I think you are hoping to evade my point. If your need is food and you haven't got the option of being particular, then any item will do just as well. — apokrisis

That doesn't avoid my point. You still must choose something particular before you can eat. So you still must go through that process of transforming the general feeling of hunger, to the desire for something particular.

It isn't necessary at all. — apokrisis

You haven't produced any argument, just this assertion. If it's not necessary, then explain how a person goes from the general condition of being hungry, to the circumstances of eating something particular, without going through a process which transforms this general desire, similar to what I describe.

It seems like your claim is that people just eat particular things, out of habit, without ever having that general feeling of hunger, and then this general feeling of hunger develops out of a deprivation of the habit. Is that the point you are arguing?

In the general what? — apokrisis

It starts in a general feeling. The desire for food, like any other desire, is a general feeling of discomfort, a lacking, a feeling of dissatisfaction. The concept of suffering, which is a broad term, referring to many different types of deprivation, is derived from this general feeling. It is often very difficult to distinguish the particulars of the suffering, as is the case in many forms of mental illness.

How is a choice of the particular thing of the ham sandwich, given the variety of options in your fridge, a necessary expression of your general desire of your feeling hungry and so wanting an answer to that in the form of food? — apokrisis

That is not what I said. You are reversing the necessity here. What I said is that the general feeling is necessarily prior to the particular choice. But there is no reason to conclude from this, that a particular choice is a "necessary expression" of the general feeling. This is why the will is free, and we have the capacity to suppress our desires and be moral beings. There is, as I've argued, a logical necessity that if there is a particular choice, the general feeling is prior to the particular choice, as the feeling is necessary to produce a choice. But a choice, following the general feeling is not necessary. And because there is no necessity of any particular choice following a general feeling, the particular choice cannot be said to be " a necessary expression" of a general desire. However, a general desire is necessary to account for any particular choice.

Also, as I've been discussing with Janus, the thing needed to relieve one from the general condition of desire, suffering, may come to a person without that person intentional seeking it, and this we attribute to luck, and chance. The reality of chance demonstrates that the relationship between the general feeling, and the particular choice, really is not a relationship of necessity, and therefore the will is in fact free.

Constraints/habits simply point to the top-down hierarchical structure of these things. Which - if you are Aristotelian - you will immediately recognise as his central metaphysical point. Food is the genus, ham sandwich is the species. And for the particular to relate to the general, it has to be either by virtue of accident or by necessity. — apokrisis

I don't recall Aristotle ever talking about a top-down hierarchical structure of things. He seemed to be more interested in getting to the bottom of things, the substance. There is no top-down hierarchical structure to his logic. There is primary substance, as the individual, particular thing, and there is secondary substance, as the species. Further there is genus. All knowledge must proceed from the thing more well known toward the less well known. All assertions, propositions, or statements, must be validated, substantiated from the bottom up. This bottom-up substantiation is our defence against the deception of pie in the sky sophistry.

2. Free will. We all know that free will is an open question. Nobody knows if we are actually free to do what we want. Right? — TheMadFool

By choosing free will we release ourselves from that complicated chain, that web of causation which you refer to in #1. No longer must we set out to analyze an immense complicated network of causes, seeking to understand the "why" of an individual's actions, because we see that this is impossible. The "why" is attributable to a free will act. And the free will act is a cause that starts a physical event, so there is no physical continuity prior to that event. Therefore that entire web of causation is completely irrelevant, and seeking the causes for the act in this web is impossible because the causes are not there..

Is that how it works? If you are really hungry, you can't afford to be too fussy. Food in general will satisfy your need. — apokrisis

I think you're missing the point. No one eats "food in general", we eat particular items. It doesn't matter whether the fridge is stocked or not, the person who has the general feeling of hunger must progress to choosing a particular item to eat, and therefore the desire for that particular item. So my criticism of your proposal remains. We cannot "start" with the habits of constraint if we want to understand this process, because these habits of constraint are particulars, while desire and want start in the general. Habits of constraint follow from particular choices which follow from the general, desire and want. So to say "It all starts with habits of constraint on degrees of freedom." is to utter a falsity. And if this is the basis of the semiotic metaphysic, then that is based in a false premise.

You defend a scholastic view of Aristotle. So already we differ strongly. Your argument from authority comes from a secondary source. — apokrisis

The Scholastics were well versed in Aristotle, as am I. That the Scholastics interpret Aristotle in a way similar to me doesn't mean that I am arguing from a secondary source. But that you interpret Aristotle in a way which strongly differs from us, indicates that you are probably not so well-read in Aristotle.

And anyway, I am basing my position on modern psychological science. — apokrisis

Well which is it? Is your notion of "final cause" based in modern psychological science, or is it based in Aristotle's description? If it is the former, then I would argue that this is not really "final cause" at all, and you are just pretending that it is compatible with Aristotle's "final cause".

Here you are going against the grain of all empiricist philosophy. — MetaphysicsNow

The division between one event and another within a causal relation is artificial, made by a mind and arbitrary. Therefore to divide an event into cause and effect in any principled way, is a division based on logic. The arguments of empiricists such as Hume, do not produce a sound conclusion that cause and effect is not a logical relation, because they just start with the assumption that an event is naturally divided into two events, one labeled "cause" and the other labeled "effect". But such dividing and labeling is just a product of the human description, so the empiricists are just begging the question.

So, for what kind of reason does the will do one or the other in any given case? Is it itself caused to do so? — MetaphysicsNow

That's a good question, and I think it will remain unknown, at least into the immediate future. The will is not itself caused to do what it does, or else it would not be free. The will starts a physical event, so it is not a matter of dividing an event, one part from another, as cause and effect, it is the matter of a physical event coming into being from a non-physical source. Exactly why the will does what it does is unknown.

Then you come bang up against the principle of sufficient reason, and leave a gaping explanatory hole in accounting for any kind of intentional action. Maybe there is a third way to respond? — MetaphysicsNow

Just because the answer to a specific question remains unknown, does not mean that there is not an answer for. So we do not necessarily bang up against the principle of sufficient reason, we just bang up against a question which human beings cannot answer. You ought not be surprised by this, and it shouldn't make you think that we are necessarily on the wrong track. There are mysteries of life which have not yet been solved.

If final cause is understood as constraint, then you have a much simpler story where determinism is just the limits imposed on chance happenings. — apokrisis

But this would not be keeping true to Aristotle's description of the four causes. Formal cause might be understood as constraint, but not final cause. Final cause is the intent, what is wanted, and this causes the person to act in a way accordingly. Final cause is associated with the freedom of the will to choose one's own actions, so constraint is contrary to final cause.

Good metaphysics is about describing the world as simply as possible. Final cause needs to be understood first at the physically basic level - as a system of constraints on degrees of freedom. Then the question is how it becomes more like what we mean by human meaningful choice due to hierarchical elaboration. — apokrisis

I don't think final cause can be understood as physical, because it is an idea, a notion of what is wanted. As such it is an immaterial object, intelligible but not sensible, having no physical existence.

How does the generalised tendency become a particular function and eventually a counterfactually-definite goal? — apokrisis

This seems like a good approach, any suggestions of how this is possible? Suppose I have a general feeling of hunger. This feeling, being completely general is not a tendency toward eating any particular food, nor could it be a desire for any particular food. As something "general", it is completely non-physical. However, I may consider physical objects which are available to me to eat, which I have sensed, and I may make a definite goal of making a particular type of sandwich. So the immaterial, and general, feeling of want, which is called "hunger", becomes the desire to eat a very specific, and particular material object, which I am now creating with my hands, the sandwich.

The advantage of the semiotic view is that it adds the least metaphysical furniture to the story. It all starts with habits of constraint on degrees of freedom. Then it adds the twist that logic - information - is also "real" here. Latent in the notion of constraint is that it can become maximally definite - as in the choices made by a switch - to the degree that the freedoms in question are themselves maximal! — apokrisis

So I think this oversimplification is not the proper approach. We cannot start "with habits of constraint on degrees of freedom", because we need to place the general feeling of desire as prior to the habit forming. The constraints of habit are produced from the individual's activities, and the activities follow from the general desire.

