I don’t think so. I think there are strong objections to the single home theory, but they don’t touch the idea of a word being at home in a language-game, having a role or a function. It’s easier to see in the negative: if you’re working on a bit of carpentry and you have the wood, hammer, nails, screws, drill, ruler, sandpaper, and so on, then the soldering iron doesn’t belong here. — Srap Tasmaner

I think you are changing the subject by switching to the negative. The issue is the affirmation that a word has a home (or possibly more than one home). By proceeding in the negative, as you suggest, all you can do is keep saying 'this is not the word's home', and 'that is not the word's home', so on and so forth. You would always be left with a multitude of possibilities such that if meaning is directly related to the home, as Sam26 suggested, we could never have certainty of meaning.

I know that we are not necessarily looking for certainty, as you say, we are simply looking to accomplish a purpose. However, the context of Sam's post indicates that the issue we are dealing with is the question of distinguishing one "sense" from another, and in the case of logic, certainty is the purpose. So the problem is well exemplified with the way that people use the word "know". There is an epistemological sense of "know" which implies justified. Justification requires logical proof, and this requires that a word's use be limited by a definition. Ambiguity and the possibility of equivocation nullifies any attempt at justification.

So you might really be talking about something completely different from me. You are saying, so long as we can exclude misuse of the tool, we can proceed with the tool in a vast multitude of correct uses. Excluding misuse will exclude the possibility of mistake, and the tool will always serve the intended purpose. But you do not appear to be considering the fact that word usage has at least two sides, the person who hears is distinct from the person who speaks. And, the person speaking cannot exclude the possibility of mistake by the person hearing, in the way you propose, because where the word "doesn't belong" varies from one person to another.

Look at Sam's interpretation of Banno's chosen word, "congenital", a few posts back, in relation to my interpretation. I think that this word does not belong in that context, there is no language game which supports that use, and Banno is wrong to use that what in that way. But Sam, in my opinion fabricates a game which supports that use, and claims that Banno is simply within the rules of that game. As demonstrated by this example, and multitudes of other similar examples which abound in this world, your proposal, that we might just decide that a word "doesn't belong here", is completely inaccurate, because someone else will come along and use it there. And this incompatibility between one person saying it doesn't belong, and another saying it does, will result in the word not serving the intended purpose, and misunderstanding.

The homonym business — eh, it’s almost semantics. The one argument against it would be that in introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in, you’re relying to some degree on people’s understanding of how the word is used elsewhere — either for the metaphor, or by making a case that there’s a strong analogy between the known use and the new one. It would be hard to pitch a known word as an empty vessel you can add a new meaning to at will. (A somewhat outlandish metaphor can do the trick. Timothy Williamson got mainstream philosophers to talk about “luminosity”.) — Srap Tasmaner

I don't agree with this at all, and I believe that this is why this issue is so "tricky". I think we have to distinguish between two very different "ways" of "introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in". If you are relying on peoples' understanding of how the word is used elsewhere, then you are not actually introducing the word to a new game, you are forming an extension on an old game. This is the sort of overlap which Banno referred to with "family resemblances". But this is where the game analogy breaks down and fails, though people like Banno will refuse to accept this fact. What Wittgenstein represents as a game, is one specific way of using the word. If we allow now, that "a game" consists of two distinct ways, even if one is related to the other by a family resemblance, we contradict the premise of "a game". Therefore distinct uses must be distinct games despite the reality of "overlap" This is the age old issue in Plato's Parmenides, of the incompatibility between One and Many.

That is the one "way" of "introducing a word into a language-game it does not already have a role in", allowing that the two games have a relationship (family) with each other. And the problem is that this really negates the effectiveness of the game analogy. Meaning is attributable to this relationship between games, not to any game. We now have to assume something within language, which is very significant and important to meaning, which is outside any particular game, as the relating of one game to another. This is equivalent to "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts". We have to allow that there is something which makes a whole a whole, which is not a part of the whole. It's a sort of dilemma, and the solution is to reject the analogy. Language-games are proposed as the parts, but the whole which is "a language" is not a congregate of such parts. Therefore the proposal is unacceptable.

That "way" we might call the natural way. The other "way," we might call the logical way. The logical way is to strictly define the word, making the usage specific to one particular game, thereby excluding all relations with other games. Excluding relations with other games is very important, to avoid the tendency to equivocate. This way is exactly opposed to relying on peoples' understanding of how the word is used elsewhere, because that way of understanding consists of a multitude of relations between games (which "game" fails to capture because the understanding lies in the relations, not in the games) and this sort of understanding is extremely conducive to equivocation.

With respect to the two "ways", the logical way is consistent with the "language-game" analogy, but the natural way is not. So the language-game description really fails to capture the true nature of natural language, being based in the logical way which is opposed to the natural way.

One point from the other direction doesn’t seem to be brought up much: must a word have a single use in a language-game? Why couldn’t a word have multiple uses in the same language-game? — Srap Tasmaner

In essence, this is exactly why the game analogy fails in accounting for natural language. "A game" as demonstrated by Wittgenstein is a single type of usage. To avoid violating, or contradicting that premise, a double usage cannot be one game. So a usage is a game, and this principle allows for the reality of logical proceedings, free from equivocation. However, natural language is directly opposed to this, deriving meaning from a multitude of very distinct usages. One might portray these distinct usages as distinct games, but that's really a step in the wrong direction. The real production of distinct games is the artificial process of creating distinct logical premises, and distinct logical proceedings. The natural process of deriving meaning is a comparison of individual, particular, instances of use, which cannot be portrayed as games. They cannot be portrayed as games because the game representation assumes that each instance of usage proceeds with the intent of establishing a rule for general usage. Natural language use does not often proceed with the intent of establishing a rule, it just proceeds with the intent of accomplishing the purpose in that particular instance. So when a person compares distinct instances of usage to derive meaning, this is not a matter of comparing distinct games, because that intent, of demonstrating a game is not necessarily there in these distinct instances.

