Is that even a possible situation? — Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

Yes. You just need a very long train track :D Possible worlds theory allows this. — I like sushi

Ah, when you said earlier "to stop every other human life on the planet being snuffed out" I thought you meant the other 8 billion lives on earth in this actual world that we live in. But if you want to bring in possible worlds ...

It's easy to imagine a very long train track. Conceiving of this possible world coherently, in a way that benefits your case, is harder.

A. We could have a possible world with only six people, five of whom will be killed if the trolley is not diverted. Maybe. In a world with six rational inhabitants, is it really possible that their civilization developed highly enough to build trains? Okay, maybe their ancestors built the trains, and these six are just a remnant left over after some horrible disaster. But in any case, we are back down to the same numbers as before, so the pressure to "save 8 billion people" does not apply here.

B. Or a world with 8 billion people, all standing on a very long train track, and all lacking the sense to get out of the way of a massive, rapidly moving object. With the laws of physics in the actual world, this train would begin plowing into the people, but then it would slow down and halt, because of friction and conservation of momentum (or maybe of energy). So in this possible world, we do not have those physical laws. But if there is no friction, trains would not work, and people would not have built them. In fact, without friction and conservation law(s), human beings could not exist. If there is any rational life in such a world, their natures would be so radically different from ours that perhaps our moral laws would not apply to them.

C. Of course, there are many other possible worlds, but it is up to you to describe one, if you want to, in sufficient detail that pushing someone onto a track to save all other human life would make sense.

That's all I have time to say for tonight.

How about being in a position where you push someone onto the track to stop every other human life on the planet being snuffed out? — I like sushi

Is that even a possible situation? I believe morality is about how we should act in actual or possible situations. If you think this is a possible situation, please explain how it would work.

Would you push a fat guy off a bridge to stop a train that was going to kill 5 people? If not then how exactly is this different from flicking a switch? — I like sushi

No. Assuming that the fat guy's body is meant to stop or slow down the train, it is different because it violates the condition that the bad effect must not be the means of achieving the good effect.

Harvesting the organs of someone to save 10 lives assuming there is no other availble means to save these 10 lives? — I like sushi

If you're asking me if I would do this or recommend doing it, then, assuming that means killing the donor, the answer is no.

Intentionality is not what you think it is if we're going to talk philosophically. Intentionality is about our mental states when those mental states are directed towards, say, objects, events, fantasy, etc. — L'éléphant

I am aware that 'intentionality' has that meaning, in the context of philosophy of mind. In the context of ethics, it has also another meaning, the quality of being intended, done deliberately or voluntarily (see also 'intend'). Perhaps I used the wrong word, but in any case let's not dispute about words! I will rephrase the condition, quoting from SEP's article Double Effect, which in turn quotes from The New Catholic Encyclopedia :

"2. The agent may not positively will the bad effect but may permit it. If he could attain the good effect without the bad effect he should do so. The bad effect is sometimes said to be indirectly voluntary."

So what I have been trying to say is that in flipping the switch, although I would be foreseeing and permitting the bad effect, F's death, I would not be positively intending, willing, desiring, aiming at it.

But I disagree with your analysis here. Anytime we act knowing that our action will result in something, that's intentional. Intentionality is about directional action. Yes, you do intend to switch the track and yes you do know what would happen. — L'éléphant

Perhaps we are not understanding "intentional" in the same sense? As I understand the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), intention is what we want to happen. If the person throwing the switch wants F to die, that's murder. If he doesn't, that's another matter; the death is not intended.

Maybe you are understanding "intend" in the sense of "deciding to do something, knowing it will have a certain effect", whether you desire that effect or not?

Sorry, but the death of F is a means of saving A-E. It is because the scenario makes sure that by switching the track F dies. If somehow you are adding a "chance" here of F surviving, then, you are essentially changing the rules.

No, the causation works like this:
Switching the track causes the train not to hit A-E, saving their lives.
Switching the track also causes F to die.
F's being killed, and A-E's being saved, are both results of the same cause, switching the track.

