I'm not clear on what you mean by "measuring assumptions." As I said to Wayfarer, if using our reasoning faculties to study our reasoning faculties is somehow viciously circular, then philosophy of mind is likewise vulnerable to such complaints, as phil of mind employs reason to study, inter alia, our reasoning faculties. — Arkady

As Wayfarer explained, the circularity is only avoided by turning to first person experience. From this perspective we can ask questions such as "what is an assumption?", or "what does it mean to make an assumption?". Do you see a difference between determining the meaning of an assumption, and making an assumption?

The study found that brain scans could detect what a subject was thinking based on the physical state of his brain. If this isn't detecting the "meaning" of thoughts (in terms of propositional content), then what would constitute such a demonstration? — Arkady

I think this passage indicates that you do not apprehend "meaning" at all. That you think "meaning" may be expressed as "propositional content" betrays this. Do you not recognize that what a given proposition means to me is not the same as what it means to you? That this is the case indicates that it is impossible to express meaning as propositional content. Consider, that what Wayfarer sees as circular, you do not see as circular. Therefore the propositions involved have a different meaning for Wayfarer than they do for you

I also warned him against conflating the study of reason with the study of reasoning (the latter is much more in the purview of cog sci or neuroscience): they are not equivalent. — Arkady

I don't know what you mean by "the study of reason". Nor do I know what you mean by "the study of reasoning". I've revisited your posts in an attempt to understand this distinction, but I haven't found it explained. Perhaps you could provide me with a description?

I can handle "perception" in this context: it's just something that happens (in me, if it's my perception). Phenomenon seems to be what gives rise to the perception. Let's question it. First, is it? If we agree that the perception was caused, then there was something that caused the perception - seems trivial enough. Let's just call that cause the phenomenon. It would appear the objective certainty transfers to the phenomenon - it is! — tim wood

I would think that the subject, being the perceiver, is the cause of the perception. The phenomenon is the perception, so it cannot be the cause of the perception because that would mean it causes itself.

Now, it is not clear to me that the phenomenon (not to be confused with perception) has a content independent of itself. — tim wood

I don't see how you separate the phenomenon from the perception, unless you are saying that the phenomenon is the content of the perception. If this is the case, then it is pointless to ask about the content of the phenomenon because you are just starting an infinite regress of "content".

To avoid this infinite regress problem, let's just make the separation by saying that the phenomenon is the content of the perception. How do you think that the content of the perception might cause the perception? It still seems more sensible to assume that the perceiver is the cause of the perception, and the content is utilized by the perceiver, in forming the perception, like we use utilize matter in creating things. The conscious mind takes the content (phenomena), and forms a perception (objects).

But none of this really makes a lot of sense, because now the phenomenon, as content, is just like a formless matter which the perceiver manipulates in creating a perception. So why not just assume that "the phenomenon" and "the perception" refer to one and the same thing? This is objects perceived, within the mind of the conscious perceiver.

I see a tree: I perceive a tree. Some phenomenon caused me to see the tree. Let's suppose that the phenomenon in question either is the tree that caused my perception, or is not the tree & etc. — tim wood

Here is the problem right here. The object, being the phenomenon, the perception, is inherently within the subject, being the perceiver. But you want to position this object outside the perceiver, as "the tree". Where do you get the principles which allow you to place the object outside the mind of the subject. As an object is how the tree appears to the subject, it is not necessarily how the tree is "in itself". It may not be as an object at all. So we cannot position the object outside of the mind of the subject, because "an object" is what the perceiver creates in the mind, in the act of perceiving.

This is the problem with "objective certainty". We want to assume that how the subject perceives the world, as "objects" is how the world really is, independent of subjects. That is what we "want", therefore we want to validate "objects" as independent from subjects. So we appeal to an inter-subjectivity as described by Cavacava, and we insist that this inter-subjectivity, agreement and convention concerning "objects", manifests as an objectivity which is independent of the subjects' minds. But all this really is, is an agreement amongst subjects concerning the objects within their minds. It does not validate objects which are external and independent from human minds. It is just agreement.

So we must reconsider true "objective certainty". Since objects are proper only to the minds of individual subjects, then "objective certainty" is that certainty which is proper to individual subjects. There has been a philosophical movement, very evident in Wittgenstein's On Certainty, to bring certainty outside of the minds of individual subjects, to make it a property of the community, the society as a whole, inter-subjective certainty. But this is not a representation of certainty at all, it is an illusion of certainty, as if certainty could be the property of an object, in the sense of "it is certain that...".. It is really merely saying that I can be certain of something because others are certain of it. But because someone else is certain of something is not good reason to be certain of it yourself. To find true objective certainty, we must understand certainty itself, and certainty is a property of individuals. To assign certainty to anything other than individual subjects is to demonstrate a misunderstanding of certainty.

There are a number of different ways that "objective" is used, and we ought not equivocate. "Objective validity" does not mean "objective certainty" because a valid argument does not necessitate that the argument is sound.

