. — Isaac

Actually that's what I'm asking, the means by which we'd establish what really is. So it would be kind of silly to include a proposal of that within the question, unless the question was rhetorical.

But what could you anticipate without memory? — unenlightened

This would be anxiety, a general anticipation without anything particular which is anticipated. In severe cases I think it's called an anxiety attack.

But that's the extreme, and I agree with you in the general sense that the two, memory and anticipation go together. That's why I rejected Janus' description of knowing the difference between future and past as a matter of orientation. Either we're oriented toward the past, or toward the future, but we cannot be oriented in two opposing ways at the same time. Janus suggested that it's not at the same time, but I think memory and anticipation come together at the very same time.

But once we reject this as a mistake, as did Ayer, we realize we are then unable to provide an experiential distinction between past and future, even while we continue to insist on it. — sime

Right, this is one of the key points of the op, we cannot claim to have any empirical knowledge which would justify the conclusion that there is a difference between past and future. However, the other key point is that we tend to consider it as self-evident that there is a difference between them.

There is of course, a big difference between an eaten Hamburger and a Hamburger sitting in front of us; if an object is called 'destroyed', then there does not exist a direct and local reference to the object that we can point at. There is instead a potentially infinite and interlinked fabric of facts called "the evidence of the destroyed object" together with our investigatory sense of anticipation. Hence an empiricist might be able to equate the past with our current sense of inferential expectation together with today's appearances taken holistically as an inseparably entangled whole. But this of course is too vague to constitute an empirical "theory" of any description. — sime

But the difference we are considering is not the difference between past and present, but past and future. So your example of the hamburger would have to be phrased differently. Consider a hamburger which could possibly be destroyed in the future, and a hamburger which actually was destroyed in the past. Now the situation at the present is as you say, an eaten hamburger (destroyed) and a hamburger in front of us (possibly to be destroyed in the future). From the situation of there being no hamburger now, one has to take the hypothetical situation of there being a hamburger now, project that situation into the past, at which point there would exist the possibility of the hamburger being destroyed, and then conclude that the hamburger was destroyed. So understanding the past is much more complex than understanding the future. Understanding the future requires observing what is present and considering the possibility that it might be destroyed. Understanding the past requires taking the idea of possibility for the future, which exists at the present, projecting it into the past to determine possibilities in the past, and then determining which possibilities were actualized. Whereas understanding the future requires only determining which possibilities exist now.

It seems to me that experience (which happens in the present) is more than capable of distinguishing between before and after (e.g., cause and effect), and designating the measurable change: time (per Aristotle). — Galuchat

Before and after is a completely different concept from future and past. The former requires an ordering of events on a temporal scale, the latter requires a present.

Is it logically consistent to be an empiricist who accepts a hard ontological distinction between past and future? — sime

No, I think it is clearly not consistent. But the distinction between past and future is obviously "the present", and most modern empiricists seem to deny the reality of the present, so there is consistency there. Yet some empiricists might agree that it is self-evident that there is a difference between past and future, so this is where there would be inconsistency. Perhaps it's the case that what is self-evident cannot be demonstrated empirically. If this is the case, then what does "self-evident" mean? Is it completely semantic?

I presented a suggestion which you can take as an argument, that the experienced difference between our phenomenological orientations to past and future events, and the ways in which we can imagine logically elaborating that difference, give rise to the very recognition that there is past and future. How else would we arrive at such an idea? — Janus

You have one sort of attitude toward some events, and a completely different sort of attitude toward other events, and you classify two types of events, future and past, according to this difference of attitude. Is that what you are saying? If so, the question is, how does a difference of attitude toward different events constitute a real difference between the events? I mean it's not like we can see the events, or in any way sense them, to make the judgement that they are different sorts of events, so the judgement that there are these two distinct categories of events is not an empirically based judgement. What type of judgement is this? It is based completely in a person's attitude toward the events. Is it a moral judgement? Moral judgements seem to be based in one's attitude toward the event.