It is like, if a doctor prescribes a medicine to treat high blood pressure, and the patient's blood pressure is lowered, but patient also experiences a side effect of, say, a skin rash. It's not that the lower blood pressure causes skin rash, or the skin rash causes lower blood pressure; rather, both are effects of the medication.

Incidentally, this example also illustrates the distinction about intention: the doctor intends to lower blood pressure, does not intend the skin rash, but prescribes the medicine, even knowing that there is a risk of side effects, either because the risk is low (most patients do not get a skin rash) or the side effect is minor and is outweighed by the greater good of lowering blood pressure.

And finally, morality by numbers is grave for me -- killing one person is equally as grave because F was not destined here to die if we allowed the trolley to continue its path.

I'm not quite sure what you mean here: one death is as bad as five? But perhaps we should leave this issue aside until/unless we can come to agreement on the previous two.

According to PDE, an act which has both good and bad effects is permissible provided that:

The act itself is morally good or indifferent: it is not an evil kind of act.
The bad effect is merely foreseen, not intended; it is permitted, not willed.
The bad effect is not a means to achieve the good effect.
The good effect must be a proportionally grave reason for permitting the bad effect.
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

This is a roundabout way of saying "the end justifies the means". If that's your idea, then you are correct, I misunderstood you. So, yes, I don't hold this principle. — L'éléphant

It depends on what "the end justifies the means" means. Double effect is a roundabout way of saying the end sometimes justifies the means, and specifies what conditions determine those times. It is not a way of saying the end always justifies the means; in fact, it denies that. Conditions 1-3 rule out that possibility.

Typically, when one says "the end justifies the means," what one means is that a greater good always justifies any action (means) to achieve it, no matter how intrinsically evil the action might be (Machiavelli, for instance).

I still answer, not to switch the track even if it means saving five people. Sacrifice of one life in order to save other lives is never, to me, a sound moral choice. The reason being that I would intentionally kill one person. So I am agreeing with ↪Gregory of the Beard of Ockham. — L'éléphant

If you thought you were agreeing with me, I'm afraid you have misunderstood. Since what I have said was not sufficiently clear, I will elaborate. I am operating with the Principle of Double Effect (PDE). Let's name the potential victims on the first track A, B, C, D, E (for short, A-E), and the potential victim on the second track F.

According to PDE, an act which has both good and bad effects is permissible provided that:

1. The act itself is morally good or indifferent: it is not an evil kind of act.
2. The bad effect is merely foreseen, not intended; it is permitted, not willed.
3. The bad effect is not a means to achieve the good effect.
4. The good effect must be a proportionally grave reason for permitting the bad effect.

Now, I would throw the switch from track 1 to track 2. This satisfies the four conditions because:

1. The action of throwing a railroad switch is morally indifferent (unlike, say, committing adultery or bearing false witness).
2. I do not intend the death of F. If it were possible to save F as well as A-E I would certainly want to do so.
3. The death of F is not the means of saving A-E. If the switch were thrown to track 2 and F somehow removed from danger, A-E would still be saved.
4. The saving of five lives is a sufficiently grave reason for permitting the loss of one life. We have a net "save" of four lives.

This is not a case of "intentionally killing one person." If we had to intentionally kill F to save A-E, for example by throwing his dead body onto the track to stop or slow down the trolley, that would violate condition 2 of PDE, and it would be impermissible.

Agreed, the unforeseen good consequences of a bad (badly intended) act may suggest mitigation of punishment or even a full pardon, but the act itself was still bad.

Sure, acts with bad intentions can accidentally have good outcomes. I guess we agree that they are still bad? Likewise, acts with good intentions can accidentally have bad outcomes.

With this, the classic trolley problem is solved.

1. A train is on a track to kill five people. You have the option to switch the track, but there is one person on the other track who will die instead. The capabilities or moral impetus of each individual is unkown.
There are no social ramifications or consequences for your actions. What do you do?

Answer: You throw the switch every time. If the existential value of each individual is unknown, the only reasonable conclusion is to assume all are equivalent. Thus saving five people vs one person is the objectively correct choice each time. — Philosophim

For me it is solved, but more complicated. What is my intention in throwing the switch? It must be to save the five, not to kill the one. Killing the one must be a foreseen, but not intended, consequence. If I'm intending to kill the one, then it is murder.