And the word "objective" is thrown around as if it adds something. But if the argument is valid, then to say that it is objectively valid adds nothing. So if you are certain, does saying that you are objectively certain add anything? It appears to me like you are saying that your certainty is a conventional certainty. Your certainty is based in convention. You are certain that what you believe is correct, because it is what other people believe. How is this any type of real certainty?

Yes, because the feeling is quite obviously not the object of the emotion. Its object is the perceived but perhaps not thematized dynamic, which reveals itself to consciousness through the feeling. — Akanthinos

There is no object though, it is an "unfocused anxiety". That is how these emotions, feelings of desire and intentionality present themselves to the conscious mind. So there is no object to be represented.

As to how theses are apprehended, at least from the point-of-view of phenomenology, it is not possible to apprehend them as anything else than objects. Their becoming available to apprehension is their constitution as objects. — Akanthinos

If phenomenology stipulates that the conscious mind cannot apprehend anything other than objects, then perhaps you ought to consider that phenomenology doesn't accurately describe the capacities of the conscious mind.

The issue, as Wayfarer explained is in the necessity of such assumptions.

The whole 'circularity' issue is this: that scientific analysis of anything whatever is based on certain axioms, presumptions, and rules. When you're dealing with the nature of reason itself, then you're actually turning around and looking at that which underlies all of those axioms and presumptions - often without actually recognising that this is what you're doing. You're treating the subject of experience as an object. — Wayfarer

If there are conditions under which using one ruler to measure another is not circular (which you concede that there are), then the act is not inherently circular. — Arkady

So you have removed the circularity of that act, of measuring one ruler with another ruler, by referring to a particular assumption. We can use "the assumption" to avoid circularity in this measuring act. Now that you understand this, we can move on to Wayfarer's concern, which I'll call the act of measuring assumptions. Let's say that we can measure an assumption by comparing it to another assumption. But this is circular. How do we remove the circularity in this case? We cannot use "the assumption" to avoid circularity because this is the very circle which we are in.

I can and on occasion do confirm what I sense by discussing it with others who either agree or disagree, and typically we come to some sort of agreement. How do you do it? — Cavacava

I agree, but the issue is how do you derive objectivity (of the object) from agreement, convention, or inter-subjectivity? A group of people might all agree that the sun rises in the morning, and sets in the evening, and therefore the sun travels around the earth each day. But how would this agreement make it objectively certain that the sun travels around the earth each day?

I rather see emotions and events of pain and physical pleasure as purely physical events which (may) inform conscious thought. — Akanthinos

Right, I agree with this. But my point is that these "feelings" do not inform conscious thought as objects. Nor does the conscious thought of an individual apprehend or represent one's own feelings as objects. They are apprehended by the conscious mind in a way like jkg20's "unfocused anxiety", rather than as objects. So this is where representationalism fails, in accounting for how the conscious thought of an individual apprehends one's own feelings.

You are proceeding from "observed phenomena" (of the subject), to conclude "observable phenomena" (of the object). Isn't this like jumping across the is/ought divide? Observed phenomena is what is, and observable phenomena is what you conclude "ought to be", based on your observations. What produces the "objective certainty", that your conclusions of what ought to be, are correct?

Not that I'm taking any sides here - but what about this unfocussed anxiety of mine? Whether or not it be self-inflicted as a result of drinking too much, it's a mental phenomenon (I presume, although perhaps it depends on definitions of terms) but doesn't seem to have an object. — jkg20

I think this is where representationalism fails, as Procrastination Tomorrow explains. All the emotions derive from vague feelings, such as your feeling of unfocussed anxiety, and the conscious mind in apprehending the feeling forms a representational object for that feeling. Consider desire, hunger for example. It starts as an uneasy feeling within, like your unfocussed anxiety. The conscious mind learns to recognize and apprehend it, assigning to it a name, making it an object, but a very general object, the desire to eat. Then in each instance of occurrence it produces an intentional object of further specificity, what will be eaten, and so you proceed to eat that item. So it is quite clear that the inner feelings begin in vague generalities, not objects of representation, and the conscious mind apprehends and manipulates these generalities to produce specific objects of intention.

One reason I have gone to the phenomenal is its objective certainty. — Cavacava

The phenomenon in itself, is objectively certain. — tim wood

Phenomenon, is by definition subjective, of the subject. I don't see how you manage to turn this around, and make the claim that it is objectively certain. Inter-subjectivity ("sharing") does not create objectivity (of the object). Human agreement does not ensure truth.

Of course. As I've twice pointed out, there's no problem using one ruler to measure another (even for calibration purposes), if we assume that one ruler has been calibrated. — Arkady

Do you recognize that the point being made is the necessity of the assumption? You say,there is nothing inherently circular, "if we assume...". Therefore I conclude that you recognize that there actually is something inherently circular about measuring one ruler with another, a circularity which is only removed by the application of that assumption.