You asked what type of knowledge allows us to differentiate between future and past.
Most people would say 'common sense' and experience. — Amity

In the op I explained why we cannot refer to empirical knowledge to justify the claim of a difference between past and future. Perhaps it's "common sense", but what's that?

Let me say it boldly; memory is time. — unenlightened

I can't agree with this, because you don't give proper recognition to the temporal aspect of anticipation. I think that anticipation has a greater effect on my overall psyche than memory does, hence I tend to be an anxious person. I think we have to respect Janus' determination that there are two distinct temporal orientations, toward the past and toward the future. I do not think we can just dismiss the orientation toward the future, and focus on the orientation toward the past, to say that memory is time.

However, having said that, there is a sense in which time only occurs at the present, as time passes. In this way, only past events are "within time", because they are within the passing of time. Anything in the future has not yet occurred, and is therefore outside of time. In this way, only remembered events are within time, and anticipated events are outside of time. Perhaps this is what you mean by memory is time, such a restricted sense of "time".

Incidentally, I think that confabulation is something which we all practise to some degree. When I try to remember a complex event which has occurred, I have to go over it again and again in my mind, putting words to the immediate memory, which is in images. As I do this, the event takes on the character of a description rather than an imaginary scene, like the inversion of making a book into a movie. This activity, of putting words to the images is driven by intention, the purpose for memorizing the event, (which is an attitude toward the future), and this intention greatly shapes the description. That shaping of the description is confabulation.

The only way it makes sense for you to wonder what makes one different from the other is if you can't distinguish them. Otherwise you'd know what makes one different from the other. That would be how you'd distinguish them. — Terrapin Station

That's nonsense. I point to two things, and say that they are different. I ask you what makes them different. You say that if I can see that they are different, then I know what makes them different. You are missing the difference between using your senses and using your mind. Normally, your senses tell you that things are different, and your mind tells you what makes them different. In this case, my mind is telling me that future and past are different, but it is not telling me what makes them different. However, your claim that if I can say that they are different, then I must know what makes them different, is clearly false.

And furthermore, the issue of the op is that if we cannot say what makes them different, then the claim that they are different is not justified. That they are different might be an illusion. So your response is really nonsensical, because you are saying that if you see them as different then you know what makes them different (which is false). And then you assume that the claim that they are different is justified, without any justification, as the appearance that they are different may be an illusion.



So how does semantic information tell us that the past is different from the future?

Can it be argued that the past and future modes of time can only be experienced by the person's imagination in the perpetually vanishing present mode of time; thereby seeming to indicate some sort of ontological priority of the present mode over the others? — charles ferraro

I think that if we say there is a difference between past and future, this necessarily gives ontological priority to the present. Don't you? Wouldn't such a difference be dependent on the existence of the present?

Are you honestly asking this? Your mind works so that you can't make out any distinction between memories of things that happened and imagining what might or will happen? — Terrapin Station

I did not ask whether one can or cannot distinguish between memories and anticipations, I asked what makes one different from the other. And, I implied that saying one is of past events and the other of future events would be begging the question, because reference to memory and anticipation was used to support the claim that there is a difference between past and future.

There seems to be past - present - future, as memory, sensation, and imagination. I suppose you privilege the present as all-encompassing, in that memory and imagined futures are also 'sensed' as 'present' — unenlightened

Yes, I actually do privilege the present. That's because without the present, as the thing which separates or divides the future from the past, there could be no future or past. Also, I tend to think that it is impossible that the present could be a dimensionless dividing point, or else we couldn't exist in the present (as we are dimensional). So I believe that the present actually contains within it, some of the past, and some of the future, and this is why we have both memories and anticipations at the same time.

I am never afraid of the past. — unenlightened

That's a good answer, but what if your memory started to fail you? If I started having trouble remembering things this would make me afraid. But maybe this would just be a matter of being afraid of my future in demential state.

Have I said that you could be oriented to both the past and the future "at the same time"? It's irrelevant to the argument. — Janus

If it's at different times, then what would separate one time from another time? What would constitute turning from being oriented to the past to being oriented to the future, and back and forth? It seems to me that such a back and forth would be a disorientation.