More importantly, I don't see that your interpretation has any traction. — Sam26

Which one of my interpretations? I offered two completely different. You are the one who brought up a word's "home". How do you interpret this concept? Does a word have only one "home" in one language game, or does it have a "home" in every language game which it is used in? If the former, how would we know which game is the home game? If the latter why would we call this the same word, if it has many different homes? And what sense is there to saying that something has numerous homes?

I’m sympathetic to your thinking in this post, but this is backwards. That is, you’re talking here about reflecting on the meaning of a word, analysing it, theorizing it, rather than using it. When it comes to use, either a word will do for your purpose or it won’t — or it can be made to work the way you want or it can’t. Think first of cases of trying to use a word for some purpose rather than of scrutinizing the word; the point of a tool is to use it when it will get the job done, not to contemplate it. — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so when deciding on what words to use, making the judgement as to whether the word will serve the purpose or not, Sam26 said we need to "think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home". So, if the word is a tool, to make that judgement as to whether it will get the job done or not, we need to find the language game which is the word's home. Whether or not this is "scrutinizing the word" is irrelevant, but this is what is suggested that we need to do. One cannot just pick up any tool, and expect that it will get the job done, so we look at a word's 'home game' to determine whether it will get the job done. How do we determine the word's 'home game'?

But doesn’t the ‘words are homeless’ line of argument contradict the ‘homonym’ argument? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that is the point. They are two very distinct, perhaps even contradictory perspectives. That's why I started off with the suggestion that there's a sort of paradox here. The homonym argument says that since each different game in which a word is used is a distinct "home", then really these ought to be considered as distinct words. But then we might annihilate the relations between one game and another, which Banno pointed out is an important part of meaning, in the article on family resemblances. Now, in this homonym scenario each game is a distinct game, as a distinct home for the words within it, and every word in a different game, even though they might sound and be spelled the same, are different words. You can see that this is an unrealistic scenario because it denies the importance of the relations between one game and another.

However, if we go to the other option, that the same word is used in many games and one of the games is the word's home game, which validates the word's meaning, we have an equally unrealistic scenario. We have no way of knowing which game is the home game, and then the word becomes "homeless" completely free from constraints, like a tool we might be able to pick up and use for any purpose.

I think we do better to take in more rather than less of what’s going on, so that we can see the hammer being a part of — being ‘at home’ in — each ensemble of tools and practices where it is useful (cabinetmaking, house framing, tractor maintenance, surveying, etc.), but not part of others where it is not. I’d lean toward multiple homes, with both hammers and words. Someone used to using a hammer in only one way for one sort of job might be surprised to find other people think of it quite differently, and the same thing happens with words sometimes. (Someone might use a chisel as a doorstop for years without the slightest idea what it’s ‘really’ for.) — Srap Tasmaner

OK, so the other two ways I mentioned are both completely unrealistic, being like two extremes, neither of which properly describes the reality of the situation. Now you propose a word has "multiple homes". I would say now, that the word "home" does not serve any purpose any more. The same word, like the hammer, has a different job, in many different games. We can't say that any particular game is the home, so it's rather meaningless to say that every game in which it appears is a "home" for it.

Now we're right back to square one, having resolved nothing. Suppose one wants to decide whether a word will serve a particular purpose or not, how could one proceed? I have a job to do and I want to know whether the hammer will serve the purpose. Each job, or purpose is unique, distinct from every other one so it doesn't make sense to start looking through all the different language games that the word has appeared in, or all the different things I've ever done with a hammer. How do you think the judgement is made? If I do not look at one game as the home game, and I do not consider all the different games, what do I do, take a few games and make an average or something?

All right! The wave function describes waves. What sort of waves do they describe? — tim wood

What sort of waves are described is the problem, isn't it? Until the aether is identified that question cannot be answered. Right? We know that waves are described, because that's what the Fourier transform (which is central to a wave function) does, describes waves. Therefore the name "wave" function. We just don't know the medium of those waves. But we know that the waves are real because the transmit energy.

You brought up this issue of "the language game that is its [a word's] home". But if you'd prefer not to discuss it then just say so.

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense. — Sam26

Since a word has a place in numerous different language-games, would we be correct in saying that the word has a number of different "homes"? You seem to imply that for Wittgenstein, only one of the language-games is the word's true "home". If this is the case, then what is the word's position in another language-game? How is it possible that we look to a word's home language-game to understand its meaning in a completely different language-game? Obviously, the situation I described, that the word is a distinct and different word in each different language-game, with its own home in that game, is not the case, if a word has a one "home" game that determines its meaning.

So, what is the case? If any particular instance of a word's meaning is not dependent on its use in that specific game in which it is being used at that time, and it is actually required that we determine the word's "home" game to know its meaning in that other game, how do we determine its "home" game? I assume that if we do not know with certainty, the word's "home" game, we cannot know with certainty the word's true meaning. Do you agree with this?

