In the summary of the Nicomachean Ethics that I'm reading from Bertrand Russell's perspective it's said that Aristotle maintained a view in accordance of the magnanimous man standing in higher regard than other men for being virtuous, as defined by Aristotle. The question to rephrase, would be that why does it seem so important that someone who is in higher standing with regards to ethics, should be treated any differently. — Shawn

This is like asking why should a law respecting man be treated differently than a criminal. Isn't it obvious to you why a person who adheres to a code of ethics ought to be treated differently than one who simply acts in random ways? The former is more dependable, trustworthy, and reliable than the latter.

A better question might be to ask why we ought to follow this ethics (Aristotle's) rather than some other ethics. Aristotle would say that ethics must be 'intuitive' as intuition is the highest guide to practical knowledge. If you agree with this, then you are already inclined toward following his intuition based ethics. If you disagree, then you need to propose another principle to base a code of ethics in, or else you become the unprincipled, undependable, untrustworthy, unreliable person, acting in random ways.

Time can't go backwards. — Raymond

Why can't time go backward? Isn't this a mystery?

I think there are two kinds of times, mutually exclusive. Entropic time and perfect clock time. — Raymond

How can there be two "mutually exclusive" types of time? Doesn't this really mean that there are two incompatible conceptions of time? And, doesn't that mean that the real nature of time is a mystery?

It's frustrating if you see so clearly what time is and no one understands what you mean — Raymond

Obviously, you see two mutually exclusive types of time, so you really do not see what time is.

In your everyday life, do you recognize a difference between past and future? Can you explain the reason for such a difference?

This ignores the distinction between heavenly bodies and the "combined beings" of the sublunary sphere. The life of the latter is "ensouled" in a material basis that does not apply to eternal substances. The references to serial order of thinking relates to the distinction being made. — Paine

This is not a distinction made by Aristotle in "De Anima". He is asking about how the soul is supposed to move its body. He describes the Platonic explanation of how the soul moves its body as being the same way that the heavenly bodies are supposed to be moved by a 'mind soul'.

3. We must begin our examination with movement; for, doubtless, not only is it false that the essence of the soul is correctly described by those who say that it is what moves (or is capable of moving) itself, but it is an impossibility that movement should be even an attribute of it. — Arostotle De Anima, Bk1, Ch3, 405b, 31

It is in the same fashion that the Timaeus also tries to give a physical account of how the soul moves its body; the soul, it is here said, is in movement, and so owing to their mutual implication moves the body also.
...
All this implies that the movements of the soul are identified with the local movements of the heavens. — Arostotle De Anima, Bk1, Ch3, 406b, 26 - 407a,3

Notice that he describes the Platonic perspective as identifying the movement of the soul with the movement of the heavens. He is not trying to separate these two, make a distinction as you say, but to reject the entire description.

He does not deny the possibility that the same principle which acts as the soul in the living being could also be what acts as the cause of movement in the heavens. In fact, we can still make that comparison. The first actuality of the living body (the soul) is the cause of the material body, just like the first actuality demonstrated by the cosmological argument is the cause of the material universe.

So Aristotle is not making a distinction or separation, he is rejecting the whole idea, the description of the soul, as self-moved mover, and the cosmological description of eternal circular motions, which supports this description of the soul.

The references to serial order of thinking relates to the distinction being made. What the actuality is for living animals does not completely include how nous is an actuality for those creatures. Aristotle says that the soul, as what makes creatures alive, is not self-moving. Something else causes it. Nous is said to be different in a way that requires more than the celestial model of Timaeus to explain. As Aristotle says: "The case of the mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed." — Paine

There is no such distinction being made. It is an imaginary one you are trying to force onto the interpretation. But if we assume such a distinction, for the sake of argument, then we'd have to look for the means by which the mind is implanted into the soul. We would now have something immutable, the mind, implanted into something, the soul, which cannot move or be moved i.e., is also immutable. And that makes no sense at all. If adding mind to soul makes no change to soul, then soul must always be united with mind as one mind soul. But this is exactly what you are claiming, that he is making a distinction between.

What Aristotle is showing here is that the Platonic conception of "soul" which has the soul move the body, in a way which is analogous to the way that the ancient Greeks believed that a "mind" moved the heavenly bodies, is mistaken. But we cannot proceed from this to make the distinction you claim.

This view does not conform to the either/or you see in Book 1. The insufficiency noted by Aristotle in Book 1 is now accounted for as a distinction of causes: These distinctions are used to clarify the different ways that desire and practical reason can said to move the living animal. — Paine

I can't see the point you are making here, Paine. Aristotle clearly says that thoughts are dependent on images. It's at the end of your quote. And images are derived from the senses. So we have no basis for a "nous" which is independent of the senses, sense organs, and material body. It's true that Aristotle, at some points alludes to the appearance of a separate, independent mind, but such a thing is inconsistent with the principles he clearly states.

He doesn’t say that. So you couldn’t have “quoted” it. You got it all backward as usual. :smile: — Apollodorus

Obviously you haven't read it yet. So I'm still waiting for an intelligent reply from you, concerning this.

Therefore, it doesn't make sense to claim that he describes the “unacceptability of eternal circular motions” in De Anima or anywhere else. — Apollodorus

What do you mean? Your quote does exactly that, describes an infinite circular motion as impossible: "an infinite circle being an impossibility, there can be no circular motion of an infinite body". That is what he is proving here, the impossibility of an infinite circular motion. Notice in your quote: "Yet our eyes tell us that the heavens revolve in a circle". That is a fundamental principle from Plato, knowledge derived through the senses can be misleading. So when logic demonstrates that something which the senses leads us to believe, is actually impossible, then we must reject what the senses are telling us.

The accepted principle of the day, was that the orbits of the planets were eternal circular motions. This was supposed to be empirically proven, scientific knowledge. But Socratic skepticism taught us to doubt any knowledge dependent on the senses. The Copernican revolution was spawned by the revelation that the orbits were not circular, but elliptical. The slight discrepancies in timing which until then could not be figured out, were figured out to be the result of elliptical orbits, and the truth was revealed. This simple revelation made the solar system intelligible, but it had to be figured out. The first step was to reject the accepted science, that the orbits are eternal circular motions.

t is perfectly clear that Aristotle here does not object to eternal circular motion per se but only to that motion as a property of the soul, and he states in unambiguous terms that the soul causes the circular movement (without itself moving):

It is not clear [from the Timaeus account] why the heaven revolves in a circle; seeing that circular motion is neither implied by the essence of soul [of the universe] nor due to body [of the universe]: on the contrary it is rather the soul which causes the motion of the body ... (De Anima 407b)

This is precisely why Aristotle introduces the idea of "Unmoved Mover". The Unmoved Mover (God) is unmoved yet is the cause of the movement of the universe .... — Apollodorus

One big problem with your account is that the orbits of the heavens are not circular. And this idea, that they were eternal circular motions is what Aristotle was rejecting. Look at your quote, circular motion is neither implied by the soul nor by the body. We ought to conclude therefore that it is unjustified, and likely, a mistaken idea.

Do you have any other evidence to support this observation? — Paine

It's common knowledge that Aristotle's "Metaphysics" is a compilation of writings put together after his death. The part which supports the idea of eternal circular motions and the divine mind, directly contradicts what is said in "De Anima" Bk1, Ch3, where he devotes the entire chapter toward explaining why this idea, drawn from Plato's Timaeus, is unacceptable. Have you carefully read this section? It exposes and deals with the problems inherent in this conception, very explicitly.

