so how far are we supposed to take it? — substantivalism

To the point that it is helpful, or violates other norms to avoid harm.

I also don't think I'm taking it too far as much as abstracting the reasoning that people use to justify this. — substantivalism

Probably yes, but that will be read as either "too far" or "Strawman". I don't think either is the case, in reality. These are discussions, not podiums for election.

Once you enforce some group as the 'out' and another as the 'in'. . . human shenanigans follow. — substantivalism

But that is what society is, and does, on its face. I can't see that 'society' amounts to much else. I think you're maybe being insufficiently clear that we're talking about visible groups, not just groups. We have plenty of 'out' groups (like rapists) who are widely condemned, often attacked with impugnity etc... for good reasons (to clean up society in some way).

I'm not for legislating, which may be what you're getting at, but I am definitely for individuals having their wits about them and making discriminatory judgments wherever they can, provided they are not arbitrary. I accept the unfortunate reality of this leading to plenty of ill-informed or patently illogical personal discrimination. I take this to be hte price.

the real issue — substantivalism

What's that, to you?

Problem. . . solved? — substantivalism

Often, yes. Avoid each other. You can still be in the same class, but do you best not to interact for your own goods. Seems a reasonable remonstration.

But they say different things... Certain contexts will give us the same information from each, but they mean different things as explicitly set out above. Is that translation of the logic above wrong?

The same way "its not raining" and "its not not raining" do.

Things tell us things in orthogonal ways all the time. A certain smirk might tell me the same thing as a sentence. A statement about the shape of a knife might tell me the same thing as the shape of the smiths anvil etc... Transitivity, I guess, bluntly.

I think you're taking it a bit far. I do not think laws should discourage assimilation.
They should discourage the importing of harmful people. If there is a high percentage of certain crimes carried out by an identifiable group, we do tend to legislate against that potential.

Men are not allowed in women's bathrooms. But this is not to encourage dissent between men and women. It is to prevent conflict, as you note. But using your final example, we could perhaps encourage caution when there are obviously indicators. An obvious indicator would not be a burqa. Far more conversation needed to get that onto any reasonable ground. In principle though, profiling and caution are more than likely the bedrock supports society uses to avoid wholesale intrasocietal conflict.

I think you've got your Ps and Qs a little wrong(that is jest).

As I understand:

"◊P" = P might be true.
"◊¬P" = P might be false.

Which of course, often tell us hte same thing but are do not mean the same thing.

Just jumping in because some of these are issues I've particularly considered - actually, some lead me to getting into philosophy proper rather than pop phil. Apologies, and ignore, if its irritating..

And yes, a non-answer happens to be just as damning (or rather, the equivalent of one) in this particular corner you've painted, by the way. — Outlander

That is something happening inside your head. The Fifth exists to counter this exact erroneous reasoning. I do not htink that's a great argument, but it indicates that refusal to answer a question can only be described by excatly that... refusal to answer. It doesn't import any other assumption (or, shouldn't. The assumptions aren't the refuser's to answer to).

1.do you think there is still systemic racism in this country against blacks? Do you think2. the fact we've never had a woman president is indicative of anything? Do you think the fact that Congress and3. the leadership of Fortune500 companies are disproportionately made up of white males is indicative of anything? — RogueAI

Preface: I refuse, prima facie, to see a disparity and lay it at the feat of bigotry. I need more.

1. No. It seems pretty obviously not the case. Trump throws a spanner, but if he's framing whatever mght actually affect Blacks negatively (seems he's doing the opposite, mostly) as a corrective, it's very hard to not accept that given the argument the other way supporting DEI;

2. Yes. Indicates that there is a lot of historical context to support both:
- Why not many women have become electable (haven't had the chance);
- Why people have a hard time voting for women, generally (unfamiliarity or inapt familiarity such
as a doting or abusive mother).

