Well, do not place too high of a standard on "higher level of understanding" then. — Metaphysician Undercover

A certain kind of readiness, state of anticipation or maybe just the openness to the mere possibility of the appearance of the unknown does seem to me like a higher level of understanding, a "meta" level cautiousness, if you will. A place where maybe the whole "spectrum of certainty" with rashness or carelessness as its extremes loses meaning. I did not mean to draw into question that such a way of being exists. I just wonder how one gets there. And then I can't help but notice that "getting there" does not seem to be a necessary outcome of accepting that either end of the spectrum isn't working for, but rather against us. How do we take the step from the doctrine of the mean to a sort of Hegelian higher understanding?

There are different levels of certitude which are proper to different subjects of study. I agree with this principle, and we can see it clearly in comparing the consequences of failure in different activities. When the consequences of failure are very significant, then a higher level of certainty is required before proceeding, in comparison with when the consequences of failure are less significant. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see. I was thinking more along the lines of ... are there activities, like for example inquiries into mathematical issues, which require a certain kind or level of certiude, and others, for example social interactions where sometimes (only sometimes, not always) requiring certitude for the "next step" is driven ad absurdum by the unavailability of knowledge of the other's actions, or inner workings if you will before they occur, are shown to us? One might call it contact with absolute and not just relative otherness. It seems to me like the higher understanding you talked about might very well be situated here.

And then again the question: How is it that when communicating with an other we evolve from simply accepting that there is always a level of uncertainty involved, making compromises, assuming we have played through some scenarios of how things might unfold, factoring in that the other might always yet surprise us and landing at a level of certainty that seems good enough for now to act upon, trying to be neither rash nor cowardly, but somewhere in the middle. How is it that sometimes this way of risk management thinking is reinterpreted, "aufgehoben" to use Hegel's term? And why is it that every explanation of how we might shift our thinking here seems to be inadequate to explain exactly how it happens? At least no explanation comes to my mind which would lead necessarily to this new way of thinking or maybe being.

@Metaphysician Undercover

It is a nice way to think of this. These two extremes - rashness and cowardice - often have a way of playing themselves out. When one is overexercised and lead to absurdity, it is often substituted by the other extreme. If this back and forth movement has been going on for a while, one tends to get suspicious of both and this process seems to sometimes play itself out, resulting at some point in this higher understandig you mentioned, where differences between extremes loose standing and the need for certitude is put in its rightful place. Sometimes. Sometimes, and maybe more often, we land at the Aristotelian mean.

I am interested in this process. Reaching that higher level of understanding seems to me to not be a necessary outcome of accepting the fact that neither rashness nor cowardice are worth pursuing. Or maybe it is, if there's only enough time to also let the doctrine of the mean play itself out?

What would you think of the idea that concern for certitude, for knowing and doing "the right thing" has its rightful place in some realms of acivity/communication, but not in others?

And do you think that once a state of higher understanding is achieved it is stable? Or can we backslide?

Are you interested in how our language-using community of philosophers defines these two concepts (conceptual approach)? Are you asking what sorts of things fall under the heading of 'language' and 'communication,' with an eye toward refining the concepts accordingly (descriptive approach)? Are you asking why we need to have these two concepts in the first place, and perhaps proposing a useful discrimination between them in order to achieve our goals (ameliorative approach)? Or are you interested in knowing how the two terms have evolved within a matrix of social practices here in the U.S. (or the West, or whatever social group seems relevant) (genealogical approach)? — J

That sounds wonderful. In that order please!

Well, in me you have a kindred spirit, but you will be hard-pressed to find more than a tiny handful of contributors to this forum who endorse anything other than some variant of realism. — Joshs

More than I had hoped for. Thank you.

I know very little about it but I have to agree with Royce's basic thrust, as I understand it, that ethics is social and relational. — Tom Storm

Mhm, maybe we should start a thread about it. I could do so later if you'd like and talk a bit about it. It's quite near to my heart these days.