Firstly, I would point out that although we can certainly say that the intended goal, in this example becoming healthy, is a cause of the act of walking, we can equally say that the material (bodily) conditions and efficient processes involved in walking are causes of the act of walking. We can also say that the form of the body is a cause of the act of walking. So, all four kinds of cause are involved. — Janus

I know you can say this. You can also deny free will if you want. My point was that the necessity to consider luck and chance, follows from allowing that intention (final cause) is a real cause. So if you insist that the material body is the cause of the person walking, rather than the intent of health, and likewise in all other instances of intent, insisting that intent is not a cause, then you remove the need for luck and chance.

None of this necessitates that the intended goal be freely chosen by the walker. And I cannot see how the possibility that one could become healthy some other way, by eating well, or cycling, or lifting weights, or Tai Chi, or whatever, has anything to do with chance. — Janus

Do you understand Cavacava's example from Aristotle? When we allow that things are done with intent, we must allow that a particular action is good or bad in relation to the intended end. If it helps to bring about a desired end the action is good. If it hinders a desired end it is bad. So when we choose to act, the act is chosen because it is designated as good in relation to a desired end. The good act helps to bring about the end, and that act can only be said to be the cause of the desired end, if it is freely chosen. If it is not freely chosen there is a regress of causation, a causal chain, and the choice is not the true cause, because it is caused. Only if the act is freely chosen can it be said to be the true cause of the desired end, because otherwise there would be a chain of causation and the choice would not be the true cause.

The good act however, which is the act that brings about the desired end, may happen without being chosen. In this case we say that the desired end is brought about by chance. So it is a function of the determination of an act as good or bad, which brings about the need for "luck", and "chance". We can only say that an event is good or bad, if it is put in relation to some desired end or intent. If the event is directed toward that end, and caused to be, by a free willing agent, it is an intentional act. If it is not directed toward the end, and caused to be, by a free willing agent, it is still good or bad, but it is so by chance. If we remove the free willing agent, deny that free will is real, then we have no difference between the intentionally good act, and the act which is good by chance, because both are simply caused by a chain of efficient causes. Therefore "luck" and "chance" only make sense if one accepts free will, because it distinguishes the chosen (willed) good or bad act from the unchosen (chance) good or bad act.

The intended goal, not the efficient cause, is the cause of the act. So in Aristotle's example, the goal of "health" is the cause of the man's walking. The man is walking to be healthy. The cause of the act, walking, is therefore the freely willed choice of health, not some efficient cause.

The need for "chance" follows the acceptance of free choice, as described already. Perhaps the man becomes healthy without walking.

Even if you are correct about the connection between decision and action not being logical, I don't see how freedom of the will follows. — MetaphysicsNow

Freedom of the will follows, because if there is no logical connection between the human action and anything which could serve as the cause of the action, then there is no cause, and the will is free. The relation between cause and effect is a logical relation. If there is no logical relation, there is no cause/effect relation.

Obviously, one can decide to do something and then when the time comes to do it, you do not, but where that happens there must be a reason why, it cannot simply be that the will did not "get in on the act". That is to say that the following kind of statement is something I regard as necessarily true:
If X decided to do A at time t and if at t there are no intervening factors preventing X from doing A, then X will do A. — MetaphysicsNow

I agree with all this, but the point is the need for a separation between the decision to act, and the cause of the act. None of this dispenses that need. If "the will" refers to the cause of the action, then the will is separate from the decision, because the decision does not necessarily lead to the action, regardless of the reason. If you can show that there is always a reason, then the will is not free, but I think this is a futile adventure. It is futile, because we can demonstrate many instances when the act follows the decision immediately. In these instances, there is no other reason except the decision. However, we've already demonstrated the separation between the decision and the will, such that the act does not necessarily follow the decision immediately. So the decision is not the cause of the act because the act doesn't necessarily immediately follow the decision, yet in the case of immediate action, there is no other reason for the act but the decision.

If I understand you correctly you, on the other hand, are inclined to think that that this kind of proposition is always going to be contingent, no matter how broadly "intervening factors" is filled out, since at time t the will, as some kind of separate faculty, has to "muscle in" and initiate the act, and since the will is free, that needn't happen. (Of course, even if the will did initiate the act, there is probably still room for clumsiness and perhaps other factors to intervene and prevent the act from happening.) Is that a fair summary of our principal disagreement, or am I riding roughshod over some more subtle difference? — MetaphysicsNow

Yes, what I am saying is that there is a separation between 'the intellect" which decides the course of action, and "the will" which initiates the action, as the cause of the action. This allows that habitual actions which do not need to be decided on, are still willed actions. The issue of "clumsiness", and mistake is actually quite complicated because we have only the decided act, and the observed act, to go by. If we separate the will from the decision making, then the will doesn't necessarily follow the decisions. Therefore I may decide to do something which I cannot physically do, jump across the creek, when I don't make the other side. The intended act is a jump to the other side. The observed act is a jump part way. According to the separation, "the willed act" is the jump part way. However, now we must look to the internal mechanisms of the human being, and the real willed act, is the acts of the internal mechanisms of the human body, which cause the physical jump. So the jump part way is really just the effect of the acts of internal mechanisms, and the movement of the mechanisms is the effect of the will.

Here's something to consider though. There is always internal activity. The various different mechanisms are active and inactive, in different ways, at different times. The internal activity acts as efficient cause. "The will", as I described earlier is principally "will power", and this is the will to prevent activity. So the will itself is active preventing internal activity, and in this way the activity is focused toward the desired activity. So when I decide to jump across the creek, the will must prevent any unnecessary activity, to focus all the internal activity on the requirement for the efficient cause to make the jump. Technically, the will is not really the cause of the physical jump, in the sense of "efficient cause" all that internal activity is the efficient, cause of the jump. The will is just doing as much as it can to make the decided act a successful act, and this is to direct the available efficient causation. The will cannot guarantee success though, as in the example of failure. Therefore the will doesn't really "cause" the act itself, in the sense of efficient cause, it just influences the success or failure of the act.

Unknown unknowns:

All the things that might happen about which we have nary a clue even existing. — Bitter Crank

Actually, the category of unknown unknowns is quite difficult, and somewhat paradoxical. You can't name any unknown unknowns because that would say that they are known as unknown. Even to say that there is such a thing as unknown unknowns is to say that it is known that there are unknown unknowns and that's paradoxical.

Claiming that we can't be certain about the sun rising is posturing. Is anyone really uncertain that ice will melt a temperature greater than 0ºC? Does anyone actually think that all of the horses in the KY Derby will either break their legs before they reach the finish line, or that 3 to 20 will arrive at exactly the same moment? Does anybody believe that nothing totally unexpected will happen in the future? No, they don't. — Bitter Crank

I think the issue is whether the fact that ice will melt at temperatures above 0 degrees is really anything more than just the attitude of individuals who believe this. If this fact is reducible to just a whole bunch of people believing this, the certitude of all these individuals, then there is no such thing as "it is certain that ice will melt above 0 degrees". But if there is something independent from the individuals who believe this, which constitutes the fact that ice will melt at temperatures above 0 degrees, then we have an objective certainty. It is certain that ice will melt at temperatures above 0 zero degrees, regardless of the beliefs or certitude of any individual human beings. We use "certainty" as if it is an independent, objective thing, but maybe it's just an attitude and there is no such thing.

Trees - news to me - are apparently amazing, dynamic and engaging in behaviours often described in anthropomorphic terms. See two books, The Secret Life of Trees, The Hidden Life of Trees. — tim wood

If you read Wohlleben's "The Hidden Life of Trees", you will find that he describes all of the various activities of trees (and there's very many of them, it's a relatively long book), in terms of intention. He is clearly not using the words metaphorically. It takes a bit to get used to this way of writing, where he describes the activities very technically and scientifically, with intention thrown in on top. We don't commonly get "intention" mixed in with scientific jargon, so it takes a few chapters to get used to. However, it is very logical, very interesting, and makes very good sense to write in this way. And the amazing thing is that the critics, as much as they may reproach him, they have no argument against him because they are science minded individuals, and Wohlleben cites all the science, as supporting what he is saying.