3. Probably that White Males are closer to masoschists than most black americans. But there's a deeper issue - the havoc wrought by Blacks in their own communities (whether or not the conversation about 'origins' of that havoc occurs and is agreeable) prevents them from systematically terrorizing other communities. White Men seem to have the time and space to do this indiscriminately. So, two layers of "You could be better psychopaths" LMAO. Most women do not want to be top managers because of the absolutely unbearable burden on ones mind, time and energy. I do not think this weird. I think it a fairly normal response to the historical situation in which people have gained, roughly, equality.

And you, a free speech absolutist, say yes, shoot him. Which he does. Should you have been censored? Should you be subject to criminal/civil penalties? — tim wood

Very interested in this, as I have seen compelling versions of an ambulance at the bottom of the hill argument. I noted it earlier in the thread, I think. But I want to know if NOS4A2 is on that page, or whether he thinks that no result of speech acts can be admonishable. I should think that even a free speech absolutist would understand that your speech can cause things to happen.
As example for @NOS4A2 in law, we have "promissory estoppel". This is, essentially, a consequence which is disadvantageous to you, because you siad something that someone else relied on to carry out an action (usually entering a contract, but I digress). Is it your view that this is illegitimate? It is censorship by other means (still by Act, but applies to Lawyers specifically in context of being a lawyer doing law stuff).

Additionally, people like Jim Morrison found literally pursuing death life affirming. I can understand that, and so I can't quite understand the premises here in the same way.

A handful - though, majority are fluid about what they will 'accept' so to speak.
I have an odd relation with a 'sister' of mine.
She was my actual sister's partner from when I was 12 to when I was 26. She is a sister to me. However, about four years ago (after being absent from the country for several years) she decided she is now "they" and Charlie.
No issues with it. I guess my position is that you can't command me to use them. But in most cases, it would be socially decent. When things get argy-bargy i resile entirely from others expectations that I assent to their self image.

I believe that I am better positioned to make ethical decisions if i practice morality. I practice morality by aspiring to virtues. as do others who disagree with me on virtue considerations. the virtues are debatable, the premise is debatable. — Jeremy Murray

Yep. And that makes me extremely uncomfortable. Not that its 'wrong'. Can't quite see what's being got at here..

they are just repeating whatever is the dominant belief system. — Jeremy Murray

This is exactly hte pitfall I am decrying (though, i used a religious basis to illustrate it).

utilitarianism and deontology would prevent that, no? — Jeremy Murray

Sort of. But I am not partial to any of the three systems hereabouts noted.

I misread the poll.

I should've said 'no'. I don't htink they can ever be free from those influences.

But The debate is about the law — unenlightened

Correct. And (if accepted) the fact that biology gives us (at least one) "sex" which is universally applicable and attends to the interesting factors (obviously, transition changes this but I do not htink that legally relevant, for present purposes. A further discussion, to be sure, as indicated by my final lines previously) then we need a pretty damn good reason to move from this obviously legislatable framework, to one which is ambiguous, hard to understand and disparate (in terms of who accepts what premises of the legal framework - people took govts to court over allowing the relaxation of restriction, some are now taking it to court over reversing it). I could certianly have been clearer as to why I found it relevant, though so fair enough. Sorry about that.

Why is it bonkers? — frank

Because it doesn't tell us what we want to know (in the infinitesimal cases it cannot be understood immediately on-sight. Rare indeed). This doesn't even require that I have a position on it, either. It is simply not helpful. Susan Boyle might be caught up by that. Jeffery Starr would likely be (on converse sides to "sex") where there isn't an ambiguity for the person involved. Seems that this would lead to the exact problems the objections of the kind "What, you're going to check genitals at the door?" seem to point out (and reasonably)

Fear of coming on to a ladyboy, perhaps? — unenlightened

Setting aside the clear stab here(it was funny, so fine lol) I am bisexual, and married. LOL. I do not care what people look like, generally. The ambiguity means the rules are irrelevant. There is no restriction, in those cases because anyone can claim an identity and move along expecting you to assent to their self-image. If that seems reasonable, we don't have much ground on which we could talk about it.