Or, is this idea of a "home" game just a ruse? One might search forever, trying to confirm the word's "home" never really being sure which game is the word's "home", therefore never really being sure of the word's meaning. Perhaps the idea that there is one "home" game is just wrong, and the word has a home in each different game which it is used. Then shouldn't we say that these are distinct words, like homonyms, each with its own home in its own game? On what principle then do we say that it is "the same word" used in different games? Oughtn't we say that a word is homeless, and is free to go and find a place wherever one wants it to be?

Wiki, wave function: "A wave function in quantum physics is a mathematical description...". I am going to assume you were being facetious. — tim wood

Well of course, a wave function is a mathematical description. And what the mathematics describes, is waves. That's what I said "'wave function' describes waves". I didn't think anyone reading this would be so uninformed as to require the qualification "using mathematics". That the description is made with mathematics is self-evident. I'm not being facetious, you are just being unbelievably ignorant.

Are you familiar with the Fourier transform which is central to the mathematics of a wave function? It describes wave frequencies.

History
Main articles: Fourier analysis § History, and Fourier series § History
In 1822, Joseph Fourier showed that some functions could be written as an infinite sum of harmonics.[10]

Introduction
See also: Fourier analysis

One motivation for the Fourier transform comes from the study of Fourier series. In the study of Fourier series, complicated but periodic functions are written as the sum of simple waves mathematically represented by sines and cosines. The Fourier transform is an extension of the Fourier series that results when the period of the represented function is lengthened and allowed to approach infinity. — Wikipedia: Fourier Transform

The infamous "uncertainty principle" is a feature of the principle referred to here as "allowed to approach infinity". We really know that neither the actual time value nor the actual frequency of a real wave could be "infinite", so this assumption introduces a degree of uncertainty (falsity) into the mathematical description.

Coming from you that convinces me otherwise. — 180 Proof

You ought not say things like that 180. It just demonstrates that you are convinced by ad hominem. And that's known as a fallacy. Relying on ad hominem to make judgements of metaphysics is just not good. Why do you base your metaphysical judgements in fallacious logic?

...even though you've taken a leap of whatever off of the raggedy edge of my post. — 180 Proof

That's hard to avoid. The entire post is a ragged mess, best to abandon.

actually this question and tim woods response makes me question whether the study of the evolution of the universe is actually 'history'. The web definition of history is 'the study of past events, particularly in human affairs e.g. "medieval European history". — Wayfarer

I think the word "history" is used to create the illusion of science, by the authors. By calling it "history", the metaphysics which consists of speculations about the early universe. is presented as if it might be science.

I'm not smart enough to dumb down my 'philosophical via negativa' any further especially for someone who won't bother to read it.
How often have I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?
— The Sign of the Four, chap. 6
Last attempt (paraphrasing Arthur Conan Doyle):

'If we eliminate (negate) the ways the actual world necessarily could not have been or cannot be described, then what remains is every way the actual world – phase space – possibly could have been or can be described.' — 180 Proof

Eliminating the impossible does not give us the truth. Such a method always leaves us with possibility because the logic operates within that category. And truth is what actually is. So we still have a categorical separation between what we get from eliminating impossibility (i.e., possibility), and truth (what actually is).

And, the proposition that all reality consists of mere possibility, without anything actual, is inconsistent with sense observation. In other words, to class the actual as impossible because it is other than possible is contrary to empirical evidence (it is a sophistic trick). So we are still left with a gap between what the logical process of eliminating impossibility gives us (possibility), and what sensation gives us (actuality). This gap needs to be closed if are to claim a proper understanding of reality. To deny the gap, by claiming that the actual is impossible because it is something other than possible, is a sophistic move of ignorance.

When you work out what it is you are claiming, then your posts might be worth addressing. — Banno

If you want to look at the issue I brought up, as a civilized, rational human being, without resort to insult, then follow me here.

I was enquiring as to what Wittgenstein means when he suggests that a word could have a "home". It is implied that when a word is used in many different language games, one particular language game might be the game which is "home" to the word. How could we ever determine which game is the home game for any given word?

Don't take it personally.

When you work out what it is that I am claiming, then you might be capable of making an intelligent reply, instead of off the cuff ad hominem, like the following:

And this is another example of Metaphysician Undercover's congenital logical problem. — Banno

What kind of bullshit purpose is "congenital" supposed to serve here? Are you racist?

"Family resemblance" implies that they have family in common, just like Wittgenstein says: "Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres". Therefore there is something in common, it's just in a way other than one might think. It's the overlapping which they have in common. So what you describe as "games held certain similarities and relations with each other", is what they have in common, these relations, like a family consists of relations. And we call this, what they have in common, "family".

That's actually the conclusion of my post above. Why don't you ever take the time to read my posts through to the end? Because of this you commonly misrepresent me.

Therefore the nature of "understanding" turns out to be comprehending how one instance of use overlaps, or relates to another, as the relationship between one game and another, as opposed to understanding the meaning of a word. — Metaphysician Undercover

Care to explain yourself?

Now, would you say that because a tool is being used differently in a different context that it's a different tool? — Sam26

Yes, I might say that the same object used in two different ways, is two different tools, like in the case of a multitool, and I'll explain further below. But what I was discussing is a word's "home". You referred to a word having a "home" in a particular language game. But if the word has a place in a number of different language games, like a tool has a number of different uses, how would we determine which language game, or use, is the "home" of that word, or which use is the "home" of the tool?