Having said that, I don't even see an inherent circularity in using a ruler to measure another ruler in order to calibrate the measured ruler's (as opposed to the measuring ruler's) accuracy: if we have good reason to believe that the measuring ruler is well-calibrated (say, by comparing it directly against the standard unit of measurement), then we can use that to calibrate other rulers (if two rulers disagree, and we have good reason to believe that one ruler is well-calibrated, then it follows that the other ruler is probably the inaccurate one). — Arkady

Yes, this is the point. Without comparing it to "the standard unit of measurement", the measuring of the ruler's accuracy by measuring it with another ruler will lead to an infinite regress of one ruler measuring another, or a circle of rulers measuring each other. And the standard is a convention, which is an assumption of minds. So to avoid the infinite regress, or circle, we must assume as a priority, a mental property, the principle which serves as the standard or convention. To deny the priority of the standard, the principle, (which is a property of minds), is to fall into the circle, or infinite regress.

Right, it is a convention, an arbitrary assumption adopted by human minds. Circles of logic, and infinite regress of justification are avoided by referring to such conventions in mental principles.

Well, Standford is not perfect, far from it, but there are few general access online ressources with the same degree of professionalism or depth. — Akanthinos

I've found Stanford expresses a materialist bias. A search through the credentials of the editorial board explains why this is the case. Their philosophy seems to be built on science, they publish ideas supported by science. and science is based in empiricism.

If you have a better ressource, please share it with the class. I'm sure my teachers are getting tired of seeing a dozen Stanford reference in every one of my bibliographies. — Akanthinos

Of course the primary source is the preferred source, go to the library and read. But I find the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, though it's not as extensive as Stanford, has better, well rounded information on the subjects which it does address.

Stanford is your Bible? Yikes!

Again, we are not trying to calibrate or justify the reliability of a given ruler by matching it against another ruler. — Arkady

To measure a ruler with another ruler, is to calibrate or justify it's reliability by comparing it to another ruler. What else could measuring a ruler with another ruler possibly mean?

We are assuming that the ruler with which we're performing the measurement is reliable or accurate, and then using that to measure other items, including, perhaps another ruler. — Arkady

This doesn't make sense. What would be the point of measuring a ruler unless one was attempting to verify its accuracy?

But if you believe that we can reliably use rulers to measure objects why does it suddenly become problematic when said objects are other rulers? I think you have some 'splainin' to do, Lucy. — Arkady

Like I said, there is no reason to measure a ruler except to verify its accuracy. The ruler's measurement is already stated, that's the only reason it could be a ruler, it already has a stated measurement. So to measure it is to question that stated measurement.

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Calibrating one ruler by means of another may well be circular, but it doesn't follow that measuring a ruler with another ruler is circular. — Arkady

True, measuring rulers with other rulers might just lead to an infinite regress, unless you come back to a prior ruler, then it's circular.

If a prediction comes out right, or your model correctly tracks the phenomenon under investigation, then you've done your work as a scientist. — StreetlightX

This is not at all true. Thales predicted a solar eclipse. Following motions, and predicting what will be where at a future time, does not conclude the work of a scientist. The scientist's endeavour is to produce a complete understanding of the phenomenon. This attitude, that the work of science is simply to predict, is a philosophic illness, a mental laze.

The point though, is that measuring a ruler with another ruler really is circular. It is the calibration against the defined object which removes the circularity. Then the question is how reliable, for the application, is the defined unit of measurement.

They are using their minds to study the mind (indeed, what else would one use?); I see no circularity there, any more than it's circular to use rulers to measure the length of rulers. — Arkady

What you describe is a situation in which they are using their minds to study the brain, and making conclusions from this study, about the mind. To make these conclusions requires specific assumptions about the relationship between the brain and the mind. These assumptions are made by minds which are distinct from the brain being studied. Those mental assumptions are the premises upon which the conclusions are based, and these are property of the minds doing the study, not the brain being studied. Therefore the conclusions demonstrate something about the minds doing the study (the fundamental premises employed), and not the mind of the person whose brain is being studied.

BTW, it is circular to use a ruler to measure another ruler, that's why we have a defined object which constitutes the base for any measuring system. If one ruler measures another, and there is discrepancy, we ought to turn to that base definition to judge which ruler is correct. However, the base definition is merely a convention, an assumption, just like the assumptions which are required in the example above, concerning the relationship between the brain and the mind.

Nelson Goodman recognized the dependence of the objects of science on subjective construction.
“If the composition of points out of lines or of lines out of points is conventional rather than factual, points and lines themselves are no less so. ... If we say that our sample space is a combination of points, or of lines, or of regions, or a combination of combinations of points, or lines, or regions, or a combination of all these together, or is a single lump, then since none is identical with any of the rest, we are giving one among countless alternative conflicting descriptions of what the space is. And so we may regard the disagreements as not about the facts but as due to differences in the conventions-adopted in organizing or describing the space. What, then, is the neutral fact or thing described in these different terms? Neither the space (a) as an undivided whole nor (b) as a combination of everything involved in the several accounts; for (a) and (b) are but two among the various ways of organizing it. But what is it that is so organized? When we strip off as layers of convention all differences among ways of describing it, what is left? The onion is peeled down to its empty core.” — Joshs

Right, there are assumptions made about the nature of space, the nature of time, the nature of living beings, etc., which form the fundamental conventions that are used by science. These assumptions are the metaphysical principles which science relies on. When we apprehend these conventions as metaphysical principles rather than as brute facts, we see how metaphysics underlies science.