I missed the previous discussion, so apologies if I'm saying something out of context. I read your nine-point summary and did not see anything I definitely disagreed with, though there were some points I did not understand. I definitely agree that existence is good.

I'm surprised no one has followed up on this topic in two years.

As for paying attention, I thought I was, but I must have missed something.

If I have now understand you correctly, you're willing to be receptive to ethical arguments, even though you think they are subjective?

This statement comes as a shock to me, and I hope I am misunderstanding it:

there is no such thing as a right action. — Darkneos

Because when I read in your original post,

I’ve struggled to find a good argument against suicide that doesn’t involve either nonsense or special pleading to life or hindsight bias.

The way I see it if there is no greater reason to meaning to life then there isn’t really a reason to keep going. Not reason to really struggle and fight for a place in the world. No reason to really pursue anything. One can just end their life and be done with the pursuit and struggle. — Darkneos

(emphasis added), I thought you were (implicitly) asking for an ethical argument. But if there is no right action, no distinction between right and wrong, there can be no ethical reasons, no (sound) ethical argument.

If no ethical reasons, what kind of reasons are left that one could give? It seems to me that the only other possible response would be to appeal to the emotions and motivations of the person contemplating suicide. Am I missing something?

Those kinds of reasons are highly variable: what appeals to one person will not appeal to another. And a person who is deeply depressed has minimal motivation to do anything, except maybe to die. So the whole "argument" would decline into subjectivity, and that would not be philosophy, which aims at objective truth.

What was this kind of question doing in a philosophical forum? Was the first sentence of the first response possibly the only one that should have been made?

This discussion doesn’t belong here. — T Clark

(although T Clark could not have known that from the O.P.)

If you ask for an argument against suicide, but then you don't want to hear ethical arguments, isn't it like saying "prove that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles", but please don't use the axioms of geometry?

Unfortunately I have allowed myself to become distracted by a needless dispute about words.

The main point I was trying to make, long ago, before Christmas, was that while

@Corvus was saying that (1) there is something, namely the state of being dead, which lasts forever;
@AmadeusD was saying (2) there is something, namely the act or process of dying, which lasts but a moment;

statements (1) and (2) are by no means contradictory, although it seemed to them that they were contradicting each other, because Corvus wanted to call (1) "death", and AmadeusD wanted to call (2) "death", and either one or both of them thought that "death" only meant that one thing and nothing else.
I stand by the claim that "death" has both meanings, but I don't want to dispute about it any further.

You need more than bluster.
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

Pretty cool that I gave much, much more than this. — AmadeusD

In context, what I said was:

my post linked to a site quoting American Heritage Dictionary supporting two (actually more than two) meanings for "death". What's your evidence to the contrary? You need more than bluster. — Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

You may have given heaps more, but the crucial thing you did not supply was any evidence to support your idea that "death" only means the one thing that you say it can only mean. Unless you are able to provide that, I don't see any point in continuing to discuss this issue with you. To be honest, I am in some doubt as to whether it would be worthwhile to discuss anything with you. So I will just conclude with saying Gloria in excelsis Deo, et in terra pax hominibus bonae voluntatis: Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace to people of good will. If that fits, wear it well.

:up:

And by the way, my post linked to a site quoting American Heritage Dictionary supporting two (actually more than two) meanings for "death". What's your evidence to the contrary? You need more than bluster.

That's not semantics. "death" is an event. "being dead" is not "death". — AmadeusD

With the same breath, you deny it is semantics, and insist that "death" means only one thing?

"Death" can mean
1 the act of dying
2 the state of being dead

https://www.wordnik.com/words/death

@AmadeusD has been using the word in sense 1, @corvus in sense 2.
Aren't you guys tired of quarreling over semantics?

You've simply changed the basis of the analogy. The entire point is that a child/pet/person is not a book. Ownership of a Pet does not entail you can do those things. Ownership of a book does — AmadeusD

Sorry, I don't know what analogy you want me to make. But it looks like we are agreeing that in whatever sense I "own" the life of a human being, whether my own or a child's, it does not give me the same kind of rights to do whatever I want with it, as if it were a book or another piece of material property. And that's all I was aiming for, really.

