I am skeptical that there is any one ultimate "purpose" which is the sole source of feelings of meaning and significance in our lives. It seems to me that there is a plurality of factors - friends and family, love, personal projects, beauty, knowledge, sports, etc. - that contribute to the flourishing of a human life which we might very well not be able to ground in some ultimate purpose in a way that is not trivial.

Now given that we recognize this plurality of values, there are a couple of things one might ask. First, one might inquire what is the source of our association of values with these experiences or activities and I think this question is one that might be most aptly answered by some evolutionary account. Further phenomenological analyses might also bring light to what it is exactly that we value about different experiences.

Secondly, someone who is currently feeling down and unable to find value in their own life might hope for an answer or medicine for their plight. These people I would first and foremost refer to psychotherapists and other experts who might best be able to diagnose their particular problems and help them solve their own problems. It is also possible that these people might find solace in some life philosophy, such as stoicism or existentialism, but I find it equally likely that the key to their lock might be found in a number of different activies like painting, running or reconnecting with nature.

Thirdly, one might ask the properly philosophical questions "But what really makes for a meaningful life?" or "How should we live?". The answers to these questions might identify ways to live that differ in significant ways from the previous list of experiences and activities that we find valuable. For example, an extreme utilitarian might possibly think it appropriate to devalue their families and commit their lives to producing "the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest amount of people". Nevertheless, I personally find that the most convincing answers to these questions are ones that, in addition to perhaps offering some ethical imperatives, recognize what we already find valuable and offer us ways to better manage these sources of value, as I find the case to be with Aristotle's works on ethics.

Presuming that you do dislike this particular argument from Putnam against BIV-type skepticism, could you maybe elaborate on your disagreements a bit? I have encountered this line only a couple of times and would like to discuss possible criticisms of it. I must preface this by saying that I do find Putnam's argument a bit odd as it seems to me clearly possible for us to discuss the possibility of us being BIVs even if our words might not have a well-defined referent - we seem to able to understand and intelligently talk about the situation via analogy.

Well I am not sure if I have persuasive or great reasons or arguments against solipsism but I must say that I nevertheless do harbor a strong belief in the existence of the external world. Do you find solipsism to be persuasive and if so, how would you argue for it?

I also totally agree with comment, especially when it comes to it being unhelpful to define "objectivity" as something like mind-independence and thereby closing off our epistemic access to it.

Another question I have is that if the OP defined objectivity this way and thus denounced it impossible, would it also not be sensible to go all the way and deny "shared subjective" (intersubjective) knowledge as well since you arguable have no more access to other people's experiences than you have to the Kantian noumena? How do you deny objective knowledge on the basis of epistemic access and yet hold on to intersubjective knowledge despite not, strictly speaking, having access to that either?

Of course one can simply define intersubjective knowledge in a solipsistic framework as that which seems to us to be shared by other people but then I think there is probably also room and theoretical utility to define objective knowledge in the same framework as something that is even stronger (e.g. "subject/pov-invariant, language-invariant, gauge-invariant AND fallibilistic" as suggested).

The shared subjective truths are often referred to as "objective truths" but are not actually objective. — Truth Seeker

What do you mean by these truths not being actually objective? How would you characterize these supposed "objective truths"?

Edit: I am at least partly on board when it comes to analyzing what we call objective truths in terms of intersubjectively validated experiences but I want to clarify what it is exactly you are doing when you are denying that "actual objective truths" exist.

Hi,

Silghtly off-topic I suppose, but I've found these sorts of Aristotelian "human good" accounts of morality, which I take you to be espousing, to be persuasive recently so I would like to ask whether you have made some posts previously elaborating and maybe formalizing these views to any larger extent? If not, are there any resources you would recommend for seeking out these views - both their proponents and critics?

I would also like to ask, how would you go about determining what is the "human good" which grounds our morality? I suppose - like the example you gave about rancid food - we are already biologically hardwired to find certain things to be "bad" but to what extent is this "human good" shared among different people and how much room is there for variation among individuals' "goods"?

Finally, in terms of metaethics, is this a subjectivist or an objectivist position on the reality of moral claims? It seems that it takes ethics to be grounded on the "human good" which we all share qua being human but do or would different types of creatures have different "ethics" due to plausibly having their own good that is distinct from the human good?

Enjoyed reading your answers.

Interesting analogy which may or may not withstand further investigation.

I would like to point out that the OP is titled "All Ethics are Relative" but it is actually unclear from the post how exactly this conclusion - if it is the one the OP wanted to draw - follows from what is said. You seem to be pointing out a possibly plausible explanation grounded in biological/neurochemical facts for why people take certain stances on so-called ethical questions (such as the abortion debate). In other words, one might ask how does there being a naturalistic explanation for our ethical behavior imply that matters of ethics are relative in the normative sense (given that most people seems to already grant that ethics are relative in the descriptive sense). I am sure most naturalist realists - and probably even most non-naturalists - would grant this premise and yet still hold that there are objective moral facts.

Perhaps one could argue that given the existence of a naturalistic explanation for our ethical behavior, it would be surprising that there are additionally objective moral facts that go with these behaviors but this is a further argument in need of a defense of its own.

Given that we acknowledge that we sometimes make mistakes in conversation, we must in some way - I won't attempt here to say just how - be able to identify in reflection when we are mistaken. It then seems that by being careful enough in conversation and pausing to reflect on what has been discussed, we should similarly be able to identify whether we have gone astray in the present as we have done in the past. If we aren't able to decide whether we are somehow misguided in our present conversation by reflecting on our prior mistakes, we might want to pause and ask "what am I actually arguing for, based on what premises, and how could they turn out to be false?"

What one knows is what has been. What another knows one might learn if one pays attention quietly to what they are saying without rehearsing what one knows over, to compare. Your question arises when there is a conflict. One thinks one knows and then discovers that one was wrong, and there is no conflict if one is ready to learn. Only if one tries to hold on to one's knowing does the conflict arise. So one learns that a conflicted mind is the infallible sign. — unenlightened

This reply seems insightful to me: if you approach conversation topics by trying to learn instead of trying to hold on to and state what you already take to know, you cannot be mistaken as there are no stupid questions (at least to some extent).