In other words, if I clone Ben 2 from Ben 1, Ben 2 should have the same psychological qualia/mindset/thinking as Ben 1, given that their brain states are similar. — LibnizMakesMeThrowMyBookAway

The problem here is that things change as time passes. Ben 1 and Ben 2 might be "the same" at the precise moment in which you make them to be 'the same" (although that is really impossible so "similar" is a better word), but with each moment of passing time their difference will increase due to the separation between them. Therefore Ben 1 and Ben 2 will never have "the same" thinking it will just be similar, and this is what we already observe between two distinct people anyway.

Yeah, thinking of language in terms of what it commits one to really is the key here. That said, I borrowed the vocabulary of commitment not from Sellars (who prefers to talk of 'uniformity of behaviour' and 'patterns of inference') but from Robert Brandom, who more or less takes Sellars' 'inferentialist semantics' and develops it. Brandom actually says that there are two modes of inference at work when using language, one of which is commitment and the other is entitlement. Saying things commits you to inferring or being able to say/do other things; and commitment in turn entitles you to saying/doing other things (If I am entitled to 'it is raining' then I am entitled to 'the streets are wet'; also, if you commit to 'it is raining', I am entitled to asking for reasons why you think so). It's a way of seeing language as a kind of contract that comes with rights (entitlements) and responsibilities (commitments). — StreetlightX

You cannot found epistemology on commitment alone. And, commitment doesn't even give us an approach to ontology. We've already learned the latter from the failings of religion, ontology cannot be supported by faith alone.

As a foundation for epistemology commitment is nothing more than an illusion. The claim of "commitment" is an attempt to negate the reality of freedom, i.e. free will, and this only enables the capacity of deception. To claim that saying "X" amounts to a particular commitment is ignorance of the possibility of deception. And to ignore the possibility of deception is to enable the power of deception.

A predicate does not denote a particular meaning, and it is not its particularity which gives it meaning. — StreetlightX

Then how would you get a particular commitment out of any particular instance of usage? The schema you present here is built on the category mistake of believing that something general, the predicate, may be reduced to something particular. But this is to deny the ambiguity of the generality of "the predicate", and to ignore the true reality that the true particularity of the predicate may only be derived from the individuality of the subject. In other words, any particular commitment implied by any instance of usage is purely personal, subjective, and cannot be properly represented as a general rule.

Our work is done! We have a reciprocal formula that can flip the parts into wholes and the wholes into parts.

This is why there is all the current fuss over holography and the dualities of string theory. Mathematically, we can demonstrate that our best theories of the small scale can be reflected on to our best theories of the large scale, and vice versa. Like particle vs field, they are two views of the same thing essentially.

As ever, only the details need to be worked out. — apokrisis

So all that fuss just concerns minor details? I don't think so. String theory is insufficient. Quantum loop gravity is insufficient. It looks more like the big picture is what is missing, not just minor details.

I think this is right, although I'm more conceptually unsteady here than with respect to predicates. Basically, Sellars develops an account of meaning in which the meaning of anything is given by it's 'functional role' in (a) language. — StreetlightX

There is a much easier, and more efficient way of dealing with the function of the predicate, and that is to make it completely subjective, an imaginary object, entirely within the subject's mind. This is completely distinct, to what you propose, as giving the predicate a functional role in something independent from the mind, called "language".

What the predicate is doing, is then seen as what the mind is doing with the predicate. It's really the proper way of looking at this issue, because the predicate is just a passive thing, an object which is not doing anything other than what it is made to do by the mind. So the mind is really the active agent which is doing something with the predicate, and the predicate is purely imaginary. Once we see the predicate in this way, it may be dissolved and replaced with "activity of the mind".

But that is the only way to actually get rid of the predicate, to replace it with activity of the mind. Allocating it to "language" doesn't do this, and therefore this is fated to failure in any attempt to understand the predicate. Attempting to understand what the predicate is doing, without reference to the mind which is doing something with the predicate is just a futile exercise.

That's not at all what Aristotle proposed. — CuddlyHedgehog

No? What did he propose then?
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One way to avoid the paradoxes is to think of a particle as a force field. There is no 'stuff' to be seen, measured or split. All there is is certain repelling and attracting properties centred at a certain point in space. — andrewk

I don't see how this would avoid the problems. Wouldn't the forces have to act within some kind of substance, like the so-called aether? If there was no such aether what would constitute spatial extension? You have proposed forces, and points of interaction, along with "space", but if there is no substance to space, then all the things we observe are just imaginary, products of our own minds, like forces and points are generally considered to be. So you've just inverted everything, saying that the substance is not the object, it is the space. In other words you describe objects as a property of the substance, space, instead of describing space (via measurements) as a property of objects.

There are only two options: objects are infinitely reducible, or there are things that are fundamental and irreducible. — Purple Pond

I think the idea that reality is composed of fundamental and irreducible particles was proven as illogical by Aristotle. But if you allow for dualism, such as Aristotle's proposed dualism between matter and form, there are more than just two options.

