You haven't resolved the ambiguity and inconsistency. You have an "impression" or "appearance" which is the effect of a sensible object on the capacity of sensation, sensibility, and also a "representation" which is a synthesized product of a faculty.

Objects here being real physical things, affected by objects indicates the kind of sensation corresponding to the mode of perception, the cause of sensations, in short, an impression. That which is received from an impression of an object is its effect, called an appearance. — Mww

As such, the resultant product of the faculty of representation are themselves representations, and in this preliminary stage, with an impression as a cause, is an intuition and this is accomplished by the imagination in its synthesis of appearance of an object in sensation with the arrangement of its matter in consciousness. — Mww

See, the faculty of representation produces a representation through synthesis, but the capacity of sensation produces an appearance only by being affected by objects. The pure intuitions, the a priori, are required to account for that synthesis which produces the representations. But how do we account for the synthesis within sensation, required to produce an appearance? The pure intuitions are not supposed to be there, within sensation, or are they?

The ambiguity arises from using Aristotle to qualify Kantian methodology, which just ain’t gonna work. — Mww

The ambiguity is because of the inconsistency and lack of clarity in Kant's work. That has nothing to do with Aristotle. However, Aristotle provides a good example of what consistency looks like.

This distinguishes a capacity from a faculty, the latter a rational, that is, other than a physical, function with a resultant product, the former merely the physical ability to do something from which all else follows. — Mww

Here's that same inconsistency again. You distinguish a rational function from a physical ability to do something, with reference to the "resultant product". However, there is a resultant product from the capacity to do something called "sensibility", or sensation. There is an appearance, just like the representation is the resultant product of the rational faculty.

There is no basis for the proposed difference between these two, it is an inconsistency. If there is something a priori, some sort of pure intuition, involved in producing rational representations, that same pure intuition must also be involved in producing the appearances of sensation. Otherwise we have no principle to account for the production of those appearances. By Kant's own transcendental aesthetic, the pure intuitions are prior to any sensible properties, and necessary a priori for sensibility. If these pure intuitions are part of the rational mind, then the rational mind must be prior to sensibility. But that's nonsense, so whatever it is which is called "pure intuitions" must be prior to the rational mind.

The “sort of intuition” does not indicate there are a multiplicity of sorts, but indicates the only sort of intuition there is, and the only sort of intuition there is, is empirical because it is by the impression of empirical objects that it is at all possible. — Mww

You are intentionally neglecting the "pure intuitions", space and time. All intuitions are given to the mind from sensibility, but not all intuitions are appearances. That's why pure intuitions are a different sort of intuition. The pure intuitions are a priori, and therefore prior to any appearances, as necessary for sensibility. Hence the 'transcendental' aesthetic.
"This pure form of sensibility may also itself be called pure intuition".
"The science of all principles of a priori sensibility I call transcendental aesthetic."
Do you apprehend these pure intuitions, space and time, as prior to, and necessary for sensation, and therefore existing in all instances of sensation, as the conditions for sensation, whether the being which is sensing is rational or not?

That the content of phenomena is susceptible to arrangement into a form because of certain relations of the characteristics of its content, is a valid observation given from judgement, in as much as we know from experience certain conditions about objects, that there is one by sensation of it, and what it is like by the form of it. If the content of phenomena is derived from the matter of objects through their sensations, then it follows that “that which effects that the content can be arranged”, cannot be sensation, so must be something subsequent to phenomena themselves, or, something common to both objects and their representations. — Mww

The matter of the object itself cannot be the matter of the appearance in sensation, or else there would be no separation between these two. They would be one and the same thing. So the content of phenomena, if it is supposed to be matter, cannot be derived from the objects of sensation. That content must come from something other than the objects.

What comes from the object is its form, that is the traditional way of understanding abstraction. If Kant wants to turn this around, and say that matter comes from the object, into the appearance, and this is the content of phenomena, then we need some principles to support this. That the sensibility is affected by the form of the object is already supported by the principles I described. The question for Kant then, is if the matter of the object is distinct from the matter of the appearance, as is necessary for the two to be distinct, then how can the appearance be in any way related to the object, unless it is through the means of some type of form?

That which is given to, or affects, perception is an object as such. That which is given to, or affects, the mind is not an object, so cannot properly be called one; it is, rather, a representation of the object that affects perception. — Mww

But Kant calls it an object, in the passage I quoted. "Objects are given to us by the means of sensibility...they are thought through the understanding..." If these appearances are not objects, then it's not objects which are given by sensibility. It's something else. Why say "objects" are given to us? Furthermore, if they are the content, or "matter" of the phenomenon, how can they be anything other than objects? Consisting of matter, they must be objects. Do you see the ambiguity here? Kant brings matter into the mind, but he has no source for that matter. It cannot be the matter of the object itself, so where does it come from? Can you say that the sensibility creates matter, or ought we not turn to the pure intuitions, as I do, and see that the matter of the appearance can only be provided for by the a priori, pure intuitions? But then the pure intuitions cannot be property of the mind.

There are only two ways for us to cognize anything, one is by sense perception, the other is by thought. It would be totally bizarre of Mother Nature to imbue us with two separate and distinct cognitive systems, one for cognizing objects present to our senses, and another to cognize objects not present to sense, but of which there is antecedent experience of when it was present to our sense, and, in addition, of which we are completely capable of presenting to ourselves in thought alone without it having ever been an experience at all. It is much more parsimonious, and logically consistent, that we as rational agents operate under the auspices of a singular system, albeit under the restrictions pursuant to the two types of cognition given by our very nature. — Mww

It is Kant who is trying to impose two distinct systems of cognition, the a priori and the a posteriori. If you think that such a proposal would be totally bizarre, as you say here, then reject Kant's system as totally bizarre. Do you not see that Kant's pure intuitions, space and time, and the a priori in general, are presented by Kant as a distinct form of cognition which does not require sense objects. Having two distinct forms of cognition is totally bizarre, and that's why the a priori, pure intuitions, ought to be rejected as misunderstanding. Whatever it is, which is active in the a priori sense, and is responsible for the existence of what Kant calls "pure intuitions", cannot be a type of cognition at all, because it is necessarily prior to cognition. The Aristotelian representation of this, as a pure form, "the soul" is extremely primitive, I agree, but it is far more accurate. instead of giving us a step forward, Kant gives us a step backward toward misunderstanding.

Obviously, the difference between the conditions for cognitions is only given from the faculty of representation, And then only that part of the faculty of representation that has appearance for its product. — Mww

This is not consistent with Kant. Appearance must be prior to representation, as that which is given to the faculty of representation, from sensibility. That's the problem I'm trying to point out to you. We need to account for the production of appearances. We cannot say that appearances are a product of the cognitive faculty of representation, because they are given to this faculty by sensibility, as the faculty's content, matter.

If we assume that the cognitive faculty has some pure intuitions, not requiring any sensibility, free from appearances, then how do these pure intuitions get into that cognitive faculty without being contaminated by appearances, when the cognitive faculty is described as a posteriori to the sensibility. How could a cognitive property, the property of pure intuitions, be prior to sensibility, in order that it be free from sense appearances, and therefore provide us with 'pure' a priori intuitions?

This must be the case, understanding is the faculty of thought, and phenomena are absolutely required for understanding. If we think, we must be using understanding and if we use understanding, there must be phenomena. That which the understanding thinks about must necessarily already exist for us in the faculty of representation from which it arises. And if it arises not from anything empirical, because the source of it is missing, it must arise a priori as already residing in the faculty of representation called intuition. — Mww

Right, except the a priori intuitions cannot be already residing in the faculty of understanding, because all intuitions are provided from sensibility. So how could these a priori intuitions, space and time, get into the cognitive faculty which gives us understanding? The faculty of understanding is a posteriori to sensibility, and receives all its content from sensibility. Yet there are a priori intuitions, pure and free from sensible content. How does the faculty of understanding receive a priori intuitions? They cannot be already residing in the faculty of representation (a cognitive faculty), because this faculty only receives intuitions from sensibility. Therefore, if the a priori pure intuitions are free from sensible content (appearances), they must be prior to sensibility.

Furthermore, if intuition arises a priori under one condition, there is no reason to suspect it does not so arise under any condition. — Mww

This is inconsistent with Kant again. "Objects are given to us by means of sensibility and it alone yields us intuitions...". In your own words, it would be extremely bizarre if one faculty of the mind was receiving a posteriori intuitions, and another part was creating a priori intuitions. It may be true that there is a part which retrieves memories, while another part receives current appearances, but it doesn't make sense to say that one part of the mind is creating 'pure' intuitions, because these would be completely random, free from all influence of sensibility. How could the mind even do that, isolate a part of itself, from any sensible content to produce pure intuitions?

It should be clear now that the notion of a priori is not temporally significant, but is merely a condition for a means for something. — Mww

Don't you recognize that a condition for something means that this thing which is the condition, is necessarily prior in time to the thing which it is a condition for? How can you even think that you might remove temporality from this concept?

The problem then becomes, even if forms of cognized objects reside a priori in intuition, says nothing about how they got there in the first place. Simply put, they are derived from experience, and thereby suffices as logical equivalent to the psychological principle of memory. Just as we can never remember that which was never known, so too can we never have empirical intuition of that which we’ve never experienced. — Mww

You ought to recognize this as contradictory as well. To say that the a priori is derived from experience begs the question of what type of "experience" might you be referring to. And to say that this is experience "which we've never experienced", is simple contradiction.

Lastly, the form of empirical intuition is not the form of empirical objects represented as phenomena. Intuition is given from objects of sense, so the form of intuition must be that which all objects have in common, or, which is the same thing, that which makes objects possible as perceptions, which in turn makes intuition itself possible. The number of intuitions is predicated on the number of perceptions, but the possibility of intuitions is directly related to the possibility of objects. For humans, space and time are the necessary conditions of the possibility of objects, and thereby the possibility of experience. Theoretical derivatives to follow, if interested. — Mww

Again, it makes no sense to say that the possibility of objects as perceptions, is a property of the human mind, because this makes it impossible for other sensing animals to sense objects as perceptions. So, if the pure intuitions, space and time, are necessary conditions for sensibility (possibility of sense experience), then these intuitions must exist in all sensing creatures, and even must have been produced prior to sensation itself. That is why it does not make sense to speak about this feature of living beings as a property of the mind, and it is better understood as a property of the soul which all living being have.

can show how temporal necessity for some a priori considerations is unwarranted. There may be conditions for temporal necessity, but withdrawing such necessity is not impossible. Remember, this is all with respect to human cognition alone, without reflection on all and everything that is or may be possible. — Mww

I agree that withdrawing temporality from a priori is a possibility, but it is not a logical possibility; it is illogical, because the defining terms of "a priori" will be contradicted in such an effort. If you think you can demonstrate otherwise go ahead and try. You would have to define "a priori" in some non temporal way, but this would be nonsense, just like defining cause and effect in a non temporal way.

Numbers are nothing but the schema of the category of quantity. If there are two things, each is already in its own part of time from its perspective, but they may very well coexist in the same time from mine. — Mww

Sure, two things might coexist, but that is not what we're talking about, we are talking about a priority of existence. To determine if one is prior to the other, we need to consider their origins. If they are both caused to come into existence at the exact same time, we can rule out coincidence as improbable, and conclude that they have the same cause. That cause is one thing, which is prior to the two. If we accept coincidence, then we still have two distinct things, and we need to look to the cause of those things, and avoid infinite regress.

But I judge the value of a theory only on how much sense it makes to me, so if I spent as much time and effort on Aristotle as I have on Kant, I might’ve had a different allegiance. — Mww

This is why I am trying to demonstrate to you how Kant's system makes very little sense.

Nice rant, commendations.

Those guys having been living it up with billions in profits that go straight to shareholders, and now they're asking for bailouts? — StreetlightX

So long as people are lining their pockets with unearned income, all's good. But when the flow stops, a bail out is needed to regenerate it.

There is no 'the economy' — StreetlightX

Excellent! That is so true. The economy is the modern God. But it's not the loving God of the New Testament, It's the vengeful, jealous God of the old testament, the God to be feared. Watch your step, or the economy will smite you. That's the religion which Jesus attacked.

The agriculture "industry", and how it relates to human health is a huge can of worms. That one will confront us someday, but not today, because the priority is not there. God (the economy) still rules, and protects it as an industry, and God is far more important than human health. Or...has that turn around already begun?