Intuition and experience. How could we truly understand each other, except through approximations? Many of us are strangers to ourselves, let alone to others... — Tom Storm

Yeah, I get the intuition. These approximations are interesting though. It is what we do at a ... let's call it phenomenological level in everyday life, right? We do somehow, sort of understand each other. Probably never to a "full extent", but somehow we do try. To follow the notion that others are simply not our's to understand, to be radical about that would indeed lead to chaos. It is not practical. And maybe it also isn't even true. Maybe we can fashion approximations of understanding of each other.

What right do these approximations have though, when we look at them through the lense of thoughts from someone like Emmanuel Levinas who very stricktly and convincingly I'd say makes the point that the Other is never our's to "have" to grasp with our greedy little imperialistic fingers of understanding, trying to make them fit a certain picture, a certain form we've only conjured up in our heads?

@Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, you are right. Misunderstanding it is. ;)
And yes, the infinite regress of justification is a sucker. What pragmatic solution would you propose?

@Wayfarer
:) Yeah, I get intimidated by it, too. Imposter syndrome is a real thing, sometimes I feel like a dilettante at best. Thank you for the warm welcome.

@Tom Storm
Mhm, conversation is a minor hobby of mine, too! It is really quite something how quickly this appreciation for each other can form, given all the adverse circumstances. Sometimes it needs little more than the reluctant companionship of strangers being kind of a mess in the same dingy place.

Royce is underappreciated. Have you ever heard of his notion of loyalty to loyalty? I find it moving. Very hopeful and kind in its nature without drifting into the reckless and profane.

I have always assumed we don't really understand each other, we just make sense of others the best we can. — Tom Storm

Interesting. Why have you always assumed that?

Sure. It is just a very simple point, I already gave it away.

אֲבִימֶלֶך

This word in biblical Hebrew means "the/my father is king". The grammar gives the translation the/my because you actually can't tell from the word. It could be both.

;) I dare you to find the different particles in the word. And before you think of it: the ' symbol in the text is a normal letter in the Hebrew alphabet (Jod). You can find this and more examples on page 160 of the grammar I linked before.

Well then. It is a fascinating language, I had a lot of fun with it. https://www.areopage.net/PDF/waltke.pdf This grammar seems to be quite good. You will find what I meant from page 80 onwards.

I told you already that I don't think I can, because I do not speak that language. Take me by my word. I could make some elaborate counterargument now by introducing you to the nature of pre- and suffixes in the hebrew language and how you can cram a sentence into a whole word and how someone not familiar with that language would not be able to distinguish the different parts of one word that make up a whole sentence. I will not bore you with it.

Let's try something different instead. In the video it is being said, that Bagg's language is a way of relating to surroundings. Maybe when I look at a stream of running water from a tap, I call that water. That is how I relate to it primarily. Maybe someone else relates primarily via touch. It is hard to imagine for someone who is used to conceiving of language in terms of words and sentences. But if language is at heart a way of relating ... myself to objects, other humans, thoughts, ideas to other ideas, is it not conceivable that there are ways of making those relations that rely on something other than the spoken or the written word? With it's own rules that might be not discovered by us yet? And would such a behavior of relating not with some right be called a language?

Try going through her tap water scene and dividing it up into distinct events of qualitatively different character that might be used for expressing something! I'll respond further when you've tried something like this. — fdrake

I don't think I can. I don't speak this language.

Because AFAIK it's known that stimming is tightly linked with autistic people's emotional regulation. If you must suppress stimming, the self regulation goes out of whack. — fdrake

Cursing is strongly related to my emotional self-regulation. If I don't get to curse when I feel it warranted, believe me, my self-regulation goes out of whack, too.
;) Just kidding of course. I am not autistic and I do not need stims to regulate myself. But there are people suffering from Tourette's syndrom. Sometimes ticks include cursing. Would you know from the outside if my cursing is me cursing or me having a tick?
The point I want to make is simply this: I find these arguments and distinctions not very convincing. But maybe I'm just being difficult, who knows.

that likens her behaviour to stroking one's hair, scratching yourself, finger twiddling etc. None of which need be carried out with intent. — fdrake

None of these behaviors need to be carried out consciously, they don't need to have meaning. But sometimes they do. Fiddling with one's hair can be a stim, it can also be flirting, it can also be a sign of an elaborate internal discussion about the effectiveness of the new hair conditioner I purchased yesterday. How can you tell the difference?