The problem is that we use the word "certainty" to refer to things which are known as definite fact, while we use certitude to refer to the attitude of an individual being certain. I can say that It is a certainty that Donald Trump is president of the United States, and I can express the same thing as a certitude, by saying that I am certain that Donald Trump is president of the United States. The two propositions "it is certain that...", and "I am certain that..." have distinct meanings.

The op raises questions about "certainty", and if there is such a thing a certainty. If you argue to reduce all certainty to the attitude of certitude, then you argue that "certainty" as we commonly use it doesn't refer to anything real. But then the op goes on to question "uncertainty". And "uncertainty" is generally used to refer to an attitude like certitude, so it would be a mistake to represent "uncertainty" as the opposite of "certainty".

I think there is a distinction to be made between certitude, which is an attitude, and certainty, which is an undoubted fact.

In a deterministic system there are no chance events.
in a probabilistic system only the constituting (micro) events are chance (random) and there are no chance macro events.
Given human limitations of knowledge chance is thus an epistemic characteristic of macro events in both cases. — Janus

Allowing that final cause is a true cause denies determinism, in favour of free choice. You cannot have a deterministic system and final cause, they are incompatible. If we opt for the free choice system, then we have to allow for the instances when one's desires, wants, or needs are fulfilled without the person willing the act which causes this. This is luck, and chance.

In addition to the "four causes" Aristotle considered two more, which you demonstrate here, "chance" and "fortune" (or luck). He decided that "chance" could not really be a cause in any proper sense of the word, but when it is considered in relation to final cause (intention), chance can be viewed as a cause of fortune (luck). This is what the example you've provided demonstrates. If "luck" or 'fortune" is considered to be a real thing, then the only thing which could cause this is chance. So by saying fortune or luck is real, then chance becomes a real cause.

The chance meeting of the two men in the market, on its own does not cause anything. However, since there is a debt to be paid, and we allow that the chance meeting is the cause of the debt being paid, then we ought to allow that the chance meeting was for the sake of the debt being paid, in the sense of final cause. However, there was no intent by either of the individuals, so we cannot allow final cause, and we must turn to chance as the cause.

This is the very odd, and difficult to understand relation between chance and final cause. Once we take that event, the payment of the debt, which has an immaterial substance, the debt, and consider it as a real object or event, which was caused to occur, it gets placed into the immaterial realm of intent requiring final cause, purpose. However, there is no intent evident from either of the two parties, which is expressly stated by the example. Therefore we have no intent, or final cause to attribute to the occurrence of the immaterial event, the lifting of the debt, so we must turn to the physical event as the cause, which is designated as a chance occurrence.

Is there any reason to think that a plant in need of water might refuse it? — Srap Tasmaner

No, but I don't see how that's relevant to the issue of whether a plant wants water. Learning how to refuse one's wants and desires is morality, and I would not expect plants to be moral beings. I expect that plants have a reason for wanting water, but I do not expect the plant to judge a particular water as to whether it is good or bad water, prior to taking it up. Even animals must smell or taste something before they decide whether to eat it.

But there's been a deep change in the conception of the nature of reason - which is that reason has been instrumentalised, understood in terms of its adaptive or utilitarian power, as per the above. Reason no longer stands on its own two feet - and it can't, because the 'furniture of reason' has a kind of reality which today's empiricism can't admit or even comprehend. Hence, my reference to Aristotelianism. I know it’s ancient, but it’s philosophy. — Wayfarer

That quote from Horkheimer provides a good description of why I don't like "homeostasis" as a description of what living systems are doing. Through its principal descriptive term, "stability", the same principle of "adaptation" is implied. it's implied that the living system adapts toward a stable existence. But this completely neglects the evidence which we observe all around us, in the vast array of living creatures, that the living systems are actually seeking "mastery" over their environment, not equilibrium. This becomes very clear in human reasoning.

The problem I see is that people like tim want to reverse the relationship between the desire for mastery, and human reasoning, such that the desire for mastery is derived from human reason instead of vise versa. A quick glance around the animal kingdom will show this desire for mastery as prevalent, demonstrating that this reversal is wrong. Human reasoning comes from the desire for mastery. This attitude of reversal is drawn from a faulty understanding of evolution which models evolutionary changes as based in chance and adaptation, with the chance changes providing for adaptation. That completely neglects the living creature's innate desire to have mastery over its environment, which is so obvious, and well expressed by the human capacity of reasoning. Once we separate human reasoning from the desire for mastery, it becomes very evident that all the living creatures, trees included, express this desire.

I think here we might have some disagreement, since whilst I agree that making a decision and acting on one are not one and the same thing, I'm inclined to think that the connection between them is logical and not just causal. — MetaphysicsNow

I don't think I understand what you mean here when you say that the connection between the decision and the act, is logical. Let's say that deciding to do X does not force the logical conclusion that X occurs. Also, if we see that Z has occurred, there is no necessity for a decision to do Z. This is how the will is free, there may be a causal relation between a decision and an act, but that causal relation is not a necessary one. So no matter how you look at the relationship between the decision and the act, forward in time from the decision looking onward for an act, or backward, from the act, looking for a decision which caused the act, we cannot make a relationship of logical necessity, therefore the will is free.

Perhaps I'm thinking of a decision as something extended over time, with a beginning, a middle and an end. The beginning may well be something along the lines of saying something to yourself, with the end being the corresponding action. My worry is that in disconnecting decision making from action in principle is that it would then make sense to say something like: John decided to vote "Yes" but John voted "No", but without giving some story in which in becomes clear that John changed his mind. — MetaphysicsNow

I don't see that this is a problem. There are many instances where John might decide to vote "Yes", but actually vote "No". He might change his mind, as you mentioned, he might forget, as we already talked about, or he might just make a mistake in marking the ballot. Notice that even a mistaken action is a very real possibility and must be accounted for. This is another reason why we need the separation between what one decides to do, and what one actually does. And again, it's a demonstration as to why there cannot be a logical relation between the decision and the act. Whenever an individual decides to do something which one does not have the capacity to do, there will be a failure, a mistake, and the intended act will not be accomplished. The act will be other than the act decided upon. So we cannot judge from an observation of the act which occurred, to make a logical conclusion about the act which was intended. Though when the failure is an obvious failure, we can speculate about what the intended act actually was.

Agreed, and here is a curious thing: an action which is intentional and conscious (such as walking to the bank to cash a check) can, when broken down into parts in the way sketched in your comment, look like it has parts all of which are entirely non-intentional/non-conscious. I think perhaps that this kind of breaking things down into parts is to give an action a description in non-rational terms, whereas human actions are - by definition - things that also have descriptions that locate them in the rational realm of reasons/decisions/intentions and so on. The difficulty (for me at least) is to account for the connection between these descriptions without falling into the position that the rational description is illusion (eliminative materialism) or just some kind of "stance" (cf Dennett). — MetaphysicsNow

This is where I was leading with the distinction between a theoretical decision and a practical decision, the theoretical being of a general nature, and the practical being of the particular. The general decision is an overall principle which is often decided by the conscious mind, but may be instinctual, and generally refers to occurrences more distant in the future, or it may just be a guiding feature of one's personality. So going to the bank is something you decide as necessary, as a somewhat general goal. You are not necessarily going to the bank right away, it is just something you know needs to be done. At some point you decide, now is the time, and this decision is more in the practical realm, it is related to your present activities, you have time now so you decide to go. Now, all the little actions involved in this practise, going to the bank, can be designated as being carried out without conscious decision. So all these little practical decisions which involve your daily activity are not really conscious decisions at all, they are done by instincts, habits and such, though you still need to refer to guiding principles along the way. We can reduce a whole large portion of practical decisions (decisions involving your present activity) to something other than conscious decisions. This includes most communication and also most OCD activity.