I don't think you can say that something is irrelevant to the argument until there is actually an argument. Did you present an argument?

I didn't say we are oriented towards the past or the future; in the sense of being oriented to one and not the other. We are oriented towards both but in different ways. — Janus

I would say that's contradictory. One cannot be oriented towards two opposing things, that's like saying you're oriented toward the east and toward the west, at the same time. And, you cannot validate this by saying that it's in different ways, because the orientation is in relation to only one thing, the passing of time. This claim of "different ways" would require showing that there is a difference between past and future, to support the "different ways", but that there is a difference between past and future is what we are trying to justify in the first place. So we have something like, you're coming from the east, and walking toward the west, and you're saying that you're oriented toward both. But that's not really the case, because you're really only oriented toward the west, as that is the way that you're headed.

In the case of future and past, empirical knowledge is based in past experience, while moral knowledge is based in what ought to be done in the future. If we are headed into the future, then we orient ourselves through moral knowledge and not empirical knowledge. Saying that we use both, empirical knowledge and moral knowledge in our orientation doesn't make any sense unless one can establish a meaningful relationship between the past and the future, through which one type of knowledge can be converted into the other. Otherwise it would be like trying to establish where you are going by looking at where you have come from. It doesn't make sense to look back at the east to determine where you are going in the west, unless you have some principles to transpose the past points of being in the east, into future points of being in the west..

Hegel: a Mystic Man ? — Amity

That's what we were discussing in the other thread.

Do you agree with Wayfarer in his comment:
"I think it is possible to identify aspects the Hegelian 'absolute' with both the 'first mover' of Aristotle, and also with the One of neo-platonism (feasibly a kind of 'world soul')." — Amity

Yes, but these terms are very general and vague, they can be interpreted in so many different ways that it's not a very meaningful observation until some particular principles are compared. It's like saying all monotheist believe in "God". it doesn't really say too much.

If I understand you then, you think that we have a particular orientation, and this orientation justifies the claim that there is a difference between past and future. To be oriented means to be pointed in a specific direction. What direction do you think we're pointed toward, the past or the future? If it's neither, then how can you call this an orientation?

Empirical (experiential) knowledge (semantic information). — Galuchat

I don't think empirical knowledge can justify the claim of a difference between past and future, for the reasons outlined in the op. We experience neither past nor future. Could you explain what you mean by "semantic information"?

The past, as the determinate, is embedded in memory, whereas the future, as the indeterminate, is merely imagined. — Janus

This might be a place to start. What makes the memory of an event different from the anticipation of an event. Don' refer to one event having already occurred, and the other not, because that would be circular, as we are referring to memory and anticipation to justify the claim that there is a difference between one event already having occurred and the other not yet

Is there anything wrong with this argument? — TheMadFool

Yes there is something wrong with the argument, you haven't defined "absolute rest". Does absolute rest mean that nothing is in motion, as would be the case if time stopped passing, or does it refer to something, relative to which the motion of all things could be measured? The argument does not show that either of these is impossible, so it really does nothing to show that absolute rest is impossible.

The issue is not a matter of my capacity with the English language. It is a matter of your inability to explain what you mean with terms like "Mind", and phrases like "American mind", "where language is stored", and "thinking that comes in groups". When you explain your use of these, simply by saying that this is common usage therefore I ought to know what you mean, this gives me no indication that you have any idea of what you are talking about. You could be a parrot, or a bot, for all I know. You've heard it, now you repeat it. Get back down to the Common, smoke some more of that weed, maybe try some psilocybe this time, and clarify your ideas, why don't you, tim?

If the forms are transcendent, then logically they are eternal, not temporal, in which case a claim of temporal priority would be incoherent. So, either way, no temporal priority. — Janus

Now, Aristotle demonstrated that the Ideas of Pythagorean idealism (the Forms of Platonic realism), cannot be eternal. But that does not force the conclusion that forms are inseparable from material particulars. There is another option, the one which Neo-Platonists and Christian theologians prefer, and that is to conceive of Forms as particulars. Apprehending Forms as particulars is the source of our notion of perfection, the Ideal.