The principal problem is the spatial representation of a "circle". Thought, Aristotle explains has a serial order, rather than a spatial order. It is evident to me, that "serial order" is based in "priority", which is substantiated by time. This is why there is a difference between cardinality (implying the spatial separation required for quantity), and ordinality (implying logical order) in modern mathematics. Therefore we must consider that "eternal", which is a description of the immaterial, relates to the material world through "time" rather than "space". (Did you read the passage from Aquinas on aeviternity which I referenced?) So the spatial representation of a circular motion, which is a material representation, is insufficient to describe an eternal being which is immaterial.

After explaining this problem, Aristotle proceeds to address the problems involved with the idea of a self-motion caused by self-thinking.

For all practical processes of thinking have limits---they all go on for the sake of something outside the process, and all theoretical processes come to a close in the same way that the phrases in speech which express processes and the results of thinking. — De Anima Bk1, Ch3, 23

Notice the reference to Plato's "the good". Aristotle expresses "the good" as "that for the sake of which". When Plato describes "the good" as that which illuminates the intelligible objects, like the sun illuminates visible objects, it is because "the good" is what directs the process of thinking which causes the intelligible objects to become intelligible (discovered). (I bring this to your attention because Appollodorus accuses me of attacking Plato rather than accepting his principles).

The entire section "De Anima" Bk1 Ch3, is a refutation of the idea that the soul is a type of motion, or even a self-moving sort of thing. Motion is a spatial conception, consisting of a body (therefore matter), space, and time. If "the soul" is to be properly understood as the cause of existence of the material body, therefore prior in time to the body, and immaterial, it cannot be represented by a concept which is a material representation.

In this passage, Plotinus seems to be ignoring the clear reference to the importance of necessity in Plato's Timaeus. Nonetheless, it does undercut the idea that the Metaphysics was advancing a view of the cosmos that the Neo-Platonists were eager to support. — Paine

The "necessity", as I see it, is the logical necessity produced by Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument, explicitly Bk9 "Meatphysics". Through this demonstration he shows that if it were ever the case that there was a pure, absolute, infinite, or eternal potential, there could never be anything actual. Something actual is required to actualize any potential, so such a pure potential could not actualize itself, and it would forever be, pure potential. Pure potential is contrary to empirical observations. What we observe is actual beings. Therefore such a pure potential is really impossible. This effectively refutes both Pythagorean idealism (because Aristotle has demonstrated the ideas to exist as potential prior to being discovered), and also materialism which assumes a prime matter (matter is defined as potential). Materialism and such idealism are one and the same in principle.

So the necessity implied, is the logically necessary actuality produced by the cosmological argument, (what we call God, as per Aquinas' five ways). It cannot be a material actuality (matter & form), because it is prior to matter, therefore an immaterial Form. It's a bit of a tricky sort of necessity to understand.
Because of its temporal base, it is not a two way street, but only one way, as the conception of dependent, or "contingent", demonstrates. An effect necessarily has a cause, and this necessity is solidly substantiated in observation. This is the nature of contingency, or contingent existence, a cause is required, as a necessity, for the existence of any contingent being. But when we take the perspective of the cause itself, adopt that position of being prior in time to the contingent thing (as the perspective of a free willing being for example), then the nature of potential allows that the contingent thing is not necessary. Therefore this "necessity" is only applicable in a backward way of looking at time.

Plotinus did not quite seem to grasp the necessity of Aristotle's cosmological argument. In my opinion, Plato actually dismissed Pythagorean idealism prior to Aristotle's cosmological argument, replacing "the One" with "the good". I discussed this extensively with Appollodorus in another thread. Appollodorus refused to accept that Plato classed "One" as a mathematical form, and placed the good as prior to all forms. Therefore we have a separation between the good and the One. Appollodorus equates these two.

In placing "the One" as the first principle, Plotinus maintains its status as an idea, and therefore a potential. The One then, is a pure, absolute potential. But this is no different from prime matter, because as much as he posits all immaterial Forms as emanating from, or proceeding from, the One, he has no first actuality. This actuality is what has been demonstrated by the cosmological argument, as the necessity which is required as the first cause. Looking backward in time this cause is a necessity. So Aquinas firmly establishes the first Form, God, as an actuality, absolving the Neo-Platonists from the misrepresentation they propagated.

This corresponds to the perfect clock present before the inflationary phase in big bang cosmology. His eternal circular motion is a related concept too. The unmoved mover is considered a person though. Considering his view on motion, he would have been a hot theoretical physicist in these days. — Raymond

You might compare the eternal circular motions to the Hartle-Hawking No Boundary proposal. It's a materialist/idealist representation which avoids the problem of having to accept a first cause to avoid infinite regress, through sophistry. It's really contradictory though, because it proposes a 'time' prior to time. So instead of going backward in time forever, we can talk of a cyclical repetition which makes the 'time' prior to time seem to dissolve into a different "time". This is the manifestation of the problem with representing the temporal concept "eternal" with a spatial representation, described by Aristotle at Bk1, Ch3, "De Anima". If time is not understood as prior to space, the problem cannot be resolved.

This only shows that you got it all backward, which explains why you think that everyone else got it backward! :smile: — Apollodorus

You obviously haven't read "De Anima" Bk1, Ch,3. I'll take your criticism seriously after you demonstrate that you've read and understood, what you are criticizing my interpretation of.

That's exactly the kind of argument that Fooloso4 would come up with. Apparently, we had to accept everything he said because he had "the degrees to show that he was right". :smile: — Apollodorus

I don't appeal to my "degrees" in my justification, I appeal to what has been written by respected authors, to justify my interpretation.

You have backed up your interpretation with nothing but more of your own baseless interpretations and opinions which, as others have noted, are pretty incoherent and make no sense. — Apollodorus

This statement completely contradicts what you have accused me of, interpreting Plato through Aristotle, and interpreting Aristotle through Aquinas. Obviously, if they were my "own baseless interpretations and opinions, your accusations that I interpret one through another, would hold no weight. So which is it that you believe? Do you think these are my own baseless interpretations? Or do you think that I interpretate through reference to others? Or is it just the case that you are irritated and incensed by the fact that I've validly demonstrated your interpretations to be off the mark, and now you have nothing but ad hominem to resort to?

As I already pointed out a few pages back (page 6), there is no reason why Aristotle’s “eternal circular motion” should be deemed less acceptable than the Christian idea of God as “an old man sitting on a throne in the sky”, for example: — Apollodorus

I've yet to come across this Christian theology which talks about “an old man sitting on a throne in the sky”. Care to provide a reference?

You chose not to answer my point (and many others) for the obvious reason that an honest and objective answer would have instantly demolished your untenable position. — Apollodorus

I didn't answer it because it's not part of any theology I've ever come across. And so I ignored it as a farce. Until you provide some respectable theology which portrays God in this way, I will continue to treat it as a totally ridiculous strawman.

The fact is that if Aristotle’s principles are “unacceptable” from a Thomist perspective, Aquinas’ principles may be equally unacceptable from other perspectives, e.g., of modern science, Marxism, or Islam. — Apollodorus

The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, in the passage I quote earlier. The reason given in that passage is that it is a spatial representation of something which is supposed to be immaterial. He also gives other reasons in that chapter, it's best if you read the entire chapter.

If you claim Aquinas' principles "may be equally unacceptable", then I'd expect you to give the reasons why. That is exactly what I did in my last post where I expressed my opinion that a particular principle stated by Aquinas appears to be wrong:

Aquinas chooses the latter on the basis of his understanding of "equality". He believed that the distinction between individual things proceeds directly from God, as matter is directly created by God. But I don't think his conclusion is sound. The reason for this, is that we need to account for the scale of higher or lower by which inequalities are judged to produce a hierarchy, higher or lower. If that scale is not related directly to God, rather than conceiving of it as relations between the various spiritual substances, then the relations become arbitrary, without a grounding principle. In other words, the "inequality" of being which proceeds directly from God, in His creation of matter, must have inherent within it, the principles for higher and lower because God as eternal, is the one principle which encompasses the whole of created being, or permanence. So the scale must be based in eternity or permanence, giving each spiritual substance a position relative to eternity, each constituting a distinct aeviternity as a mean between permanence and change, the points on the scale being each related to the overarching principle, rather than to each other.. — Metaphysician Undercover

You may call it “educated interpretation”, but I think objective observers can see it for what it is, namely anti-Platonist and anti-Aristotelian disinformation and propaganda. — Apollodorus

Say what you like, but I think it's obvious that you see my expressions as anti-Appolodorus propaganda, and that's what pisses you off.