The worst possible thing will probably happen: things will go back to being just as they were before, after some time. — StreetlightX

I don't share your pessimism.

Still.....how are thoughts on the subject avoided, if the mind is directed toward the conclusion in memory with respect to it? How does the mind know it’s being directed to the conclusion that corresponds to the subject it is avoiding thinking about? — Mww

When something is put into memory, it is forgotten about. That seems contradictory, but what I mean is that it's put away for later access, so it leaves the conscious mind at that time (is forgotten by it), but can still be accessed later. Any random occurrence, or odd association might incline one to access the conclusion which lies waiting in the memory. The conclusion is remembered, because it has significance in the present circumstances, but the conditions which led to making that conclusion (thinking on that particular subject) need not be remembered. I think that we can find the essence of a symbol, or word here. It has meaning or significance, as a sort of conclusion, stashed away in the memory, but the actual conditions of why and what for, are not remembered. So the mind is directed toward particular words when determining what to say in a particular situation, without remembering the particularities of the situation in which the word was used, when it was remembered. Numerous instances of use are remembered when learning a word, so usage is remembered in a general sense.

This is why word meanings vary so much, and evolve, sometimes quite rapidly. Likewise, in the case of a conclusion, a person will be in a situation doing something, and realize, 'I have a principle (conclusion) which applies here'. They'll remember it, and use it, without ever thinking about the problem which first lead to the conclusion, so thinking on that subject is quickly forgotten.

Yeah, that was me using “sensible”, not Kant, who used “sensuous”, or external or empirical. A sensible intuition indicates an intuition given from sense data of real physical objects in space, thus not to be mistaken for an intuition that is sensible, that is to say, makes sense in itself. Intuition from sense, not intuition that makes sense. In the introduction to the “Doctrine of Elements” is found the definitions for terms used explicitly in his theory of knowledge, of which I may have taken some liberties. — Mww

Kant did use "sensibility". Here's a definition from the first page of "Transcendental Aesthetic"

The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled sensibility. Objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts.

First, notice that sensibility is a passive, receptive thing. It is a capacity, like an Aristotelian potency, like "matter" is for Aristotle. As taken from Plato's Timaeus, matter is the receptacle. Second, notice that "objects" is used in two distinct ways. In the first sense, sensibility is the passive thing, affected by objects. In the second sense, sensibility gives us objects, as intuitions, therefore sensibility plays an active role as well. So "sensibility" has a dual personality, it receives from external objects, and it gives (internal) objects, as intuitions. This is the basis of the Kantian ambiguity. If he would have adhered to the Aristotelian categories of active and passive, he would have apprehended the need to divide sensibility into two distinct aspects. Instead of such an analysis, he has synthesized the two distinct aspects into one thing "sensibility". But there is no such thing as "sensibility", he just made it up as a means of putting an end to the analysis and starting a synthesis. In reality, he ought not have stopped the analysis here, because this made up thing, "sensibility", just causes ambiguity by allowing that one thing, sensation, is both passive and active, which is sort of contradictory if we do not distinguish a passive aspect from an active aspect of the thing.

In Aristotelian terms "form" refers to the active aspect of a thing, while "matter" refers to the passive aspect, which provides the potential for activity. So a little further on, Kant defines matter and form in relation to sense appearances:

That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its matter; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations, I term the form of appearance.

Can you see the problem here now which the ambiguity creates? An appearance is an object created by sensibility and given as intuition. As an object, it must consist of matter and form to be consistent with Aristotelian principles, yet here Kant assigns to it "matter" only. In the previous definition, of "sensibility" he has made the mind which receives the intuition, passive. But now he wants to reverse roles, making the mind active, such that instead of receiving objects it creates objects by ordering intuitions into relations. So the active role of sensibility, giving objects to the mind, he now retracts, and hands it over to the mind, as sensibility is only supposed to provide a passive aspect, matter. But now the sensation, the object given to the mind, has no form at all, and cannot correctly be called an object, it is completely dependent on the mind for its form. Therefore it cannot be actively "given" by sensation, it is actively created by the mind. But this turn around is what allows him to talk about pure intuitions, because there must be an active form in the mind to act on the matter of sensibility. But these pure intuitions are contradictory because he has already succinctly stated that intuitions can only come as objects, from sensibility.

By not differentiating the passive and active aspects of sensibility he has gotten himself into a pickle. He must allow that sensibility is passive, in order to receive the forms of sensible objects. But he cannot allow that sensibility passes these forms directly to the mind, because he needs to maintain a separation between the object as appearance, and the sensible object itself. So he says that sensation creates an object which is given to the mind. But sensibility cannot create the form of these objects because he has no a priori principle there, no pure intuition to act within sensibility.

Now he has the same active/passive problem again, at the level of mind, or intuition, so he posits a pure, "a priori", intuition to account for the activity of the mind in creating forms. But this is wrong because he's already said that all intuitions come only from sense. So this "a priori" or pure intuition which he posits must be something completely different from an intuition, or an object, or anything like that, it would be more like a pure actuality, pure activity. Furthermore, this pure actuality must really, also be present within sensibility, to account for the activity of creating the objects of sensation. which are given as intuitions.

Not in my philosophy. The effect of an object, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. Form, as intuition, is not yet a procedural presence. Sensation represents a physical effect; form is an a priori representation of the composition of the effect. The capacity for sensation is, therefore, dependent on our sense organs and something that effects them. In truth....theoretically....this designation, that the form as a priori, renders it as nothing other than the capacity for phenomena, and subsequently, the capacity for experience of objects. — Mww

You don't seem to be accounting for the distinction between the thing itself which is sensed, and the object which is the appearance. If you recognize that the object of sensibility which is given to the mind is the appearance, then we need to account for the cause of existence of this object. The cause is the sensibility itself, so we cannot say that the sensation is the effect of the thing being sensed, though the sensation is affected by it. The sensation is the effect of the sensibility (capacity to sense) when the sensibility is active. When the capacity to sense is active, objects, appearances, are produced. What activates the capacity is the internal, pure actuality, we might call it the a priori, rather than the external thing which is being sensed. the external thing does not activate the sensibility. This is evident from the fact that we can sleep, and not sense while we sleep, then wake up and start sensing.

A sense organ is a passive thing, a receptacle, which needs to be activated, to actually sense. Only when it is activated can it sense. It is activated from within. This is where scientism has lead us away from vitalism, in what I believe is a misguided direction. A sense organ is not simply a passive receptacle which receives outside activity. Yes, it has a passive element which receives outside activity, but whatever is received is 'interpreted' within the sense organ itself, and this means that it is judged or measured somehow, by an internal activity in the sense organ. So sensing is properly an activity itself, an activity of judging other activities. It's not well described as a reaction.

I think I see why you are so reluctant to accept the idea that the conscious mind can prevent thoughts. You do not really accept free will. You think that sensation is the effect of the sensible object, caused by that object. Therefore you believe that objects in the mind, intuitions, are caused by sensations, and the mind does not have the capacity to prevent these thoughts.

But still, you want an immaterial mind, so you posit an "a priori". But this creates inconsistency, because if the a prior exists within the mind, to influence and act on the intuitions, then why is it not at work in the sensibility as well, to influence and act on the sensations? And if we remove it from the sensibility, as Kant attempts to, we have no separation between the object received by sensibility and the object given to the mind from sensibility (the phenomenon/noumenon separation). The object given to the mind by sensation must have form as well as matter, and the form cannot be the same as the form of the external object sensed, or else we lose the separation. So the form must be given to that object of sensibility, by the active sensibility. But where does the sensibility get that form from? It can't come down from the pure intuition.

This is why the Aristotelian conceptualization, which is has the form (soul) acting at all levels, from bottom up, is more consistent and comprehensible. The form, as soul, is active in all the potencies of the soul, from self-nourishment, to self-movement, through sensation, and intellection. The soul creates the forms of existence of the material body, from the lowest organism to the highest organism. The forms of intuition, are just an extension of this activity of the soul creating forms. However, we have a distinction between the material form of a living body, and the immaterial form (final cause) by which the body is created. Even the lowest organism (maybe even a virus) acts on an immaterial form. The immaterial form which accounts for the activities of the soul is prior to any material form.

In this way, we have the pure immaterial form, the soul, acting from the bottom up, at all levels of living organisms, active in all the activities of living beings. There is no need for the "pure intuition", or "a priori" conceptions, which within the Kantian system appear to be imposed from the intellect downward onto the material sensations. The "pure intuition" is inherent within even the lowest organisms, and is therefore already inherent within the object given to the mind from sensation. Notice that "intuition" in a common sense of usage refers to what is instinctual, provided through hereditary means, so the most pure intuition can only be sourced from the most primitive life form. Though it is sourced from the lowest levels of life, it appears to us in the highest levels, as that knowledge which goes beyond empirical knowledge. But what this means is that it must really be prior to, before, all empirical knowledge, which takes us to the lowest forms of organisms. I recommend you consider what I said last post, that all forms of "prior" are grounded in, or reducible to, temporally prior.

I understand where this comes from, though, for Kant says, “...These (space and time) belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation...”. I rather think this conundrum is a manifestation of the necessary separation between what is given to us, and how we treat what is given to us. On the one hand, a thing is given to us because it is in space and time, which implies space and time are properties of objects, and on the other hand, a thing is given to us only if we can say it is in space and time, in which case space and time are merely subjective conditions for objects, and of course, subjective conditions are always a priori. In the former, space and time could be said to be rolled under the possibility of sensation, insofar as sensation only becomes possible when space and time adhere in the objects being sensed, but in the latter, space and time, being conditions for things of sense, do not need to be thought as properties of things of sense. The proof thereof, is quite facile, being a scant few uncharacteristically short paragraphs, and readily understandable. — Mww

So, these pure intuitions, space and time, as necessary conditions for sensation, must be prior (in time) to all sensation. This means that they must have existed within living beings before living beings could develop the capacity to sense, therefore a property of non sensing beings. Therefore we cannot posit these as properties of the mind, if a mind requires intellection, because intellection came after sensation. As prior to sensation, and active in sensation, they actively form the object produced by the sensibility. Then when the sensibility gives objects of intuition to the mind, the pure intuition, the a priori, is already inherent within those objects. This resolves the apparent contradiction above, where Kant says that only the sensibility can provide intuitions, yet the mind has pure intuitions, free from sensation, a priori. The pure intuitions are already inherent within, as required for, the empirical intuitions.

Close enough. The “forms of intuition”, however, are not proper to the activity of sensibility, for the very reason that the capacity for sensation is provided by the external matter, the environment. Also, there are only two “forms of intuition”, but there are as many intuitions as forms as there are arrangements of matter met with in perception.

Again....immediately upon perception, our knowledge of what we’ve been affected by is not available to us, but that we have been affected must have a validation in order for the eventual experience given from it to be called knowledge. The reasons are legion for why the unconscious part of our mind is necessarily ordered, and the fact Aristotle didn’t recognize them is why his metaphysics was subsumed under an advanced theory that does. His theory wasn’t wrong, per se, just incomplete. And there is nothing to say Kant’s theory is right, per se, no matter how complete it is. — Mww

So I think you're wrong here. The "forms of intuition", as space and time, the pure intuitions, as a priori, and a necessary condition for sensation, must be active within the activity of sensibility (sensation). This means they must be temporally prior to sensation as required for sensibility. Otherwise the inconsistency and contradiction appears.

This is why the Aristotelian metaphysics is actually more sound than the Kantian. Kant introduces ambiguity within the concept of "sensibility", making it appear like the sensibility gives objects of pure matter to the conscious mind. But this is impossible, these objects, as objects, must have form and the form must be derived from the act of the sensibility, sensation. Therefore the forms of intuition, space and time, as pure a priori intuitions, must be prior to sensation, and active within the activity of sensibility.

Prior to is a temporal relation, to be sure, but is generally understood as an empirical predicate. A logical temporal relation of the same kind is usually represented by “antecedent”. A priori is a logical distinction representing the relation between things, or, the ground of the origin of things, but not necessarily in a temporal sense. We have empirical objects given to us simultaneously with the a priori representations of them, after all. — Mww

This I also see as a mistake. You are assuming that the temporal necessity can be removed from "a priori", and this is impossible. You assume that there can be a logical type of "origin" which is not temporally prior. Removing the temporal order from prior, or "a priori", introduces contradiction into your logic, rendering the principles as unsound.