So let's say that OCD activity is activity which is not really conscious decision making, but is of this lower realm of practical decisions, simple habits or something like that, which we just sort of carry out as we go along, without really thinking about them to make a decision of whether or not we should do this. If this is the case, then we ought to be able to identify the overall, general principle, the conscious decision, or instinctual tendency which all of these little parts are subservient to. In the case of going to the bank, the decision to go to the bank was the general principle. We need to consider the possibility that the general principle was never made as a conscious decision, it may be something instinctual, which is guiding these little activities. So if I am a hoarder for example, it may be my instinct (not a conscious decision) that every existing thing has a proper place. The garbage is not a proper place for anything but garbage. So if I am cleaning up, or going through things, I will habitually put each thing on a shelf, or beside another thing, in a pile, etc.. I could be doing this without questioning, or even recognizing or determining the guiding principle, that each thing has a place and the garbage is not a place for anything but garbage. That general principle, the guiding principle may be completely hidden, not evident at all, but until it is determined and addressed, the individual has no hope of preventing the practical decisions which flow from it. It's like trying to tell your feet not to walk to the bank while still having your mind made up that you are walking to the bank. That's why the OCD activity cannot be stopped simply by the person wanting to stop those particular instances of activity, the general principle which brings these particular instances on must be addressed.

I have to admit this language works, as a practical matter and as a shortcut for people always already aware of its shortcomings, although the number of people unaware and deceived by it seems large, even on this site! But it adds nothing to any understanding of what the tree does. This language will not do at all for any theoretical account of the tree's activity. Descriptive, metaphorical, convenient where the convenience is understood as such, sure. Adding to the confusion is stretching the metaphors to suggest that the metaphor has tecnical meaning - which of course as metaphor it cannot have. — tim wood

I think that this is exactly the opposite of reality. The language of intention, with words such as "want" are appropriate for this subject. It is the designating of this as metaphor, which is driving a wedge of separation between the activities of various life forms, plants and animals, that is misleading, and given to misunderstanding. There is no scientific evidence to support such a wedge of separation, which is driven by bias and superstition, while science and evidence demonstrate a close relationship rather than a division of separation.

This is language (imo) that is on the right track. The same author (I think) remarked above that the lives of trees are alien to the lives of us and animals in general. This language starts to set out that alien nature and to give some account as to what it is and how it works. — tim wood

But this is obviously false. Evolutionary theory proves that plants and animals are descendent of the same ancestry. DNA and genetics demonstrate that plants and animals are actually very closely related. To say that the lives of trees is alien to the lives of animals is simply false, unless you mean it in a sense like you would say that your life is alien to my life.

The primordial life of trees was the original topic. We never got there - or have not got there yet. Maybe it's not possible, or maybe possible only through the rigorous language of theoretical science. But certainly not possible if the only way I can understand that life is in terms of my Uncle Gilbert! — tim wood

I am not arguing, that when we discuss the lives of trees, we must of necessity, use the terms of telos or intention. It is possible to discuss many aspects of living beings without using such terminology. However, if we are discussing the reasons why a particular living being, plant are whatever, acts in one way rather than in another way, then we cannot exclude the terminology of telos or intention, or even designate it as metaphorical, without justification for this exclusion.

You seem to want to make this exclusion without justification, implying that such talk is unscientific. In reality, the exclusion which you request is what is unscientific, because it is supported by nothing other than bias, while the science demonstrates that such an exclusion is uncalled for.

Yes, it is as if that were the case. As if there was a sniffing out of all trajectories.

So the metaphysical challenge would be to understand that as a physically intelligible process. It is not saying that reality has some actual mindlike active choice. It has to be something much more deflationary in practice. — apokrisis

The "sniffing out" is an apprehension of possibilities. This is what a mind does, apprehends possibilities choosing appropriate ones. Where your approach leads you astray is in the attempt to understand this as a "physically intelligible process". The physical and the intelligible are distinct, as material and immaterial, one excluding the other, like in the example of Nous and Apeiron, one excludes the other. If your goal is to maintain these two as real, then it is necessary to produce a separation between them which allows them to interact but also maintain their separation, in order that they can each stay true to their incompatible descriptions. Then we would have the two incompatible principles, with a separation between them, allowing them each to stay true. Instead, you portray "the metaphysical challenge" as uniting them under "physical process".

We could start with Whitehead's "prehension", as the means by which the immaterial, non-physical, is related to the physical. Notice that whatever is prehended by a mind, is necessarily in the past, and this consists of actualities, actual occasions. Now we need to account for how actual occasions, the past, comes to be, from the future. Whitehead proposes the concept of "concrescence". Concrescence is an ordering of the occasions, events, which will occur at the present, being prehended as they slide into the past. For Whitehead, future events can have no physical existence, we could call them possibilities. So concrescence is a non-physical, non-temporal, ordering. The present itself, being, existing at the present provides the boundary of separation between the actual events of the past, and the possible events of the future.

This ought to provide a brief explanation why the possibilities, possible trajectories, cannot be understood as a physical process. The world in its physical form, all the physical objects of the universe, cannot have any existence prior to the moment of the present. This principle is central to eastern metaphysics (arguably the principal feature of Awakening, found in nibbana, and where Whitehead and Buddhism share principles). But instead of giving the Awakened credit for understanding this feature of reality, the western world of physicalists tends to dismiss this as a confused falsity. However, consider the existence of a physical object, like a cup on a table. A human being with a free wiling mind, and a hammer, could sit there and smash that object, annihilate it, at any moment of the present. Since this could happen at any moment, it is demonstrated that the object cannot have physical existence in the future. We could extend this general principle to include all physical objects, and conclude as Whitehead states, that there is no physical, temporal, existence in the future, and as eastern metaphysics states, that the physical world must be created anew at each moment of time.

So the principle of least action says that nature applies this limiting constraint on all material possibility. And what results is the actuality of a substantial action - some actual trajectory taken by a process or event. — apokrisis

This is problematic. What is this "nature" which is acting to constrain or limit material possibility? You have invoked a "nature" which is outside of, transcending, material existence, which can have real influence over what occurs in the material world, by choosing from possible trajectories. Why not use "nature" in the customary way, to refer to what actually happens in the material world, and call this thing which transcends the material world, and can make free choices as to what happens in the material world, what we normally call it, God. If you would just replace "nature" with "God" here, you would greatly reduce the ambiguity of your writing.

Yeah. That is addition and subtraction. Simple negation. Dichotomies are a reciprocal or inverse relation. Completely different. — apokrisis

Right, dichotomies are completely different, that's why I accused you of wantonly changing the subject. If we could get to the point of establishing the necessary boundary, separation, between the two incompatible principles which negate each other, then we might be able to present them as a dichotomy, something like what I proposed above from Whitehead's perspective. But to class the two together, unite the contradictory principles, under "physical processes", rather than providing a real separation between them, is a mistaken approach.

Who was talking about God here? Not me. That's your bag. — apokrisis

Call it "nature", or call it "God", if it bears the same description, we're talking about the same thing under a different name. But you are in the wrong here, because you have no convention which allows you to say that "nature" transcends material existence, as you do. So you ought to relinquish such misleading use of terms.

You are talking about two incompatible things. I'm talking about two complementary limits.

A dichotomy is logically that which is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. So Apeiron and Nous would have to "exist" as the inverse or reciprocal of each other. They would be the mutually opposed limits on being, and hence Being would be that bit - the actual or substantial bit - left in the middle. The limits themselves are not part of what is actual because they are the extremes that mark the limit of what even could be actual. We might give them names, like Apeiron and Nous. But they are the names of the complementary limits on being. — apokrisis

Now, instead of addressing my post, you've completely changed the subject. You said "nature can check every possible option to find the most locally effective choice to actualise". And also you said, "my own metaphysics is founded on vagueness, apeiron, quantum foam or firstness.". Clearly, nature checking every possible option is not a limit, it is a thing, nature, acting. And the apeiron you propose is not proposed as a limit, it is proposed as an existent thing. What you stated earlier was two distinct principles of existence, two distinct ontological principles, a mind which organizes, and the chaos which it organizes. Now you want to talk about a dichotomy of opposing limits.