I haven't read the article, I confess, though I've read the majority of this thread, still trying to determine whether it's worth reading. StreetlightX has pretty much convinced me that it is not. I agree with StreetlightX that a big part of the problem is that we're dealing with antiquated terms. However, unlike what Streetlight says above, I do not think that such terms die. What often happens is that once the conceptual relevance of a word becomes outdated, use of the term will continue, but move off into some realm of free, unbounded usage, where it may be used by anyone, in any way. In the case of scientific or technical terms, which have become antiquated, people will use them in the pretense of saying something important, pretending to know something which others don't, by creating confusion in the minds of others.

The word "matter" with its associated extensions, material, materialism, etc., is such a word. From Aristotle it is well defined as a representation of the unintelligible aspect of the world, "potential", that which neither is nor is not, violating the law of excluded middle. This is why the assumed reality of "matter" is fundamental to early Christian mysticism and fringe religions like Manichaeism. Western science, especially under the direction of Newton, moved to bring "matter" into the fold of intelligibility by assigning it a fundamental property, mass. Newton's laws are applicable to mass, and if mass is equated with matter, matter appears to become intelligible through the category error of making the property the thing itself. The problem though is that there is a multitude of properties, like inertia, and gravitation, which are grouped together under "mass", and the relationship between these properties remained somewhat unintelligible. So Newton had taken the unintelligibility out of "matter" rendering the word useless in its technical definition, and pushed that unintelligibility into aspect of reality more deeply hidden, more mysterious.

However, it is wrong to portray Newton as materialist. He remained fully committed to God and the reality of the immaterial. This is evident from the fact that he appealed to God as required to maintain the truth of his first law of motion. And, the nature of "force", such as gravity, as well as the relationship between light and matter (as a type of force) were maintained as immaterial. What you can see though, is that he inverted the terminology, making "matter" intelligible, and assigning unintelligible to the immaterial, "force". As a result, "matter" in its traditional use has been abandoned to float freely in random use (abuse), and the "immaterial", which had provided the foundation for intelligibility, has now been designated as unintelligible.

The fact is I wasn't talking about "unacceptable principles". — Apollodorus

I was talking about unacceptable principles. When an author whom a person respects to a great level, proposes unacceptable principles, like eternal circular motions for example, then one must dig deep within that author's work to uncover the reasons for that mistake.

You can approach this with the attitude that eternal circular motions is completely consistent with all of Aristotle's work, in which case we'd have to reject all his work as being based in an unacceptable principle, or we can look to see where this principle is inconsistent with the rest of his work, and keep the rest. Or do you happen to believe that eternal circular motions is an acceptable principle?

I was talking about your admitted method of dismissing passages from one author because they are "inconsistent" with your spurious interpretation of other passages from the same author, while disregarding the very real possibility that the cause of the "inconsistency" may lie in your faulty interpretation. — Apollodorus

The fact that I back up my so-called "spurious interpretation' with reference to other well respected philosophers, and you do not, indicates that it is more likely that your interpretation is faulty, rather than that mine is faulty. And this is exactly the problem. You imply that referencing Aristotle when explaining Plato's philosophy, and referencing Aquinas when explaining Aristotle's philosophy, a procedure which indicates a well educated interpretation, is more likely to produce a faulty interpretation than a completely uneducated reading.

Gerson shows how such misinterpretations can arise and how they can lead to passages or chapters being dismissed by those who misinterpret them. This has nothing to do with "philosophy" but with an inability (or unwillingness, in some cases) to correctly understand the authors in question. — Apollodorus

It's possible that there is a misinterpretation, but it's also possible that the author is mistaken. Therefore, we refer to other well educated philosophers to consult with their interpretations. You seem to think that it's wrong to consider the possibility that the author is mistaken, and therefore wrong to consult the interpretations of others.

More generally, you are using Aristotle to attack Plato, Aquinas to attack Plato and Aristotle, etc. This is a pattern we’ve seen before and I think we know where it is coming from .... — Apollodorus

This is nonsense, pure and simple. Each and every philosopher makes some good points and some bad points. We are all only human, and no human being can have perfection in one's philosophy. So we take the good points and we reject the bad. However, the good and the bad must be demonstrated as such, and this is called justification. That a philosopher like myself accepts the majority of another philosopher's work, yet rejects some fringe aspects, and produces demonstrations as to why these fringe aspects are inconsistent with the majority of the work, does not constitute a matter of attacking the other philosopher. It's just a realization, and acceptance of the fact, that no human being is perfect in one's philosophy. So we need to proceed with due diligence in our justifications.

he stuff the wave is made of non-local stuff that dictates the particle where to be without exchanging energy with it. — Raymond

If "the wave" is a theory which is intended to determine the probabilities of where a particle may be found, then it is not really active in causing the particle to be anywhere. And we cannot say that it is the wave that causes the particle to be where it is, because the wave is theory only. What we need to consider is what is causing the particle to be where it is. If the wave is the cause, then the energy is the property of the wave.

But if there is a wave which is active in causing the particle to be where it is, and the energy must be attributed to the wave, this leaves the particle as having no energy proper to it. Therefore the particle is non-existent during that time period when the wave is causing it to move from here to there, and it is not an acceptable representation to propose a particle being pushed by a wave.

To expound a little bit more, the question of what happens to the soul after death is premature from my perspective. It's a question which we cannot even look at, because we do not have the relevant knowledge required to even make it an intelligible question. The soul is seen as the cause of the body, in the sense of being what actualizes that potential. Therefore that question is like asking what happens to the cause, after the effect. Well, the answer is that the cause is in the past. Unfortunately, we do not have a conception of time which provides even so much as the minimum requirement toward understanding what it means to be in the past.

The closest thing we have, that I know of, is Aquinas' "aeviternal". If you read what he says about time and eternity, he distinguishes "eternity" as the measurement of being the same, "immutable", from "time" as the measurement of change. This distinction allows that we can understand an object or a being, as having both a permanence of being, as well as change annexed to it, in so far as it recedes from that permanence. In order that we can relate these two distinct types of measurement, (the logical permanence of being, or truth, having been demonstrated by Aristotle as incommensurable with change), it is necessary to posit a medium, or "mean", between them (in a similar way as Plato proposed passion or spirit as the medium between body and mind). So Aquinas proposed aeviternal as the mean, and this concept allows for the reality of, and the further development of "a point in time".

https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1010.htm

The final question in this referred section, whether there is one aeviternity or many, has important relevance. If all spiritual substances have an equality in relation to God, then each has its own distinct relation to eternity, thereby being a distinct aeviternity. But if there is a hierarchy of spiritual substances, one would be nearest to God and eternity, making that the one true aeviternity which all others are related to.

Aquinas chooses the latter on the basis of his understanding of "equality". He believed that the distinction between individual things proceeds directly from God, as matter is directly created by God. But I don't think his conclusion is sound. The reason for this, is that we need to account for the scale of higher or lower by which inequalities are judged to produce a hierarchy, higher or lower. If that scale is not related directly to God, rather than conceiving of it as relations between the various spiritual substances, then the relations become arbitrary, without a grounding principle. In other words, the "inequality" of being which proceeds directly from God, in His creation of matter, must have inherent within it, the principles for higher and lower because God as eternal, is the one principle which encompasses the whole of created being, or permanence. So the scale must be based in eternity or permanence, giving each spiritual substance a position relative to eternity, each constituting a distinct aeviternity as a mean between permanence and change, the points on the scale being each related to the overarching principle, rather than to each other..