Here's an example, 1 is prior to 2. You could argue that it is logically prior, but not temporally prior, arguing that the concept of two is logically dependent on the concept of one, but there is no need for one to be temporally prior to two. But this is false because it is impossible that there could be two things, prior in time to there being one thing. The concept of "2" requires that there be two individual "ones".

Temporal priority can only be logical, if one accepts that time is not real. The time of this thing may be prior to the time of that thing, not because of time itself, but because of our understanding of things. — Mww

To assume that time is not real is to assume a falsity, rendering the principles which follow from this assumption as unsound. Again, you are showing that you do not believe in free will. Free will requires that there is a real difference between past and future, and therefore time is real.

So the issue here is that a priori thoughts have to be grounded in something.....
— Metaphysician Undercover

(Yes, they do. They are grounded in the faculty of understanding) — Mww

This is the falsity which Aristotle demonstrated with the cosmological argument. If the a priori is produced by understanding, it only exists in potential prior to being understood. Then it cannot play an active role in understanding.

Here is a big problem. You claim that Kantian metaphysics has supplanted Aristotelian as an "advanced theory", but all it really does is neglect sound Aristotelian arguments. This plunges us backward toward Pythagorean idealism, the deficiencies of which Plato had already demonstrated by analyzing the theory of participation. It was Plato's analysis of "participation", which revealed the nature of idealism, as the concept that things participate in the Idea. Kant's transcendental idealism brings us right back to this conception of passive, unchanging, eternal a priori, necessary Truths. This assigns activity to the things participating, and passivity to the Idea, or a priori Truth which is participated in. The passivity of the a priori Truth leaves it exposed to the Aristotelian refutation. So Neo-Platonists turned to an active Form, the One, from which emanates the Soul, then the Intellect. Kant undoes all this, foregoing the cosmological argument, and plunging us back to pre-Socratic times. That cannot be called an advancement.

(By classic Greek reckoning, perhaps. Enlightenment reckoning says a priori thoughts do not require matter, but the proofs for them do, re: mathematics. This is why forms are a priori; they have no matter but are applied to or justify our knowledge of matter) — Mww

But this is just a rehash of Pythagorean idealism, which was soundly refuted.

Us. Me. We. External to that which is represented by personal pronouns. I may experience my own blood but I think I’d be in serious trouble if I come to experience my own brain. And even if I could, I’m not about to experience the workings of it, except by means of philosophical musings. Imagine....a machine on my head, showing me what it looks like to enjoy a brisk swim in the lake. I don’t think so. The point being, there is no matter of basketball in my head when I represent one to myself upon perceiving or remembering it. — Mww

This is just an issue of how you would define "experience". Regardless, when you perceive a basketball, under Kantian principles there is a material aspect, the object given by the sensibility. And when you experience a memory of a basketball there must be a material aspect given by the memory. What Kant neglects is that these "objects" given to the mind, must also have a form as well as matter. Since he neglects it, he doesn't need to tell us where they get that form from. A careful analysis of his principles, as explained above, reveals that these objects must receive their forms from the a priori, or pure intuitions. Therefore these pure, a priori intuitions, cannot be property of the conscious mind.

Absolutely, we might. All the needs to be done is come up with a theory that allows its hypotheticals to overlap. Problem is, what is responsible for what, if they stumble all over themselves? How do they stay out of each other’s territories? A molecule cannot be confused with an atom, even if their fundamental physical constituency overlaps. In the same way, hypotheticals cannot be confused with each other even if their respective logical conditions overlap. Still, if individual things have individual jobs, I don’t see how boundaries for those things won’t be part of the bargain. — Mww

I don't agree that we "might", because these fundamental "things" turn out to be activities. Notice that you even implicitly agree to this principle by saying that the individual things have individual jobs, they are doing something, so they are activities. And activities cannot overlap each other without some sort of interference, that's what's called interaction. Now, boundaries are out of the question here because interaction is not per se, a boundary. But we describe interactions as the distinct activities either cooperating or interfering with each other. If we assume that there is such a thing as cooperation, then we must assume a further end, a common goal. Without that end, the interactions are just interferences. Therefore to have a theory in which the interactions of distinct activities are described as cooperating, instead of simply interfering with each other, we need to assume final cause.

Anyway......think I’ll let the rest of your post alone. Thing to keep in mind is, Kant knew Aristotle very well, being a professor of metaphysics and held the chair in logic. Kant’s major philosophical claim to fame is taking Aristotle where he either didn’t know he could go, or refused to go because he saw no reason to. Either way, Kant is based on Aristotle, for most intents and purposes. — Mww

Here's something to keep in mind. Long before Kant, Aristotle's "Physics" had been determined by the scientific community, as not worth the time to read. I assume his biology "De Anima", had gone the same way. His logic was maintained and taught, as valuable, but his metaphysics would be incomprehensible without the structure and principles laid out in his physics and biology. So I'm not as sure as you seem to be, that Kant had an adequate understanding of Aristotelian metaphysics. He doesn't address the cosmological argument, to either accept or reject it, which is the basis of Aristotelian ontology. Instead, he introduces ambiguous synthetic judgements which create the appearance that further analysis is not possible.

I don't see how any nonpublic information was used.

I don't see that you have a point.

Now the ugly side of just how corrupt and sleazy politicians are: — ssu

How is that corrupt? Corruption is when one acts on inside information, private to the company. Coronavirus was public information, and if some savvy individuals could foresee problems coming for specific types of companies, and sold, you cannot call that corruption. The market was extremely high anyway, and it was obviously time to sell, if you are inclined toward making money off the market.

What would be glaring is if they don't even get a slap on the wrist. — ssu

What would the slap on the wrist be for? The people were just doing what we are all entitled to do. If there was evidence of inside information that would be punishable, but Coronavirus is fully and completely an external condition. But only so many stocks can be sold before a crash. First come first served.

And despite the fact that Trump insisted it was not a problem, there is no indication that any evidence was withheld from the public, which would constitute a conspiracy within the governing body. It's just a matter of which media companies one would source their information from. Trump's fake news tweets can hit you in the pocket book. Some poor innocent people were taken advantage of, to make them even poorer. What else is new in the world of Trump?

Color is a frequency-property of light/EM waves. — TheMadFool

You clearly do not know what colour is. Do you recognize that what we sense as colour is combinations, mixtures of wavelengths, and that the eyes have three different types of cone sensors, sensitive to different ranges of wavelengths? The fact that human minds judge EM wavelength using mathematics, and we classify the different types of sensors with reference to these mathematical principles, does not mean that the cones use mathematics to distinguish different wavelengths.

Consider a couple different repetitive patterns, a clock ticking every second, and something ticking every seven seconds. You can notice that the two are different without using math to figure out that one is 1/7 of the other. It's just a matter of noticing that the patterns are different, not a matter of using math to determine the difference between them.

Noticing a difference does not require mathematics. We notice that it is bright in the day, and dark at night without using math, and we notice that it is warm in the sun, and colder at night without determining what temperature it is.

Change the frequency of light and color changes i.e. without changes in frequency there are no changes in color. — TheMadFool

Your logic is deeply flawed. Change the amount of salt in your dinner and the taste changes, therefore there are no changes to taste without changing the amount of salt

In fact color is an excellent example of our brain doing math because we can discern colors and color is completely determined by a mathematical quantity viz. frequency of EM waves. — TheMadFool

This is wrong, the eyes are what we use to determine colour, not mathematics. And colour is not determined by frequency of EM waves. That's a false myth.

Just keep in mind, what appears to be a failure to grasp is really nothing but a difference in points of view. I would never be so presumptuous to think you fail to grasp your own philosophy, so I’d appreciate reciprocity. — Mww

OK I respect that. Sorry, too much time spent at TPF and I've developed bad habits. Since you said "lay it on me", you get a long post. Feel free to ignore parts, or just reply to any issue which is important to you, or the thread, as the dialogue has gotten unruly.

So, the first point I'd like to make, external/internal is not clear cut. If we make these two into categories, and say that some things might be of the internal, and some might be of the external, then we need a boundary in order to classify, and I don't think such a boundary can be established. But if we make these two into directions, then we can conceive of them as opposite directions. Something can be moving from the inside outward. or from the outside inward. No boundary is needed, just a sense of direction.

There is a problem with assuming boundaries between external and internal, because we see from chemical analysis that things which are supposed to be individual, like atoms and molecules, actually overlap each other. Furthermore, we see that things are active, and the nature of interaction is that it crosses external/internal boundaries. Therefore the external/internal division, while it appears on the surface to be a clear cut division, is not very useful because it can't help us to represent the reality of the activity of things. We'd be best off to place internal/external as the two extremes of a single category, spatial existence, and represent all activities as occurring by degrees in between.

It has already been agreed, that any content of a thought prevents all other content for that thought. This is a necessary prevention, because its negation is impossible. If the thinker doesn’t think something at some time, it is a contingent prevention, for the impossibility of a thought is not given merely from the not having of it, but from the having of a different one. — Mww

OK this is a starting point of agreement The thought prevents contrary thoughts, at the same time. This is during the act of thinking. But what do you think happens when a decision is made? I propose that the conclusion (decision) is either acted upon immediately, or relegated to memory, then the act of thinking on that subject, therefore all thoughts on that subject, are prevented. If the conclusion is acted on and the act is successful, this is relegated to memory as well. So anytime there is an urge to think about that subject, the mind is directed toward that conclusion in the memory, and thoughts on that subject are avoided. If the conclusion is acted on and there are problems, thoughts might be resumed.

Not sure of any benefit in mixing the two greatest thinkers known to man. — Mww

There is a very good reason for mixing great thinkers. As people say, great minds think alike, but that does not mean that they think the same. When we find principles of consistency between them, we are likely on the right track. But every great thinker has weaknesses, and it takes comparison with another great thinker to find the weakness.

Not sure how you arrive at form as possibility in a Kantian sense. Seems to me the idea always refers to something definitive, re: space and time are the forms of all sensible intuition; categories are the forms of all experience, and so on. — Mww

Do you apprehend the suffix "ible" on "the forms of all sensible intuition"? This introduces possibility into the phrase, in an ambiguous way, because Kant does not make it clear as to where the possibility lies. We have a capacity for sensation, which he calls "sensibility". We have forms, which are intuitions, and "matter" to an extent, as a representation of the sensation itself. The "form" of the intuition, is a priori. But this designation, that the form is a priori renders it as nothing other than the capacity for sensation. So this is where the ambiguity lies. If the form of intuition is supposed to be something other than the capacity for sensation (a possibility), to ensure that the "form" is something actual, as is necessary under Aristotelean terminology, Kant does not provide us with that separation. The forms of intuition, space and time, as a prior to sense experience, are rolled together under the term "sensibility", which is the possibility for sensation, and this is a category mistake from an Aristotelian perspective, to make "forms" possibilities.

What is at issue here is the source of activity, and that defines what is actual, rather than possible. When we look at living creatures like human beings, we see the source of activity as internal, moving outward toward the environment. This is the essence of free will, the human being acts according to an internal principle, rather than being determined by the external activities. Now, we ought to represent sensation in the same way, the living being is actively sensing, such that the activity comes from within, as the being senses its surroundings. Under this representation, the possibility for sensation (sensibility) is provided by the environment. And in Aristotelian categories, possibility, or potential, is provided by matter. So the "forms of intuition", would be proper to the activity of sensation, not properties of sensibility, because the capacity for sensation, as the possibility for sensation is provided by the external, matter.

However, placing matter (potential, possibility) as only external, is inadequate. We need to bring the capacity for activity (potential, possibility) inside the individual being, by providing for the necessary potential within. This is where Aristotle excels (oddly enough), in his biology, "On the Soul". Capacities are the powers of the soul. However, since these powers, or capacities, like self-nourishment, self-movement, sensation, and intellection, are not active all the time, they must be represented as potential, potencies, the possibility for action. And, since potential is properly assigned to matter in categorization, this creates the dilemma of the nominalist/realist debate. How do we allow matter into the mind to account for the passive intellect? The problem with the passive intellect was already identified by Aristotle, as inherent within the ancient understanding of the act of abstraction. The ancient understanding was that the mind received the forms of object, in abstraction. But this would mean that the mind is passive in abstraction, rather than active.