I don't really know the history of people who advance this premise philosophically. — Jeremy Murray

here you go :)

aspirational moral system — Jeremy Murray

Virtue Ethics, then. This is what I am critiquing. It allows for whatever 'aspirations' one can coherently generate to be followed. Not really the boundaries I would prefer, at any rate.

some people are better equipped to make moral decisions than others. — Jeremy Murray

I'm unsure this makes sense in a aspirational system. Your aspirations wont match the person's who you are making decisions for. On it's face, I feel as if this is true, though.

seems to show that we do have common values, and that there is therefore a morality common to all human beings — Leontiskos

It really, truly does not, as far as I can tell. If your definition is just "shared values" sure, but you could've just said that in your first reply and be done with it. That's like saying "God did it".
I Do think I have been very clear, and specific on that point particularly. I don't even think 'value' came into that discussion about Egyptian waterman. Maybe you cannot conceptualize this, as you would have approached the situation another way, but I did not even involve my values. I ascertained whether someone has knowledge I want (WANT...not need). That's fine.

there is a moral system that is common to all human beings, namely the system based on those shared values? — Leontiskos

No. There is no reason to jump from shared value to shared system. This speaks to why, in all the political threads, I am banging on about sorting out shared goals before talking about how to get to them. I imagine the Muslim and Xtian would have a decent conversation about shared goals. Achieving htem though? Shit show. So the idea that values lead to systems is wrong to me.

Okay, good, and that partially answers the question I just asked. — Leontiskos

Hopefully I've given the rest of hte answer above LOL.

<We morally influence another person when we influence their values; sometimes we do influence another person's values; therefore moral influence does occur>. Do you agree with that? — Leontiskos

As long as there's an addition that the changed value leads to changed action (but, it is crucial to keep in mind i may not share the value which I have inspired - I imagine this will be a big spanner).

but again — Leontiskos

This is needless. I have expressed my take on your system several times. It is non-moral, and a better way of thinking about actions than morality is.

I don't think morality is reducible to categorical/exceptionless norms. — Leontiskos

Yeah. This seems clear - I think that is what everyone is talking about ,when they talk about morality. If the idea is to reduce "morality" to some shared value system, again, that's fine, but I doubt it would be very helpful for instance cross culturally. These are still going to be socially-restricted systems. I understand that you're trying to "tease out" that I'm objecting to exceptionless norms. I am not. I am objecting to your system being considered moral. It doesn't seem to relate to morals, in the standard sense, as far as I can tell. This obviously rests on the fact that there are disparate concepts of morality. I just took the middle ground on that, and used "relatability" as a metric for whether or not you could even call what you're talking about morality and have people understand you. I do not know that you could. But I prefer it to any 'moral' systems I've seen (other than my own, obviously). So, in light of that, I have to say I can't quiiiiiite grok what the last couple of exchanges have really been debating. Perhaps you have clarification to come. Onward..

it is equally true that 'right' is not reducible to categorical/exceptionless obligation. — Leontiskos

This does not seem to be what most people think is the case. I agree with you, though. Neither of us seems to think there are any exceptionless norms (even speaking 'ideal'ly). That's good. But, that's not what most moralists are talking about, as best I can tell. Even the "relativist" kind want to draw unassailable lines in the sand. Incoherent, as you say. I thikn we need to have the discussion in light of these facts - 'right' and 'wrong' are not considered ambiguous to most.