Evolution gave rise to life's precursors, the living emerged from the nonliving at some point. — fdrake

What do you think is the difference between "evolution" and "emergence"? Are they just two different words which refer to one and the same thing? Is evolution a special type of emergence?

Then what makes the ID example different to the lottery ticket example? We're justified in believing that the ID isn't fake because the probability that it is is high, but we're not justified in believing that the lottery ticket won't win even though the probability that it will is high? — Michael

The ID example is different from the lottery example. One consists purely of odds, the other there is a person and ID to be judged. What justifies "the person is over 18" is the time of birth until now. Strictly speaking, the ID does not justify, it's a substitute, a representation of the time of birth, which serves the purpose, in practise.

The criteria for justification is specific to the particular situation at hand, and the person judging, and that is why I could not answer creativesoul's request for the criteria for justification. You use the ID, and appeal to the "odds" that it is correct, in an attempt to justify your claim to the time of birth, just like you use odds in your attempt to justify your claim to "this ticket will not win". Whether or not your claim is actually justified is a matter of the discretion of those who judge your argument. But there is more to judging ID than an appeal to odds, and since you have not produced the person, and the ID, so that we can judge the authenticity, we cannot judge your justification on this matter. We are familiar with the odds in lotteries, and some participants here think that your claim "this ticket will not win" is justified, I do not. All you demonstrate here is a difference between those who buy lottery tickets and those who do not.

Language is a property of living beings, just like any of the various other properties. You can separate the property from the beings who possess the property, and view its evolution as "non-organic", but that's just a category mistake. Looking at the artificial as if there is no artificer, to premise that the artificial is natural is to commit such a falsity.

There are different degrees of certainty which are appropriate for the different fields of study. Aristotle explained this in his Nicomachean Ethics. Theoretical knowledge requires a higher degree of certainty than practical knowledge. What is being discussed in this thread is knowledge in theory, justified true belief. When you bring an example such as you have, saying I would be justified in believing X, in Z situation, you conflate practise with theory. You, knowing X, in Z situation, is an instance of practical knowledge, when justified true belief is concerned with knowledge in theory, epistemology.

The problem with introducing examples of practise into theory is that theory does not deal with the particularities of the various situations. You can never specify all the particulars of a situation of practise, in a theory. So in reality you cannot claim to be justified in your belief that the person is over 18, just because they showed you ID. The ID might be clearly fake, or the person might be a 5 year old with an older person's ID. Such examples, which attempt to introduce practise into theory are just examples of category mistake.

Perhaps the real issue of this thread is a failure to distinguish between knowing-how (practical knowledge), and knowing-that (theoretical knowledge). Such a failure will lead to the conclusion that there is no such thing as certainty because the skeptic can always find an example to make mistake possible.

Let's say that 100 people have each picked out a ball. Given the high odds, I am justified in believing that Person 1 doesn't have the black ball. — Michael

Because you cannot rule out the possibility that any of these people have the ball you are not justified in believing that any one of them doesn't have the ball. Until you rule out the possibility that X is the case you are not justified in believing X is not the case. The justified belief is X is probably not the case. Likewise, with the lottery, if one has a ticket, the belief that this person will not win is not justified. That's why people buy tickets, the belief "I will not win" is not justified despite the low odds. However, "I will probably not win is justified".

Interestingly, both "idealist" and "materialist" philosophies tend to say that the "first cause" (or "first principle") is something that is "simple", has infinite potentialities etc. — boundless

What the cosmological argument shows is that "infinite potentialities" (as infinite possibility) is physically impossible. Whatever has actual existence, at any given time, will limit the possibilities, such that "infinite possibility" implies that there is nothing actual. Because something actual is required to actualize any particular possibility, then if there ever was infinite possibility there would always be infinite possibility, and therefore nothing actual would exist ever. Since we observe that there is actual existence then it is impossible that there ever was infinite possibility.

"Many Worlds" has the means to avoid the cosmological argument (or is a manifestation of the disregard for it) by claiming that what we perceive as "the world" is just one of many possible worlds. But the fundamental problem with this is that we must adhere to this designation, and the logic of "possible worlds". And this means that we cannot declare any world as the "actual world". Each world is equally a possible world and there can be nothing to distinguish one world from another as the actual world. If we try to declare one world as the actual world, we step outside the boundaries of what is permitted by the logic. So we would have to refer to some other principle, something extra-worldly as that which distinguishes the actual world. Now we've just put ourselves back to Rene Descartes' position. What principle is going to ensure us, that the world we live in is "a real world"? So all we have is "my being", "my existence", "I am", to validate "my world". Therefore Many Worlds is inherently solipsistic because there are no principles whereby my world ought to be the same world as your world.

Anyway, Aristotle's argument is sound. — boundless

It's unusual that a scientifically minded individual would say that the cosmological argument is sound. It is generally framed in a theist/atheist argument where the scientifically minded person would take the atheist perspective. The problem is that the atheist is prone to denying the argument simply because it is used to support the theist position. Therefore instead of acting to properly understand the principles involved, and the force of the argument which is consequent upon understanding, the atheist will expend all sorts of energy attempting to dismiss the principles as unsound.