Aside from this:

But I wanted to put owning a life into a context that made it clearer, IMO, how absurd the idea of owning one's own life is. — Ludwig V

If someone owns a life, that is slavery. — Ludwig V

which was a very real thing back in the day and thoroughly wicked, but of course that's not what we're talking about here. Ludwig V is right to point out that whenever we speak of "owning" somebody or somebody's life, unless we do mean slavery, there is something odd about this sort of speech. It is not univocal with "owning" a car, a house, a picture, or even a pet.

After thinking about it it's not that I want to die, it's that I don't another way of dealing with my present situation. — Darkneos

When I first read your reply I thought you were in a better state than before, and I was happy for you. Then it occurred to me that the missing word after "don't" would most likely be "see".

I take it you are no longer interested in answers to the OP, "to find a good argument against suicide". Some people continuing the discussion here, after its nine months lapse, are no longer trying to answer that; they are more intent on finding conditions in which they think suicide is justified.

It sounds like what you need now, more than philosophical wisdom, is prudent practical advice. May God lead you to good counsel to lift you out of your present situation.

QUOTE
Run the same argument with a pet and you get my position, legally.

'If I may not kill the child whose life I "own", it's not clear why "owning" my "own" life as an adult would mean I may kill myself.'
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

Because one is you, and one is not. By analogy. when you hold funds in trust, you cannot bankrupt the trust. You can bankrupt yourself at leisure.
UNQUOTE

I think both analogies fail.

1. "Run the same argument with a pet and you get my position, legally."

You mean like this? "If I own a book, I may cut it up, beat it without mercy, burn it, sell it to another. I may not do that with my child." (My words) Substitute pet for book: "If I own a pet, I may cut it up, beat it without mercy, burn it, sell it to another. I may not do that with my child."

(a) In many jurisdictions, those activities, except for selling, would get you in trouble with laws against cruelty to animals, and even where there are no such laws , those actions are immoral. True, you may euthanize a dying pet, but even with pets there are limits to what "ownership" allows us to do.

(b) More importantly, you are a human being, an animal with a rational nature. Your pet is not. That is a critical difference and makes the child far more analogous to you than the pet.

Incidentally, I'm wondering why you chose to qualify your position as something I would get "legally". I thought we were discussing a moral issue.

Or did you mean this? Substitute pet for child: "If I own a book, I may cut it up, beat it without mercy, burn it, sell it to another. I may not do that with my pet."
I don't see how that gets me to your position, legally or otherwise.

2. "Because one is you, and one is not. By analogy, when you hold funds in trust, you cannot bankrupt the trust. You can bankrupt yourself at leisure."

Agreed, you cannot, legally or morally, deliberately bankrupt the trust. But can you bankrupt yourself so freely? If you deliberately accumulate more debt than you can pay, it is the same as stealing. It is unjust to the debtors, and likely violates a duty towards yourself as well.

'Sorry if I used the phrase incorrectly. I meant "raises another question"''

Okay, so you punned. No problem! I recently read something about people not understanding the phrase, so I wanted to be sure you understood, and now I know.

Did you understand that by "begging the question" I meant the logical fallacy of assuming what was to be proved? For it seemed to me you were making an implicit argument concluding that suicide is (sometimes) morally permissible. But then in your reply you used "begs the question" in another sense.

"[Who owns a life?]. The owner. This seems to essentially mean between ages of about 0-16, the parents of that child (or, their caretaker/s. We seem to legally agree with this position). After that, it is the person who is living the life in question. They are free to do as they please with their life (hint: Not other's lives, which will come into play for 3.);"

Yet parents do not "own" their children in the same way they own material things. If I own a book, I may cut it up, beat it without mercy, burn it, sell it to another. I may not do that with my child.

If I may not kill the child whose life I "own", it's not clear why "owning" my "own" life as an adult would mean I may kill myself.

Perhaps it is not safe to assume that any of us owns *any* life, even the one we call our "own."