Now if that word really made no sense to you in that context, your friend's utterance would make no sense to you. — Leontiskos

It doesn't. I would ask what they mean by 'right' and they're going to give me a teleological argument about ends and how the drinking wont achieve those ends. Is the 'shared value' something as bogus-ly amorphous as 'success'? Maybe. But I find that unhelpful and would ask more questions. Perhaps I am unusual.

is meaningful — Leontiskos

Is different to "Means what they intended to me"(I think) which it wouldn't, in the circumstances. It's meaningful as context rather than as a indicator of what the speaker means. I am just not stupid, so know what they intended via context and biography.
If, upon noting to them the incoherence, they didn't resile from the use of 'right' I'd have an 'argument' in front of me(though, for social reasons, wouldn't engage it). As it happens, I've made this challenge several times and people, generally, do resile and switch to something like "not optimal" or "unhelpful". I am not sure what that means for them, but for me, it means they understand that 'right' cannot mean 'agreed-value-pointing' (i.e if done/agreed, points in the direct of an agreed value).

yet this does not make it a hypothetical judgment. — Leontiskos

It couldn't possibly be otherwise as I see it. I see your argument, and it's a good one as to understanding hte difference between events and deliberations. But it is plainly true that the 'moment' has passed - nothing could change the decision. It would be hypothetically-derived even if you want to call the regret 'live', as it were. Personally, I only regret actions I could have avoided, at the time. Where that isn't available, I do not feel regret, but something more akin to despair. I do not feel guilty about things I can't see that I could've done differently. It just sucks, in hindsight. Again, maybe i'm peculiar.

your claim that moral acts tend to be conceived as grave acts, such as acts that pertain to the possibility of deat — Leontiskos

That's not my claim. That's just what my system leaves behind. I do not think most people have this in mind. They simply have "acts towards others" in mind. So I've not address the following about the objections (though, some Sorities can be solved quite easily hehe).

To be clear, I take all (human) acts to be moral (in the sense specified in my OP). — Leontiskos

Cool. That sorts out a lot of where we're disagreeing, i guess.

valuing your own faculties of knowledge) — Leontiskos

I see what's going on here. Hmm. I want to say that this is an inherent property of any deliberation, and not something we could take into account as a choice of value. We would be paralyzed without it. Maybe that's a cop out. If it is, I may need to concede something rather fundamental, but I haven't push that far through my thinking yet.

you are required to weigh your own faculties of knowledge against the Egyptian's faculties of knowledge — Leontiskos

Not quite. What I am comparing is my knowledge about, lets say NYC, with a gap in my knowledge about Cairo. This man is likely experiencing a reversal of those mental spaces. His values tell him to help me. My knowledge gap tells me to fill it. So, there's a way your description is correct, but I don't thikn it quite captures what's happening. We're not actually comparing each other's knowledge at all. There is a trust involved, though it is not personal. It is actually quite discriminatory. "You live here. You fill gap. Yay". His choice to tell me is absolutely a moral choice. My decision to listen doesn't seem to be, whether or not I do the thing. There is also the question whether or not my decision to not trust my own faculties is the moral one, and not the one about listening to A or B in terms of a response to rejecting my own faculties.

<A suggestion is moral if it fulfills at least one of two possibilities: either it bears on a behavior whose possible outcome is death, or if part of the suggestion is to shift a value underlying an action> — Leontiskos

This seems bang on. Feels good, too.

Note that I would prefer 'NH' to 'suggestion' given the ambiguity of 'suggestion.' — Leontiskos

Fair enough. That's reasonable.

don't seem to do so arbitrarily — Leontiskos

Generally, it seems that way. But i can, and do (for fun) arbitrarily get myself into certain moral positions. My wife does not like this exercise. LOL.

I think these considerations are also precisely what are operative when we interact with other moral agents and influence one another's values — Leontiskos

Probably, yes.

No, that doesn't change anything mate. That is multiple use of words. You're also missing that one is indicative and one is determinative So lets go through your response:

We can, and do, talk about intersex individuals having both a female phenotype and a male karotype, or having both a male phenotype and a female karotype, therefore the terms "male" and "female" cannot mean what you claim they mean, else such biologies would be logical contradictions — Michael

No. There is absolutely no contradiction at all. Convenience makes a lot of things unclear. If you are male, the fact you have a 'female' phenotype (which can't be true - you have certain feminine traits, physically speaking - and almost universally incomplete and inactive so, even functionally... Not female) does not change your sex. It means your phenotype is an aberration, and your process of sex differentiation went awry which we know because if your SRY is active, this is not a typical process - it is atypical, and aberration which we can actually pin down genetically, and we call 'disorder'. This is not complicated. Sex determination, and sex differentiation are different processes. This is why you are getting confused about clear uses of the same word in a single field for multiple indications.

has a female phenotype despite having an active SRY gene. — Michael

They are male. This is not hard to understand. A fully fledged male can be extremely feminine without aberration. So, either you're saying a physical spectrum determines sex or something else does.