In any case, this is how Aristotle provided the principles whereby we can understand ourselves as material beings. The powers of the soul are potentials, and potential is grounded in matter, so he brings matter right into the living being, as an essential part of "the being" in this way. However, it is still necessary to posit a first principle of activity, and this is the soul. Any powers or potentials, as possibilities, must be actualized, so the soul (as the first form) accounts for the activities of a living being, while matter accounts for the powers that it has. This allows that all the powers of the soul, including intellection itself, are accounted for by the material aspect of the being (the brain in the case of intellection), yet there is still an immaterial source for the activities of the material being.

There are alternatives for categorization which the Scholastics take advantage of. If matter and potential are not categorically the same, then there might be potencies which are not material.

In Kant, though....two things: matter is not a category, and, possibility for thought does not require matter, if the thoughts are a priori, re: space, time, causality, existence, geometry, etc. — Mww

This is the difficulty I have in interpreting Kant. If a "possibility" is not grounded in matter, its existence cannot be logically supported. This is the problem Aquinas had in interpretation of Aristotle's passive, or possible intellect. In the attempt to keep the intellect free from matter, he speculated about the nature of time and potentiality, in order to come up with a form of possibility, or potential, a passivity, which is not grounded in matter. I believe he posited a medium between eternal and temporal, as "aeviternal".

A priori implies "necessary for", prerequisite, or required for. Any sense of "prior" is reducible to a temporal sense. People try to argue that logically prior is distinct from temporally prior, but in the end this makes no sense, because logic is dependent on understanding, which is a temporal process.

So the issue here is that a priori thoughts have to be grounded in something. If they are looked at as the potential for a posterior thoughts, then this is a temporal priority. If we do not ground them in the Aristotelian way, by saying that they only have actual existence by being "discovered" (which really means created) by the human mind, then they become eternal like Pythagorean or Platonic idealism. So Plato could not validate Pythagorean idealism, and Aristotle decisively refuted it with what is known as the cosmological argument. Because of these principles, a priori thoughts, or thoughts which do not require matter (or perhaps some other form of potential) are incomprehensible. We could move toward some other form of potential, but what's the point? All this does is add an extra layer of complexity for the sake of denying the reality that human thought requires a material element.

That being said, you are correct in that the synthesis of the two is phenomena. It must be kept in mind, that there is no matter, per se, except external to us. Internal to us is merely representation of matter. It follows “subject matter” can attributed to any of the individual faculties for which there is an object derived from it, therefore “subject matter” of the unconscious part of the mind in general, is phenomena. The subject matter of the faculty of sensibility is represented as appearance; the subject matter of the faculty of intuition is the form of the appearance. — Mww

This is hard for me to grasp, because as human, we are material beings. So I don't see how you can say matter is only external to us. The physical body which we use in the acts of sensation, and the brain which we use in thinking are composed of matter. If I am supposed to assume that all matter is external to me, then where does this leave "me"? If I am internal to all matter, this just leaves me as an inner soul, with the entirety of my body somehow clinging to me from the outside. How could the sensations, and all unconscious faculties relate to the conscious mind if not through the means of the material body?

The production of phenomena itself must be a complex process, whereby the immaterial soul would use the material body. The material body is a necessary condition for the faculty of sensibility so we cannot remove matter, as the passive element (providing the possibility) from sensibility. And for the same reason we cannot remove matter from the faculty of intuition.

As history would have it, yes. However, in order to theorize on the possibility and truth of a priori cognitions in general, as the means to explain the certainty of mathematics in particular, rather than just take such certainty for granted, the entire historical methodology for the understanding the real world needed a paradigmatic overhaul. And the most radical part of the overhaul, was the speculation that it is us that assigns form to objects, not, as history warrants, that objects come to us with their forms included. — Mww

I don't think the idea of "a priori cognitions" really makes sense, for the reasons explained above. I don't think that cognitions free from the influence of matter are possible. And so these cognitions cannot be free from the influence of that matter interacting with other matter which is the essence of experience. But this brings up the importance of differentiating between activity which is sourced internally, from the soul, and external activities which are understood as the relations between material bodies.

Suppose there's an internal source of activity within me, the soul. I also see other people moving, so that motion is sourced externally to me, though it is internal to them. Now, whether the motion is internal or external is completely dependent on one's perspective, of what constitutes "an object". For example, if a culture or society is taken as an object, then all the different activities, sourced from the different people is all internal to that object, the culture. But from the perspective of myself, as an object, only what's within me is internally sourced. Now look at what happens if I divide myself into distinct objects, like we could divide a culture into distinct individuals. Where would I find the internal source of activity? Does each part of me have its own internal source, or is some part specially equipped? We might resolve the issue by dissolving the boundaries between individual objects, allowing them all to overlap, like atoms and molecules overlap, but then we might completely lose the meaning of "internal".

Granted. Actual a priori and actual a posteriori. Both from the principle of cause and effect. Done deal.) — Mww

The problem here is that "a priori" is given the status as prior to sensation, in the form of sensibility. In this way it becomes a possibility rather than an actuality. So the principle of cause and effect doesn't really apply. The a priori does not cause the a posteriori by any sense of necessity as is required for causation. The a priori is required as a condition, or possibility, required necessarily for it, but not necessarily producing it. That's why the a priori is more properly called a possibility rather than an actuality.

Yeah, I guess, sorta. The external activity is given, so not a possibility, but knowledge of what the external activity entails, is possibility. In effect, what we are trying to establish is not compatibility, but intelligibility, insofar as the external activity could be anything at all, but in order for us to comprehend it, it absolutely must at the very least be logically possible, or......intelligible.) — Mww

Yeah, intelligibility is compatibility. The internal activity produces principles for understanding, and those are applied towards the external activity. But even the principles are just part of the internal activity (going back to our discussion on thinking, where I argued a conclusion is a stopping point for activity). The stopping of internal activity (perhaps you'd understand it better as "redirecting") must be caused by resistance which itself is the opposed, the external activity. So the internal sourced activity must seek ways out through the opposition, and these ways become possibilities, as weak points in the external activity, and the way through the resistance. When a way out is determined, it is remembered as a possibility.

[quote="Mww;393406"(But we can; there is compatibility or there is not. Either of which is an establishment with respect to ontological disparity)[/quote]

Sure, but that ontological disparity is misunderstanding, plain and simple, and that's what we need to dispel. One can assert "it is possible to understand ontological reality, the reality of existence is intelligible". But if that person applies principles which render ontological reality as unintelligible there is an inconsistency between the person's assertion and the person's actions. That's a form of hypocrisy. And if the person says it is impossible, then there's no point to even trying. So the only logical approach is to seek compatibility. If the principles we employ lead us to a dead end (we think and think and think without coming to a conclusion, i.e. finding no way out) then our principles have mislead us, and it is time to discard then (that itself being a conclusion, and possible way out).

[quote="Mww;393406"[(Isn’t external/internal clear cut?)[/quote]

This is the type of principle which needs to be discarded. We find that through language and communication, ideas which are internal to me are also internal to you. The boundary between us therefore, is porous. The internal is shared through the medium, which forms the boundaries. But that's an odd concept to wrap one's hand around, and it results in many people insisting that the boundaries between us are not real. We see a very similar issue in our attempts to understand physical reality, physics. We have in the past, individuated objects, separated the earth from the moon, and from the sun, divided things up in labs, etc.. However, such separations are incomplete as there are gravitational fields, electromagnetic fields, and other fields, which permeate distances and penetrate objects, making these principles, this dichotomy of internal/external, inapplicable to the objects we've actually individuated in practise.

(I take “imposing activity onto the external possibility” to mean we tell Nature what it is rather than Nature telling us, to which I agree. — Mww

Right, we impose our activities onto nature. However, Nature grants us real limitations, real impossibilities which must be respected. So in that sense we must allow also that Nature tells us what it is. We can have great success in telling Nature what it is, going very far in one direction, but that is simply one direction out of many possible directions. If we hit a dead end, the confidence produced by that progress will impede any inclination to turn back, and find a fork in the road that may have been missed. This is where skepticism is essential. Consider the history of evolution, and the creation of dinosaurs. Back then, bigger was better, and that's the direction evolution followed. But it was a dead end, the creatures could only get so big and it didn't really help them get anywhere, so it all collapsed. Then the mammals superseded, with the capacity to teach their young, and smarter was better. The point being that if the dead end is not recognized as a dead end, we won't seek the real way out.

(Correct, we may fail to abide by law as the condition of our thinking, as witnessed by our possible errors in judgement, which is the same as being unintentionally irrational. All that means is that it was never absolutely necessary we think in a certain way to begin with, which is the same as saying reason is not law-abiding in itself. It couldn’t be, given the differences in subjectivity in otherwise perfectly similar people. Still, if a cognitive system as a whole is theoretically predicated on logic, then reason should theoretically adhere to logical law in order for us to trust in its authority.) — Mww

Unintentional irrationality is one possibility, but what I was talking about is intentional irrationality. That is the dilemma of moral philosophy, first identified by Plato, or Socrates. A person can know that it is irrational to go ahead with a particular act, yet go ahead with it any way. This reality was Socrates' ammunition against the sophists, who claimed to teach virtue. Since knowing the right thing to do does not necessitate the right thing being done, the claim that virtue is a type of knowledge is effectively refuted. This reality is extremely evident in the fact that bad habits are extremely difficult to break. Augustine, who has probably the most comprehensive treatise on free will is somewhat stymied by this dilemma.

So the issue you point to is dependent on how one defines "reason". If "reason" is defined by the principles produced by a rational mind, as rules or laws, then it is impossible for reason to be non law-abiding. But remember, in the model I propose, the rational mind is itself constrained by matter, the human brain. So the rules or laws produced by the rational mind, principles which we say the free soul ought to follow, are not infallible. And, the free soul is not necessitated to follow those principles, which are the habits of thought, but are essentially possibilities, so the person might act in a way which is knowingly irrational.

Yes, if we wish to instill a necessary ground for something. It is never the case we absolutely must know some external object as a single thing, but it is absolutely necessary we act in a very certain way iff we wish to think ourselves as moral agents. That is to say, we are allowed to contradict ourselves with respect to what we know, which merely makes us silly, but we are never allowed to contradict ourselves in our moral determinations, the occurrence of which jeopardizes our very human worthiness. Thus it is the power of necessity, and the authority of law given from fundamental principles, from which a singular effect called “morality”, is at all possible. — Mww

That we cannot contradict ourselves in moral determinations is an irrelevant platitude. The fact is that we actually knowingly do what we know is wrong. So we actively contradict our moral determinations with our actions, as hypocrisy. And hypocrisy is not a rare occurrence, it's widespread. Therefore, if we take as a fundamental epistemological principle, that hypocrisy is impossible, or that it would make us look silly, irrational, or inhuman, we are starting on falsity. Hypocrisy is common place and widely accepted, "do as I say, not as I do".

Again, not to put too fine a point on it, all knowledge is possible from pure reason; morality is possible from pure practical reason. The difference is that morality has its own object, that being the agency that both formulates its own criteria for formulating his moral disposition, then obligates itself to conform to such formulation in order that becoming such an agent is possible. — Mww

Here is the difficulty. Thinking is itself the activity of an agent. And thinking produces the principles to be followed, even if you assert that these are principles of "pure reason". So even the principles of "pure reason" have come into existence through practise. Understanding follows from the production of those principles, it is posterior, requiring principles of reason. The principles are posited prior to understanding, as enabling understanding. Following understanding, i.e. posterior to understanding, it may be determined that some thinking practises, and therefore some principles of pure reason, are wrong, or unacceptable. Since these principles are already accepted epistemological practise, the only recourse for redress is the precept of morality. The thinking practises which produces the principles of pure reason, which understanding reveals as possibly faulty, cannot be demonstrated as epistemological faulty, because they are by their very nature the principles which ground the epistemology. Therefore the skeptic, who recognizes through understanding, the possibility that the principles are unsound, must turn to moral principles to demonstrate how this practise could possibly be wrong.