If it is true, then a "double-aspect" is heavily implied. — boundless

The "double-aspect" is a duality of "actual" existence. Forms of existence are describable states, which are assumed to have actual existence. This is the basis for logic, what is and is not. "Becoming" falls between the cracks of actual existence, so it is described as potential, the potential for this or that state of existence to follow what actually is right now. However, "becoming" is itself understood to be an activity, so this activity must be accounted for by something actual. Thus we have two distinct actualities, what actually "is", and what is active. Without employing this second actuality "becoming" appears to be infinite potential. Infinite potential is impossible, so we must, according to the cosmological argument assign a second type of actuality to account for activity itself.

In Aristotelian philosophy "form" refers to what is actual. We get a glimpse of this second type of form in his biology, as the soul. The primary definition of "soul" is as the actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This body is an active body, and the form here, the soul, is responsible for the activities (becoming) of the body. So in his biology, the describable states, forms of being are referred to as the potencies of the soul, and the soul itself is the principle of activity which is required to actualize the various potencies.

In this theory, free-will seems well explained. — boundless

Free will is well explained because it is taken as a premise, something concluded from observation, that human beings interfere in natural processes creating artificial things. Human activity is what necessitates the concept of "potential", that there is a multiplicity of possible states to follow any current state. And when we assume the reality of potential, what may or may not be, we need to allow exceptions to the fundamental laws of logic, referring to moral laws instead.

In your view the universe had a beginning? I agree that speaking about something "before time" is illogical ("before" is a temporal relation and outside time speaking of "before" or "after" is meaningless), but at the same time, to me it seems that this model requires that time had no "beginning" due to the fact that potentialities and actualities cannot be separated. — boundless

The point is not necessarily that the universe had a beginning, it's more like facing the fact that there are aspects of reality which are outside of our conception of time. So if "the universe" is restricted to temporal existence, (as we define time), then there are things outside the universe, things outside of time. If there are things outside of time, and temporal existence defines the universe, then it appears like the universe had a beginning. But in my mind, to say that there are things outside the universe is to speak contradiction, and so I conclude that our conception of time is faulty because it forces on us the contrary notion of something prior to time.

Imagine a point which is supposed to mark the beginning of time. At this point, there is only future and no past. In relation to temporal existence, this implies infinite possibility and nothing actual. There are numerous ways to demonstrate that this is a faulty principle. First, the notions of future and past are derived from the activity of time passing. At this point, there would be no time passing, as there is no past, and therefore to even use "future" and "past" in this context is invalid. Second, at this point, we need time to begin passing, so this is the "necessary cause" the "eternal actuality", which is external to the temporal universe and is implied by the cosmological argument.

But what the cosmological argument really does is demonstrate that our concept of time is inadequate for describing all of reality. There are parts of reality which are non-temporal according to our concept of time. But these parts have causal influence, so we can infer that they are in some way "temporal". Therefore we can conclude that our concept of time is in some way a misconception, and needs to be reconceived to bring these apparently "non-temporal" aspects into relation with the temporal.

This is not a new endeavour, it is what Plato grappled with in The Timaeus, and was taken up by the Neo-Platonists and earlier Christian theologians. Once we see the reality of that which is outside of time, we give it a name, the eternal. However, the eternal must have relations with the temporal or else we would not be able to see its existence. So the enterprising metaphysician is tasked with determining this relationship between the eternal and the temporal. My understanding is that our concept of time falls short, creating this separation between what is temporal and what is eternal. "Eternal", meaning outside of time, only refers to something real because our concept of time doesn't extend far enough to include those things which appear as being outside of time.

Just for curiosity: do you know online sources that explain well the cosmological argument of Aristotle? I am very curious to learn about his philosophy after this discussion :grin: — boundless

I haven't found a good presentation of Aristotle's cosmological argument online. it's very misunderstood and presented through various different lenses. The problem is that it's not well formulated by him in the first place, so it is left to others to pick and choose which statements to reproduce. The key aspects I find are in Bk.9 of his Metaphysics. A good, probably the best, re-formulation is that of Aquinas, in his Five Ways. I think it's Way #3. But even this is a re-presentation, from a Neo-Platonist, Christian perspective.

What Aristotle concludes is that anything eternal must be actual. He uses this to refute Platonic (Pythagorean) Idealism which assumes that human ideas, mathematics and geometry, are eternal. He shows that human ideas are "discovered", made actual, by the human mind, so if they exist prior to this they are of the nature of potential. He then proceeds to posit the idea of "unmoved mover" which is formulated as a perfectly circular motion. Because the perfect circle cannot have a beginning or an end (similar to the Hawking "no-boundary"), the circular motion is eternal. The Aristotelian proposal is defective though, so the Neo-Platonists just go on to assume eternal Forms which are actual. This produces a separation between human ideas which are potentials, and actual divine Forms, which are property of the divine mind, in Christian theology.

Aquinas has developed a quite complex concept of time. He introduces the concept of "aeviternal", which serves to differentiate between the two directions of time, looking backward, and proceeding forward. These two ought to be properly distinguished. Remember, the goal at that time was to produce a concept of time which related the eternal to the temporal. In the realm of the aeviternal are the angels, which are created at a point in time, as time has already passed, but live indefinitely into the future.