I have given you the something else, and I have actually provided sources. One really easy one right here , on the Wiki for Sex Differentiation. We get this banger:

"Most mammals, including humans, have an XY sex-determination system: the Y chromosome carries factors responsible for triggering male development."

Supported by:

"Males: The SRY gene when transcribed and processed produces SRY protein that binds to DNA and directs the development of the gonad into testes."

As you can see, once this has happened at fertilization and sex has been determined all sorts of aberrations and genetic mishaps can take place, causing differences in differentiation to do with either internal or external genitalia, breast development, psychological development (weaker, but theories about)
Under the section about DSDs (disorders of sex development) we get this:

"These categories consists of different types of female disorders along with categories specifically for male DSDs."

Because all people are either female or male. There are no people who are not female or male (if you truly belivee there are, I need to know what they are.. no am "ambiguous" because that would simply violate the two categories we have... WHAT are they; bearing in mind "intersex" is also, insufficiently clear in meaning, and clearly not about whether the organism is male or female.. what's the third category or number of categories??)

Therefore the adjective "female" cannot mean "doesn't have an active SRY gene". — Michael

It does, though, when used here. You're bait-and-switching this to high hell. If you mean chromosomal sex, then say that. If you mean phenotypic sex then say that. These have no effect on whether one is a male or female organism.

I cannot understand why this is even something to push back against. They are simple observations about biology.

Only when you do not have the gear to check it out. It is visually ambiguous. It is not ambiguous, per se. And none of this - none, whatsoever - has a social dimension to it. Those are totally different questions. But fwiw, whether we're talking socially or biologically, using visually-represented phenotype to determine sex is bonkers.

Swings and roundabouts boys. No one can clearly put forth any reason to do anything but preference. Nice.

I don't. I choose my battles - and when it comes to you, you're either trolling or incapable of clearly reading things. So my responses might be unpleasant to you - Not my choice, and not my issue.

You continue to do so. Well done.

I don't think you've understood what I've said, at all.

Everything you've said applies what I am noting, and exactly what makes it unattractive to me.

Yes. Funnily enough, i actually picked up Tractatus for hte bus this morning, so read these exact passages before responding.
The point of Many Worlds is that you can think, logically, of a world which does not exist, but is coherent and possible.

Nothing illogical about that. My comment about Witty leading to the type of thoughts Meta is putting forward was about not contextualizing Wittgenstein as coming out of Russell per On Denoting. Not a great way to move from language use, to what 'can be'.

I think pretty much that, yes. Nice :)

Sort of (I can't immediately override an existing value), but yeah, that seems to be what morality amounts to to me, so I'm not perturbed by that.

I act from (or maybe, act out?) values. So my values, wherever applicable, are what will 'inform' me as to which action should be undertaken. But 'should' can only be read "Should, if one held these same values with the backing of my same biography' to me.

I'm unsure, as it's never been particularly attractive to me, but it sounds that way.
A person steeped in Wahabi teachings couldn't be "virtuous" as compared to a Catholic vicar. Or, for that matter, a physicist. LOL.

please explain that to me? — Jeremy Murray

My understanding of hte way virtue ethics work is that its a non-religious moral system that allows someone to say "The type of person i ought to be is *insert religious ideal*" and so work toward that, under the guise of non-religious development.

I think you are the first person I've encountered who has used the word zeal. which is awesome. — Jeremy Murray

haha, awesome!