I would say logic has determined the need to assume distinct ontologies, but not so much distinct intellects. Transcendental idealism dictates there is but one intellect, which functions under two ontological conditions. The external condition is a passive ontology, insofar as everything about it is given to us. The internal condition is the active ontology, insofar as everything about our cognitive system arises from itself. There is one inconsistency intrinsic to this system, in that we think perception to be passive, which falsifies the notion that our entire cognitive system is active. We just allow an overlap between them, so we can move on. Hence the lack of precision?? — Mww

Yes indeed, apprehending the system of sensation as passive is a serious issue which needs to be resolved. This is why the Aristotelian biology "On the Soul" is so coherent and comprehensive. It allows passivity, and therefore matter to enter into our principles of understanding, as a necessary condition. By describing the powers of the soul as potencies, potentials, or possibilities for action, we allow the required passivity into the human being. Now we can create consistency between all the various powers, including intellection. But passivity is only allowed for by matter, and this means that we must allow matter as an essential part of the intellect. In doing this we separate "mind" from "soul", as a potency of the soul. So even "mind" is a contingent property, and not a necessity of the soul.

I would say that this is true relative to human understanding (only) — but not in an absolute sense. Because humans experience time one instant at a time and don't know the future with any certainty (needless to say). — Daz

If you believe in free will, the future is not determined. So it is true in an absolute sense, if free will is true. If you think that "X will happen" is the same a "Y has happened", in an absolute sense, then you are a hard determinist.

Mostly, we are saying the same thing, but you are considering all traders as some sort of "cohesive group" that have some sort of agreed on strategy. This is not true. — boethius

I agree that "traders" are not a cohesive group, and they don't have an agreed strategy. Nevertheless, they have the same intention, which is to make money off the market. And they make money in similar ways, so they develop similar strategies, which feeds the herd mentality.

n my robot-human analogy, not only is the ability to catch near-identical when observed but the methods employed seem to be similar in terms of needing quantification (math). — TheMadFool

Your analogy is worse than mine. A human being doesn't use math to catch a ball. That's a false premise. You admit this yourself when you say a human beings adjustments are "vague". Math is not vague.

So, there's something non-mathematical in human and animal physics? If that's true then how come mathematical physics is applicable to kinesiology and biomechanics; after all human limbs are essentially mechanical levers and the amount of force muscles can exert can be quantified. I don't see how the body's physical abilities are quantifiable mathematically and yet the brain controls it non-mathematically. At the very least the applicability of physics, a mathematical enterprise, to our bodies indicates that somewhere along the chain from intending a movement to the actual movement itself there is some math involved. — TheMadFool

The fact that mathematics cannot adequately predict human motions, because it cannot predict changes due to free will decisions, ought to indicate the falsity of that premise to you. Human motions cannot be modeled with mathematics.

Well, to be fair, there is no reason why there shouldn't be non-mathematical determinants of motion. However, given that we can model motion based on only math it seems either these non-numerical determinants of motion are superfluous or operate in parallel to the mathematical ones. Do you have any idea what such a system of non-numerical determinants of motion that makes predictions possible would look like? — TheMadFool

Perhaps we model motion only with math, but math is inadequate for modeling human motions. So you ask what is the nature of such "non-numerical determinants of motion", and the answer is conscious judgements. A mathematical judgement is one very specialized type of conscious judgement. However, the vast majority of conscious judgements, including those which induce motion are not mathematical judgements.

To disprove your theory, just watch a dog jump for a stick, or a treat, then try to get the dog to apply some mathematics. I'm pretty sure that the dog catches without applying mathematics.

If they think the market is going down they will tend to sell. If they think it's going up they will tend to buy. If they think it will stay the same they will tend to hold. — boethius

Traders make their money from transactions. If they think the market Is staying the same (stable) they will hold, as you say, therefore they make no money. So the trader's livelihood is dependent on an unstable market, and they will do what they can (strategic buying and selling) to ensure that the market is unstable.

"encourage traders to believe the market will stabilize" — boethius

Impossible, because a stable market makes no money for the traders.

If traders believe "geniuses in the FED obviously know what their doing, as otherwise they wouldn't wear suits and hold press conferences" they interpret any actions by the FED as "obviously going to work in stabilizing the market", regardless of the primary consequence of the FED's actions (indeed, the primary consequence of the interference could actually have a negative effect, because they don't know what their doing, but the secondary psychological effect could completely dwarf that; just like the placebo effect can completely dwarf negative side-effects and the treatment seems to "work great" reinforcing the placebo effect). — boethius

Traders know they have more control over the market than the FED could ever hope to have.

So, if the FED has a carefully cultivated cult following that believe the public providing a private entity with the monopoly on what legislatively created entity people can pay taxes in, then basically anything it does or says to move the market will move the market because people believe it will work and thus anticipate it working, moving the market to were the FED wants it to be. And it works! Prediction came true! Reinforcing this psychological influence over traders. — boethius

Your analysis is faulty boethius, because you are not distinguishing between the general population and the traders. Perhaps the general public might believe that the FED has control over the market, but this is an illusion, and the traders know that. The traders will play along with the FED at strategic times, because it's in their interest to encourage the deception, which keeps the public money rolling in. The FED may claim to act in a predictive, preemptive way, but the fact is clear that its only significant acts are post hoc. Therefore the Fed's actions do not move the markets, stabilize them, or anything like that. This is an illusion created by the traders playing along with the Fed, to exercise what you've called "psychological influence" over the general population. In the end, what influences the general population in its perception of the market, is what happens in the market place, and this is where the traders have all the leverage.

However, if traders lose confidence in the FED, then the psychological leverage can not only be zero, but can actually be negative. — boethius

The traders don't give a fuck about the FED. The FED protects their livelihood, but when it's time to make their money they don't give a damn. It's not a symbiotic relation.

Due to the 2009 crisis (and wanting to bail out their friends, and even make them richer, rather than pursue any sound fiscal policy even according to their own ideology, which is just a public position to keep useful-fools inline and not their private position of doing whatever idea, socialist or capitalist, will get them more power in any given situation), the FED and central banks have spent all their ammunition blasting holes in their own floor in which to shovel in trillions of dollars and lighting it on fire. — boethius

See, now the traders are not only taking money from the general population, they are taking it from the FED as well, in the form of bailouts. Clearly the traders don't give a fuck, so long as they can feed the greed, and keep stuffing it in their pockets, they'll take it from wherever they can get it. Greed is an incorrigible disease.

At some point even economists will be going around saying "tut, tut, tut, no free lunch, tut, tut, tut, no free lunch" and wagging their fingers in the faces of every econ 101 students who is trying so desperately to believe regulators are playing some sort of arcane zero dimensional chess and have a point to their actions. (wagging those fingers through video-link of course). — boethius

So long as traders are allowed free access to the market there will be always be an abundant supply of free lunches.

3. There are no more tools available (nor the prospect of until now "unthought of" tools) that can encourage traders to believe the free market will be stabilized by collectivists schemes of one form or another. — boethius

The unstable market is the trader's market. That's where the traders make easy money. So why would the traders want to stabilize the market? Traders will never allow for a stable market. And unfortunately, if traders are making easy money it usually means that other people are losing their hard earned money. If a stable market is desired, the solution is to ban traders. This was demonstrated by the 2008 crash.

By analogy, hopefully not a poor one, the processes that confer the catching ability should also be similar if not identical. — TheMadFool

Why would you ever conclude that? If a group of people show up at work in the morning do you conclude that they took similar, if not identical modes of transportation, just because they demonstrate that they have the capacity to get to work?

Charges against the individual Russians are maintained!

DOJ moves to drop charges against Russians accused of funding troll farm — NOS4A2

This statement, as well as the headline of your referred article, is false and deceptive.

No charges against Russians have been dropped. Charges against Russian companies have been dropped.

The reasons given for dropping charges against the companies, was that the companies display no inclination to comply with rulings of the court, the court has no jurisdiction to enforce compliance, and the companies have the capacity to abuse information given as disclosures of evidence.

The US government cannot charge Russians for national security reasons? — NOS4A2

Get with it Nos4A2! It's not "Russians" who are the defendants here, it's Russian companies.

Yes, not be able to bring the responsible individuals into court to face trial, and having only representatives from a company who have the sole intention of abusing the judicial process show up, is a failure.

What and/or who determines the selling price? — creativesoul

The selling price is determined by what people are willing to pay. it's a simple matter of supply and demand. Sellers are plentiful, buyers are not, prices drop. The sellers are motivated for numerous reasons, to cover margins (loans), or whatever, and the buyers are not. There are times of year, where the markets are more vulnerable due to predictable expenses, like income tax payment in the spring, people need cash.

or would those lower prices be the new share price? — creativesoul

Right, the share price reflects the last sale.

There are many ways to make money from buying and selling stock. Some actually contribute to the market drop. Check out short selling. In this practise, you take advantage of the period of time which you have to settle your transaction. You can sell stock which you do not presently own, and buy it at a later time, for a lower price. Your time is limited, so it's extremely risky, but if the market is in free fall one might reap significant rewards in that short period of time. Strategic short selling can actually induce a market drop by providing an abundance of stock for sale (large lots) creating significant drops, margin calls (demands to pay up debt as collateral vanishes), and general panic, while buying back in dribs and drabs to cover what has been sold. Don't underestimate conspiracy within the market place. Prostitution might be the oldest known sin, but conspiracy remains unrevealed and therefore might be even older.

The government drops the charges against the only Russians to show up for trial. — NOS4A2

Did you read the article you referred? They dropped the charges against the company, or group of companies, "Concord", for various reasons, mostly due to the fact that the company had the capacity to, and practised non-compliance, and it would be capable of taking advantage of the court case through access to information. Pursuing the case was clearly detrimental to the interests of the United States. However, charges against the 13 individuals have not been dropped.

"The United States will continue its efforts to apprehend the individual defendants and bring them before this Court to face the pending charges..."

Recent research suggests that a more computationally efficient strategy is to simply run so that the acceleration of the tangent of elevation of gaze from fielder to ball is kept at zero. — StreetlightX

Right, if you're a sailor you'll know that avoiding the zero tangent is how to avoid a collision. And, if you're a storm chaser, and the tornado isn't moving to the right or the left, it's coming right at you. These are the situations when evasive maneuvers are called for.

In the Kantian sense, form is a priori, hence derived from the unconscious, and from that the fun, and rampant confusion, really begins...... — Mww

Here's another thing to consider Mww. The precise separation between passive (possible) intellect, and active (agent) intellect, has never been resolved. Logic has determined the need to assume both of these as distinct categories, but no one has been able to adequately demonstrate which things are property of each, because all things are a combination of both (matter/form). This was a fundamental issue in the nominalist/realist debate. Some wanted to deny material elements within the mind, attempting to maintain the pure immateriality of the human mind. But then the passive aspect of the intellect needs to be accounted for by some sort of passive element which is other than matter. And if matter (as passive intellect) is proper to the individual mind, then the active intellect must be something external to human minds, to maintain the separation between the two. It remains an unresolved issue as to how the passive intellect and active intellect might both be features of one human mind.

On the other hand, one might characterize the same division as a priori/a posteriori like Kant. The problem is that we create these categories of separation as a means for analysis, because such a division is "necessary" (in the sense of needed for understanding the operations of the mind), when we do not have adequate principles to define the categories; "and rampant confusion, really begins...". So a philosopher might say "these are the categories required for analysis", without paying due respect to the fact that everything to be categorized already contains aspects of both categories. So there is confusion That's why I propose we go to a different form of analysis, a sort of analysis where we look at the things to be categorized as essentially of one category, with accidents of the other category, in an attempt to avoid the confusion.

But you can't say that time becomes space as you go backward in time. — god must be atheist

Under Einsteinian relativity theory there are no good principles to distinguish spatial measurements from temporal measurements. That is a deficiency of Einsteinian relativity which I mentioned above. So if you look backward in time through the lens of Einsteinian relativity, there is no principle to prevent an interpretation of "time becomes space". But that's just a matter of theory-dependent interpretation. The "seemingly impossible situation" is produced by application of a faulty theory.

Meaning what, exactly? Material? If not material, then what, exactly? — tim wood

By "actual" I mean active. If you are insisting that to be actual, something must be material, then I'll look to you for an explanation as to why you believe this. I see all sorts of indications that immaterial things are actual, starting with gravity and electromagnetism.

Your (b) is correct: the time of action taken, is the time of the thought of the solution, and because we have but one thought at a time, all other thoughts, as alternative solutions, are prevented therefrom. — Mww

OK, we're starting to have better understanding of each other, and better agreement.