Can you even say what this finger rub means vs that one? Can you even tell when one ends and one begins? — fdrake

Just because you can't tell, do you think no one can tell? And how about if we compare these predicaments to language. Just because I can't make heads or tails of Japanese sentences, does it mean no one can understand it?

There just aren't units of fine enough graduations to represent the continuum of behaviour she has. — fdrake

What units exactly would be fine enough for you to consider something a language?

I also think interpreting Baggs' stimming as language has the opposite of its intended life affirming/depathologising effect for autistic people. — fdrake

I can see the argument. We weren't the ones calling on the lable language first though, I believe that was Baggs. We are now trying to reconcile what Baggs calls "my language" with our notion of what a language is.

It's repetitive, there are patterns and types of things but... you can say the same of almost any process. — fdrake

It is difficult to ascribe parts to the stimming. When her hand is moving back and forth in the water, should we just think that the first bit where she's relatively slow and the second bit where she's relatively fast count as distinct "units" which we could interpret as items of language? What about the variations in hand angle, which fingers feel the water etc within the units? — fdrake

I feel like there are quite some different parts of the stimming! There are definitely distinct moments, actions, some of them repeat, sometimes changing rapidly, sometimes more slowly. But the moments are distinct from one another. We can describe them. Whether or not there is intent or meaning(s) behind them ... we still don't know.

If we take her at her word, and that she's in a constant state of reciprocal connection with the environment, it would be really weird if we could only ascribe meaning so broadly. She spent a long time humming, and we'd have to reduce that to "her humming". — fdrake

I think so too! It would be really weird if minutes of one utterance would just mean all the same. Maybe we should think about the different tones, how the voice sometimes trembles, sometimes is very clear, and so on. Maybe they are different from each other, these moments. I don't see why we have to reduce that to one act of humming. A song has different notes after all, which we wouldn't reduce into one either.

I do wish that stimming was understood more like yawning than like language. Something autonomic. — fdrake

Why is that exactly? And how about the question if you would consider a sigh or a yawn part of language? Or maybe communication?

Hey guys, my name is Kris.

I have been studying theology, philosophy and English literature for nine years at university (primary focus being philosophy for the past five years). I've always been driven by questions revolving around understanding. What does it mean to understand? Is this a term only to be used when "success" is evident - to understand is to understand correctly or there is no understanding at all - or is there such a thing as "wrong understanding"? Can we ever not understand something and if yes, what does that look like? What does it mean to understand a thought, a concept, an object, a series of events? What does it mean to understand another person? Can we ever understand an other (correctly, at all)? Should we even strive to? What does it mean to understand myself? How does my understanding of myself shape the possibilities I have of relating to an other? Why is it that our ability to relate to one another, the nature of any given relationship seems to hinge on understanding, its quality or the lack thereof? And what is there to learn in thinking about these questions in a philosophical way? Is there headway to be made? How do our answers to these questions influence the choices we're confronted with daily when in contact with others - war or peace, indifference or love, to understand or to leave be, freedom or commitment, communication? And are any of these admittely hopelessly naive and painfully insufficient questions even somewhat able to open up a line of inquiry that isn't doomed to eternal mediocrity or - even worse - a traditional academic career?

At least these questions have led me down various paths, including French and German existentalism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, philosophy of language and American pragmatism. I am currently working on papers involving Jean-Francois Lyotard, Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. The last few years were mainly spent with these characters along with Emmanuel Levinas, Samuel Beckett, and some lesser known figures like Josiah Royce or Francois Laruelle (sometimes you just gotta get a little weird). Truth be told, it is difficult to find people interested in these authors, so I hope to find some companionship in this forum.