"How dare you judge them." People who judge that suicide is wrong are judging a kind of act. They are not necessarily judging any *person*. You yourself, I hope, will agree that judging an act is morally okay, because in that very sentence you were judging an act of judging.

"they were the most moral person I ever knew."

Seems to me this is begging the question. "They" may be the most moral person you ever knew *except* (possibly) in the matter of suicide. So then *if* suicide is okay, then yes, they were very good. But if suicide is horribly wrong and they did it, then they also did something horribly wrong. Same as a man who is morally upright in every way except that he rapes young girls. I won't deny that your person was very conscientious and did what they *thought* was right, but so do people who commit horrible crimes against humanity for the sake of some twisted political ideology.

"I've struggled to find a good argument against suicide ...."

Your OP lists some kinds of answers you would consider *not* acceptable, but it is not clear to me what kind of answers you *would* accept.

You received many responses, most within the framework of hedonistic materialism, and you've rejected all of those, maybe with good reason. By hedonistic materialism, I mean: pleasure is good, pain is bad, nothing else is good or bad except as leading to pleasure or pain; there is no God, no immortal soul: when we die, we cease to exist. Is that the framework you also are operating under? Would you be open to answers that question or deviate from those ethical premises---for example, Kantian or other deontologies, virtue ethics, natural law, non-hedonistic consequentialism? Or questioning the materialistic assumptions? It seems you've poo-pooed metaphysics, but it is important to realize that materialism, too, is a metaphysic.

Or maybe you are not looking for an ethical answer at all, but only considerations of "self-interest":
egoistic, what some would call "prudential" reasons? Do you think there is an objective rightness or wrongness about suicide, and if there is, do you care?

No apologies needed: most of it was red herrings and ad hominems. — Bob Ross

I read this at breakfast yesterday and felt it was très à propos:

'Can we then get benefit ... even from one who reviles us?'

Why, what good does the athlete get from the man who wrestles with him? The greatest. So my reviler helps to train me for the contest: he trains me to be patient, dispassionate, gentle. You deny it? You admit that the man who grips my neck and gets my loins and shoulders into order does me good, and the trainer does well to bid me 'lift the pestle with both hands', and the more severe he is, the more good do I get: and are you going to tell me that he who trains me to be free from anger does me no good? That means that you do not know how to get any good from humankind.

---Discourses of Epictetus, Book III, Chapter XX, translated by P. E. Matheson.

Thanks for clarifying. I thought I had another question after those, but I'm finding it really hard to put into words.

Gender theory views 'sex' as 'the biological characteristics of a being that defines its procreative role in the species', whereas 'gender' is 'the socially constructed roles, identities, and expressions of people'.

The problems with this theory are as follows:

1. The divorcing of sex and gender renders gender as merely a personality type that someone could assume, which is an ahistorical account of gender.

2. The very social norms, roles, identities, and expressions involved in gender that are studied in gender studies are historically the symbolic upshot of sex: they are not divorced from each other. E.g., the mars symbol represents maleness, flowers in one's hair is representational of femininity, etc.). If they are truly divorced, then the study collapses into a study of the indefinite personality types of people could express and the roles associated with them. — Bob Ross

There are a couple of things I would like to understand better here.

1. When you say divorcing sex and gender makes for "an ahistorical account", do you mean it is an account that does not agree with the historical usage of the term 'gender'?---as when Charles Dickens in the first page of David Copperfield referred to "unlucky infants of either gender", meaning either sex (a phrase which struck me sharply on the nose, for I had been protesting to myself that gender is an attribute of words, not of people).

Or do you mean, as some people here (don't remember who) seem to have thought, that it was disconnected from queer history and the like?

2. I am not sure what you mean by 'the symbolic upshot of sex'. The Mars symbol ( ♂ U+2642 MALE SIGN = Mars, alchemical sign for iron) is of course a symbol, but it seems quite arbitrary that it is attached to the male sex, or for that matter to Mars or iron.

When you refer to "the very social norms, roles, identities, and expressions ... that are studied in gender studies", it would seem more relevant to give as examples typical or stereotypical male or female behaviors, such as dominance or submissiveness, interest in things or interest in people.