This puts "matter" in an awkward position conceptually, because matter is now not necessary for the existence of the particular. The particular, as a form, the Ideal, is independent from any material particular. Prior to Aristotle, the defining feature of the particular was that it was a body, material. After Aristotle there was the conceptual structure available to conceive of the particular as a pure Form. The pure Form, as a particular, is validated by the good (Plato), what is intended, a particular object (goal), in perfection. The material existence of the particular, however, what comes about as a result of an attempt to produce this perfection, is always deficient. This is the fact that no act is perfect, there is always some degree of mistake.

For many, this points toward matter as the root of evil and mistake. It is assumed that faults inherent within matter itself are responsible for the privations of material objects, and consequently our own failures. I believe that a principle similar to this is fundamental to Manichaeism. Christian theology, on the other hand, teaches that privation is formal, and therefore not intrinsic to matter. It is not the fault of matter, that we cannot produce the perfection desired, but a problem with the form which the human mind apprehends (the form is less than Ideal). This points right to the concept of Original Sin, which might be an attempt at reconciliation between the principles of Christians and Gnostics. In dualism, the cause of evil is a difficult question. Is the cause of sin inherent within the soul of the human being (form), such evil is a necessary product of the free will, or is it produced by the material aspect of the human being, and necessitated in this way?

It's not an easy question, because the human body is already a composite of matter and form, so we have to look toward the principles which produce this composition, and this is beyond what is evident to the human experience. This is why it is a mistake to limit epistemology to what is empirically known, because this would exclude the possibility of knowledge in moral issues. Appropriate mental training, discipline, is required in order that one may proceed logically and coherently within this body of knowledge which is not grounded in empiricism. This is the top section of Plato's divided line.

Going back to this. Is your claim that this temporally prior form is itself separate from particulars? If so, then why would that not be a Platonic form on your view? — Andrew M

It is a particular, but it's prior to and therefore separate from material particulars. It is better understood as a Neo-Platonic Form, because Plato was rather confused in his efforts to relate the universal to the particular (Timaeus). But the Neo-Platonists manage to do this with the fundamental unity "One". See, "One" is both a universal and a particular. It is a Platonic form and a particular. Plato's Parmenides actually leads in this direction.

I don't see 'the forms' as temporally prior - before in time - but ontologically prior, i.e. the form is something that is 'realised' to a greater or lesser degree of perfection by the particular. — Wayfarer

If the form is "realised" in the perfection of the particular, then the form is necessarily prior in time to the particular. It's like when you try to draw a perfect circle, the form, the perfect circle, exists in you mind, prior in time to the one you draw, acting as a cause (in the sense of final cause) of the less than perfect circle which you will draw.

The "Ideal", (in the sense of "the perfect"), is a particular because it cannot be anything other than perfect as this would make it less than ideal. The Ideal is therefore a unique thing, a particular. In the sense that we strive to produce the ideal, the ideal is a cause, and therefore prior in time to the multitude of less than perfect things which we produce in that effort. The vast multitude of the less than perfect circles which we draw may be classified under the universal category of "circle", but this is only because we allow the universal to be less than the Ideal, which is a particular.

This is where Plato was confused in Timaeus, he wanted to put the universal first, and have the particulars emanate from the universal. But Aristotle turned this around, and showed how the particular must be prior, so the Neo-Platonists proceeded with the One as first. We can understand the One as the Ideal.

Aristotle identifies a different kind of cause - a final cause. The golfer moves his hand because he desires to play golf. Thus he is the unmoved mover that causes the golf ball to move. — Andrew M

This is where the concept of free will is derived, a cause which is not itself caused.

Just common sense and common usage. Yours is an illegitimate reification of a notion of mine. — tim wood

Don't try to turn the table, you are the one making the illegitimate reification, talking about this Mind, as if it is a real thing. If it's not a real thing, then what are you talking about other than a group of human beings, each with one's own mind?