You cannot produce an ontology from limits, because you need existents. Now you do not want to talk about what exists anymore, you just want to talk about the limits of existence.

So here you are trying to assert the authority of the law of the excluded middle. Faced with a dichotomy, you say its complementary pair must be reduced to either/or. One thing or the other. You deny the third thing of the reciprocal relation that creates the separation and so also forms the interaction. You say - with the full force of an unexamined habit - that only a yes/no answer is logically acceptable. — apokrisis

No, you misunderstand. What was described is not a dichotomy. What was described is two principles, each excluding the possibility of the other. For example, "God exists", and "God does not exist". These are two incompatible principles, each excludes the possibility of the other, like Nous and Apeiron are two incompatible principles, each excludes the possibility of the other. Either you totally misunderstand, or you intentionally changed the subject, to now talk about a dichotomy.

So you misunderstand why the "reciprocal relation" is impossible. The reciprocal relation requires that we accept both principles as if they were limits of a dichotomy. But this is not a dichotomy of limits, it is two opposing principles, and acceptance of them both is impossible because they contradict each other. And, to accept just one is insufficient to explain reality. So it is necessary to reject both, neither the principle Nous (God exists) nor the principle Apeiron (God does not exist) is acceptable as a first principle.

Here's something you ought to consider apokrisis, if you wish to produce a more comprehensible metaphysics. You appear to be mixing together two completely incompatible metaphysics without offering any real principles which might establish compatibility and consistency between them.

The forms that matter take are intelligible because nature can check every possible option to find the most locally effective choice to actualise. — apokrisis

Remember that my own metaphysics is founded on vagueness, apeiron, quantum foam or firstness. So I have a pretty specific conception of a state of being that is "less than nothing" in being "potentially anything". — apokrisis

So you have here, first, from Anaxagoras, the concept of Nous, a controlling mind of the cosmos. Then you have from Anaximander, the concept of apeiron, which is an infinite potential. Do you not see that the one metaphysics excludes the other, in the sense of contradiction, leaving one or the other impossible if you accept either one? If there is a controlling mind, "Nous", then infinite possibility, apeiron, is impossible because the controlling mind, Nous, is itself a limitation. And if there is infinite possibility, apeiron, then there cannot be a controlling mind, because the existence of the controlling mind, Nous, would be a real limit to the possibilities, leaving the possibilities less than infinite.

You have a proposed solution, the triadic solution, which suggests the co-existence of both. But this solution is impossible. As described, one excludes the other, so the two cannot coexist in the triadic way. This is why Plato, and his followers, Aristotle and other Neo-Platonists, went in a totally different way, introducing a completely new principle the Good, the Perfect, the Ideal, the One. This new principle, introduced by Plato out of the necessity derived from the inapplicability of the other two, is neither the controlling mind, Nous, nor the infinite possibility, apeiron, nor does it allow that either one of these is a valid principle.

The conclusion to be drawn, is that both of these, the controlling mind, Nous, and the infinite potential, apeiron, are inherently incompatible. The triadic approach you present, which is an attempt to do the impossible, establish compatibility between the two incompatibles, ought to be dismissed, as the impossible solution. Further, since neither one, the controlling mind, Nous, nor the infinite possibility, apeiron is capable of describing reality in itself, both of these ought to be dismissed as unacceptable. Simply put, they negate and annihilate each other. Therefore we must proceed to derive a new principle, as Plato did, which might be "good", "love", "karma", or some such thing.

So there are differences and similarities. I prefer to focus on the similarities. What all these guys saw was that there is some kind of holism going on, some kind of downward acting oversight, which causes the Cosmos, the physical world, to be organised by a global optimising principle. The forms that matter take are intelligible because nature can check every possible option to find the most locally effective choice to actualise. — apokrisis

What's this, some form of pantheism? Are you saying that the belief expressed by these metaphysicians is that the universe, or "Cosmos" is some sort of thinking mind, which considers every single possibility, prior to every physical action, choosing the most "locally effective"? Or is this a way of saying that the entire physical universe which we know of, is just a computer simulation, and the computer figures every possibility prior to actualizing the most effective choice? What do you mean by "nature can check every possible option"? Is "nature" a computing machine making decisions according to a predetermined program of entropy or some such thing, or is it a free willing being, making decisions according to a principle of "Good", or as wayfarer pointed to "Love". Why would you say that choosing the principle of Love for one's metaphysics is a mistake?

Let's see if we can agree on some principles.

1) Making a conscious decision and acting on a decision are not the same thing. This is evident from the fact that we decide all sorts of future actions, often thinking ahead. Action only sometimes follows immediately from a conscious decision, it doesn't necessarily follow from a decision, because much of conscious thought concerns things other than one's current activity. This is what is commonly called contemplation, and all judgements are decisions, even solving a mathematical problem is a decision.

2) Human beings can proceed with actions without having to consciously decide to make that action. This is evident in habitual, instinctual, and reflex actions. If you are walking, for example, you do not need to consciously decide to lift one foot and move it ahead of the next.

So the argument to be made is that the part of the human being which initiates activity is not the same part of the human being which makes conscious decisions. Do you see that this is likely? Many conscious decisions are made which do not initiate actions, and many actions are made which do not derive directly from conscious decisions. There is an overlapping though, where many actions follow immediately from conscious decisions, and this creates the illusion that actions and conscious decisions are somehow tied together by some necessity.

The issue you seem to have difficulty with is how one can decide to do one thing, yet actually proceed with a contrary action. And you are right to bring up memory, and forgetfulness. As unenlightened mentioned, members of AA are urged to remind themselves over and over again, of their commitment. Without reminding oneself of one's decisions, an individual could slip into the habitual activity without deciding to proceed in this activity. But if they remind themselves of their commitment they will be diligent in preventing the activity from starting.

If we're on the same page here, we can proceed to the further complication which is the more common instance of doing what is contrary to what you decided, and this is changing your mind. Changing your mind requires a second decision. And the reality of mind changing allows that one can switch back and forth. The switching back and forth may develop into indecisiveness. An individual who knows oneself as being prone to switching back and forth may get into the habit of not even deciding. What's the point of even making a decision concerning something tomorrow, if I know that I am likely to change my mind by the time tomorrow comes? So I don't decide at all. But the habit of being indecisive is not good for one who is involved in fast moving situations, because this would put you at the mercy of reflexes and instincts.

We may not be able to say exactly what making a conscious decision is. It is similar to saying it to yourself, but it must be said with conviction, and repeated so as to be remembered, or else followed immediately with action, if it is to be of any value. Perhaps we could distinguish two types of conscious decisions, one theoretical, producing no immediate call for action, just a general principle to be applied, and the other, a practical decision, dealing with immediate actions. Intermediate decisions, concerning actions of tomorrow, next week, or some definite point of time in the future would be a mixing of the theoretical and the practical. So I could resolve to follow some general principle, in theory, but find that this resolution does not always work for me in practise. This is when we talk about exceptions to the rule.

Sure, why not, IF it has it's own reasons. We're talking plants, are you suggesting that plants have reasons? — tim wood

Yes, that's what I'm suggesting. Don't you think that a plant has reasons for producing seeds?

Certainly plants do some things and do not do other things. I attribute to dumb instruction through DNA. Maybe that's not exactly accurate, but I'll stick with the dumb part. — tim wood

Well the word "dumb" doesn't say much. If a plant does something through instruction from its own DNA, then isn't this its own reason? Why is this reason a dumb reason?