If it turns out that the word has a number of different "homes", wouldn't we have to say that these are actually different words? Homonyms are considered to be distinct words aren't they? Likewise, if a tool is defined by its use, then the same object could be two different tools, depending on how the object is used. Suppose a "saw" is what cuts wood, and a "knife" is what cuts meat. Then the same object could be both a saw and a knife, two different tools, depending on how it is used. And a multitool is a lot of different tools.

In case you're not following, here's a couple examples. I think most people would agree that "right", when it means correct, is a different word from "right" when it refers to one side of a person's body. But in the case of "see" they would say it is the same word whether it refers to seeing with the eyes, or seeing with the mind.

Obviously you wouldn't because that would be silly. — Sam26

I'm not making a pun, so don't consider this as silly. Homonyms are understood to be distinct words.

His argument is based on the idea that there must be something had in common by all uses of a word that make it a use of that word. The argument for family resemblance shows that this need not be so. — Banno

I don't see how "family resemblance shows that this need not be so". Obviously "family resemblance" implies having something in common. So how can the argument for family resemblance show that the uses need not have something in common?

And this is another example of Metaphysician Undercover's congenital logical problem. His argument is based on the idea that there must be something had in common by all uses of a word that make it a use of that word. The argument for family resemblance shows that this need not be so. — Banno

OK, so I'll ask you the question Banno. How would you distinguish between homonyms (in the case of two different words with the same sound and spelling), and one word having two different meanings? To take your analogy of "family resemblances", why would we say in the case of homonyms, "those two words are just like identical twins", but in other cases, "that's the same person"

So, when we think of meaning, think of how a word is used in the language-game that is its home. If for example, we’re talking about epistemology and how we justify a conclusion, then we’re using the word know in a way that’s determined by the logic of that language-game. The problem that arises, is when we take the use of a particular word in one language-game, and try to apply it in another language-game where the word is used in a completely different way, i.e., it has a different use, or it functions differently. This is not to say that a word can’t have the same use in a different language-game, but to say that it’s use maybe different; and thus, it may have a different sense. — Sam26

What you describe here is a sort of paradox, which might even be called a contradiction. If a word's "home" is its position within a particular language game, but the same word might be used in different games, then it has distinct homes. So we have the problem of the same word having numerous homes. To resolve this problem we ought not think of these numerous and distinct uses, of what appears to be the same word, as actually being instances of "the same word". Having different homes, therefore different meanings, ought to indicate to us that they are distinct words, despite having the same outward appearance. Therefore we ought to apprehend these words which appear to be the same, yet have different homes, as different words.

If we adopt this position, we have a new problem, which is the necessary boundary between a word with one home, and a word which appears to be the same word, yet has a different home, so is really a different word. Since both instances appear to be the same word, yet we conclude logically that they are not the same word, having different homes, we need other principles to distinguish them. It's kind of like they are identical twins. How we might distinguish the words is through context, the word's home, the two distinct games which are home to each, respectively. This means we must identify the game itself, and that's where the difficulty lies.

The various games of a language overlap, they share rules at some points and diverge at other points. And so a further problem develops. If the two distinct words, which appear to be the same, go by the same rule in two games, but different rules in another game, then why can't we say that they are actually "the same word" in those two games, and a different word in the third game. But if we adhere to the principle, a different game constitutes a different word, we must disallow this idea because the two games are distinct, constituting different homes, even though what is said of the two words, "appears to be the same" takes on an even stronger meaning.

What follows though, is that we lose all principles to distinguish one game from another, until we reach the point of "each particular instance of use must be viewed as a different game". Therefore the nature of "understanding" turns out to be comprehending how one instance of use overlaps, or relates to another, as the relationship between one game and another, as opposed to understanding the meaning of a word.

Yes, my point exactly. Yours is predicated on education, the qualifications above listed being more attributable to experience than mere education. One cannot even become properly educated without those qualifications. Or, in other words, becoming educated presupposes those qualifications. Either way, and however reduced. It is education that comes as a consequence, and never as an antecedent.

So any bias can be overcome, that's the nature of free will, and will power.
— Metaphysician Undercover

And that right there is the proverbial knife-in-the-heart of your predication on education. Will power cannot be taught. And while experience is a form of education, absent the stipulation that says otherwise, education as used herein indicates the formal, sit-down-shut-up-and-memorize brand of it. — Mww

What's with the inconsistency Mww? First you say that these "qualifications" are more attributable to experience than education, but then you proceed to say that experience is a form of education. If these "qualifications" are attributable to experience, and experience is a form of education, then such "qualifications" are necessarily attributable to education. What we cannot conclude is that they are attributable to all forms of education.

So you proceed to restrict "education" to a "sit-down-and-shut-up" form, attempting to deny that introspection and other forms of being self-taught are valid forms of education. And this is evident in your claim that "will power cannot be taught". In actuality will power is self-taught, through practise and exercise. We are given will, but the determination and persistence, which constitutes the will to succeed, will power, is developed through practise. And since this "power" can be freely transposed from one habit to another, it cannot be called a bias. It is the inclination to direct the will power in one direction rather than another, which is a bias.

.......the proposed counterargument suggests both a reevaluation of conditionals and a reassessment of the principle the conditionals endorse.

With respect to which, I offer, for your consideration: education in the minor and my experiences in the major determine the possibilities toward biases in general, my biases represent a rational determination from those possibilities, which is called persuasion, my innate predispositions judge a priori whether my biases conform to my nature, which is called interest.

Agree with any of that? — Mww

Inconsistency again? Above you said that experience is a form of education. This would put experience as the minor, and education as the major, education as logically prior to experience. You now look to reverse this, making experience the major, and education the minor. Are you now saying that education is a form of experience? Why not just equate the two? All forms of experience are education and all forms of education are experience.