So, it's up to you to tell me, what are you talking about, a real thing called Mind, or real individual human minds. You talk about "Mind" as if it is something other than individual human minds, and when I point out that's nonsense, you say you weren't talking 'mind' as is it's a real thing. What were you talking about then, a bunch of individual minds? I think so. So stop calling this group of minds "Mind" if there's no such thing as Mind.

Consider, for example, American freedom, such as it is these days. Where and in what does in inhere? Steve's mind? Bob's mind? Stephanie's mind? Perhaps some aspect of it, some sense of it, in all their minds. What do you call that collectivity when it includes 300+ million Americans? I'd call it the American mind - not necessarily restricted to Americans. Is the American mind a thing? Have you ever the hear the expression "American mind"? — tim wood

I've never heard of such a thing as the "American mind". You're still talking nonsense. Freedom is not something that inheres in a mind, unless you are talking about free will. But free will is proper to each mind individually. We are each free to choose, individually, in one's own way, we do not choose collectively.

Or where is language stored? For example, English? In the minds of English speakers. What might you call that collectivity? — tim wood

What are you talking about, "where is language stored"? Have you never heard of "memory"? Each one of us has one's own memory. There's nothing collective about that, it's personal. Where do you get this idea that language is stored in some sort of collective memory? Do you mean books? But books just contain written symbols, which must be read and understood by individual minds, through reference to one's memory.

Or any kind of thinking that comes in groups. So-and-so has a mathematical mind, or a legal mind, or an artist's mind, and so forth. This is all just common usage. — tim wood

"Thinking that comes in groups"? That is not common usage at all. We might classify a person as having this type of mind or that type of mind, just like psychiatry identifies "states of mind" which are common to different people, but in no way does this indicate that there is thinking which comes in groups. It is just classifying similar ways of thinking.

Saying "all human beings have a mind" doesn't justify talking about "a Mind which all human beings have", just like saying "all grass is green" doesn't justify saying "there is a Green which all grass has". You're either being totally abusive of the English language, or you really misunderstand simple logic.

This I neither thought nor said. What I mean is that there are individual minds, "and given minds, you get something like Mind." Offhand I'd agree that ideas - the content of them - originate in one mind, or a few working together - I suppose one must always be first. But as the knowledge becomes generally known, it becomes a community possession. No special mystery here. — tim wood

There's no mystery here, only an invalid conclusion. The point, is that many human minds does not make a "Mind". That's like saying many horses makes a "Horse". There's no justification for such a conclusion. No matter how many human beings with minds you put into the same room, they do make a Mind which is human, but which is not a human mind. You've inverted subject for predicate by pluralizing, such that a number of human beings with minds becomes a Mind which is human. How could you possibly justify such an illogical maneuver?

You apparently missed that the article wasn't there. Human mind, not a human mind. — tim wood

That's nonsense. You're saying that this proposed "Mind" is not a human mind, though you said it is human, it's simply human mind. So there's this thing called Mind, and it's not a human mind, it's human mind. What are you guys smoking down there at the Boston Common?

Actually, Toronto is a great example of classic Trumpian business practise. Bring in an investor with a big "debt" (for God knows what) to be paid off. Fill your personal account by charging exorbitant management fees. Defer payment to the locals who are doing the work. Declare bankruptcy and get the hell out of Dodge, pockets lined with gold. Debt paid off! -- At the expense of the locals.

He probably thought that being up north, property would be cheap, just partner up with a Russian investor, and the locals could be bulldozed. You think he would have learned something from his experience in Toronto!

(he's way ahead on the global warming curve). — Baden

No, he just goes by the name, Greenland, perfect for golf courses

"I'm a Mystic Man, I'm just a Mystic Man ... I man don't ... I man don't ... I man don't..." -Peter Tosh

A mind? How about minds?

Or maybe you're just arguing that in the whole entire history of the universe every single instant that ever was or ever will be is unique. Not only can you not step into the same river twice, you cannot even once. Is that where you're going? And every thing, which requires continuity, is just a dream, because nothing is the same from moment to moment. - wait! not even in dreams! Is that where you're aiming? — tim wood

I'm not arguing anything here, I'm just trying to get some clarification of what you mean. You say things which do not make sense to me. For instance, why do you say "minds" instead of "mind"? I can have an idea in my mind, which does not seem to be dependent on any other minds, so why would you jump to this conclusion that ideas are dependent on minds, not on a mind?