Their processes require water to operate, for the plant to remain alive. I deny they want water: they need water. — tim wood

Again this doesn't make sense. You say that plants need water. And, when they are dry, they show by their actions, that they need water. But you say that they do not want water. Do you know what "want" means? Let's say, for the sake of argument, it's like desire, can you agree to that? Do you not think that the dry plants are desiring water? What about animals, other than human beings? Do they desire food, water, and sex? Why do plants not desire as well? Just because you cannot imagine what it would be like for a plant to desire doesn't mean that the plant doesn't desire; especially since the plant acts like it desires.

I'm taking "want" to be something that humans and arguably a lot of animals do. You're free to define "want" any way you please, but how can anyone understand you if you use private definitions without warning that you're doing so? — tim wood

Actually, it is you who is trying to enforce odd, arbitrary restrictions on the use of terms. You suggest that human beings, and some other animals "want", while other life forms do not "want". Unless you can produce some principles for this division it is completely arbitrary, and is nothing but a display of the quirkiness of your own personality.

Please keep in mind that, so far as I am concerned, these metaphorical descriptions are fine in the right context, where they're understood as metaphor. — tim wood

I'm not speaking in metaphor, I'm speaking literally. When a plant is dry, it literally wants water. It demonstrates this by its actions of extending its roots, in search of water. There is no metaphor here, it's a simple fact of life. Plants grow their roots to follow where the water is because they want water. How else can we describe this activity?

You, on the other hand want to restrict the use of "want", to some colloquialism that you are more familiar with, and any usage outside your customary vernacular, you insist is metaphor.

Starting with a definition of human life, I would find it difficult to extrapolate a definition of plant life and natural life using the term "awareness". Because I define human awareness in terms of human anatomy, physiology, and mental capacity (i.e., sensory stimulation/perception, interoception/sensation, and cognition). Also because my knowledge of plant (and other) biology is inadequate to the task.

A possible solution is to use the term "awareness" defined differently for each species, and avoid equivocation by stipulating types of awareness (e.g., plant awareness, animal awareness, bacteria awareness, etc.). Then use "awareness" in a definition of natural life without stipulating type.

Starting with a definition of human mind, I would find it easier to extrapolate a definition of plant life and natural life using the term "mind" instead of "awareness".

For example, abstracting "human mind" (the set of conditions experienced, and functions exercised, by a human being which produce its behaviour) to "mind" (the set of conditions experienced, and functions exercised, by an organism which produce its behaviour). — Galuchat

I don't like "awareness", or "mind" as defining terms for life. What's wrong with "self"? Living things seem to have an inherent selfishness, whereby they separate themselves from what is other than themselves with some sort of boundary.

Where I see the weakness is in how you define "agency", and how you define "agent" in your classification of actions as beyond the control of the agent, and within the control of the agent. You limit "agent", and "agency" to the conscious intellect which is making decisions about what to do. But the conscious mind is only the tip of the iceberg, so to speak, when we're talking about the motivators for human activities.

So I would say that you ought to define "the agent" as the entire united human being, and do not try to restrict "the agent" to the conscious part. This allows that all internal activities of the human body, as well as outward activities which are instinctual, unconscious, and habitual, are all classed together as requiring agency, despite the fact that it is not the decisions of the conscious intellect which motivates these acts.

When we observe that an individual may consciously decide to do one thing, but actually proceed to do a contrary thing, we have to allow a separation between the conscious intellect which decides, and whatever it is (called the will), which motivates particular activities. Then the source of agency is not to be equated with the conscious mind at all. The conscious mind is more like a conditioner, having some power of influence over the activities of the human body, especially outward acts, but it is just the tip of the iceberg because the vast majority of the activities of the human body are activities of internal parts and systems, which, though they are clearly under the control of the agent (the individual human being), they are not under the control of the conscious mind.

I think of this set of distinctions in terms of causes, but that involves agency. Mainly, I agree. And further, I read that modern science has no use for causes, although it may still use the word for convenience. An analysis of cause, taken down to the root of it, shows an animistic bias that science has learned is illusory. It seems that between time t-1 of Cause c-1 and event E at time e-1, there is always an intermediate t-2, t-3 of intermediate causes c-2, c-3, until you arrive at simultaneity of C an E. There is no discrete agency of cause. (I'll review the argument and correct it if I've neglected a detail.) — tim wood

This difficulty with "cause" is why we're better off looking for the reason for an occurrence, why it occurred, rather than its cause. The distinction I was trying to make is the difference between the reason which is internal, inherent within the thing which is acting, and the reason which is assigned to the thing from an external source.

So for example, a person works at a job, as a member of a team, working on a project. The person's reason for working, the reason inherent within the person, might be to make money, and earn a living. The reason assigned to the person from the external source, the team manager, is the function which the person plays in the project. This is an example of how very different the internal and external reason for the activity might be. From the person working's point of view the work is carried out for the purpose of earning a living, that is the reason for the activity, and from the external point of view the work is carried out for the purpose of completing the project, that is the reason for the activity. Two very different reasons for the very same activity.

The function of a thing is the reason for a thing's activity in the external sense, a purpose which is assigned to it, in relation to a larger whole. So all the components of my computer have a function, a purpose, a reason for their activities in relation to the computer itself. However, the components do not have an internal reason, like a human being does, they do not have their own reason for being there. Their reason for being there has been assigned to them. However, despite the fact that inanimate things do not display their own internal reasons, we can infer that living beings other than human beings have their own internal reasons for behaving as they do. Clearly other mammals which have brains and think have their own reasons for their actions as well. Don't you think that trees and other plants have their own reasons for their actions as well?

think the only argument - disagreement - I have lies in what I take to be a reification of motive, purpose, telos, and now gestalt. As explanatory concepts - as ideas - they're all wonderful. But in my view they are not things. They can't be dissected with a scalpel or stored in a jar. — tim wood

If a thing has its own reasons, internal to it, for behaving like it does, what else can we attribute these reasons to, other than motive, purpose, or telos? Don't you recognize that not all things are physical things, capable of being cut with a scalpel, or stored in a jar? This is a fundamental principle of philosophy, to learn the distinction between material and immaterial things, as Plato said, sensible objects and intelligible objects. You can deny the reality of immaterial things, but then how do you account for your own motives, intention, and purpose, and other ideas? And once you see the need to allow for the reality of the immaterial, you'll come to realize that there's no reason to limit the existence of the immaterial to strictly within your own mind.

Plants grow around ponds. If you want to say that the plants want water, nothing wrong with that as poetical description. The trouble comes if you say that the plants actually want water. It's one thing to say they "act" like they "want' water. It's another to say they actually want water. That's the distinction I make, that I think you - and a lot of people - do not make. I assume you can make it when it's laid out like this, and I repent in sackcloth and ashes that I did not make this clearer, earlier. — tim wood

This is irrational nonsense. The plants display every action necessary to demonstrate that they want water, yet for some undisclosed, and most likely irrational reason, you deny that they want water. Must they say "I want water" in order for you to know that they want water? Sorry, plants can't speak English. If a person was dying from thirst, and making noises in some foreign language, would you say that the person acts like it wants water, but it doesn't really "want" water? What kind of a nonsense argument is this? When something carries out the actions required to call it by a certain name, we call it by that name. We don't say that the thing is not "really" acting in the way determined by this name, it's just making the appropriate actions which correspond to what that name signifies, but for some unknown reason it's not "really" acting in the way signified by the name.

Is the motion constant and long-run in terms of its direction or not? — apokrisis

No of course not. How many times do have to say it? It starts with the pedaling, and may stop with the brakes at any moment, and the direction changes with the steering. There is nothing "constant and long-run" here. It's a fiction which you've made up to support homeostasis. And I really don't know why you're so bent on supporting homeostasis when you clearly prefer to describe life's systems in the more realistic terms of instability. It's as if you cannot let go of the old, outdated, demonstrably false descriptions.

What you're calling me to justify, near as I can tell, is the proposition that attributing motive, purpose, telos, to trees is at best a convenient fiction, unless it is just general and abstract terminology used to describe either reacting to stimuli or acting per DNA. The only grounds for objection are that you maintain that the tree has, possesses, exhibits motive, purpose, telos, and these not to be confused with mere response to stimuli or its DNA. — tim wood

Doesn't "acting per DNA" demonstrate purpose, telos?