If we take this position as a clean slate, I'd have to disagree with your proposal. I disagree because there must be a capacity which enables, or allows one to experience, or be educated. And this capacity is necessarily prior to experience and education. And, I believe it is quite possible that a bias could be inherent within such a capacity. In fact, upon analysis we might find that this capacity is best described as a type of bias in itself.

This is why, in philosophy we must doubt, or question this very capacity itself, the capacity which allows us to understand, because of the way that it may taint our knowledge. This is the tinted glass analogy used in theological metaphysics. It is proposed that the soul must be immaterial in order that it can understand and know all material things. However, since the intellect, which is the means through which the soul knows, is united with, and dependent on the material body, this material body acts like a lens through which the intellect "sees" the world. And since the lens is material rather than immaterial, it is as a tinted lens.

That the lens which we see the world through is tinted, does not necessitate that the world will be misunderstood by us. What is required is that we determine and understand the nature of the tinting in order that we can account for it, and adjust for it in our understanding. The "capacity to experience and understand" is that lens through which we "see" the world. And so we must learn to understand the biases which inhere within this capacity, in order to develop a true understanding. This is a matter of negating those biases.

The Platonist answer is that humans have a foot in both worlds - physically embodied beings who can by virtue of intellect peer into the realm of ideas. That is how we've been able to devise such amazing inventions. — Wayfarer

The past (observed) is the physical. The future (unobservable) is the realm of ideas. Human beings live at the present. However, it has become evident that the present, which the being occupies, is not a clean and precise, non-temporal point of division. In Peirce's words, it is a vague boundary, described by the ancient Greeks as the medium of "becoming", matter. This necessitates the conclusion that the human being, as composed of matter, has "a foot in both worlds", the past and the future, occupying a vague boundary between the two.

\It's quite clear that in physics a "wave" is a disturbance in a medium. Since the "wavefunction" describes waves, we can conclude that these waves require a medium (commonly known as the ether). Until this medium is identified and properly "observed", the wavefunction, and all the derivative principles in physics which depend on it, are based in unsubstantiated metaphysical speculation, and ought not be called "science".

The modern trend in metaphysics is to simple deny the reality of the ether. But since the ether is logically required, this trend is just bad (illogical) metaphysics, which many people like to pretend is science.

True enough, if one accepts that biases are innate. I don’t think I’d go that far, and apparently, neither do you, because you said, “inclined toward due to genetics or predisposition”. — Mww

Oh yeah, you can see right through me. Not. If one is naturally inclined in one way rather than another, that's a bias. But being inclined in one way or another does not necessitate behaviour in that way because we have the will power to resist such inclinations. So any bias can be overcome, that's the nature of free will, and will power. But just because these inclinations (biases) can be overcome, does not mean that they are not biases.

We naturally have feelings, but can certainly distinguish a good one from a bad one. It follows that how we feel about a bias may be exactly how we distinguish them from each other, by how the object of each affects us. — Mww

I don\t agree that we can "certainly distinguish a good feeling from a bad feeling". Sometimes the distinction is easy, other times not so easy. And if we start to analyze the criteria of what distinguishes the good from the bad, then sometimes we find out that some of the ones we have taken for granted as good or bad, have been misjudged.

And this prevents us from just going right back to a new bias, a new inclination of a different color, but inclination nonetheless? — Mww

Yes, but the decision is made from a more fully developed intellect, so it is more rational. That's the whole point. Biases developed when we are children are positions of judgement accepted by a juvenile mind, which has not necessarily developed the full potential of rationality. And innate biases are even less rational. So as we grow older, and develop the full capacity of logical reasoning, which is proper to an educated human being, we need to reassess any biases developed when we less capable of such reasoning. This is simply a matter of introspection, to distinguish bad habits from good, and use the will power required to reject the bad,

The problem is that one's own ways of thinking are always assumed to be good, or else the person wouldn't be thinking that way. And the same will power, or more, is required to break a good habit as is required to break a bad habit. But in the case of ways of thinking, the habit can only be judged as a bad way of thinking if one is not thinking that way at the time. So each way of thinking, be it good or bad, must be prevented before it can be properly judged as good or bad.

That we return to a "bias" after such a judgement is not an issue, because the practise of breaking the biases, and judging them has been developed, and this is what matters. So in a matter of time, the new bias will itself be blocked and reassessed, and this is what is important. This habit, of blocking the biases, and judging them cannot be said to be a bias itself. It is a way of thinking of a free willing mind, which cannot be called a bias because it is not directed in any particular direction.

True, but it serves no purpose to doubt ourselves into oblivion. If humans are naturally inclined to biases and cognitive dispositions, it seems rather futile to effect their collective demise. — Mww

It is not a matter of doubting oneself into oblivion. It is just the introspection of a healthy rational mind which does not want to be misled by itself, by trusting, and relying on, decisions it made when it was less capable. Once we realize that a mind keeps developing over a very long portion of one's lifetime, we ought to recognize the need to keep reassessing the principles we employ for making judgements.

Besides, I suspect there are some biases we refuse to over-rule, and in conjunction with them, the innate predispositions we couldn’t over-rule without destroying the manifest identity to which they belong. — Mww

Yes, most people refuse to judge their biases, that's why we call these people biased. But if you recognize that biases can be judged and over-ruled, then you'll see that this way of thinking, which engages in that procedure cannot be a biased way of thinking.