I've read through the first 7 pages of this discussion and encountered a lot of noise, along with a few gems. Apologies if skipping the next 10 has made me miss anything relevant to my inquiries.

Thanks for the link to "Judith Butler on Gender Performativity." Most illuminating (in a dark sort of way, if you know what I mean).

Recently: Plato's Gorgias, parts of Epictetus's Discourses.

Currently: David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, for the second time in way too many years. Zane Grey, Riders of the Purple Sage.

So I'll optimistically start with an argument for

1. Slavery is not always, necessarily, or in all forms evil; God permitted it because some forms of slavery are just.

From the beginning the Christian moralist did not condemn slavery as in se, or essentially, against the natural law or natural justice. The fact that slavery, tempered with many humane restrictions, was permitted under the Mosaic law would have sufficed to prevent the institution form being condemned by Christian teachers as absolutely immoral. They, following the example of St. Paul, implicitly accept slavery as not in itself incompatible with the Christian Law. The apostle counsels slaves to obey their masters, and to bear with their condition patiently. This estimate of slavery continued to prevail till it became fixed in the systematized ethical teaching of the schools; and so it remained without any conspicuous modification till towards the end of the eighteenth century. We may take as representative de Lugo's statement of the chief argument offered in proof of the thesis that slavery, apart from all abuses, is not in itself contrary to the natural law.

'Slavery consists in this, that a man is obliged, for his whole life, to devote his labour and services to a master. Now as anybody may justly bind himself, for the sake of some anticipated reward, to give his entire services to a master for a year, and he would in justice be bound to fulfil this contract, why may not he bind himself in like manner for a longer period, even for his entire lifetime, an obligation which would constitute slavery? (De Justitia et Jure, disp. VI, sec. 2. no. 14.)'

It must be observed that the defence of what may be termed theoretical slavery was by no means intended to be a justification of slavery as it existed historically, with all its attendant, and almost inevitably attendant, abuses, disregarding the natural rights of the slave and entailing pernicious consequences on the character of the slave-holding class, as well as on society in general.

---Catholic Encyclopedia, Ethical Aspect of Slavery

What do you think?

I've been away from the forum for a while due to family obligations, which will likely make my presence here continue to be irregular for several months or so more.

Going back to the issue of slavery, if you agree with me that the legislation in the Torah ameliorates it, there seem to be three ways to argue in defense of God as portrayed in those books:

1. Slavery is not always, necessarily, or in all forms evil; God permitted it because some forms of slavery are just.

2. Although what we understand by the English word "slavery" is unjust, the Hebrew word translated as "slavery" refers to a different practice which was not necessarily unjust.

3. Even if slavery in all its forms is unjust, God could permit it without being a consequentialist.

It is possible that #1 and #2 are related, e.g., maybe everything properly called "slavery" in English is unjust, but some things called by the Hebrew word thus translated are not unjust.

I am utterly unqualified to say anything definitive about #2, due to my lack of knowledge both of the Hebrew and the rabbinic tradition, to which Hanover has drawn our attention:

Then let's talk about your insistence upon looking only at the text. That isn't the Jewish tradition. They rely upon the oral tradition that was eventually written down in the Talmud, which has as much priority as the Torah for explaining all these things. That is, subtracting out the rabbinic tradition from the source material is not how the source material is supposed to be understood by those who are relying upon it. — Hanover

Because what God said to them cannot be separated from what they understood. I would be glad if he or others familiar with that tradition would be able to help us out here.

Appearance of bear when there is no bear: subjective. In your terms: exists, but not real.
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham
The confusion is real in the sense that it affects you somehow. But I distinguish between this real and the real in my first comment. All our experiences are real in this sense.

Imagining a unicorn: ditto
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham
Imagining a unicorn is another activity. — MoK

Please let me know if you are happy with what I said. — MoK

Happy with what you say, MoK.