From his post-solution time, he can easily think another solution, which means it is false further solutions are prevented. — Mww

He can think of another solution, but he doesn't because he believes the problem has been solved. Therefore these thoughts (looking for other solutions) are prevented. Please don't think of this as a situation of necessity, because we are talking about free willing beings. Yes, "he can easily think of another solution", but he doesn't because his mind is made up by the present solution. Any person can change one's own mind, at any time, I mentioned this, but so long as the mind is made up, the thoughts are prevented.

The one and only time in which no other and all alternative solutions is prevented, is the time of the thought of a solution. This principle applies for any number of successive thoughts, for each and every thought can be a solution in itself. — Mww

It's not "the one and only time", because it's an extended period of time. So long as the person has made the decision, and adheres to the decision, the thoughts are prevented, just like we prevent thoughts in meditation. Of course it is possible that at some future time the person will reconsider, and at that time allow those thoughts, but that's irrelevant to the fact that during that period of time (no matter how long it is), when the thoughts were prevented, they were being prevented. Delaying the occurrence of something is a matter of preventing it for a period of time. While it is being prevented it is being prevented, but when it is no longer prevented it is no longer prevented. Nothing about the concept of prevention implies that prevention must be eternal. It refers to the here and now; I prevented myself from falling down the stairs many times when I used the stairs, but maybe not next time.

I should have given your comment on conscious vs unconscious parts of mind, and the general uselessness of the conception itself, more attention. It is relevant now, because you brought up coming to the mind, and we never agreed on what that really means. In the Kantian sense, form is a priori, hence derived from the unconscious, and from that the fun, and rampant confusion, really begins...... — Mww

I'm wary of the Kantian use of "form", because in the Aristotelian sense "form" is strictly actual, while Kant seemed to allow "form" to be possibility. So when we talk about what is derived from the unconscious, if this is understood as possibilities for thought, then we must place it in the category of matter rather than form, if we adhere to Aristotelian terms. However, as you state below, all these possibilities must be present as particular forms. So even if it is categorized as matter, subject matter, or possibilities for thought, it still must have some type of form.

Physical objects do have proper form, which is the particular arrangement of its matter. So....“subject matter” as mere sense data alone, does come from the unconscious part of mind in a particular form, but is yet unknowable to the conscious mind. This kind of form is called intuition, by which we represent to ourselves the arrangement of the matter of a thing as it is perceived. This is the fur, claws, whiskers, etc., thought to belong to some yet unnamed thing, which will eventually become conceived as some kind or another, of “cat”. — Mww

So I'm in agreement with this paragraph.

Forms from intuition and appearances from sensibility are the subject matter of the unconscious faculty of imagination, the synthesis of which gives us phenomena. — Mww

I wouldn't say this though. The faculty of imagination gives us forms, as images, what you call phenomena. If that faculty works with both, forms from intuition, and appearances from sensation, I would say that only one of these is the "subject matter". Since we have a workable form/matter distinction, and we say that the imagination gets forms from intuition, then we ought to say that it gets subject matter from sensation, and synthesis of the two is phenomena.

An important point though, is that the subject matter, the appearances from sensibility, must already have forms of their own, the particular forms mentioned above. So even within this unconscious faculty of imagination, there must be something (a faculty) which establishes compatibility or consistency between the forms from intuition and the forms from sensibility (which are the material aspect, as the possibility of phenomena, contrary to Kant), in order that phenomena be intelligible. There is a fundamental difference between the two types of forms, universal and particular, so this faculty must focus on, and work with the matter from sensation, as providing the possibility of phenomena. The particular forms are reduced to possibility because they are fundamentally incompatible with the universal forms from intuition.

The conscious mind works with. Imagination works with forms. — Mww

I think we have a lapse in terminology here. I would understand "cognition" as what the mind does, but we still have the issue of what it is working with when it is engaged in that activity, the content. "Form" historically has a wider range of applicability, as ideas and concepts, in the sense of "formulae".

Moral philosophy has nothing to do with speculative epistemology) — Mww

Wouldn't you be surprised! Do you see the problem we've had with this issue of preventing thoughts? If you'd only release your idea of necessity, and approach this from the perspective of a free willing human being with the capacity to choose, that being the approach of moral philosophy, rather than the approach of some epistemological necessity, perhaps the reality would reveal itself to you. But you have created that wall of incompatibility between your intuitive forms of necessity, and the forms of the particulars which must be understood as possibilities. It is only moral philosophy which gives us a true understanding of possibility, and this is the only way to understand the particular. And the particular does enter the mind, as is evident in the case of individual words. Therefore the existence of a word, as a particular, must be understood by the terms of moral philosophy, the terms of possibility.

Within the conscious mind is subject matter, yes, but that subject matter is what is known, or possibly known. Experience or possible experience. — Mww

I don't think you are adequately grasping the role of the possible. There are two distinct roles for "the actual". There is the actual which is activity within, creating forms of intuition, knowledge, etc.. And, there is the actual which is activity outside the individual subject, creating the material world of objects. The two types of activity need to be understood as distinct, as I described, because the internal forms are universal principles, while the forms external to me are individuals, particulars. Since we cannot establish compatibility between these two types of activity, within and without, we look at all the external activity as possibility. Then we have the basis for a dichotomy. But the dichotomy doesn't work, because it's not clear cut. Judgement and decision are how we impose activity onto the external possibility, while indecisiveness and skepticism is how possibility seeps into the internal activity. So we cannot hold such a dichotomy. The real dichotomy it is far more complex.

If that were the case, irrationality would be impossible. We would never make a mistake in judgement if all understandings were predicated on necessity and universality. — Mww

Why do you say that? Failing to abide by the law is a real possibility. What you don't seem to realize is that law does not produce necessity, laws are produced out of some necessity. This is why it is far better to approach this subject from the precepts of moral philosophy, rather than to approach it as a speculative epistemology. From moral philosophy, the law says what one ought to do, but the law does not provide the necessity to ensure that what ought to be done is what is actually done. Moral philosophy is the only philosophy which provides us with real principles to give us a real understanding of possibility.

But some things seem to me to be part of ultimate truth, in the sense that they are not fuzzy. The categories that come to mind are, in no particular order:

1) Physical reality. Meaning, everything that exists or occurs in the physical world. Whether in the past, present, or future. Anywhere in our universe, or even in disjoint universes, in case there are any. — Daz

The problem here is that the future is indeterminate, so "vague" or "fuzzy" are not even applicable terms for the future, it's more like non-existent.

Do the Forms exist? Why not pure potentiality, or even spiritual nothingness, instead? — Gregory

Pure potentiality is demonstrably irrational. This would exclude anything actual, but a cause must be actual. Therefore pure potentiality cannot produce anything actual, and if there ever was pure potentiality, it would always be the case, because nothing actual could ever come from it. However, we do notice that there is actual existence, so we can exclude the possibility of pure potentiality as an unreasonable proposal.

Our 20th century teaches us that at the level of the large those are probabilities that at the level of the small don't necessarily work out. At the level of the small the unlikely and even the seemingly impossible occur with regularity. — tim wood

Actually it works at all levels, that's why quantum physics provides us with such good predictions. if you think that events at the small level are absolutely random, and completely unpredictable, then you misunderstand quantum physics.

Further, laws of physics and nature are descriptive and problematic, not prescriptive. — tim wood

Laws of physics are descriptive, but the metaphysics I referred to assumes that these laws are representations of the "laws of nature" which govern the behaviour of the physical universe. And this is modern metaphysics I am referring to, not ancient metaphysics.

There are no oracular structures or imperatives, though probability make it seem so, and indeed we can live a whole life as if there were. — tim wood

Actually, the science of physics works really well to make accurate predictions, and there is a reason for this, physical things behave in predictable ways. If you want to start with the premise that all prediction is based in probability, that doesn't effect the argument, because we already know that inductive principles are based in probability. The fact remains, that accurate predictions are possible. Due to this fact modern people tend to assume that there are laws which govern the way that things behave.

Do these forms exist in any sense whatsoever? If yes, then what form would that be? After all, it's a form; seems reasonable a form has a form. — tim wood

Some people refer to them as "the laws of nature". They determine material existence by restricting the behaviour of physical things. There is an inclination in some modern metaphysics to describe physical existence in terms of behaviour. This is based in our conception of "energy". In this perspective, all physical existence is simply activity. But since the laws of physics are very applicable, something must dictate which activities are and are not possible. So the laws of physics are said to be representations of the laws of nature. These "laws of nature" must necessarily be prior to physical existence, if physical existence is law abiding activity. Hence we have a necessity to conceive of immaterial "Forms" which are prior to material existence.

Yes, insofar as it is false that alternative solutions are necessarily prevented. — Mww

But it's not false. Alternative solutions are prevented, just like in my analogy, when an action is taken alternative possibilities, which as possibilities, are just as real as the one decided upon, are prevented from occurring. That's how we work to avoid bad situations. We take action to prevent the possibility from materializing. By ceasing to give the problem further consideration we prevent the possibility of alternative solutions from materializing.

Once the thinker has solved the problem, further thoughts about that problem, and alternative solutions qua solutions, are just redundant, and if pursued could actually be irrational, illogical or even catastrophic. — Mww

Right, the thinker sees thinking about that subject as irrational and avoids thinking about it. Therefore thoughts on the subject are prevented. Where's the problem for you? When a person apprehends a specific course of thought as irrational, it is avoided. Why do you insist that this is not a case of preventing those thoughts? In the analogy, we apprehend a bad situation as possible, and we act to avoid it. Here, irrational thinking is apprehended as a bad situation, and we act to avoid it. That bad situation consists of irrational thoughts, and those thoughts are avoided. Therefore the irrational thoughts are prevented from occurring.

On the other hand, there’s nothing preventing further thought on an alternative solution facilitating a solution of greater benefit. But even a greater benefit is not a necessity in itself. Nahhhhh.....not thinking an alternative solution is not the prevention of it; not thinking an alternative solution is merely the lack of causality for it. — Mww

I agree that there is nothing to prevent these thoughts from occurring at a later time, if the thinker changes one's mind, but for the time being, the thoughts are prevented from occurring. Furthermore, the later thoughts would not be exactly the same thoughts anyway, being triggered by new information or some such thing.

With respect to your determination of "lack of causality", consider my analogy. We are on course for a bad situation. Preventing that situation requires action, causality. The bad situation would happen, following from the present situation without any causality. The issue is that the continuity of the current situation, as understood by the principles of physics, inertia, momentum, will continue with no cause required.

Thoughts are not different. The thinker is actively engaged in thinking about something. If this particular activity, thinking on this specific subject, continues indefinitely it will develop into a bad situation, severe anxiety, or some sort of incapacitating fear of the impossibility of deciding. So the thinker puts an end to it by preventing this type of thought from occurring anymore. Therefore stopping the current situation, i.e. stopping from thinking about the specific subject, is causation, as defined by the principles of physics. And so there must be an act of causality and this prevents the continuity of further thought on the subject.

And I question the relevance. When we’re awake and aware, we always have something to work with, because it is impossible to prevent, which has been my position all along. The questionable relevance arises from the fact that the something we always have to work with is not always a problem to be solved. Problem solving is the domain of empirical psychology/anthropology, where the analysis of words and concepts is the domain of pure reason, or, speculative epistemology. — Mww

I agree with this, we cannot prevent thoughts in an absolute sense. So I grant you this principle, that there is always something there, "something to work with". If you agree, we can call this "content", or "subject matter". I like the latter because it implies a sot of "matter" which is proper to the individual human "subject".

Would you agree that this "subject matter" is what is derived from the unconscious, and taken by the conscious mind to be worked with? As required for thinking, it is temporally prior to the conscious act of thinking, and therefore the conscious mind has no capacity for causal impact on this subject matter. However, if we adhere to the Aristotelian concept of "matter", we might allow that this subject matter has no necessity of any particular form, though it necessarily has "form". There is no particular form which is proper to it. So it might come to the mind in any "form", a problem, a word, a concept, etc., it still must come to the mind as a form.

However, since the "form" is what the conscious mind works with, and the conscious mind has the capacity to change the form which the subject matter has, through imposing the causal limitations described above, the subject matter itself has no inherent capacity to restrict the conscious mind. So in spite of the fact that we tend to think that things come to the conscious mind from the unconscious systems, and these things constitute the content of the thought, as imposing on the person, what that person will think about, this is actually false, because the conscious mind will actually impose the form (the 'whatness') on to that subject matter, through the imposition of the restrictions described. This is how we can say that the will is free.