And the latter statement here is just a blatant denial of free will as an identifying feature of human beings. Are you determinist?

Doubt implies dismissal Without the opportunity for correction. — Mww

No, "doubt" implies indecision. This does not mean that the thing doubted, i.e. what the person is indecisive about, will necessarily be dismissed. Judgement is suspended, so the thing being judged (doubted) is held in a mental position where it is neither accepted nor rejected.

I get what you’re saying; I just think you’ve gone too far with it, in terms of practical purposes and the consequences for philosophy. — Mww

If the principles are reasonable, and there appears to be nothing wrong "in principle", then why not take them as far as one can go, in practise. If in practise, a brick wall is hit, where the principles have difficulty, and further process is prevented, then we need to reassess the principles to see what the problem is.

Go ahead, express something that is not already seated somewhere, somehow, someway. The notion of the ridding of all is absurd - impossible. One may attempt to identify biases and to work with, around or through them, but every gesture is biased is some way. Do you care to retreat from the categorical to something (more) reasonable? — tim wood

Obviously you are a very biased person if you are attempting to justify your biases in this way, instead of accepting the fact that you might be able to rid yourself of the bad ones if you would only submit to the process of doubting them all. This being required in order to identify all the bad ones as bad.

Not really, because quantum chemistry is energy based, while my description is mass based. This is a big difference because a molecule is understood to have distinct massive parts, therefore distinct "spaces" by my description. Even an atom is understood to have distinct massive parts. From the energy perspective, the interaction of electrons occurs in one space, rather than a number of different spaces according to distinct massive centers representing distinct spaces.

Actually my post was directed toward Bret and the op. I just inserted a line from your post. so I put quotations to give proper credit to you, for that phrase.

Still...can a innate predisposition, as such, be subjected to over-ruling, whether by education or otherwise? And what of a good bias? Should my innate predisposition to help the proverbial lil’ ol’ lady cross the street be educated out of me?

You made no distinction between the relative values of our individual biases, grouping them all as biases in general, the compendium of which we can be taught to overcome. To that alone, I make objection. — Mww

There is no doubt in my mind, that some innate biases can be overcome. The more pertinent question is as you say, "what of a good bias?" And of course the related question of how do we decide which are good, bad, or indifferent.

What you seem to object to is the idea that all biases ought to be overcome, even ones which might be good. The reason for this, and this takes us right to the foundation of skepticism, is that we cannot properly distinguish between good and bad biases, when we are already biased. This means we must rid ourselves of all biases, form an open mind, then reassess all those dismissed biases from this newly established position.

Skepticism instructs us to doubt everything, and this is because what appears to be knowledge appears to be knowledge, regardless of whether it is true or false knowledge. So we cannot distinguish between true knowledge and false knowledge by its appearance because it all appears to be knowledge. Therefore we must subject anything which appears as knowledge, to doubt. And this is a similar principle to rejecting all biases, because from the position of holding a bias one cannot properly distinguish which biases are good, and which are bad.

I suppose that's why they say "taste" is subjective.

My take: space is personal. Not just relativistic (fixed by reference frame), but rather each thing that exists has its own personal space. Interactions and correlations are couplings between these spaces that allow us to map one space onto another, approximately at least. These mappings enable a statistical projection of all these things going on in all these spaces onto a single hypothetical space constructed by the mind (or computer). So more like an infinite net, I suppose. — Kenosha Kid

That's good. Each "thing" has space proper to it. Now how would you relate this to the concepts of chemistry and physics, within which, things move relative to each other? We cannot use an artificial coordinate system representing one "space", because this would be a false representation. Now each thing has its own space, within which it moves and changes, and that space needs to be related to the various "spaces" of every other thing. So we are left with a very complex problem. We need to determine the way that each type of thing moves within its own space, and also we need principles to relate the space of one thing to the space of another thing.

Let's take an object like a chair, or a rock for an example of a "thing". We can say that it has "a space" proper to it. We might define the boundaries of that space with reference to gravity. Now, lets proceed to a molecule, as a "thing" which conventionally is a part of that thing, identified by the example as a chair. The molecule has its own "space" defined by its gravity, and obviously the distinct "spaces" of the molecule and the chair overlap in terms of occupying the same place. What means would you propose for distinguishing the space of the molecule from the space of the chair?

I proposed that the boundaries of a thing's space be determined by a thing's gravity, but what kind of space would be proper to a thing which has no mass? This sort of problem would reveal two distinct types of space, the type of space proper to a massive object, and the type of space proper to something which has no mass. Since the space which is proper to things which have no mass seems to permeate all the spaces of massive things, maybe an understanding of this space could be used to relate all the other spaces of the massive objects to one another. In the case of massive objects, gravity is the defining feature of the space. What features should we look for to define the space of massless objects?

Doesn't "vat-grown meat" moots the question of "justification"? ↪180 Proof (re: link to article) — 180 Proof

Vat-grown meat will undoubtably be similar to hydroponically grown vegetables, in the sense of extremely deficient in taste. We already experience a big difference between grass fed beef and grain fed beef. There is something very untasteful about producing growth (quantity) for consumption, with complete disregard for the quality of life of that which is consumed. The vat-grown meat will experience the lowest quality of life possible, and most likely have the least taste as well.

In the old days, when the opponent appeared to be gaining too much power, someone would execute.

How does the use of words (casting spells and stuff like that) enter into the concept of magick? Does Donald Trump

summoning wild animals — Tobias

qualify as an example of someone who uses magick?