Isn't it true that every instant of time in the history of the universe is unique? That seems very obvious, once something has happened we cannot go back to how things were before. Why would I need to argue this? Where do you get the idea of "continuity" from? We observe that some aspects of reality stay the same even as time passes. Aristotle posited matter as the principle of continuity, to account for the reality of what is observed. Newton took matter for granted, as the substance of "a body" and gave matter the property of inertia (continuity); Newton's first law. You seem to think that this idea is wrong, and ought to be replaced by a modern conception of "matter", how so?

In the Augustine citation almost the first qualification that meets the eye is "...must be independent of particular minds...".

I buy the notion that no mind(s) at all, then no ideas. Plenty to think about, but no one to do the thinking, or even to think about the possibility. But given minds, you get something like Mind, the collective and dynamic wisdom of..., that as history plays out, ebbs and flows, and has its spring and neap tides, its seasons of flood and drought.

A difficulty I have with any notions of being-less minds being the author and communicator to us of reality-as-we-perceive-it, is that the people who themselves create such theories do it to give an account, and the only account they can think of, of what we perceive and how we perceive it. In every case they simply do not have access to any understanding of the history of the development of mind - brain - itself over, what, most of five-hundred-million years? Maybe four hundred million?

Arguably the human brain given its methods of perception has itself evolved into a cognizing organ of very great sensitivity to the world it finds itself in - or more accurately, to the world as it perceives it. Were we whales or porpoises or squid, or had we thousands of eyes like a fly, or if like May flies we lived a day, or some other things that live very long times, or if we were just plain a lot different that we are, then likely we would have very different ideas of our world.

So what I find in most ancient philosophies and religions - and imo all religions are ancient, even the modern ones, is the attempt to make sense, but with the only recourse to make the sense being non-sense - and a credulous audience. Unfortunately credulity too is both an ancient and a modern trait, with some excuse for them, and not-so-much or hardly any at all for us.

Of course this Mind in question is human mind, its wisdom, as opposed to knowledge, mainly in good and astute psychology. But this won't do at all for either of the myth-ifiers or the mystifiers. Just leaves the question if we will survive them. — tim wood

There's a deep inconsistency here. Let's take the assumption that an idea is dependent on minds, and cannot be produced, nor maintained simply by the single mind of an individual human being. Because of this assumption you are forced to jump to "Mind", which is supposed to represent some sort of collective mind, as this is what is required to support the existence of ideas. But then you belittle this Mind by saying "this Mind in question is human Mind". Do you see the inconsistency? A human mind is a particular mind of an individual human being. If you assume some sort of collective Mind, it is impossible that this is a human mind. The assumption of a collective Mind is not so easily supported as you make it sound.

I go with the first option, my dogs have always been much smarter than me. The fact that they do not talk is evidence of this. The barking is intended to irritate me, but probably for good reason.

As to the question of whether Hegel was a mystic, we must first ask what a mystic is. Is it someone who has experiences or someone who has been initiated formally or informally into secret teachings or someone who yearns for immediacy or someone who attempts to attain altered states of consciousness via particular practices or ...? — Fooloso4

Mysticism is philosophy centred around the mystical experience. I believe that in it's most simple form, the mystical experience is the experience which makes one aware of one's own spirituality. Recognizing your spirituality, and acknowledging this as experience, makes you a mystic.

In brief, it means that, for example, studying what people have done and thought is usually helpful to current effort.

So long ago I do not remember the particulars, an economist addressed the challenge of new manufacturing in countries that did not have good manufacturing and wanted it. This question (c. 1962?) was, why don't countries without good manufacturing just buy "stuff" and copy it, maybe improving it in the process?