How could the wave push the particle if it didn't have energy?

IMO it is simply wrong to dismiss whole passages and chapters as "mistakes" and to call the author "misguided". — Apollodorus

Hey, that's philosophy. When an author states unacceptable principles, we reject them, regardless of how revered the person is.


Thanks for the consideration. There are many different facets to the ideas at play here. The key principle is time. That's what validates the potential/actual distinction. Understanding the potential /actual distinction as a temporal distinction is the key point to the image I have. Notice in the passage I quoted from "De Anima" Bk1, Ch3, Aristotle rejected eternal circular motions because that was a spatial representation, whereas he said thoughts have a "serial unity". The serial order is a temporal order and the cause of the unity is something outside the order itself.

The "eternal circles" produces a conception of "eternal" which can be described as a never ending (infinite) process. But when we look to the serial order, as a temporal order, there is a need to assume something outside of time, as the cause of the temporal order. In this case "eternal" means outside of time. Metaphysically, these two are very different. And when we apprehend the need for a cause which is outside of time, we cannot avoid the need to reassess our conception of time. Being enamoured by the eternal circular motions makes us blind to that need.

The situation can be resolved by looking at the wave function realistically. Considering it to be made up of waving stuff pushing the particle along within its confines. — Raymond

I don't think this would work. The "waving stuff" would be transmitting energy from A to B, and also the moving particle would transmit energy from A to B, so way too much energy would be moving between A and B, violating the conservation of energy law.

But how do you visual observe this? — Raymond

A rainbow, a prism. This phenomena is explained with reference to waves.

I have been disagreeing with your interpretation of its purpose in the text. It doesn't match what Aristotle says later in De Anima. You discredit references to cosmology outside the book where the differences between actuality and potentiality are discussed in detail in relation to first causes. — Paine

You are simply refusing to accept the facts of what is written, and the logical conclusion derived from them. I've addressed what is said "later in De Anima". And, I've addressed what has been stated in cosmology "outside the book where the differences between actuality and potentiality are discussed in detail in relation to first causes".

So, I'll recap below, (1) what is said at the disputed reference. (2) What is said later in De Anima. And (3) what is said in cosmology outside the book:

1) Aristotle discredits the Platonic idea of a mind soul, which is supposed to an eternal circular motion of a mind thinking of itself, "De Anima" Bk1 Ch3. The basis of this dismissal is that the proposed sort of actuality, a circular motion, is not properly non-spatial, and therefore cannot adequately represent an immaterial substance.

2) The human mind is described as a potential, both prior to learning, and after learning. "De Anima" Bk3, Ch4, 429b 5-9.

3) No potential is eternal. "Metaphysics" Bk9, Ch8: "But (b) actuality is prior in a stricter sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal thing exists potentially. The reason is this. ..." 1050b 7

How has this transfer been seen seen then? Light moving through a bottle with liquid? — Raymond

That light transmits as waves is evident from the visual observation of refraction.

As for your dogmatic insistence on reading Plato and Aristotle through Aquinas, what can I say? — Apollodorus

So, when we discussed Plato you derided me for interpreting Plato through an Aristotelian perspective. Now we discuss Aristotle, and my interpretation of Aristotle is what you call "through Aquinas". Let's just call it what it is, 'my perspective'. And the fact is that I've read a lot of material from many great philosophers, and I do not rely on one only, to produce my metaphysical perspective.

What is good here is that there is a lot of diversity of thought on what the 'truth' is. As you may have discovered if you have read some of this thread there is questioning of science rather simply people being blinded and mystified by its power. — Jack Cummins

A significant way, in which science loses track of the truth, is that the scientific mind neglects, or even outright denies the importance of the individual. This has occurred as a very complex process, but we see first the trend toward understanding everything, even the actions of individual human beings, through universal formulae. Then, evolutionary theory has replaced the will to survive, which is evident in the individual, with a fictional survival of the species; the "individual" now being an individual species. But you can see how the will to survive cannot be logical transferred to a will of the species to survive. The desire of the individual to survive is expressed in ideas about an immortal soul, not in the longevity of the human species.

To make matters worse, mathematical axioms have been formulated which allow an interpretation which provides that if two things are equal they are actually the same thing. That's an interpretation of the law of identity which involves an inversion fallacy. The law of identity would allow that one and the same thing is equal to itself, but not necessarily that two equal things are the same thing. So we now lose the law of identity as fundamental to logic, and the principle which dictates the reality of a particular, individual, inanimate object is obscured to us. Therefore we have physicists who see a quantum of energy emitted here, and a quantum of energy absorbed over there, who insist that because these are equal amounts of energy they must be "the same photon", without being able to demonstrate the continued existence of said "photon" in the meantime.

"But all that can be made out of the elements of a quantum is a quantum, not a substance." Aristotle On the Soul Bk1, Ch5, 410a, 21

These mistakes in science lead to contradictory metaphysical principles by those who insist that science is the be all and end all of knowledge. A common expression of one such contradiction is a principle of pragmatism, stated something like "a difference which doesn't make a difference". You can see how this somewhat common philosophical expression is actually contradictory, because in order for someone to apprehend something as "a difference", it is necessary that it has already made a difference.

As for your dogmatic insistence on reading Plato and Aristotle through Aquinas, what can I say? Plato lived from 428 to 348 BC. Aquinas lived from 1225 to 1274 AD, i.e., more than a millennium and a half after Plato. It is absurd to claim that ancient readers of Plato and Aristotle were ignorant of what they were reading and had to wait more than fifteen centuries for Aquinas to tell them! — Apollodorus

And you live in 2022. Why should I listen to anything you say about these ancient writers then?

If this is Aristotle's intention, why is it placed in Book 1 of De Anima, devoted to the criticism of his predecessors' views of the soul, and not in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics, where the immovable mover is shown to be the first principle of all? In chapter 6 of the same book, Aristotle approaches the models of his predecessors with this observation (1071b12): "So there is no gain even if we posit eternal substances, like those who posit the Forms, unless there is in them a principle which can cause a change" (translated by H.G. Apostle). On this basis, Aristotle says: — Paine

I don't see your point. The nature of the soul, and its relation to mind is exactly what Aristotle is discussing at this point in De Anima Bk1. I gave you the quote. His discussion of the 'mind soul' and his dismissal of that idea of a self-moved, eternal circular motion, goes on for about three pages. He very clearly discredits this idea in a number of ways. It's right there for you to read, but you'd prefer to ignore it.

The text called "Metaphysics" consists of a scattered bunch of writings put together by others, long after Aristotle's death. That's why I said, it's debatable as to whether Book Lambda was actually even written by Aristotle. Some conclude it was written by an unknown Neo-Platonist. This is probably because it is inconsistent with Aristotle's dismissal of this Platonist principle, in "De Anima", at the point of my reference, and "De Anima" is known to be Aristotle's work, while this debated idea is clearly a Platonist principle.

The separation you are calling for also makes it difficult to understand De Anima, Book 3, Chapter 4. In that chapter, the role of the intellect, as expressed in certain kinds of souls, is presented side by side with the view of an activity not conditioned by that role. — Paine

Yes, this is the difficult part. Notice here that mind is potentially anything, but not actually anything until after it thinks. 429a,24 & 429b,31. But even after the man becomes a man of science, and the mind has thought a set of possible objects, such that the man can now exercise that power, "its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind too is then able to think itself." 428b 8-9. So even after learning, the mind is still described as a "potential".