And the definition of exists depends on the definition of reality, so the combination is circular.
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham
Correct. So, I need to provide an example to illustrate what I mean by "exist". When something, such as a human, exists, it is a part of reality. By reality, I mean the set of all objects, whether mental or non-mental. Mental objects, such as experiencing the red color of a rose, and non-mental objects, such as a cup of tea. So, something can be unreal yet still exist, such as an experience. In the same manner, something can be real and exist, such as matter. Something that does not exist cannot be real. And eventually, nothing is defined as something that does not exist and is not real. I have to say, making the distinction between existence and real started from a post by me that from which Bob agreed that evil exists, but it is not real. The story is long, so please read the discussion if you are interested. — MoK

Okay, thanks for clarifying. "Is Real" = exists objectively. "Exists" may be subjective or objective.

Yes, I knew you were having that discussion with Bob Ross, and it was confusing me because I didn't understand your terms.

For example, I seem to be seeing a bear in the woods, but it is only a tree stump, or I am imagining a unicorn, both merely subjective; versus there really being a bear in the woods?
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham
I don't understand how this example is proper to what you said before? Do you mind elaborating?

Appearance of bear when there is no bear: subjective. In your terms: exists, but not real.

Imagining a unicorn: ditto

Seeing the bear which is really in the woods: objective. In your terms: exists, and is real.

I hope I've got that straight!

So far we have five senses of death:

Death can mean various things. (1) When a person stops breathing and the heart stops beating and soon the body begins to decay, people say "he is dead," without necessarily understanding what death is, i.e., its essence. (2) Traditionally, death is understood as the separation of the soul from the body. This is called the First Death in Christian theology. (3) There is also the Second Death, when the soul is separated eternally from God (goes to hell). (4) In 1968, the Harvard Medical School promoted the concept of "brain death", ....
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

I'd like to add another description of death to your list:
(5) When a person is dead to God. When a person ceased to exist to God. — GregW

It is not clear to me how (5) is different from (3), unless maybe you believe that God destroys, i.e. literally annihilates the soul in (5)? To my understanding, "separated eternally from God" and "dead to God" are the same thing.

... but in an ethical discussion about murder, we must understand death in the right sense. GregW thinks (3) is the appropriate sense of death for murder.
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

No. I do not think that (3) and (5) are the appropriate sense of death for murder. Murder can only be committed by people, not God. The death described in sense (3) and (5) are the prerogatives only of God, it is not murder.

But this cannot be correct, for it is beyond the power of any human being to put another to death in sense (3). How, then, did Cain kill his brother (Genesis 4:8)? How did Lamech slay one or two men (4:23)? How did Moses kill the Egyptian (Exodus 2:12)?
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

Yes, it is beyond the power of any human being to put another to death in sense (3), but Cain, Lamech, and Moses did murder, kill, and cause death in sense (1), (2) and (4).

Okay, we agree that human beings commit murder by causing death in senses 1, 2, 4 (except I would not include 4 because it is not true death). However, I was under the impression that elsewhere you were saying God did not commit murder when He put someone to death in sense 1, 2, or 4, but only if He killed someone in sense 3 or 5. Maybe I misunderstood, but if that was what you meant, is that not an equivocation?

Why is there a commandment against murder (Gen. 9:5-7, Ex. 20:13)? It is pointless to prohibit what cannot be done.
— Gregory of the Beard of Ockham

There is a commandment against murder because God did not want us to murder, kill, and cause death without His sanction. It is not pointless for God to prohibit murder as described by (1), (2), and (4).

And why would that commandment not apply to God himself in senses 1, 2, 4?

Real is defined as: actually existing as a thing. Existence is defined as: The state of having objective reality. So the definition of real depends on the definition of existence. — MoK

And the definition of exists depends on the definition of reality, so the combination is circular.

Is the distinction you're trying to make here between objective reality and merely subjective experience? For example, I seem to be seeing a bear in the woods, but it is only a tree stump, or I am imagining a unicorn, both merely subjective; versus there really being a bear in the woods?

(a) Abortion is prohibited after 6 weeks of pregnancy not resulting from rape or incest.

(I couldn't remember what (a) said.)

(a') Abortion is prohibited after six weeks of pregnancy.

Yes, b’ is immoral to endorse: it positively affirms abortion; whereas a’ does not. — Bob Ross

I think that, in answer to my question, "wouldn't you also have to say that (a') is condoning abortion during the first six weeks?", your "Yes" meant "No", because you went on to say "a' does not."