By way of answer, the author noted that BMW made excellent motorcycles. The Soviets (as I recall) had bought several and taken them apart on the assumption they had merely to copy and make. They made, they ended up with, the Ural. A look-a-like motorcycle, but in quality as a horse chestnut is to a chestnut horse (thank you Mr. L.). The idea was that in order to have good manufacturing, you have to travel at least most of the path to get there. To learn to make good tools, have good steels, make good plants - a problem of its own - have skilled labor and technicians and management, and on and on. That is, copy and make just is not that simple.

In the same way, the history of philosophy - the history of ideas - is at least as valuable. I've read it - if I could cite I would - that philosophy just is the history of philosophy. Call it the propaedeutic part.

As to the rest of the latter part of your remark, that's too much deconstruction for (my) present purpose. — tim wood

Sorry Tim, but I just can't understand what you're trying to say here.

"... just be an expression of..."? Isn't that both minimalist and reductionist beyond sense? It implies that idea is based in a mind and has no independent existence. Granted that people can express ideas in different ways, but the idea itself, to stand as an idea, must have something constant in it independent of either yours or my twist of it. You may have feelings about two plus two equaling four, but they don't touch it, yes? — tim wood

What do you mean by "the idea itself"? And how does an idea "stand as an idea"? Isn't an idea dependent on a mind? Do you think that an idea can stand alone out in a field, like a horse? We have books, and written material which maybe could be considered to stand alone, as representations of ideas, But to refer to the idea itself, wouldn't this be referring to what the mind produces from the reading and understanding of the book? And this is in a mind. What do you think is this "constant" thing? I believe that my understanding of two plus two equaling four is similar to your understanding of this, but similarity is not the same as "constant thing".

But I think it is possible to identify aspects the Hegelian 'absolute' with both the 'first mover' of Aristotle, and also with the One of neo-platonism (feasibly a kind of 'world soul'). — Wayfarer

In my experience Hegelians generally dismiss this enterprise of relating Hegel's thought to that of the ancients, insisting on Hegel's originality. I find that this enforces the representation of Hegel as mystic, because mysticism focuses in on the originality of the individual. We approach the meaning of One (in the sense of the unity of all), through understanding "one" in the sense of one individual, oneself.

This classes all phenomenology as mysticism. This mystical method takes the approach that the only true access we have to the unity of being, which is the source of the particular, the object, is internally. Presupposing the existence of things, as objects, is rejected, because there is no principle of unity to justify that assumption. The subject, oneself, can be the only true object, because only by looking at oneself can one come into contact with the source of unity, which is necessary for the existence of an object.

Perhaps you could specifically quote where you think Aristotle argues this. If you simply mean that there is potential for things in prior (actual) states of the universe, then that is not at issue. But neither does that imply dualism. — Andrew M

We've been through this already, and I referred you to some of the sections. If you still don't get it, pick up the book and read it from beginning to end. As I said, it's consistent throughout the book.

After some consideration, I choose not to play water-polo with you in your pool. Aristotle is your subject. As to matter, my only point has been that whatever the jr. high school science teacher means by "matter," it is not in any way or sense what Aristotle meant. As to presuppositions of Aristotle, I feel no need to list them. They're there in Stanford.edu, such as they are. In any case he was not a modern scientist. He observed and tried to make sense. A modern scientist asks questions and does experiments to find answers. — tim wood

Yes I would agree with all that. That Aristotle was not a modern scientist is a rather obvious and trivial point, unless perhaps someone here thought he was, then there might be a need to point that out.

Mainly it is significant thinking in the history of thinking. — tim wood

What exactly does this mean to you, "significant thinking in the history of thinking"? Suppose that someone thinks, and comes up with some influential ideas. Would this constitute significant thinking in the history of thinking? Does this put Aristotle in the same category as someone like Einstein?

Earlier you said "The history of ideas shouldn't be confused with ideas in themselves." What does this mean? How would you propose to create a separation between an idea and the history of that idea? An idea has a temporal presence, an extension in time. Doesn't it appear to you, that to describe an idea is to describe its extension in time, its influence on people through time, how different people understand the same idea, etc.. What do you think would be 'the idea itself'? Consider the example of Einstein's general theory of relativity. The history of that idea would be how different people interpreted it, applied it, and the effects that it had on the people in general. What would be the idea itself? Suppose you tried to tell me what the idea of general relativity is. Wouldn't that just be an expression of how the idea affected you, and therefore just a small part of the history of that idea?