That is what determines maleness. What maleness is, is the active presence of SRY. There isn't a further answer. The 'further answers' are the ones for which you find all these holes (rightly - they are not the correct way sex is determined, but differentiated, and that is liable to wildly disparate outcomes. Though, it is to be noted the vast majority of people do not go through that).

You missed the preceding sentence: — Michael

I didn't. But those responses make it quite clear. I didn't htikn "No" was required, given those statements. Apologies.

what is the connection between an active SRY gene and being biologically male? — Michael

They are synomymous. That's the connection. We call "active SRY gene" maleness, in a human. I assume you're looking for a form and function response. And it is clearly true that males are supposed to have a certain form and function, and females are supposed to have another with genetic aberrations interrupted the processes.
What's the connection between "human" and human genetic material?

If you disagree with his position then my question isn't relevant, so I'm not sure why you answered it. — Michael

"Who decides who passes" didn't seem a policy question, but fair enough. Sorry.

The deduction of biology is that an active SRY gene is responsible for the development of testes. — Michael

False. SRY determines maleness. Male phenotype (including testes) is derived from genetic material, which can result in aberrations in genetic expression.
Which means your next two questions are not relevant.

Then someone with ovotesticular disorder is both biologically male and biologically female, and someone with gonadal dysgenesis is neither biologically male nor biologically female. — Michael

Neither of these is true. Both of these aberrations occur during sex differentiation, not determination. A good way to know htis is that the second of these sometimes manigests as Turner syndrome. Turner Syndrome can only affect females.

The maths of the situation makes it appear that trans women are much bigger criminals than they are, and the amount of exaggeration depends entirely upon the unobserved trans population, which committed petty crimes. — fdrake

You're right - but it is patently, and unequivocally irrelevant how many trans woman carry out petty theft, or public nuisance (which isn't linked to identity such as auto-gynephiles who present publicly as such) or whatever. What matters is what's harming females. And there, there is clearly, inarguably a propensity over females, and very strongly arguably a propensity over non-trans males. This may be true for pedophilia as well, but I actually don't even care to look into that further than what I've seen. The point isn't that that is true, the point is that if we want to protect children crimes against shop owners isn't relevant.

Edited in: Someone asked about htis:
trans men in male prisons would be at serious risk. That's why they shouldn't be there.

Potentially not 'on a whim' because values tend to be a bit more deep-seated. But I can do it while sitting quietly in my bedroom, unconnected to media or other people. However, I take that to be changing my values. My 'morality' is a system that says those values inform my actions. Not something like "my moral views" which seems unreal to me.

We can just leave it at that. No need to make peace with a worldview. Is there? — frank

No, there isn't, but we're discussing it, so why not take stabs?

I don't feel morality comes from without, and never have, besides watching religious people go about their business. My experience tells me, more, and more than people are making shit up morally as they go. Only my interactions on TRP, with my wife and one of my brothers seems to indicate any notion of stable, well-developed moral thinking and all three are quite different to one another (I should add, i am ignoring "group" morals here, for which I have different assessments and different experiences).

But I did resonate with the idea of historically formative ethical principles, and see more value, today, in the aspirational 'working on' of virtue ethics as opposed to the binary 'right and wrong' of deontology or utilitarianism. — Jeremy Murray

:up:

If virtue ethics weren't so caught up in allowing religious zeal, i'd be well on board.

To me, they can only possibly imply a fuller thought of the person. They may use a term like 'ought' but in reality, that cannot be more than a suggestion to placate their discomfort with such and such.

An active one, yes. That seems to be the deduction of biology.

I believe that Jane passes as a woman. John believes that Jane doesn't pass as a woman. — Michael

Are you using the women's bathroom? If not, you're not relevant. I know that's not your point, so to address your issue:

In the hypothetical, no, she shouldn't, assuming she is male. Passing isn't a criterion for me, though, so unsure why I'm asked to defend it. All i meant is that "who passes" is up the person assessing you. What to do, policy wise, is another question and I think one that appearance wont resolve.