I take it that your objection to (a) is because (a) positively mentions exceptions for rape and incest, but you do not similarly object to (a') because it does not positively mention an "exception" for before 6 weeks, although it implicitly allows it because it only prohibits after 6 weeks?

Similarly, then, your objection to the legislation concerning slavery is that even if it greatly ameliorates the evils of how slavery is practiced, it still recognizes a right of masters to own slaves? And where exactly does it say this?

In support of the idea that voting for an abortion law with narrow exceptions would not be consequentialist, I was wanting to quote that arch-anticonsequentialist, John Paul II, but for a few days I could not find the text. Here it is:

A particular problem of conscience can arise in cases where a legislative vote would be decisive for the passage of a more restrictive law, aimed at limiting the number of authorized abortions, in place of a more permissive law already passed or ready to be voted on. Such cases are not infrequent. It is a fact that while in some parts of the world there continue to be campaigns to introduce laws favouring abortion, often supported by powerful international organizations, in other nations-particularly those which have already experienced the bitter fruits of such permissive legislation-there are growing signs of a rethinking in this matter. In a case like the one just mentioned, when it is not possible to overturn or completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal opposition to procured abortion was well known, could licitly support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. This does not in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects. ---Evangelium Vitae, sec. 73

He says "aimed at limiting the harm", without saying anything about the precise wording.

I would argue that If God go and kill someone it isn't murder because they haven't truly died since their soul is immutable and ends up in heaven to face God's judgement. — GregW

If you are using my definition and leveraging that God is not murdering people because they can't truly die, then no one ever commits murder. — Bob Ross

You are equivocating the killing of a person in the natural sense of the body dying and the soul be killed. — Bob Ross

There is no equivocating, when you are dead to God, you are truly dead body and soul.

We apparently disagree on the definition of death. What is your definition of death? — GregW

Death can mean various things. (1) When a person stops breathing and the heart stops beating and soon the body begins to decay, people say "he is dead," without necessarily understanding what death is, i.e., its essence. (2) Traditionally, death is understood as the separation of the soul from the body. This is called the First Death in Christian theology. (3) There is also the Second Death, when the soul is separated eternally from God (goes to hell). (4) In 1968, the Harvard Medical School promoted the concept of "brain death", allowing organs to be harvested for transplant while they are still fresh because the patient's (donor's) heart and lungs are still functioning. (See David S. Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach, sec. 2.7.) And there may be others.

Mathematicians can define their terms as they like, but in an ethical discussion about murder, we must understand death in the right sense. GregW thinks (3) is the appropriate sense of death for murder. But this cannot be correct, for it is beyond the power of any human being to put another to death in sense (3). How, then, did Cain kill his brother (Genesis 4:8)? How did Lamech slay one or two men (4:23)? How did Moses kill the Egyptian (Exodus 2:12)? Why is there a commandment against murder (Gen. 9:5-7, Ex. 20:13)? It is pointless to prohibit what cannot be done.

I'm having trouble seeing a real distinction between (a) and m(a). It seems to me they say the same thing, just different words. You yourself say they are "basically saying the same thing ... for practical purposes." The purpose of a law is to regulate actions, and if two laws (or two formulations of a law) would prohibit and permit the same actions, don't they then fulfill the same purpose equally?

But suppose we omit the "not resulting" part:

(a') Abortion is prohibited after six weeks of pregnancy.
(b') A woman has a right to an abortion during the first 6 weeks of pregnancy.
For the same reason that you thought (a) was condoning abortion in cases of rape and incest, wouldn't you also have to say that (a') is condoning abortion during the first six week? If not, why?

I hold God to a higher standard then myself; because, as you noted, we may tolerate laws because we don’t have the power and freedom to inspire what we really think. Can we agree on that? — Bob Ross

We can agree to hold God to at least as high a standard as ourselves. Whether higher, I feel a little doubt, because Christ says "You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matthew 5:48, RSV). A king or a president has more power and freedom than I, but must uphold the same moral standards. I'm not responsible for what I can't do. So I don't think God's power and freedom entail that He should be held to a higher standard; only that He can do more to fulfill that standard than I can.