Now we know that in Aristotle's physics, what has the characteristic of potential, is matter. And at "De Anima" Bk3, Ch4, he is comparing the mind's activity to sensation which is explicitly described as dependent on the body. But on this page here, Aristotle states that "...the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, mind is separable from it." 429b, 4. He provides justification for this statement, and I will say that his justification is weak.

However, this point, that the power of the intellect is described as a potential is also what gave Aquinas trouble, as I said in my last post in my reply to Wayfarer, because potential is associated with matter. Aquinas as well, wanted to maintain the immateriality of the intellect, and if I remember correctly his solution was to propose a type of "potential", distinct from matter. Notice in my quoted passage from Aristotle, there is two senses of "potentiality" referred to.

The problem now, is that by Aristotle's cosmological argument, anything eternal must be actual. So even if the mind is assigned some type of potentiality other than matter, it is still excluded from the category of eternal because it is a potentiality.

The process of photons traveling in spacetime is not visible by itself (you can't enlighten them to make them visible), and in a sense all photons are virtual (so not only the ones between electrically charged particles, being the means for interaction). — Raymond

It has been very well demonstrated that light energy transmits through space, from one place to another, as a wave motion. The idea that there are photonic particles which move through space from one place to another, is a theory which is completely unsupported by empirical evidence.

I'd say blunt as in direct, not blunt as in something you smoke.

The question of how to understand the passive and active intellect is very interesting, and one I believe has never been satisfactorily answered. Aquinas wanted to hold the immateriality of the intellect, but there was a problem with the passive aspect of intellect, passivity being associated with matter. I believe he ended up proposing a passivity which is not material, to maintain the immateriality of the intellect, thus allowing for the disembodied intellect which Apollodorus clings to. Augustine has as good a representation of the human intellect as anyone, with his tripartite intellect (in comparison with the Holy Trinity). It consists of memory, reason or understanding, and will. I don't think he avoids the problem of passivity though because memory appears to be a passive aspect.

Your comments seem to imply that you are denying some basic and generally acknowledged facts. A person’s power of optic perception or sight, for example, may operate differently in different surroundings. In a prison cell, one might see some light through a small window, but outside the cell one will see the direct sun light and even its source (the sun) itself, together with all the objects it illuminates: the sky, the earth, the sea, and everything else under the sun. — Apollodorus

You, Appolodorus have opted for the belief that the intellect , or "mind" is an immaterial power. Therefore the comparison with sight, which is a power dependent on the material body, will not work for you. If you accept the belief that the human intellect is a power dependent on the material body, as I've explained, then we can make the comparison with sight. However, by doing this we forfeit the idea that a human intellect, or "mind" can continue to exist after the death of the material body.

Since you make mind distinct from sight in this way, you cannot even claim to have an understanding of Plato's cave analogy, as you leave mind as being incomparable with sight. The comparison can only be made if you understand mind as a power of the soul, just like sight, but then mind becomes dependent on the material body, just like sight. That's why the intelligible objects, as intelligible, are dependent on "the good", and not absolutely independent.

Obviously, if the soul or nous has knowledge prior to embodied existence, it must also have consciousness of that knowledge, otherwise it could have no recollection of it. — Apollodorus

You are making the mistake of equating "soul" and "mind". Making the separation between these two concepts is exactly what Aristotle spends a significant portion of De Anima doing.

To infer that is for the purpose of rejecting "the whole idea of an eternal "mind" as fundamentally incoherent" runs into the fundamental problem that Aristotle keeps referring to precisely that idea throughout his writings. — Paine

It is not a "fundamental problem", nor is it in any way strange or unusual, to refer over and over again to the idea which you are refuting or discrediting. Any idea to be rejected or refuted, must be fully exposed, and all of its weaknesses laid bare, well explained and left unprotected, in order that the idea may be properly understood, so that it may be rejected.

This we find in Plato's treatment of Pythagorean idealism. Plato draws out this form of idealism, explains the theory of participation which supports it, and in the meantime he exposes the weakness of participation. The untrained philosopher, who does not thoroughly read a significant portion of Plato's work, and perhaps along with a study of the work of Aristotle, who was a student of Plato, might think that Plato was doing what he could to support Pythagorean idealism. But this would be a mistake, not seeing that Plato, with the method of Socratic skepticism, was actually working to expose its weaknesses.

We see this in Aristotle's references to 'prime matter'. Many modern philosophers will insist that Aristotle supported the idea of 'prime matter'. But it's very clear from Bk9 of his metaphysics, in what is called the cosmological argument, that he rejects "prime matter'. And all those before him whom he has discussed as employing this idea, are dismissed as misdirected in this idea.

Now, It is clear from the passage I quoted from De Anima, that Aristotle rejects this idea of the mind moving itself through eternal circular motion. He attributes this idea of the mind moving itself to Plato's Timaeus, and he rejects it, for the reasons given in the quoted passage. The description is spatial, and that which is immaterial cannot be described in spatial terms.

But then, in Bk10-12 of Metaphysics, the same idea, circular motion of the mind, seems to be accepted. When I took a course on Aristotle's Metaphysics in university, the professor told us that it was debatable as to whether Aristotle actually wrote this part. He attributed the writing to some other (unknown) Neo-Platonist, and so we did not study it with the rest of the text.

I am not proposing a reversal of a property but observing the role of the statement in Aristotle's argument. The passage I quoted at 408b starts with "The case of the mind is different." What it is different from is the argument that started at 408a30 which distinguishes the soul from the vehicle it is in. The vehicle can move in space but that is not the soul that is moving. Regarding the experience of man, the lack of motion of the soul is put thusly: — Paine

You are neglecting the part which I quoted, which is at 407, prior to 408. Here, it is explained why "the case of the mind is different". The case of the mind is different because the mind is said to move itself, in an eternal circular motion. As such, it has no need for the soul, or psyche, as the active principle. The mind in this conception is properly independent, as self-moving. But this is the idea which Aristotle is rejecting. He wants to place the soul first, and not have the mind as independent sort of soul. If the mind is a self-moving sort of soul, then it has no need for the "soul" as Aristotle is defining, as the source of activity. That would separate "soul" in the sense of mind from "soul" in the sense of first actuality of a living body.

And it's very evident from the last line of the passage you quoted "That the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said, and if it cannot be moved at all, manifestly it cannot be moved by itself." This is clear reference to the previously explained conception of "mind" as a self-moving eternal circular motion. And it excludes thus sense of "mind" from being a soul, rendering the concept useless.

The sharp contrast between saying the nous is self-moving while the psyche is not, places the problem squarely in the wheelhouse of first philosophy while also not trespassing the causal formula Aristotle demands for 'combined' beings. — Paine

But this expresses a misunderstanding. The Platonic notion of a self-moving nous is dismissed at 407a, in the passage I quoted, and it's discredited further through 407b. So the point at 408b is that the soul does not move the body in the way proposed by the Platonists, as a self-moving mind. This leaves the question of how the soul actually moves the body as completely unanswered. And we leave Bk1 in that condition.

On the level of the cosmic order as a whole, the way that neither nous nor psyche can be made entirely the part of the other is recognized as a problem in the narrative of the Timaeus but not resolved there. Aristotle does not explain it away somewhere. — Paine

As we proceed through Bk2 and 3, an explanation is provided. This is the actual/potential division. The way that the soul moves the body is by means of the powers, which are potentials. The potentials are not naturally active, they need to be actualized. So I do not think it is the case that we consider one to be a part of the other, but they exist in this relationship which is the active/potential relationship of hylomorphism, matter/form.

With the above distinctions applied to what 'universal principles' might mean, I don't understand your last paragraph. It seems to me that you are blowing past boundaries Aristotle went to great effort to put in place. He is trying to make the question harder for us, not easier. — Paine

I don't understand this. What boundaries are you referring to? And why do think that Aristotle would want to make things more difficult for us? Do you recognize the two distinct senses of "form" in Aristotle, as I described?