What, actually, has happened? The surface of the tree reacted to a high temperature. — tim wood

How can you say that reactions are not purposeful? Just because they are high speed, and occur immediately after, in response to, an external action, does not suffice as an argument to exclude purpose or telos. If someone says to me "there is a bear behind you", and I react by turning around, that it is a reaction does not mean that the turning around is not purposeful.

This is susceptible of description in teleological terms, and it would be a very convenient way to describe it. But where is the mediation? What mediated What/where is the awareness? Where is any evidence that the tree did anything other than immediately react to stimuli? — tim wood

The fact that we cannot draw a direct causal chain, in terms of efficient causation, from the thing which occurs, to the reaction, indicates that there is mediation, allowing for intent, telos, final cause . Some living actions and reactions are quite rapid, so we tend to think that the external occurrence "causes" the internal response, without mediation, but I don't think that this is the case. Javra argues this quite well.

Can you justify attributing awareness, mediateness, to living things that don't have the capacity? — tim wood

Neither of your definitions of teleology call for "awareness". You should consider that being aware is just one type of teleological (purposeful) activity.

Or if all you mean is that the so-called behaviour serves a purpose, then it's teleological, then have at it. But I think Apokrisis correctly assesses this usage:
Or else it deflates the rather inflated notion of telos that folk have in the first place. — apokrisis — tim wood

I don't see how this is the case, but apokrisis is commonly guilty over-generalizing in a fallacious way. As I said much earlier in the thread, in regard to "reason", we need to distinguish between an agent acting for a reason (purpose), having the reason or purpose for action within itself, and the reason (purpose) which we project onto a thing from outside, saying that the thing did this for this reason, or that it is good for this purpose, to us. Apokrisis continually conflates these two, and refuses to recognize a distinction between them.

What a horrendous self-contradiction. You claim that to be moving forward steadily is unstable? Next thing you will be claiming Newton was wrong about inertia! — apokrisis

The forward motion is dependent on the pedalling. Where does this "steadily" that you've fictitiously inserted come from?

An organism must be able to both persist and to adapt. In the long run, it must be stably centred or balanced - hence homeostasis. In the short run, it must be able to adjust that general balance in locally useful ways. — apokrisis

There is no "long run" for an organism. They are born, eat, get active, reproduce, and die. This idea that homeostasis is necessary for an organism to persist and adapt is a falsity. Individual organisms do not persist, and adaptation is the result of change, brought about through reproduction. This describes instability.

What don't you get about the difference between the general and the particular? — apokrisis

We are discussing particulars. If each particular displays itself as an instance of instability, then it is extremely faulty inductive reasoning to draw the conclusion that in general, these instances of instability are an example of stability.

The child first learns to stay upright on a bike. Then it learns to lean into corners. — apokrisis

To stay upright on a bike requires forward motion, pedaling, and this is a form of instability, not stability. The hardest part of learning to ride a bike is giving up the fear of leaving the stability of the solid ground, to propel oneself forward into a realm of instability.

An organism has autonomy because it can make an active distinction between its long-term central balance and its moment-to-moment fine adjustments. — apokrisis

There is no such thing as an organism's "long term central balance", that's a fiction. And to think that an organism could recognize such a thing within itself, and distinguish this from its moment to moment activities is simply nonsense. Even the most rational of living beings, the human being, with the power of self-reflection, cannot distinguish a long term central balance within oneself.

It is not my problem if your understand of biological terminology insists on a more inflexible reading - one that is either/or rather than and/both. — apokrisis

My training in logic has taught me that "both", when it comes to contradictory attributes for the same subject at the same time, is unacceptable. If you want to do your biology in this contradictory way, then I think that is your problem.

Importance is very subjective. What is important to you is not the same as what is important to me. I think that we rationalize and produce our rational principles around what is important to us, so the distinction between what is rational and what is irrational is not really objective, it's subjective. This is why, as you say, what is rational is dependent on the state that one is in.

As for X, and his odd behaviour, which some might label as OCD and irrational, perhaps for X the behaviour is not really irrational at all. This is the state that X is in, and his behaviour might be completely rational for that state. If we could change X, bring X to another state, then whatever it is that is important to X would have to change accordingly, just like if I lost my teeth I would have to give up on steak, and I'd be forced to relinquish that importance.

However the reason why the symbol part of the equation - the stuff like the genetic memory that can encode constraints - can actually work is that it acts to regulate the unstable. If the physics has rigid stability, how could information push it in any direction? But if the physics is balanced on an instability, a point of bifurcation, then it is like a switch that can be tipped by the barest nudge.

So that is how semiotic control can arise. That is how symbols can control states of matter. The matter has to be in a state that is inherently unstable and hence able to be nudged in a direction that is some higher level informational choice.

That is the trick of life. It is the combination of information and matter, a system able to be directed with a purpose because the matter is poised to be tipped and has the least amount of telos concerning its actual state as is possible.

Stable matter knows what it wants to be. It is deterministic. But instability is freedom just begging to be harnessed. It solves the mystery of how symbols could affect the actions of anything.

And how life goes is how mind goes. The same applies when it comes to closing the explanatory gap between matter and symbol there. — apokrisis

Right, that's why homeostasis, and its assumed goal of "stability" is an inappropriate description of living systems. The systems do not have stability as a goal at all, because stability would rob them of the capacity to do things. As you say "the matter has to be in a state that is inherently unstable". Why do you find it so difficult to agree with me, even when you are saying the same thing anyway?

Theories of homeostasis dictate that living systems have the goal of setting up stable equilibriums, that's how the living system is described, as a stable equilibrium. But what you have just said is completely opposed to this idea, the living systems are setting up unstable material conditions, not stable conditions.

Right, that's what I said, in homeostasis stability is the goal. There's no adult male cow manure here. Now, let's proceed to discuss "managing instability". Stability is not the goal here, because instability is required as the thing to be managed. Do you agree? If stability is achieved then there is no more instability to be managed. Do you agree?

I was thinking of my own fear of dentists. I go, stressed and fearful, because I have rationalised that the discomfort of wild toothache is far worse that the pain and humiliation the dentist inflicts. Or how health scares can make people give up smoking. But for X, the comfort of ritual has very little cost, so rationally, it is an effective palliative and should be indulged, even though it is a mere placebo. Just as I like to grow flowers, though they have little use. It is not rational, but there is no stronger reason not to. — unenlightened

So I'm on the right track with "importance" then. For me, it is important that I have teeth to chew my steaks, so I overcome my fear of the dentist. Notice that the fear is of the dentist, and the fear is overcome by means of the importance. The importance is a rational principle which renders the fear as irrational. The fear must be overcome because of Z, where Z is something of importance. The importance inspires the will power. In the case of X, there is no perceived importance which would be required for the will power to overcome the irrational behaviour.

In fact the whole "mental illness is physical illness" brigade presumably will propose this. — MetaphysicsNow

But physical illness is not necessarily neurological though. That is the problem, there are many possibly factors, diet, hormones, etc., and you are trying in that example, to reduce this illness to neurology. So even if the mental illness is a physical illness, it is wrong to reduce it to simply neurological.

Please do not misunderstand me, I am certainly not saying that I agree that OCD behaviour has a neurophysiological cause. What I do believe, and what I am trying to work out in this thread, is that if you do believe that, then there are consequences that follow for how we should understand notions such as "will power", "free will", "decisions" and even "action". It may be that the consequences are that those notions are ultimately empty, that there really is no such thing as "will power" or "free will". — MetaphysicsNow

I do see where you are headed But I think it is a foregone conclusion that those who think behaviour can be explained completely with neurophysiology are already determinists who deny free will and will power anyway.