There is a way of ;looking at time implied here, which sees temporal existence as completely in the past. Instead of extending time equally to past and future, as we commonly do, we can say that only the past has real temporal existence, the future has not yet come to be temporally. The past is always being extended, all the time, and things come into existence at any moment of the present, and proceed with temporal extension. To account for things coming into existence, we look toward the future, they must come "out of the future". If, on the future side, there is a being like us, which always remains in the future (like we always remain at the present), never slipping into the past, then that being is always outside of time, eternal, always remaining ahead of the present, never coming into view at the present as it would if it slipped into the past. We have no way of understanding any activity of that being, because it is outside of what we know as time. It is eternal because it never slips past our view at the present, into the past. However the actions of that being could create things which slip into the past, come into view in our temporal existence.

Anyway, thank you very much for the interesting discussion we had so far :blush: ... and thanks in advance for the reply! — boundless

Well it's been a long process, we might take a break it up again on a later thread. You've been quite attentive to listen to some very unconventional ideas, demonstrating that you actually take the time to understand. I appreciate that. As you say, we are not at a position to produce any scientific theory but we may find a way in if we could carefully analyze and compare wave features. There are probably aspects of wave phenomena which are veiled by the Fourier uncertainty.

No. Do you think that being wrong could be reasonable? Isn't this how we define "unreasonable", as wrong? I think so. And if unreasonable is wrong, then how could wrong be reasonable? To say that something which is wrong is reasonable is simply contradictory. By designating it as "wrong" you are declaring it unreasonable.

Let's start there. How do you know the premise isn't false? — Srap Tasmaner

That's irrelevant, what I'm talking about is when one believes that the premise is false, and also that the conclusion drawn from it is justified. Look at the op. Gettier believes that a person has a false belief, belief (a), from which a conclusion is drawn, belief (b). It is stated (1), that belief (b) is justified. My claim is that it is impossible to believe that a conclusion drawn from a belief which is believed to be false, is a justified conclusion. An unsound argument is not justifiable. Therefore the proposition (1) is nothing better than irrational nonsense at the best, or outright deception at the worst.

The word "justified" is really not particularly important here -- you can substitute any epistemic virtue you like. What Gettier discovered is that if we assume, what seems reasonable, that material implication preserves epistemic virtue in much the same way it preserves truth, then it is trivial to construct counterexamples where our intuition is that the conclusion is not known even though it is believed, true, and has whatever virtue it inherited from the premise (that it is reasonable, rationally believed, that we have warrant to believe it, that we are justified in believing it, whatever). What the conclusion doesn't inherit from the premise is truth -- that it usually gets somewhere else. — Srap Tasmaner

I think you'll have to lay out for me what you mean by "material implication". In any case, you don't seem to be getting at the point here. The issue is not the relationship between truth and epistemic virtue, it concerns the relationship between falsity and epistemic virtue.

In the Gettier literature this is the "no false lemmas" view, I believe. So you would say that material implication only preserves epistemic virtue when the premise is true. I'm inclined to disagree. If I have good reason to believe my keys are in the kitchen, then I have good reason to believe they're in my house. If I can't say that sort of thing, of what use is material implication? — Srap Tasmaner

Again, this does not address the point. It is implied by the op, that Gettier believes that a particular argument is an unsound argument (having a false premise), and he also believes that the conclusion of this argument is a justified conclusion. This is what I see as irrational. If you recognize that the argument uses an incorrect premise, you cannot recognize the conclusion as justified. Your example of a conditional is irrelevant because it doesn't utilize a false premise.

But "potential" has some causal role in change or is merely a substratum? I mean, we observe acts, i.e. changing forms. We assume that there is a "potential" to take into account change to avoid the intermediate "what is" paradox and we call "matter" this "potential".
So, the above question can be rephrased as: are "changing forms" simply an "expression" of "what persists", i.e. matter? If this is true, then I agree with you that this "matter" must be something that in itself has almost no "properties" - hence it is "formless". The property it has is that it can be actualized in all possible "forms". — boundless

The issue with "potential" gets more complicated with Aristotle's cosmological argument. The argument is that no potential can be eternal, therefore there must be an actuality which is prior to all potential. This is how Aristotle denies the reality of "prime matter", potentiality without any actuality (what is sometimes called the eternal flux of the infinite apeiron). A boundless potential denies any actuality, and therefore could not actualize itself. If such an infinite potential ever existed, it would always exist, and therefore there could not ever be anything actually existing. But this is contrary to what we observe, which is the actual existence of forms. So we must deny the reality of infinite potential, assuming that there is always actuality which is prior to and therefore limits any potential.

Understanding this cosmological argument can have a great influence over the way that one understands time. Suppose that the passage of time is understood by us through the analysis of changing forms. The passage of time, in conception, is tied to and bound by the changes in actually existing forms. But we also learn from our understanding of free will and such things that the potential for any actual form precedes its actual existence. This is how ethical determinism is denied, we allow that a form of actual existence comes from the potential for that existence. So any actual state of existence, at a particular point in time, doesn't necessitate the next state, there is the potential for a multiplicity of next states.