Maybe I was too blunt, and I apologize for that. But I'm well informed on Aristotelian hylomorphism and it's not like what you were presenting. The problem with what you presented, concerning "sense knowledge", is that we do not ever get the form of the particular through the senses. (That's what Kant pointed to with the phenomenon/noumenon distinction.) We always get an abstracted form, and the form of the particular, complete with accidents, stays united with the material object. This is why our knowledge of particulars is always incomplete, as Kant pointed out.

hylomorphism, (from Greek hylē, “matter”; morphē, “form”), in philosophy, metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, namely, substantial form. — https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism

Well, you seem to have some kind of fixation with Aquinas. The reality, of course, is that Aquinas is a Christian who is trying hard to put his own spin on Classical authors. Plato and Aristotle are not Christians. There may be similarities, but their systems are NOT the same as Christianity. IMO it is delusional and dishonest to claim otherwise. — Apollodorus

Aquinas offers what I believe to be by far the most comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle, and possibly Plato as well, with comparison to numerous other ancient philosophers. He makes Gerson appear to be speaking from an introductory level of education. I'm sorry for being blunt, but it's rather obvious, and your comment implies that you do not notice this.

And no, there is no inconsistency in saying that the powers of disembodied nous are the same as those of embodied nous. — Apollodorus

You might assert this as many times as you like, but until you address the arguments, your assertions have no significance, impose no influence, and bear no fruit.

It is absurd to claim that embodied nous does not have these powers and only acquires them on becoming disembodied. If this were the case, (1) man wouldn't be human and not even alive, and (2) the analogy of the entombed or imprisoned soul would be nonsense and no one would speak of "release" and "liberation" as there would be nothing to release or liberate .... :smile: — Apollodorus

What you have stated there, are the features of the embodied intellect, "consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action". What is absurd is to say that an immaterial existence, eternal and immutable, has these same features.

Correlating phrases helps to spot things like contradictions, omissions, fallacies, babbling, etc. Obviously, people didn’t need reconstructions to spot these already, but it can be argued they were sort of doing reconstruction before it was called reconstructionism. At a small scale (short political discourses for example), reconstruction of discourses is basically the same as traditional analysis. — thaumasnot

I see a problem with this sort of thing, because the same word in different contexts has different meanings. So when you remove phrases from their contexts and say look, here's a contradiction, when it's really not a contradiction at all, because of the difference in context, that's being disrespectful to the author.

Great question. Logic is focused on the errors or false statements. It’s a pinpointing thing. Reconstruction makes you focus on the whole reasoning that led to the error/false statement or was built on the error/false statement. The “help” here is not in establishing that the reasoning was wrong. Logic can do that. It’s to make you appreciate how the reasoning was “constructed”. You’ll surely remark that in doing so, reconstruction uses logic, and that’s true. In that case, the “content” considered by the reconstructionist is the combination of that logic with the pseudo-scientific text. In reconstructionism, the process of defining the content is a formal step that I call “conventional medium delimitation”. It’s just a convention, not a profound statement of truth. — thaumasnot

Most reasoning is outside the formal constraints of logic, so I can see how reconstruction would be useful if it could help someone to recognize different styles of thought process. There is for example abductive reasoning, and different people have different ways for dealing with probabilities.

What I have the most difficulty with is your idea of medium delimitation. I think that the difference between what you call the medium and what I call the medium is significant, and this shows in what I say above. I would say that the medium on its own, must be considered to be completely passive, and cannot be assigned any meaning toward the piece of work. All the meaning is what has been given to it by the author. So any time that you remove a part of a narrative from its context, you cannot assign any meaning to that piece, because all its meaning is derived from its position in the narrative.

For example, there is a trend in modern TV, for a series to develop a character's personality over many episodes, even over numerous seasons. I actually find it rather boring, and unreal because I find that they'll spend an unreasonable amount of time demonstrating a person's character as being a certain way, then all of a sudden the person will start to do things right outside of one's character, seeming to undergo a significant change in character. From my perspective, I would say the person would never do something like that, the act is out of character for that person, so I see it as unrealistic, and I'm pissed off that they tricked me into thinking that the person was otherwise.

And with good editing they can even do this with "reality" shows. They show numerous, very particular types of actions, by the person, to make you think you understand the person's character. But they've actually created a false representation with crafty editing. Then all of a sudden they'll show the person doing something completely inconsistent with that, completely outside the realm of what you think that person is capable of doing, based on what they've already shown you. And this is supposed to be a filming of real life, "reality" TV.

So editing film footage for a "reality" show is like a reconstructive interpretation. And you can see how taking parts from the narrative (parts from the true narrative offered by the author, or by the complete set of footage taken in filming the "reality" show), you can very easily create a "sub-narrative" which doesn't have to be at all consistent with the true narrative. And you can very easily create a false narrative simply by removing bits and pieces from their proper context, and producing a new context with these bits and pieces.

It could be argued that it’s more interesting to see how errors are made than how a perfect scientific text is constructed. The empirical argument is that there are millions of ways of making errors, and only one way to be correct. And learning how we make errors is quite interesting, not only theoretically, but also as a lesson. So reconstruction is not primarily about finding errors, but rather about discovering reasoning patterns, and that’s a fun endeavour (hedonism). — thaumasnot

I propose that you turn this perspective around, consider that there is a vast multitude of ways to be correct, and only one way to be incorrect. There are many ways to be correct because correctness is determined in relation to the end, if the end is achieved. Notice that there is a vast variance in ends themselves, and even if we define a particular end, there can be a number of different ways to achieve it. Each of these produces a "correct" way. However, any time there is determined a "correct" way, what is inconsistent with this is often called "incorrect". But when that supposed "incorrect" way is seen to be consistent with a slightly variant end, then it is actually a correct way according to that different end. This leaves only one way to be "incorrect", and that is to be consistent with no end whatsoever. What is consistent with no end is a mistake. Therefore there is only one way to be incorrect, and that is to make a mistake.

So when we look at all the different ways that people do things, we cannot say such and such is incorrect, (eg., point to the the phrases which have been removed from context, and say there is contradiction), we look at the different ways as being different. And being different means that they were done for a different purpose, from the one which I apprehend, and this makes it appears as incorrect, to me. But if I can determine the purpose, then what seemed incorrect to me, becomes correct because I've found the proper context. And only if I can demonstrate that it is inconsistent with any possible purpose, can I say that it is an accident, a mistake, and therefore incorrect.

The stated powers the nous has in the embodied state are the same powers it has in the disembodied state. The difference consists in the wider range those same powers can find application in the disembodied state, resulting in more accurate or "true" knowledge.

This is precisely why the body-mind compound is referred to as a "prison" or "tomb", as it prevents the nous from utilizing its powers to their full potential. For the same reason, separation from body-mind is referred to as "release" or "liberation" - which obviously implies release and liberation of the power to know and other powers already belonging to the released or liberated nous: — Apollodorus

The realistic interpretation is the one offered to us by Aquinas. A separate, independent, immaterial intellect, (a divine intellect), has a superior knowledge which is completely different from the knowledge of the human intellect, which is tainted by the human intellect's dependence on the material body.

There is no "inconsistency" in this at all. — Apollodorus

There is inconsistency in saying that the intellectual power which is united with a material body, is "the same power" as the intellectual power which is immaterial, independent, separate, and not united with a material body. That's like saying that the "form" which a material object has, which is united to that material object, making it what it is, as the unique and particular material object which it is, is the same "form" which is separate from the material object, existing in the mind of the knower. Notice that these two senses of "form" are distinguished from one another by the accidentals of material existence. The material object has a "form" as a particular, and within the human mind is a "form" as a universal. A particular is not the same as a universal, therefore we cannot say that they are "the same".