The problem with separating the intellect and the will, though, is that it then becomes a problem to establish how they ever get to work together, other than by mere accident. — MetaphysicsNow

Of course this is a problem. But isn't the unity of life in general, a problem? How did the lungs and the heart ever get together to work together? Was a brain required? How could a brain get built without blood and oxygen? There is the very same problem with separating the heart from the lungs from the brain, because how could they ever get to work together. Yet we seem to have no problem separating these things. Why should it be a problem to separate the intellect from the will, if this is what is required to understand the mind? Are you against separating the memory from the calculative acts of the mind?

You are wondering how such a unity could happen by "accident", when the accepted theory of evolution subscribes to accident.

Ever ridden a bike? Is there no homeostatic balance involved in managing its instability? — apokrisis

If stability is the goal, and it is achieved, then instability has been removed. If it is a case of managing instability, then stability is never achieved, nor is stability intended, because instability is required for the desired movements.

In living systems, is it the case that instability is managed, and therefore utilized toward achieving various goals, or is it the case that stability is the goal? Teleologically there is big difference between describing life in terms of stability (homeostasis), and in terms of managed stability. Homeostasis assumes that stability is the goal, the end, whereas "managed instability" leaves the goal, or end, as undetermined. With "managed instability" we remove the implied goal of "stability", to describe life in a more realistic way. But then we leave unanswered the question of the goal "instability is managed toward what end?". To determine this intent we must ask, what is doing the managing, because this is how we proceed toward determining intent, by identifying and understanding the agent.

It's blatant contradiction that I have difficulty with. You would too if you were a disciplined philosopher. Instead, you make contradictory statements, and then rather than trying to explain yourself you pretend to be bewildered at how it could be difficult for me to understand such contradictions.

It is homeostasis that is the process "excluding" instability and thus creating - dynamical - stability. — apokrisis

You said "life is managed instability". If homeostasis excludes instability, then it excludes life if life is managed instability. Either life is not managed instability, or it is not homeostatic. Which do you believe?

Life is managed instability. So homeostasis is central to that. — apokrisis

What is central to homeostasis is stability. So if life is instability, whether that instability is managed or not, this excludes homeostasis, as instability excludes stability. That's the problem with "homeostasis", it really doesn't describe life.

It’s only a marker for the key difference between living systems and minerals. Homeostasis is a chraracteristic of even the simplest organic forms but is absent from the most complex inorganic forms. — Wayfarer

My opinion, as I stated, is that "homeostasis" is a false representation of what these living systems are doing. Homeostasis implies equilibrium, but the living systems are growing and reproducing. Growing and reproducing, which is what living beings do, cannot be represented as homeostasis which is a form of equilibrium.

I know that one of the books Apokrisis mentions from time to time on the question of the nature of life is a book by the name of ‘Life Itself’ by Robert Rosen which I understand is a well-regarded book. As it is rather a specialised biology text, I am not intending to read it, but it might be of interest to others here. There’s a pretty detailed review here which list some of Rosen’s philosophical premisses, a key one being his resistance to mechanistic reductionism. — Wayfarer

I do not know Rosen very well at all, but I know that apokrisis argues to dissolve the distinction between living and non-living systems. From what I've read, Rosen argues to maintain a distinction between living systems (as anticipatory systems) and inanimate systems, by describing living systems according to function rather than by describing them as material activity. So although apokrisis may mention Rosen, I don't think that apokrisis has respect for Rosen's principles.

And this may be too, but it seems to me that you are defining will power as doing what is right and not accounting for ill-will. And this is problematic for X. We know, by hypothesis, that X's rituals are pointless, but X is conflicted about that. His will is divided, and he does not know whether it is right to be cautious and follow his superstition or right to resist it. — unenlightened

It's not necessarily right or wrong, in the sense of being ethical, it is just a matter of what one determines should or should not be done. In the op, X realizes that his behaviour is irrational. So I don't think that there is any conflict in the sense of X not knowing whether his behaviour is right or wrong, he recognizes it as irrational and therefore not called for.

If X did not recognize his behaviour as irrational, that would be another issue. Then perhaps his will would be divided, not knowing whether he should continue with the behaviour or not. But that is not the case X knows the behaviour is irrational, but it is not an important enough issue for X to find the will to take the necessary steps to cure the irrational behaviour.

Is this what you meant when you referred to the ant scaring the grasshopper? When the problem is perceived as important, this import acts to scare up the nerve, the will power to proceed with restraint.

One might say 'the decision acts'. — unenlightened

This is the idea that I think is wrong, and what I was trying to steer us away from, the idea that there is ever a direct and necessary relationship between the decision and the act. It doesn't matter if you decide the night before, or in the morning just prior to the act, the decision never necessitates the act, as there is always the possibility that you will not do what you've decided to do.

That's the problem which I referred to, which creates the need for a division between the intellect and the will. If the will is what motivates the act to begin, and the intellect is what decides the act, we need this separation because even after deciding I will do such and such, I might for some reason or another, proceed in a contrary way. It doesn't matter if the decision concerns next week, tomorrow, next hour, or even the next moment, sometimes we make decisions which we are incapable of following through with.

So we cannot say that it is the decision which brings about the act. This is most evident when we decide such and such is wrong, and ought not be done, yet we do it anyway. I might be fully aware that I am carrying out the activity which I have decided I ought not do, and even rationalize reasons for doing what I have decided not to do, as I am doing it, but I may in many cases proceed into this act without ever deciding to do it. So I am doing the act which I decided not to do, having never actually decided to do it this time, but as I am doing it, and realize that I am doing what I decided not to do, I rationalize it such that I carry on with it.

This is why the decision to abstain must be renewed at every moment, as you say with AA. Certain actions will lead one into the forbidden act, without one ever deciding to do it. So we must recognize that we have ventured into this act, which will lead to the forbidden act, without even deciding to do the forbidden act, and instead of rationalizing to proceed into the forbidden act, we renew the vow of abstinence and therefore not continue onward.

But isn't having or not having will-power also a matter of character? And what of X, obsessively following the rules of his existence; is it his stubborn will that insists on following his plan even when it is shown to be foolish, or is he impulsively indulging against the plan to change the plan? — unenlightened

That's what I think, having or not having will power is a matter of character, and if it's not an inherited feature it must be cultured at a very young age. Impulsively indulging and stubbornly following one's plan which has been shown to be foolish, are both, opposing examples of lack of will power. Each is a case of an individual not being capable of doing what one knows oneself ought to do. The complexity involves recognizing and establishing one's own limitations, or even devising a mechanism for changing one's limitations. So as much as we might think that will power only involves making oneself adhere to one's decisions, it also involves constraining one's own mind to only make decisions which one is physically capable of carrying out.

Sure, 4 might need some more filling out, but the filling out is to be neurophysiological in nature. There is perhaps an epistemological point that we don't know enough about neurophysiolgy currently to explain the behaviour this way, but the point is a metaphysical one that - whether we know it or not - there is a sufficient neurophysiological reason (in the sense of fully sufficient neurophysiological cause) for the repetitive behaviour. — jkg20

But my point is that the point you are trying to make here is unacceptable and must be rejected. There is no reason to believe that the reason for the repetitive behaviour is neurophysiological at all. Introducing this assumption just forces upon us the so-called hard problem of consciousness, directing us to look for a neurological solution for a psychological problem, when this is most likely not even possible. So unless it can be demonstrated that there is a specific "neurophysiological cause" for the behaviour, to assume that there is, is a mistaken assumption. And such a demonstration will not be produced because the assumed "cause" is really a complex thing which involves a multiplicity of factors. It's not just a simple neurological issue.

All living systems display homeostasis, which non-living systems do not. — Wayfarer

I hear you, but that really doesn't say very much. And, it is a bit of a deceptive principle, perhaps an oversimplification, because we need to inquiry as to what is the purpose, or the reason for this homeostasis. Then we see that living things grow, multiply, and carry out activities in the world, so the concept of "homeostasis" does not properly represent what the living system is doing. Despite the fact that we say "all living systems display homeostasis", it is not a fact that the concept of "homeostasis" displays what the living system is doing.