Apart from these things, my life is pretty boring. I spend my days mainly working in an administrative job to pay the bills, not get trapped in an ivory tower, and because I do not find any value in working for professors whose only concern in life is the furtherance of objective truth accompanied by a crusade against people who are of the opinion that "wrong understanding" is a thing and that weird Kant interpretations are usually far more interesting than Kant himself. My nights I spend at a bar, smoking and drinking way too much, hunched over some book, being asocial, surrounded by good people who are used to it, like me anyway, and for the most part have no fucking idea why the heck I'm doing all of this. Maybe some of you can sympathize a little more. ;)

Do you believe what Baggs is doing counts as language? — fdrake

Oh I must admit, I am not sure. If you ask for my gut feeling: language yes, communication not sure. But I don't think I feel fit enough to argue for either thought just yet. I'd rather have three more questions first.

There needs to be something in the action that allows it to be standardised in order for it to count as an item of language in some context. — fdrake

Okay. So language is something that can only happen when there are people agreeing on a standardized meaning of sentences, words, gestures?

And I don't think her stims can be standardised in the above way. They probably can't even be individuated - can you tell the difference in significance of the water, or Beggs' relationship with her environment, when she changes the speed her fingers move against the water's current? — fdrake

So "to individuate" stims means to be able to ascribe different meanings to each part of action within one stim (playing with the water)? I mean ... we can certainly individuate the different stims (playing with water, moving hands in the air) and the different actions within one stim (moving slowly one second, then faster the next), right? We just are not sure about the meanings these actions have or if they have meaning at all.

Stims can be like sighs. — fdrake

Would you consider sighs part of language?

Thanks, that clears that one up. I have three more questions.

I think language is a subset of action. Just there are some actions which aren't instances of language. — fdrake

What exactly distinguishes language-action from other forms of action?

I assume you consider stims to be an action as a response to an emotion. I assume that, because you paralleled rubbing the face on a toy with someone going for a run when they are sad before. Is that correct?

I assume also that you consider the actions you have seen in the first part of the video to be stims. Is there any action you have seen you would not call a stim?

@fdrake So just to make sure I understand you correctly first. You would characterize language as: something with syntax and items that can be arranged, having reproducible content, and structured presentation. And language is definitely not something like ... let's call it an "action" (going for a run when sad).
And communication would be something with a reproducible message.

Consider the face rubbing stim. You can rub your face on two different soft toys in the same way, the phenomenology of those acts can differ radically even if the rubbing stim is the same. Thinking of the stim as a language item, it must have a reproducible content of some sort, and since the phenomenologies differ so much it would difficult to call the content of the stim state reproducible. — fdrake

Could you maybe explain what you mean with "phenomenology" of the two different rubbing stims here?

To what extent is an immediate relationship with our non-human surroundings a language? — Joshs

To what extent is one event, one acting-out of this relationship a sentence? Everyone at some point probably conceives of language in terms of "getting meaning across", having a sophisticated system of symbols and conventions to transplant someone else's thoughts into my brain. Perhaps even mine into another's. ;) It is practical. If we wouldn't conceive of language in this way, we wouldn't get anything done! Imagine the chaos!

But what if communication is actually communion, what if what language does is to form a pact, to link us to something other, someone other, something somewhat other that cannot be grasped, only touched like wind. Or what if it leads up to a point, a void it leaves, at the edges of what can be said, when stories fray, like ends of a string, not quite apart, one at one point, but disjointed at another, little tips of possible contact, touching air. Apart at one point to be together at another. What if language does the weave? Going under and cutting across, fraying and stumbling at the edges while inexplicably producing patterns, narratives that entrance and disgust, that soothe and aggravate and most of all perhaps leave speechless.

In language, there are sentences. Even silence is a sentence a negation of what could be referred to, who could be adressed, what could be meant, who could speak. You know Lyotard. What if touch, a movement, a sound, a look perhaps is a sentence, a universe? In language sentences are linked. Reaction upon (re)action, no sentence is the last, the linking happens. There are universes. And they are linked. Is there any other prerequisite for something being language?

Part of me is just kidding around. Obviously there are many objections and questions. I've been thinking a lot about Lyotard lately. About affect-sentences. About their transcription. About the differends inevitably produced in the attempt. About the seeming inevitability of it all, the transcription as well as the hurt, the pain of something not being able to be put in words. This video reminded me of the practicality of these things, the stakes in always yet another form. Thank you.

What is the difference between language and communication, if any?