I suppose if the causal connection between the person's will, and the occurrence could be established, then the person is legally responsible. But doesn't "magic" imply that the causal connection remains hidden? So I think "magick" is an oxymoron. You are saying that the person is necessarily the cause, in a situation where there is no evidence to conclude that the person is necessarily the cause. And the legal issue you raise is just a sham, because you are asking if the person ought to be held responsible in a situation where the person cannot be proven to be responsible. Of course that is a non-starter.

I wasn't making an appeal to consistency, although obviously consistency is important to any rational thought; I was merely pointing out that the various domains of inquiry in modern science form a consistent whole. — Janus

The various domains of science actually do not form a consistent whole. There is significant inconsistency between principles employed from one field to the next, and the same words are not always defined consistently from one to another. There isn't even consistency as to which fields qualify as "science" and which do not. For insistence, google the phrase "is mathematics a science", and you'll see evidence of disagreement.

That doesn't mean that theories in the various domains are not tested by observation. How else do you think they could be tested? — Janus

I think theories in the domain of "science" are tested by observation. But that doesn't mean observation is the only way to test premises. In mathematics for example, axioms are tested by consistency. That's why we generally do not class mathematics as a science.

However, many people seem content to blur the boundaries of "science". This is probably because science has a very good reputation. So if you can pass something off as "science" which really isn't science, and you don't get exposed, it will make you look like you know more than you really do

So the hard vacuum does a better job cleaning the rug.

So I can assume that you wouldn't have taken a spectator's seat at the guillotine in the French Revolution. Maybe what you've learned to over-rule is the inclination to enjoy beheadings.

From Wikipedia:

Outer space, commonly shortened to space, is the expanse that exists beyond Earth and its atmosphere and between celestial bodies. Outer space is not completely empty—it is a hard vacuum containing a low density of particles, predominantly a plasma of hydrogen and helium, as well as electromagnetic radiation, magnetic fields, neutrinos, dust, and cosmic rays — jgill

What do you think is meant by "hard vacuum" here? Is that as distinguished from a "soft vacuum"?

Does my individual psychology (which has accrued various arbitrary biases based on my genes, upbringing, books I've read, etc.) limit what philosophical theories I can consider to be good/true? — clemogo

This is why proper upbringing, and education are imperative. One's way of thinking is no less of a habit than other activities which we engage in. Learning to overrule whatever biases one is inclined toward due to genetics or predisposition, is part of a proper education. How to proceed with an open mind is something which must be learned, because it is impossible that it could be hereditary. This is the concept of free will, to free your decision making from such influences which force your decision making in one way or another irrationally.

I understand the concern. I think it's not just that they cannot be observed, it is my understanding that they can not exist independently. From the point of view of Gnomon's point, I'm not sure that it matters. — T Clark

The point is mainly directed at Janus, and anyone else, who argues that the theories employed in modern science have been "tested", or proven by observation. What constitutes 'proof by observation' seems to have lost all credibility in modern science.

Take the famous Michelson-Morley type experiments for example. What these experiments prove is that certain postulated relations between mass and the proposed ether of light transmission, are incorrect. What is commonly cited as "proven" by these experiments, is that there is no ether. You ought to be able to see that logically, the inability to properly represent the existence of something in hypotheses, is not proof that the thing is not real. In this case, what is demonstrated is that "ether" has not been adequately described (defined).

This is the big problem with the metaphysics of 'observation is the foundation of knowledge'. It doesn't account for the fact that in knowledge observation, as proof, is posterior to hypothesis. Therefore the usefulness of observation as a means of proving hypotheses, is limited by the formulation of the hypothesis.

To really understand the nature of knowledge therefore, we need to grasp the method by which hypotheses are produced. Focusing on observation as the source of knowledge, is to account for the a posteriori while remaining ignorant of the a priori. And to deny the reality of the a priori simply demonstrates this ignorance.

Only premises that are descriptions of physical things or the behavior of observable things can be tested, though — Janus

That's not true, logic is tested by consistency. That 4+5 equals 9 is tested by 9-5=4, etc..

The premise that the truth of premises can be tested only by observation is itself based on observation of how we test premises. — Janus

Obviously you don't actually know how premises are tested, so your premise is false. It's like you saw 20 black squirrels, and no other squirrels, so you claim as a true premise, "all squirrels are black".

You have actually given a very good example of how "observation" itself is very deceptive as the basis for validating premises. Without very good (immaterial) rules as to how one might derive a valid premise from observations, observations very often mislead us.

Moral premises are judged against standards of compassion, social harmony and against how we feel about things — Janus

Your missing the point. No amount of observations of compassion, social harmony, and such things, will justify the claim that we ought to support such things. Moral premises concern what ought, and ought not, be done. That people act in a specific way, and they say "this is good", does not justify the claim that what they say is good, is what ought to be done.

But quantum theory and particle physics is consistent with chemical theory, and chemical theory is consistent with geology, cosmology and biology. I see them as just being different domains or levels of description and explanation. — Janus

What happened to "premises can be tested only by observation"? The example of "quarks" described earlier, is clear evidence that the Standard Model is not supported by observation. So now you make appeals to consistency? That a quantity of energy moves from one place to another, in the form of a wave, and also in the form of a particle, is an example of inconsistency. So quantum theory is supported neither by observation nor consistency. It is supported only by its capacity to predict.