In that regard, the concluding remark is not a qualification of the statements just made but the reverse. — Paine

Yes, that is the way that the overall passage, and the concluding remark seem to fit into context of BK1 in general. But the remark is made at the end of that description of the relationship between mind and soul, and this description is oddly inserted into a discussion about how the soul can be the actual cause of movement, but it cannot itself be moved. Prior to your quoted passage, in Ch3, you'll see a discussion of Plato's Timaeus, and the idea of the soul being, or causing, a circular motion.

What is at question is how does the soul move the body. Aristotle gives Plato's account from the Timaeus, of harmonic numbers, and a bending of the straight line into circles. What I quote here is the end of the paragraph where Aristotle gives Plato's account, and the beginning of the next, where he proceeds to dismiss it. Pay particular attention to how he drives a wedge between "soul" as referring to the whole, and "mind".

All this [Plato's account] implies that the movements of the soul are identified with the local movement of the heavens.

Now, in the first place, it is a mistake to say that the soul is a spatial magnitude. It is evident that Plato means the soul of the whole to be like the sort of soul which is called mind --- not like the sensitive or desiderative soul, for the movements of neither of these are circular. Now mind is one and continuous in the sense that the process of thinking is so, and thinking is identical with the thoughts which are its parts; these have a serial unity like that of number, not a unity like that of a spatial magnitude. Hence mind cannot have that kind of unity either; mind is either without parts or is continuous in some other way than that which characterizes a spatial magnitude. How indeed, if it were a spatial magnitude, could it possibly think? Will it think with any one indifferently of its parts? In this case, the 'part' must be understood either in the sense of a spatial magnitude or in the sense of a point (if a point can be called a part of a spatial magnitude). If we accept the latter alternative, the points being infinite in number, obviously the mind can never traverse them; if the former the mind must think the same thing over and over again, indeed an infinite number of times (whereas it is manifestly possible to think a thing once only). — On the Soul. 407a

Notice here that Aristotle has rejected Plato's description of the soul, as being like a "mind". Furthermore, he has rejected the whole idea of an eternal "mind" as fundamentally incoherent. To support the continuity required by the concept of "mind", the mind must either traverse an infinity of points, or think the same thing an infinite number of times. Both, as stated here, are impossible, therefore the concept of "mind" as such a continuity is incoherent. But he proceeds to discuss the possibility of mind thinking the same thing forever, as a type of circular movement, and demonstrates how this is not consistent with a description of actual thinking.

Therefore, I think that we can conclude that the closing sentence of the paragraph you quoted, is referring us back to the prior page, and this prior discussion of "mind". And, we can see that Aristotle is working to produce a concept of "soul" which is distinct from that earlier Greek concept of "mind", that he has found to be incoherent. The problem is exposed as describing the "mind", or the "soul" using spatial terms. Notice in the quoted passage that "serial unity" implies a temporal order, as the suggested replacement for "spatial magnitude".

The limits of what is possible for composite beings informs the way universal principles work on the level of causes within the cosmos. — Paine

So I believe that the reversal you propose here is quite mistaken. The difference between the knowledge which a material human being has, and the knowledge which a divine independent, separate soul is said to have, is the difference between universal forms, and particular forms. The human intellect, being deficient as united to a material body, understands through the means of universal forms. But the reality of the universe is that it exists as particulars. This marks the deficiency of the human intellect, the failure to grasp the accidentals which are proper to the uniqueness of the particulars of the universe. Aquinas proposed separate intellects, God and the angels, which being immaterial, and independent of matter, may apprehend the Forms of the particulars, complete with accidentals. He even proposed a temporal concept, "aeviternal", which serves as an intermediary between eternal and temporal, allowing for an actuality which moves the material world without itself being moved by the material world.

Therefore it is not as you suggest, "universal principles", which act as causes within the cosmos. "Universal principles" is the means by which the human intellect, a deficient intellect, being united to a material body, understands the cosmos. The true immaterial causes within the cosmos are, each and every one of them, unique and particular, and this is why each and every thing is unique and particular. And the human intellect understanding through universal forms lies trapped within this deficiency in its capacity to understand.

That's the passage Appolodorus brought up earlier. The idea of the mind as an independent substance implanted in the soul is very doubtful. And, at this point, Aristotle is discussing in what way the soul moves, and in what way it might be moved. The last line, "that the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said", seems to dismiss the idea of the mind being an independent substance implanted in the soul, which moves it.

What about the two hydrogen atoms in water. Aren't they symmetric somehow? — Raymond

I think the bonding of those atoms is actually quite complicated.

Isn't symmetry about two different things being the same? Left and right are symmetric. If you let things move to the left it's the same as making them move to the right. — Raymond

Two different things being the same is contradiction. Left and right, as principles are symmetrical, but the issue is not symmetry in theory. In practice, making something move to the left is not the same as moving it to the right.

Then the perpendicular direction is "the front", in relation to the mirror, because the mirror switches the direction front to back. You might call it right and left, but the result is the same, the right becomes the left when the mirror switches the image. And the side toward the 1 is different from the side toward the 3.

That should read as the beginning of the conflict between them. Paul's Letter to the Hebrews was an eviction notice. — Paine

It's not the beginning of the conflict because Saul was already engaged in the persecution of the followers of Jesus, stoning them to death. The conflict began before Jesus was crucified, and his crucifixion was a part of that conflict. Paul acted to end that conflict by declaring to the Jews, of whom he was one, that Jesus is in fact the Son of God.

Certainly, for Plato true knowledge is possible only in a disembodied state. — Apollodorus

There is another way to interpret this. The way I've been suggesting throughout this thread. And that is that human knowledge is necessarily deficient. The human being, as a soul united to a body, has a deficient form of knowledge, as the result of being united to a body. That is the interpretation which Aquinas gives us.

Knowledge and action, the very powers of the embodied self that determine its fate, are the same powers that define it once death has separated it from the physical body. — Apollodorus

This is inconsistent. If only a disembodied soul can obtain "true" knowledge, then the knowledge which a human being, with a material body, has, is distinctly different from the knowledge of a disembodied soul. So it's inconsistent to say that the embodied powers are " the same powers that define it once death has separated it".

But what if it has length only? Front and back are symmetric then, like the 2 facing 1 or 3. — Raymond

Where does the mirror fit then?

How do you involve complex numbers here? I'm not sure I understand. — Raymond

It was the agent's suggestion, that -2 is the mirror image of +2, which got complex numbers involved

Plotinus' mysticism was said to be impersonal, the invidual literally surrendering or loosing his/her identity in merging with the Absolute, whereas in Christianity it is supposed that personal identity is retained. — Wayfarer

I believe it was Paul who really pushed onto Christianity the idea of personal resurrection. It's in his letters or something like that, I can't remember now. But Paul (Saul) was Jewish, and was appealing to the ancient Jewish traditions for acceptance, so the more modern Greek science based principles might have been neglected by him.

Paul also strongly promoted the idea that Jesus was Son of God, rather than Son of Man as Jesus professed. It was only through this twist that the crucifixion of Jesus, by the Jews could be justified. This was the way which was revealed to Saul, as to how to produce consistency, unification between Christians and Jews, ending the continued conflict between them. He could propose both, that Jesus claimed to be Son of God, thereby justifying the crucifixion, and also that Jesus actually was Son of God, thereby supporting the Christian sect. Paul obviously had a great influence on the course of Christianity by conceiving of this unity between the Jewish and the Christians.