But the will is not free in an absolute sense. If we say that when the content comes to the conscious mind it necessarily has form, adhering to Aristotelian metaphysics which dictate that there is no such thing as pure matter, prime matter, then the subject matter necessarily has some sort of form, but not any particular form of necessity. Then the possibilities for the thinker would be determined by that form which the content has when presented to the conscious mind. The thinker is therefore restricted in the capacity to prevent thoughts which are already dictated by that prior form.

Me: something necessary; minimal; conception;
You: problem, conception, solution;

How in the hell am I suppose to relate those? I never said anything about a problem, or anything that could relate to a problem.

What is a problem if not a separation between what is given and what is known. Conceiving the exact nature of a problem is understanding the synthesis of its fundamental a priori representations, and judging that relation to experience. So no, a problem to be solved is not a conception alone, but rather, it is reason in conflict with itself, temporarily if subsequently solved without contradiction, other than temporarily if solved with contradictions, hence irrationally, or, permanently, if unsolved because of insufficient rational predicates. — Mww

You appear to be claiming that the subject matter, the content which comes to the conscious mind, from the unconscious, is necessarily a "conception", and this is what I dispute. Yes, the content comes to the mind as subject matter with a form, but the form is the form of a particular, in the case of "subject matter". So this is what separates it from a "conception", as a conception is known as the form of a universal. It is only the subject matter that is worked with by the conscious mind, that has the nature of a universal, conception. Therefore we have a necessary separation here, the forms (abstractions) which the conscious mind is applying, and the subject matter which the conscious mind is applying it to. The subject matter already has a particular form, and the conscious mind is working with universal forms, so there is an incompatibility here, a necessary separation between the two.

You are not upholding this necessary separation, to claim that anything within the conscious mind must be a conception. But we must maintain this separation to properly account for the nature of temporal existence, and the fact that new material, material from the particular circumstances, which must be dealt with, is continually coming into the conscious mind. Relating the new subject matter, to the already existing universal forms, or conceptions, is what is called abstraction. So, "a problem" is exactly as you describe it "a separation between what is given and what is known". And since that separation is very real, we need to respect the reality of it, within the conscious mind. So within the conscious mind there is both "what is given", subject matter with a particular form, and "what is known", conceptions, as universal forms.

This is not "reason in conflict with itself", it is two incompatible aspects of reason. But it is the essence of reason, because with out these two distinct aspects there would be no need for any reasoning whatsoever. The conscious mind must reconcile the particularities of the present situation, given to it as subject matter, with the universal conceptions it holds within, produced from prior processing of situations.

Therefore the conceptions, being extensions of past situations, are simply memories. And the memories are held within the brain and presented to the conscious mind as representations of what has occurred, images, and symbols. Primitive conceptions exist as images which are recreated, requiring extensive brain power, while advanced conceptions exist as symbols which have a known representation, reducing the required brain power.

Absolutely necessary is one of two principles of law, the other being universality. Reason, and by association, human thought, is not law-abiding, which is sufficient reason to justify the proposition that thought at t1 does not legislate thought at t2. Thought may be random, and often is, but it stands just as much chance of being pertinent, or logically related, to its antecedent.
—————— — Mww

I disagree, thought cannot be random. That is contradictory. If one's mind is changing at every moment of passing time (random thought), this cannot be called "thought". As describe at the beginning of this post, breaking up a line of thought, creating a discontinuity, requires causation, under accepted principles of physics. Therefore thought is naturally continuous, and breaking it up with discontinuity (randomness) requires acts of causation.

Absolutely necessary is one of two principles of law, the other being universality. Reason, and by association, human thought, is not law-abiding, which is sufficient reason to justify the proposition that thought at t1 does not legislate thought at t2. Thought may be random, and often is, but it stands just as much chance of being pertinent, or logically related, to its antecedent. — Mww

"Reason" by definition is law abiding.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but what we’re conventionally calling the subject is actually the object. That which is thought about is the object of thought, the subject being that to which the thought belongs, the thinker, represented by “I”, or other grammatically coherent personal pronouns. The proper form of all human thought is “I think (__x___), x being the object to which the subject directs himself. Such is the only reasonable way to account for subjectivity, even if it is only an appearance. — Mww

Can you see the separation between the particular and the universal, which I described above? The particular we might call "the object" of thought, and the universal we might call 'the subject" of thought. All thought must consist of both, as the mind operates with the two. However, if we take the Aristotelian principles of matter and form, the role of each of these two is inverted between the object of thought, and the subject of thought. The universal, being a conception, is essentially a form, and the material aspect is accidental to it, this is the subject. The object, being the peculiarities of the particular situation, provides the material aspect. to the thinker.

And what would that be, except thinking? Is there something else we do mentally, such that knowledge is possible from it? Feelings don’t count here; they are not cognitions, and we’re not interested in whether or not feelings “look right”. — Mww

I think it is necessary to distinguish the different mental activities. The two fundamental ones, described above, are receiving present information, and retrieving past information. That they are fundamentally separate, I believe, is evident from the activity of dreaming. There is a third fundamentally different mental activity which is judgement. The nature of judgement (what I described as preventing unwanted thoughts) is what we have been disagreeing on.

The problem with the Hawking proposal is that it defines time in relation to spatial existence, as derived from Einsteinian relativity. So, when looking backward at spatial expansion, which has been revealed as a fundamental feature of the universe, we see a time when spatial existence becomes unintelligible. The size of the universe was infinitesimally small at that time. Because the Einsteinian conception of time is dependent on spatial existence, time before this point is completely unintelligible. But that's just a flaw in the Einsteinian conception of time. If we conceive of time as independent from spatial existence, this allows for time prior to spatial existence.

Refusal to allow for time prior to spatial existence is a manifestation of modern scientism. Monist materialism denies the possibility of anything real, independent of material existence. However, dualist principles support a world of immaterial Forms independent from material existence, which act as the cause of material existence. Can you see how this allows for time prior to material existence?

Hopefully you can comprehend that it is only a scientism based metaphysics which supports the Hawking-Hartle no-boundary proposal. With disciplined philosophy we see this world view as insufficient, and unable to account for the immaterial aspects of reality. Therefore such proposals are rejected as inadequate.

We can make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the past, because the past has already occurred and is therefore determinate. We cannot make truthful 'is' and 'is not' statements concerning the future because it is indeterminate, characterized by possibility. So statements concerning the future are predictions.

Now, WE, in order to responsible for preventing something from coming into the mind, must have something presented to us, otherwise we have nothing to work with, and if we have nothing to work with it cannot be said anything occurred, in this case, the occurrence of prevention for which we are the cause. — Mww

It is not the case that we have nothing to work with. We have something to work with, this is the subject, what is being thought about, what I described as the problem to be solved. Once the thinker believes oneself to have solved the problem, further thoughts about that problem, and alternative solutions are prevented. Are you denying this?

From this, it is clear it makes no difference what this something is that is necessary for us to work with, but the very minimal thing it can be, and still be an affect on the mind, is a conception. — Mww

Are you saying that a problem to be solved is a conception? I don't think so. Conceiving the exact nature of the problem is half way to solving it.

We, as conscious, otherwise fully cognizant individual humans, cannot prevent things from coming into the mind. — Mww

We already discussed this, meditation and such. You agreed that we can prevent words from coming into our minds. Saying that we can prevent things from coming into our minds does not imply that we can prevent everything from coming into the mind, to have an absolutely empty mind. That would be a ridiculous conclusion. How can you assert that we cannot prevent things from coming into our minds, yet agree that we can prevent words from coming into our minds, then insist that this is not contradictory?

The content of the thought at t1 makes no absolutely necessary restriction whatsoever on the content of the thought at t2 — Mww

Are you serious? Despite the fact that I do not know what you might mean by "absolutely necessary restriction", if it were true that the thoughts at t1 had no restriction whatsoever on the thoughts at t2, we'd have no control over our thoughts at all. The temporal progression of thoughts would be completely random.

Issue grasping? So what...you have a bunch of ideas on a subject, one right after another, pick one, cease examining further ideas, stop thinking about the subject. Move on to the next. How is that any different overall than what I said? — Mww

What I say is different from what you say because I say that "picking one", deciding, choosing, is what allows one to stop thinking about the subject. You are arguing that a person cannot stop oneself from thinking about a subject. You are insisting that a person cannot prevent thoughts, because the thoughts would have to be present to the person's mind, in order for that person to prevent them. But that's contradictory nonsense. And it leaves you in the position that if an individual did happen to stop thinking about something, it would just be random chance. In fact, it appears like under your principles all thoughts would be random occurrences.

Carried out without the same thinking that went into solving the problem, but not without thinking of some kind. — Mww

Where do you derive this necessity to talk about not thinking, in an absolute sense. I am surely not talking about a person doing something while not thinking at all. How would that even be possible? This is how we multi-task, things we do routinely we put on auto-pilot, and do them while we think about other things.

Even if you’ve done the same problem repeatedly, since the solution of it, you still have to do something mentally in order to ensure the solution you give actually belongs to the problem given to you. — Mww

Yes, I agree you must do something mentally, but all you have to do is pass it in front of your conscious mind to make sure it looks right. That is the point, the person is not solving the problem at this point, just making sure that it looks right. So back to the example of speaking in the habitual way. When the words come to my mind, in response to a question, I simply make sure that they appear correct for the circumstances, and I speak them, without thinking about what they actually mean, or considering if they are the best words for that situation.

If “we” have that much influence on “mind”, than we and mind must be separate entities. I reject that “I” am in any way distinct and separate from my mind; “I” am my mind. To say some natural activity that justifies and legitimizes what this “I” is, by means of the manifold of my thoughts, is willfully prevented by that very same “I” from thinking something less than that manifold, is ultimately a self-contradiction. This condition can be alleviated by granting reason as possessing sufficient power for preventing things from coming into the mind, in as much as reason prevents nothing except logical impossibilities from coming into the mind, as a consequence of the human methodological system. — Mww

This all depends on how one defines the terms. The point is that there must be some sort of divisions. If "mind" means "conscious mind", Then these things which come from the unconscious, like memory, feelings, and emotions, are separate from mind. If "mind" is supposed to include these, then where do we draw the line? You ask me about images, and sure they are real, but are they produced by the conscious mind, or the unconscious? Images come to me in my sleep when I am unconscious so if images are produced by the mind, the mind must extend to the unconscious. But is my finger part of my mind because it has feelings? I think "mind" is a somewhat useless term here because it is commonly used in so many different ways that it's really hard to know how someone is using it. Often people will equivocate, because it's very easy to do with a term like that, and the equivocation is not intentional.

To say we can prevent a thing from coming into the mind presupposes the thing. The thing presupposed is at least a valid conception, otherwise we are preventing a thing that is nothing. But to conceive a thing makes explicit it has already entered the mind, for the faculties of mind in general are the sole arbiters of validity in conceptions. — Mww

This is not true at all. We commonly prevent things which we haven't even identified. We do this by limiting the possibilities. By doing one thing in the next minute I prevent a whole bunch of things from happening which were possible, but now impossible, which I haven't even identified. So it's completely untrue that the possibility has to come to my mind, as a valid conception, before I can prevent its occurrence. By choosing to do anything which excludes that possible occurrence, I prevent it without even knowing about it. Sure, the possible thing is "nothing", but that's what preventing something is, ensuring that it remains a nothing. But this does not mean that it didn't exist as a real possibility at some time. This is why a possibility is really nothing, but at the same time as being nothing, it has some sort of reality.

Such are two arguments refuting the assertion we can prevent things from coming into the mind. — Mww

You argument is clearly contradictory. It assumes that something must exist before it can be prevented. But that's nonsensical contradiction, because if it exists, it hasn't been prevented.