I don't associated the idea of the 'world soul' with Aristotle in particular, but definitely with the idea of 'animating principle'. — Wayfarer

The point (derived from Plato) which Aristotle demonstrates very well, is why the soul is necessarily prior to the material living body. Any living body is organized. Such a body is necessarily organized from the very first moment of its existence. Organization requires a cause. Therefore the thing which causes the living body to be organized (the soul) is necessarily prior to the body.

Then, in his metaphysics, Aristotle carries this principle further, to all physical existence in general. Since the very essence of physical existence, is to be in some way organized, then all physical existence must be organized from the very first moment of its existence. And since organization requires a cause, that cause must be prior to physical existence.

The modern trend in metaphysics is to posit some initial condition of absolute disorganization, from which organization emerged. This idea is what is demonstrated by Aristotle's cosmological argument to incoherent and unintelligible. But it has reemerged in modern metaphysics as a result of physicalist bias impairing the cognitive capacity of human beings.

Quarks have mass. I do remember reading that the mass of the quarks making up larger subatomic particles; i.e. protons, neutrons, and mesons; add up to less than the mass of the particle itself. — T Clark

I agree that quarks have some mass, but it's relatively small. The majority of the mass in a proton or neutron is accounted for by the energy of the gluons which are supposed to hold the quarks together. The problem is that individual, separated quarks, cannot actually be observed.

Logic, though, doesn't tell us anything about an inference other than whether it is consistent with its premises (validity); it cannot tell us whether the premises are true.

The only way to test the truth of any premise is by empirical evidence. — Janus

Premises need not be descriptions of physical things, whose truth and falsity is judged according to empirical evidence. We can make premises which are descriptions of how logic works, and also premises concerning moral issues. The judgement of truth or falsity of these premises is not based in empirical evidence, so it isn't really correct to say that the truth of a premise can only be tested by empirical evidence. That itself would be a premise which cannot be tested, so the truth or falsity of it could not be judged. Whether empirical evidence, or knowledge about the immaterial, provides a more sound judgement is another question. Plato was insistent on the latter.

Science is based on a method of testing the truth or falsity of immaterial principles (hypotheses) through reference to empirical evidence. What science does not provide for us is any real principles for testing the validity of empirical evidence. Sure there are guidelines as to what constitutes an "observation\", and principles as to how experiments ought to proceed in a way to produce objective observations, but these are all based in "ought", so they can only be supported by strong metaphysics. Weak metaphysics produces inconsistency between one field of science and another, as to what constitutes a valid observation.

Most of the mass=energy of a proton is from the gluons. — PoeticUniverse

Yes, gluons have no mass in themselves, but they are responsible for, as carriers of, the strong force. The strong force, which binds quarks into massive objects, is mathematically equivalent to mass. So if quarks are separated there is a freeing of energy which exists in the hadron (massive object) as gluons.

The problem is that the strong interaction force is not well understood. It is "observed" to be unrestricted by distance, and because of this, quarks cannot actually be separated in experimental practise. No matter how far apart they are supposedly separated, the strong force still acts to hold them together, and no real separation can be observed.

The strong force acts between quarks. Unlike all other forces (electromagnetic, weak, and gravitational), the strong force does not diminish in strength with increasing distance between pairs of quarks. After a limiting distance (about the size of a hadron) has been reached, it remains at a strength of about 10,000 newtons [N], no matter how much farther the distance between the quarks.[7] As the separation between the quarks grows, the energy added to the pair creates new pairs of matching quarks between the original two; hence it is impossible to isolate quarks. The explanation is that the amount of work done against a force of 10,000 newtons is enough to create particle–antiparticle pairs within a very short distance of that interaction. The very energy added to the system required to pull two quarks apart would create a pair of new quarks that will pair up with the original ones. In QCD, this phenomenon is called color confinement; as a result only hadrons, not individual free quarks, can be observed. The failure of all experiments that have searched for free quarks is considered to be evidence of this phenomenon. — Wikipedia

I think that the Higgs mechanism only accounts for a very small percentage of mass that is known to us.

It is worth noting that the Higgs field does not "create" mass out of nothing (which would violate the law of conservation of energy), nor is the Higgs field responsible for the mass of all particles. For example, approximately 99% of the mass of baryons (composite particles such as the proton and neutron), is due instead to quantum chromodynamic binding energy, which is the sum of the kinetic energies of quarks and the energies of the massless gluons mediating the strong interaction inside the baryons.[28] In Higgs-based theories, the property of "mass" is a manifestation of potential energy transferred to fundamental particles when they interact ("couple") with the Higgs field, which had contained that mass in the form of energy.[29] — Wikipedia

A Quark is invisible and un-measurable, so in scientific terms it exists only as a theory in a mind. — Gnomon

Yet quarks are supposed to be the constituent parts of massive objects. Where does all that mass actually come from?

How could a non-physical explanation ever be tested? — Janus

Non-physical explanations are tested logically. That's what logic gives us, non-physical explanations. Are you familiar with mathematics for example? Some people however, still do not trust logic, they have no faith in the non-physical, and so they must fall back onto the comfort and illusory security provided by their senses.

I think scientifically educated people will find it very difficult to honestly believe in things for which there can be no definitive evidence. — Janus

The problem with this statement is that you define "definitive evidence" as physical evidence. If you would allow that logic provides evidence which is just as "definitive", or even more so, than your senses, you would allow for "non-physical evidence".

If the explanation you are considering is a physical one then there is nothing wrong with it, — Janus

What kind of bias is that? If we are seeking the cause of physical existence, obviously the answer cannot be something physical.

That kind of question is not answerable in any verifiable or falsifiable manner in principle.. — Janus

I don't see how you would justify this claim.