You could not have found trans women in it if they'd served time for petty things with minimal sentences. — fdrake

Which are sentences we don't actually care about, for this assessment. Perhaps that's why I saw no relevance. I cannot understand why you would care about other crimes, when we're tlaking about propensity to commit sexual assault.

Tell me if this is this a fair characterization of your view. — Leontiskos

I don't think so, overall, but i'll be specific.

and the values never change — Leontiskos

Values constantly change. This is another reason its somewhat arbitrary, even on some shared value basis (on my view, obviously). This says to me the overall thrust of this conception is not what I'm going for.. but...

So we can mutually influence people who have overlapping values, but we cannot mutually influence people who do not have overlapping values. — Leontiskos

That seems right.

It sounds like you agree with the conclusion, but you think it does not lead to some other, unmentioned conclusion. — Leontiskos

Yeah. I can't see the point of the argument if its just to assert that we have shared values. Obviously we do, even if we didn't know that empirically. I can assume anyone striving to stay alive shares that avlue with me, whether i know htem personally or not.

Everyone has them, but nothing guarantees that one person's set of values will overlap with another person's — Leontiskos

This seems true on any view of anything moral lol. So, yes.

I guess I would want to know your criteria for determining whether moral influence has occurred. — Leontiskos

This is a tricky one, because it causes me to have considered how other minds can access other minds. I think it would be extremely hard to ever tell but the criteria would be if you've influenced another's values. Then, their values, being the basis for their moral system, subsequently influences their action. Does that make sense? I still have no idea how you'd know, in the event, other than verbal report.

Or do you want to proffer an entirely different understanding of incoherence than the one I have offered? — Leontiskos

I'm unsure whether or not, on this, but for the sake of ease i'll attempt this, regardless:

If "right" and "wrong" are to inform moral systems (all common understandings seem to think so - so this isn't a comment on your system, which i take to be non-moral, and instead a better concept that morality for describing behaviour anyway) then that supposed fact is contradicted by the obvious fact that 'right' and 'wrong' give us nothing which could inform the system as they are too ambiguous and essentially self-referential. This is why i say 'brute' in the face of people's use of those words. If someone says "My moral system rests on "right and wrong"" and hten I ask "What do they mean" they will tell me the same thing in a different word order. Recursive, perhaps, and a dead-end rather than incoherent.

Do you think regrets are hypothetical? — Leontiskos

Yes. You can only regret something on the hypothetical basis something else could have been done. I note that you say all human acts are moral. I can't get on with that. If that's the case, there's no discussion. That's just how it is, and no version would move that needle. They all apply to all acts. Fair, but not what I would assent to, I don't think. Rubbing my nose is not moral.

You thought it was right (or at least permissible) to drink the water, and he led you to believe that it is not right (i.e. not the right thing to do). — Leontiskos

I don't think those words are usable here. It was either a helpful, or non-helpful action for me to take toward myself. Again, if you take all acts to be moral, fine. I don't take myself acting toward myself to be a moral act. But I also don't quite understand what's being said here - perhaps that[s because (as outlined above) changing someone's action isn't a moral influence, but an empirical one. My values aren't involved in whether or not I act on such and such (that I have incorrectly assessed) and someone's putting my assessment right. My values remain exactly the same, but the data is fixed. In the Egypt example, had I perhaps not even known that drinking water in Egypt could lead to sickness, all he's done is given me information in a really weird form (that socially, I can understand).

You told me that we need to use words like "right" and "wrong" if we are to talk about morality, and now I am using those words. — Leontiskos

And they make no sense in this context, to me. Yay!!! LOL.

Okay, but why not? Do you have an argument? — Leontiskos

I take it your answer is, 'yes' then?
I see nothing moral in it. It's information exchange. No one's values are involved. In fact, I may refuse the umbrella based on my values.

What is a morally forceful suggestion and when does some suggestion fail to count as one? — Leontiskos

I don't know what this would mean. I don't think the concept obtains, in reality. I think you can make morally forceful arguments about what you think is right and wrong to potentially influence another's values. Suggestions about acts don't do this.