My own view is that the unmoved mover should be understood in terms of Aristotle's hylomorphism and naturalism and not in Platonic terms. — Andrew M

Aristotle was a student of Plato, he was not educated in modern naturalism. And, he clearly refers to the difference between artificial things and natural things which was the convention of his day. In the attempt to establish principles for resolving this difference (which was a chasm of misunderstanding), he employed the concept of "final cause", "that for the sake of which", "the good", which is clearly Platonic.

Nope. One is material, the other intellectual. Otherwise, why is it ‘dualism’? And why doesn’t the soul simply die with the body? — Wayfarer

Have you not read Aristotle's On the Soul? He's explicit, sensation is a power (potency) of the soul.

I guess I just don’t see why conceiving of prime matter as pure potentiality is problematic. The concept seems fairly straightforward to me; I mean whatever exists materially must have the potential to do so, right? So that potential is prime matter. — AJJ

Prior to the existence of a thing, is the potential for that thing. But the potential for that thing exists as something actual, so this potential is not "pure", it is restricted by what actually exists. Pure potential would be infinite, and this is what is impossible to conceive of as being real. It can't be real, because as I said this would mean that at this time, when there was infinite potential there would be nothing actual. And if there was nothing actual, there would be nothing to actualize anything out of that potential, so there would always be nothing actual. But this is inconsistent with our observations that there is something actual. That's why it's impossible to conceive of, because it requires that nothing is actual.

Plotinus has it that the One, being beyond the constraint of ignorance, creates freely and not of some necessity beyond its control; an important distinction I guess, although it seems to me it amounts to the same thing - since to not create would presumably then be an error made in ignorance, and so not free, and so impossible. — AJJ

That's right, there is no principle which we can say "necessitates" material existence. One Form necessitates another Form, through a logical process (logical necessity), but no Form can necessitate material existence. This is an indication that material existence is caused by an act of free will, the love of God, or because God thought it was good.

And btw, the "what" referred to what Aristotle says about matter. It's right there above: "What is it he says...? So the question stands: what does he say about it? — tim wood

Actually tim, you said: "What is it he says explicitly matter is". This is asking what Aristotle said matter "is". AJJ answered that very well, with "potential". Potential neither is (being) nor is not (not being), that's why it is proposed as a means of accounting for the reality of becoming And since "potential" is other than "actual", and this is what "is" refers to, what is actual, it really doesn't make any sense to ask what matter is. Now you've changed the question to what Aristotle says "about" matter, and this is a whole lot of different things, in a whole lot of different places, and that's why your quotes from Stanford show such a variance. When we say "what" a thing is, we generally state some sort of definition. But when we talk "about" something we tend to say many different things about it, and it is not necessary that "what it is" is one of the things that we say about it. So we might entertain the possibility that there could be something (like matter), which has no "what it is".

Now I make a claim about Aristotle. He was operating with wrong presuppositions... — tim wood

OK, if this is the case, then you ought to be able to state these presuppositions which you believe Aristotle was operating with, and we can discuss whether he actual was or not, and if he was, we can determine whether your judgement that it is wrong is justified.

As a matter of the history of ideas, his conclusions are interesting. But they're not modern science. As noted above, his "matter" is that which not only isn't, but isn't even an isn't, and cannot even be asked about. it's a plug-placeholder for a problem that Aristotle encountered in giving an account that he did not solve and that he knew perfectly well that he did not solve. — tim wood

Of course he knew perfectly well that he didn't solve that problem (the problem of becoming), he proposed some principles, and a direction to move in. I don't see the point in your comparison to modern science. Physicists know perfectly well that they have not solved this problem either. Modern physics points us in a direction slightly different from that proposed by Aristotle. The fundamental particle "isn't", but this isn't isn't even an isn't, because the fundamental particle is something, it's a wave. OK, I see the point to your comparison. But since neither solves the problem, on what basis would you claim that one is wrong?