If we apply this to our understanding of time, we see that this understanding is incomplete because the conception of time is produced from the changing forms, but we have determined the logical necessity for a "potential" which is "prior to" the changing forms. Our concept of time cannot grasp this potential, because it is prior to the changing forms, upon which the concept of time is based. The idea of something prior to time is irrational and contradictory. Now we bring in the cosmological argument which states that this "potential" cannot refer to anything real and therefore cannot account for the real existence of the changing forms, unless it is soundly based in something actual. So we must find the means to give actual existence to the potential, in order to bring it into the realm of intelligibility (potential, as it is, defies the fundamental principles of logic).

What I infer from this is that we need to extend our concept of time, to establish a relationship between the actuality of changing forms, and the actuality which is prior to the potential for changing forms. Our concept of time stymies us because the idea of something prior to time is contradictory. But the concept of time doesn't extend beyond the changing forms, and this is what is necessary to allow for the potential for change. The potential for change is prior to the changing forms, and therefore outside of "time" as presently conceived. So we must extend "recreate" the concept of time to allow for the potential for change, which is now outside of time. "Potential" itself doesn't give us anything to base a concept of time in, because it can refer only to the passing of time which is the potential for change, and this produces nothing but infinite possibility. So we must turn to the actuality which is behind this potential, to restrict what appears as infinite potential, determine what the passing of time actually is, in order to relate the changing forms to the underlying actuality, thereby expanding the conception of time in a real way.

...And therefore we need to introduce the distinction between the "potential" and the "actual" into two dfferent spaces. So, in fact, maybe it can be said that SR tends to consider only an aspect of reality, i.e. "pure energy". But in fact if we want to really understand the nature of time, we need to consider both "aspects".

So, if we do not consider the "positive" space then we will conclude that "time does not exist". But, time in fact, contrary to what many physicists think, might be real, after all — boundless

Right, the two different spaces account for the two distinct actualities. Without distinguishing between them they are conflated and produce the appearance of infinite possibility, or potential. There is nothing actual which "the passing of time" refers to, so it appears as infinite potential. What the cosmological argument teaches us is that "infinite potential" is an unintelligible concept which renders metaphysics and ontology as incomprehensible. Idealists and materialists alike get drawn into the trap of infinite potential as Aristotle demonstrated. The cosmological argument refutes Pythagorean (Platonic) Idealism, in which human ideas are said to be eternal, by showing the true nature of these ideas as having the characteristic of potential, and it also refutes Anaximander's materialism which refers to an eternal chaos, or "aperion", which is matter, or potential.

There's always a possibility of being wrong, so can you claim that your belief is justified if that claim isn't justified? Then you couldn't make that claim. In your belief, you can't have an idea that can't be justified and be justified in making the claim that it is justified simply as the belief justified by the justification is believed to be justified. — BlueBanana

It's not the claim "this is justified" which makes a belief justified, it's to demonstrate the correctness of the belief to others and have them agree with the demonstration, as correct, which makes it a justified belief. One's claim that a belief is justified or not, is meaningless and irrelevant except in arguments of whether or not the belief has been justified. But anyone can claim any belief as justified, so I don't see your point.

Responses to Gettier along the lines of, "Well, he had a false belief -- garbage in, garbage out," rather miss the point, I think. Do we allow falsehoods to have real connections? Traditional logic says yes, valid but unsound, But how can this be? If our reasoning mirrors the rationality of the universe, those connections must also be only seemings, conditionals that cannot ever be perfected, for there is no truth underlying them. — Srap Tasmaner

The issue I take against Gettier is that he seems to be arguing that an unsound (because it's based in a false premise) conclusion, may be a justified conclusion. I think that's contradictory nonsense. If you can honestly state that the conclusion is unsound then you cannot honestly state that it is a justified conclusion.

I rest my case. — creativesoul

You could probably state such criteria, but you've already demonstrated that you'd be wrong. I prefer to maintain integrity, not insisting on the correctness of something already proven to be wrong.

It's a soundness/validity kind of thing. Reasons that actually support the conclusion, if imperfectly, are what we want, not just any old stuff.

We distinguish between how well a claim supports a conclusion and whether that claim is itself factual.

Do you not understand the distinction, or do you reject it for some reason? — Srap Tasmaner

That tells me nothing. What we're talking about is falsities which support the conclusion. If someone is going to use a falsity to support a conclusion, they''ll probably use one which supports it well.

So we can never state that any belief is justified or reasonable because we can't be sure about hwhether they are true or not? — BlueBanana

Why would you say that? We can always make those claims, and often do. What I am saying is that if one makes such a claim, and is later proven wrong, then that person ought to admit to having been wrong, admit that the belief was unreasonable and unjustified, instead of trying to claim that the wrong belief really was "justified" or "reasonable", supported by other wrong beliefs. Such a failure to admit to having been wrong creates contradiction in what is meant by "reasonable" and "justified", and this allows deception to be reasonable and justified.