Can you honestly tell me you’ve had more than one thought at a time? I’d be very suspicious of an affirmative claim, insofar as it is generally accepted in the literature that human thought is singular and successive, rather multiple and co-existent. It follows that words representing thoughts and phrases representing groups of thoughts, and eventually representing cognitions, must also be singular and successive. — Mww

You don't seem to grasp the issue. Suppose I have an open question in my mind, "what will I do tomorrow morning?". As soon as an idea comes which I accept, and I decide that's what I will do tomorrow morning, then I stop thinking about it, and no more ideas for what I might do tomorrow morning come to my mind. I close my mind to that subject. It's not an issue of multiple ideas coming to my mind at the same time, it's a succession of ideas, one after the other, as possibilities to consider. But I put an end to that succession as soon as I decide, therefore no further possibilities come to my mind. For instance, if I decide right away, I have to go to work tomorrow, then I plan for my commute, etc., and don't let anymore alternative ideas of what I might do tomorrow morning come into my mind. Having a conclusion puts an end to any line of reasoning and allows one to move on to other thought..

So you think that as soon as I, e.g., learn arithmetic propositions, I don’t think about them the next time I find myself in the presence of one? — Mww

What I mean is that you do not think about how to solve them now, you already know. So when you come across more, you simply act to solve them rather than thinking about how to solve them. Take my example of walking. The child has to learn how to walk, and puts much effort over many days, trying different things. I'm sure the child puts a whole lot of thought into learning how to walk. But when we get up to walk we don't put any of that thought into it, because we already know how to walk. The thinking goes into solving the problem, but once the problem is solved the procedure is carried out without thought.

Even if I need no noticeable time in the accomplishment of any learned task, I am still required to relate something to something else, such the solution of the same problem is consistent. — Mww

When you say ten times ten is a hundred, what is the other thing you are relating it to? It's nothing other than a memory. If a new problem comes to your mind, then you'll have to relate it to something else in your memory to figure it out. But the solution to "the same problem" ought to come straight form your memory.

Hmmmm....possibly correct; I should have been more precise in my terminology. If I see a red apple more than once, the observations of apples is repetitive and its relations hold, but if I’ve never seen a green apple, the concept “apple” fails in at least one of its relations, so technically I have no right to know the green thing as an apple. Nonetheless, if I observe this green thing on the ground under an apple tree, surrounded by red apples, similar extension and mass being given, I am safe in drawing a new relation, such that future observations will abide as repetitive relations. — Mww

Let's take this example of an apple. If someone asked me, when I see an apple, how do I know it is an apple, I would say I don't know, I just kind of recognize it as an apple. So I can start to describe an apple, different features, but this is not really how I know an apple is an apple, by naming these features I see in it. I just see an apple, and somehow I know it's an apple, without relating it to anything else, or comparing features. You might suggest that when I learned how to recognize an apple as an apple I had to learn these features. But I don't think I did, I just saw a number of apples and learned how to recognize an apple. So where's the concept apple? It's not in any features of an apple, it's simply the capacity to recognize an apple as an apple.

Some concepts go together, and some situation will trigger concepts to come forward. Introspection resolves the “inner voice” reality, but we spend far less time introspecting than we do understanding the world’s relationship to us, which just means we use words less than we use the means to understand the world, through the representations of mental imagery. — Mww

This is just a feature of our society. The society we live in is very much science oriented, so we learn from a very young age, and develop the habit, of trying to understand the world. We are far less directed toward introspection, so we do not develop that habit.

Do you recognize how screwed the system would be, if it required absolute precision for each of its responses to any given situation? If “it was an accident” was the habitual response for tipping over a glass of water, wouldn’t it suffice for tipping over a glass of milk? Particular relations can hold in general experiences. — Mww

I can't see what you're saying here. Are you saying we shouldn't cry over spilt milk?

Some corporations (like people) are good, but obviously not all of them. Here in the US it is preached that corporations should be able to do whatever they like and that any government hindrance will hurt both profit and people's well being. I personally think not having corporations answerable to anyone other than their shareholders is no better than trying to run a town or city without any police and why corporations act like their in the "Wild West" when dealing with their employees and the rest of the world as a whole. — dclements

There seems to be a trend in government to hand over enforcement of consumer protection rules, to the corporations themselves, as a form self-governance. The health and safety rules are set by government agencies, but the task of inspecting and enforcing the rules is given to the companies which manufacture or produce the goods. This saves the government a good deal of money by not having to set up a network of inspection agencies, but it has a complex negative effect. First, the corporations are so huge that the same company in production might have a branch involved in health research, advising the government on health rules. Second, it excludes from existence small companies without the capital to set up their own inspection and enforcement system, reporting to the government. And third, as I think might be the case in the Boeing situation, the inspections and governance might not be very rigorous, falling into loopholes for the sake of profit.

When the third becomes evident, in the food industry for insistence, with listeria outbreaks, E.coli outbreaks, and other contaminants, consumer confidence in the corporations' capacity of self-governance wanes. We've lived under the illusion that the government has agencies and systems designed to protect our health and safety, when in reality that responsibility has been assigned to inanimate entities, corporations, without feelings, emotions, or sensibilities, structured for one purpose, profit. I can't wait for the self-driving car revolution, might have to stay home for the rest of my life and learn how to practise agoraphobia.

I don’t care for “allowing to come to one’s mind”; it carries the implication I could actually prevent something from coming into my mind. — Mww

We prevent things from coming into our mind all the time. Once you accept as the phrase you will say, and say it "…" you prevent other possibilities from coming to your mind. But if you don't accept what first comes to your mind, you leave your mind open to other possibilities, so more and more possibilities come to your mind. Preventing things from coming into one's mind is what is commonly called being closed minded. Though it's often considered a vise rather than a virtue, it's not at all self-contradictory.

We don’t “allow” thoughts; they arise from reason necessarily, invited or uninvited, from our very nature as humans, and we may allow them to matter if they relate to something or we may reject them because they don’t. — Mww

Thinking and reasoning are carried out for a purpose. In general the purpose is to solve a problem. When we pass judgement, decide that the solution has been found, we no longer think about that subject. At this point, thoughts concerning that subject are no longer allowed. That's why people on this forum will defend a position to no end, refusing to even consider contrary arguments. They disallow further thought on that subject. So disallowing thoughts, closed mindedness, could be in some cases be related to a confidence in what one believes, or it might be related to some sort of fear of the unknown, and allowing thoughts, open mindedness, is related to a type of skepticism.

From here, that which comes to one’s mind by habit is just a repetitive relation, or, which is the same thing, good ol’ experience. — Mww

If this were really the case, how would it differ from straight forward memory? It's not really the case though, because each situation that a person finds oneself in is different from the last, so we can't describe this as a "repetitive relation". When a phrase comes to one's mind in a habitual sort of way, it may be that the person recognizes a similarity in the present situation in relation to a remembered situation, but I don't even think that this the case. It's more like the words just come to mind in relation to each other, like some words just kind of go together, and the situation (being asked a question with specific words for example) just sort of triggers a particular grouping of words to come forward as a reply.

I don’t know or care much about “the whole apparatus of speaking”, but I suspect it is mostly sheer mechanics — Mww

"Mechanics", do you really mean that?

But there must be some part of the speech apparatus in which the thought of what to say transitions into being said, at least in general conversation, which would seem to be a lot like your walking muscles.....operating behind the conscious scenes and only comes to the fore upon defect or accident of some kind. Just as stumbling is not necessarily the fault of muscles, so too is speaking falsely not the fault of the language. — Mww

I would say that the thing operating behind the conscious scene is what is putting the words into the mind. The reply to the question just pops into the mind, as if hearing the question asks the unconscious to produce a reply. But the words have to pass in front of the conscious mind to be judged, before they are spoken. The conscious mind might just glance at them as they pass by, or it might prevent them from being spoken, and allow other options to come forward. So this is not like walking muscles at all. If it were, then each potential act of the walking muscles would have to pass in front of the conscious mind before being carried out.

Positing that words come from a place still needs justification for the ways and means of them being there. Going to be pretty hard to tell ourselves something about that of which we are not consciously aware, except as a logical possibility. Which sometimes just has to be good enough. — Mww

There's no problem with the place where the words are, they are in the memory, just like other memories.. A person doesn't speak words that one has never heard before. But we are clearly not consciously aware of everything which is in the memory. What I suggested is that certain combinations of words come from the memory into the conscious mind, depending on the situation, in a sort of habitual way. But how can this really be habitual, when all the situations are different, and the combination of words which comes forward into the mind as ready to be spoken, is tailored for the situation already, when it comes into the conscious mind? How can an action be said to be habitual when it is different every time it occurs?

You know very well that free will is defined in terms of choice; no choice, no free will. — TheMadFool

Actually there are two aspects of "free will", one is the will itself, and the other what is attributed to it, freedom. "Choice" defines the "free" part, but it doesn't define the "will". I think Possibility outlined this for you in the reply. "Will" is the actual motivator of the act, it causes the act to occur. So even when we make a choice according to preferences, an act is not necessitated, because one might act on that preference later, or something else. Therefore we say that someone with a "strong will", or with "will power", can resist acting in ways one is inclined toward acting by one's preferences, because an act is not necessitated.

This is why your op, which says that preferences determine the will, is wrong. Preferences are what are judged in a "free choice", but they do not necessarily cause action. That is the only way we can prioritize things, by judging that even though I prefer this to that, I prefer something else even more, so I do not choose that. Notice the preference does not cause an action, because will power causes me not to act, allowing me to create a hierarchy of preferences prior to acting..

This is a distinction without a difference. The capacity to choose must include the act of choosing. How would I know if you had the capacity to eat? By eating, right? The capacity to do x is inferred from doing x. How else would I know you had the capacity to do x? — TheMadFool

Your request here is unreasonable. You are asking to demonstrate the existence of the capacity to act, with an act itself, when the act will only demonstrate an act, not the capacity to act. The determinist will cease this demonstration to say you acted therefore you are determined.

The capacity to act is a power, the potential to act, and is therefore a withholding of the act, like a seed which is some sort of alive thing withholding its power to act, until the environment is right. Any energy withheld within a material object is a capacity to act, and that's what E=MC2 signifies. Nuclear energy demonstrates that a physical object contains the capacity to act. In the case of "will", what we have not identified is the thing which withholds the action, creating the potential (capacity to act), such that it can be directed towards a preference. This is what is called the agent. But notice that the agent creates the capacity to act by withholding activity, will power, just like the seed does.

This thread's dead. Where's NOS4A2 to grease the wheels?

Unfortunately because of the nature of share markets a large part of the common human good, in simply economic and lifestyle (including healthcare) terms at least, has become dependent upon corporate profits. — Janus

But this is to make corporate profit into the public good, it is not to prioritize it "over" the public good. See the difference? One says corporate profit is more important than the public good, while the other says corporate profit is the public good. But even the latter is just an illusion anyway because the profit is not shared equally by the public.

.in that me telling you all about the human faculty of representation, for which the necessity of language is given in the objective telling but not in the subjective doing, is congruent to subjectively getting right into the activities of the muscles used in objectively walking. In other words, inasmuch as we only think about walking muscles for some reason other than merely walking, so too do we only think about the unconscious operation of the faculty of representation for some other reason than merely thinking. We walk, but how is it that we walk; we think, but how is it that we think. Same-o, same-o. — Mww

We were talking about awareness. Have you switched this for the faculty of representation? Or do you think they are one and the same?

So....answering from habit still requires thought, just doesn’t require understanding to waste any time on it. Because answering a question even out of habit, presupposes a set of empirical conditions in the form of the receptivity of the question, the unconscious cognitive apparatus remains in play just as in any other empirical consideration. Of the myriad of intuitions residing in consciousness, of all the possible answers to that question, just slightly different this or that (his shirt was red (redwood, rosewood, rust, terra cotta and auburn)) the habitual answer is only one, because its precedent has been set, hence the impossibility of understanding contradicting itself. This is how contemplation in judgement, from which the answer is delivered as its cognition, is shown to be unnecessary, and from which follows the immediacy of habitual cognitions in general. — Mww

I don't see how you get to this conclusion. The habitual answer is not the only answer, because a person might interrupt one's own inclination to speak, and decide on a different answer. So the whole apparatus of speaking appears to be an interplay between allowing what comes to one's mind by habit, and also at the same time possibly declining this, to decide on saying something else. Therefore it is only sometimes that contemplation is unnecessary, but this itself would be a judgement, that contemplation is unnecessary. It may be the case that all words come from the unconscious cognitive apparatus, and the conscious mind only makes the judgement of whether or not to say them. Would this mean that the conscious awareness doesn't actually think with words, because it would need to think with something else in order to judge the words coming from the unconscious?