But we must remember that Paul was preaching to Jewish people, and so was influenced to say what they needed to hear, to produce acceptance of Christianity. This made Christianity the 'higher' religion, because it had the Son of God as its leader. But Christianity itself suffered by being overwhelmed with the ancient Jewish traditions, some of which it was trying to distance itself from. The result of the merger was that the Jewish religion seized power through application of its existing structure, taking the name from the Christians, while the 'true' Christians lost the capacity to dispel unacceptable ideology So a large portion of the more "true" Christians ('true' at that time, prior to The Church defining 'true Christian') retreated into the mysticism provided for by Greek philosophy. You can see how Augustine comes from the mystical side, rather than the structured religious (Jewish) side.

nterestingly, the "intention" or idea seems to be to destroy the symmetry. — Agent Smith

It's not to "destroy the symmetry", but simply to see it for what it has become, a tool which has limited capacity, rather than a reflection of reality. Traditionally we'd see the appearance of symmetry in nature as something beautiful. But we'd always know that any deeper analysis of the beauty would reveal discrepancies, and the appearance of perfect symmetry is just an illusion. But this in an odd way, only adds to the beauty of the natural world, and all those little discrepancies would contribute to wonder, which is the philosophical attitude.

Now the tool, symmetry in principle, has become so powerful in its mathematical applications, that we dismiss all those discrepancies as insignificant, assume that the thing which appears to be symmetrical really is symmetrical, and this kills the philosophical attitude.

t depends on how you mirror the 2. You can mirror it with a mirror perpendicular to the 2. Then the mirror image of 2 and the 2 are symmetric wrt each other. — Raymond

A mirror only creates a reflection of something, if the thing has width, so this wouldn't work.

Flat spacers claim global space is flat and thus infinite. — Raymond

Is this meant to imply that flat spacers are like flat earthers? Is space curved if there is no mass? If not, then how do you know that the curvature is not just a property of the mass and its influence on surrounding objects, like the earth and its gravity.

"Dimp stands for DIMensionless Point.
This is a new idea with a funny name that challenges all physics.
We know that photons are outside of time and distance.
My suggestion is that Dimp contains all photons.
That means Dimp contains all electromagnetic energy in a single dimensionless point.
Dimp is eternal and outside time, space, distance.
Dimp was here before the Big Bang and will be here after the Big Bang, and long after this space-time universe has ended. — universeness

If we remove time from its "fourth dimension" relationship with space, and allow that time can pass without any physical change, time becomes prior to physical existence. Then time becomes the zeroth dimension, and we have the basis for the reality of dimensionless points. There is allowed for, activity within the dimensionless point, as time does not require physical activity, and time is conceived as prior to space. When time is prior to space, we need principles to allow for the coming into being of space, as space is then something which is generated in time. This means that we must allow that space itself is not static, but changing, as the concept of spatial expansion indicates.

he lateral inversion in (vanity) mirrors accounts for the change in valence/sign: good reflected becomes bad, positive becomes negative, left becomes right, top becomes bottom ( :chin: ). — Agent Smith

No. the rotation (or change in valence) is the 180 degree turn, to be facing the other way. That the left becomes the right when the turn around occurs indicates that the representation is limperfect.

Think of it this way. The 2 has two parts because that's what "2" symbolizes. If the 2 were to turn from facing the 3, to become facing the 1, it's right part would remain its right part, and its left part remain its left part. But the mirror image is not such a turn, it is a reflection. And so the left and right do not get properly represented in the reflection because it's not a true turn, but a representation which is deficient.

When -2 is compared with +2, for symmetrical value, the deficiency is even greater, more complex, than the deficiency of the mirror image. This is evidenced by imaginary numbers. A whole system of imaginary numbers must be employed to create the illusion of symmetry. In the case of the mirror, the deficiency can be traced to the activity occurring at the medium, the mirror. In the case of the numbers, a faulty conception of zero is indicated.

Aristotle also says that the universe is created by an Intellect in conjunction with Nature: — Apollodorus

Aristotle's conception, a divine mind thinking on thinking, as the source of eternal circular motion, and the cause of heaven and earth, is demonstrably incorrect. This ought to cast doubt on his entire conception of divinity, the proposed highest good, the way that order is imposed, etc..

Plato did not make this same mistake, saying only that "the good" is the highest, and that a divinity caused the order in the universe. But you can see that Plato has a gap between "the good" as something passive, and the act itself which moves to bring into reality, the good, which is order. So Plato only avoids the problem because he didn't go far enough to properly attempt a solution. Aristotle excelled in demonstrating that the actual is necessarily prior to the passive potential, in the absolute sense.

And this is where Plotinus failed, he assigned to "the One" the nature of absolute, pure, potential, in the Platonic tradition. But he also said that the One is responsible as cause, of the manifestation of everything else. And this directly contradicts Aristotle's demonstration, showing that a pure potential cannot actualize anything. We can conclude that both Aristotle and Plotinus failed in resolving the problem raised by Plato, though Aristotle gives us better direction. But I don't think it is the direction which you have chosen to take from Aristotle.

Can't the metric of space have a symmetry? — Raymond

What I believe is that such a symmetry is imaginary, and not a true representation of space. We make up the symmetry principles, and apply them because they are very useful. But then we have to deal with what is left over, the aspects of reality which don't fit into the artificial symmetry. So if we represent space as a thing, we should consider the same principle. If we represent it as symmetrical, we ought to accept that there are aspects of it which vary from that symmetry, that we still need to describe. This is the difficult part of description, accounting for the aspects of the described thing, which do not quite fit into the parameters of the descriptive terms. So in cosmology they propose names like dark energy and dark matter to describe the features which do not fit in to their descriptive models.

What's a mirror image (to you)? — Agent Smith

We discussed this earlier in the thread. A mirror image is not a symmetry because the mirror shows the features of the left side of my body as being on the right side of my body. So when the mirror does what it does, to turn the image of my body from frontward facing to backward facing (from my perspective), it does something which makes the backward facing image of me, not perfectly symmetrical with the frontward facing image of me.

Multiplication (the operation you used) is a scale transformation and, in my humble opinion, has nothing to do with reflection symmetry unless you want to use a do/undo transformation combo. — Agent Smith

The square root of +2 differs from the square root of -2. The reality of imaginary numbers demonstrates that one is not a mirror image of the other.

A black hole has a perfect cylindrical symmetry. It exists in the real world. — Raymond

I think that is a good example of a mistaken conclusion derived from this misunderstanding of symmetry which I am talking about.

Not really, because +2X+2=4, and also -2x-2=4. So there is something asymmetrical there. But this is all irrelevant, because as I said, symmetry is just a principle we apply. So even if we stipulate that +2 and -2 are perfectly balanced, it doesn't give us the reality of the principle. Show me where -2 represents something real in the world, for example.

Identification with the highest element in man is the whole point of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy. — Apollodorus

The issue seems to be what it means to be "the highest". If we go by logical priority, the soul is the highest, as first cause of the living body, and what is required (necessary) for the activities of all the various potentials of living beings. However, we are generally inclined to place the soul, being first cause, at the base, the foundation, and we perceive the base as lower. On the other hand, you place the intellectual capacity, being the soul's ability to know itself, as the highest.

In Plato there is definitely a conflation of the soul and the intellect. Mind, as the power of reason, and soul, are often interchangeable. This is primarily because Plato had not thoroughly worked out the passive/active division. Aristotle worked out the passive (potential)/actual division, and gave "soul" a proper definition as the active cause of the living body. From this it follows that the capacities of living beings are the soul's potentials. We might ask the further question, as Aquinas does, how does an actuality (the soul) have potentials as properties.

So it really doesn't make sense for you to say that "identification with the highest element is the whole point of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy". It would be better said that a chief point in both of their philosophies was an attempt to identify the highest element, thus recognizing that the highest element had not been properly identified.

It's a principle of perfect balance, an ideal, which nothing in reality actually achieves.