You are saying <If death is not a possible outcome, then the suggestion which bears on the outcome is not moral> — Leontiskos

Not quite. The point is more to delineate between types of suggestion. If death is a possible outcome, then even the suggestion to avoid a behaviour is moral given the 1 or 0 nature of death. In other contexts, only the suggestion to shift the value underlying an action would be a moral suggestion as there are disparate and potentially infinite possible outcomes/attitudes. But that certainly comes close.

If I am right in this, then it seems that your values or value-hierarchy has been influenced by the Egyptian. — Leontiskos

You are, and I concede this point. If I have changed my value assessment, then he's influenced me morally. But coming back to the example, he's just given me information by inference. he knows something I don't. My values didn't change.

You shouldn't have to do that if morals are a choice. Morals seem to come from outside, that was my point. — frank

I understand they seem to, but there's no way to assess this beyond "people influence each other". If that's morality for you, all good. Then we're on the same page. There's no particular reason to be moved by that (or, more properly, those influences). This is just a description of what happens, not a principle for moral thinking). I think....

I don't accept 2, so I cna't say much.

Hehe I guess if all you go on it Wittgenstein, then yeah. But who would do that, when, yeah - there it is.

Yeah. It's the difference between being cautious around men for good reasons and assuming that men are latent rapists, the former's something behavioural and can {and usually is} done without prejudice, the latter treats men as if they are always on the verge of boiling over into rape as if it's an essential facet of masculinity, just waiting to get out — fdrake

I hear you, as the latter causes suffering for men, generally. But I do not think that is what's happening here. Otherwise, the general separation of males and females would suffer the same objection. I don't htink it does, or can.

In the discussion, the latter move also calls trans women men — fdrake

Yes, and that can be truly problematic in a social sense. But I do not think it wrong. If your conception is that men are male, then they are men, on their own logic.

responds to trans women as if they are latent rapists on the basis that they are men male. — fdrake

This is what I think is happening, and what gets said to me/in the media etc. If the word "man" is equated with "male" for the speaker in question, that's worth noting. This does also make me want to throw out, what would normally be, a confrontational challenge:

Are you happy to accept the "not all men" movement as legitimate and a reasonable objection to the feminism concept that "Not all men, but always men""? I find both true, but hte latter is what matters for safety.

rape anpossible aspect of every man's personality — fdrake

I think that's functionally true, and that is why females take it to be "latent". No one thinks all men are rapists unless they're insane or trolling. But most females have had unwanted sexual contact with a man. It is justified.

You can just believe that without doing a Dworkin and saying penis = rape. — fdrake

I more-or-less agree, because I've suffered both rape, and false rape claims against me. That said, there is nothing wrong with point out "Someone with a penis = vastly more likely to rape". that seems empirically true, and justifies a lot of this type of reaction.

The lobbyists here were calling trans folk rapists loudly in the street and handing out pamphlets to that effect. — fdrake

I spoke about violence and (impilictly) property damage. Being a dick is fully allowed in society. Violence and property damage are not. This is why "gender critical" speakers regularly win legal battles about platforming, and trans activists are (semi)regularly losing legal battles around their activities ( one in NZ was quite the to-do given how low-level it was - but this came after several groups failed to prevent a women from coming here and speaking her mind. We can see a single direction that the unacceptable aspects of that issue are - preventing the free speech of a woman, and assaulting her when you couldn't shut her up. There are plenty of these examples like Stock, Maya Forstater, Hollow Lawford-Smith, Alison Bailey and many others

I also looked at your spreadsheets — fdrake

The UK MOJ statistics? That's what I used for my assessment and even calibrated 50% of hte raw numbers to be favourable to trans women. I noted the Fair Play source wasn't as good, but gave some further info. I wouldn't rely on that to present hte "table" i gave.

There is provision for any female prisoner - trans or not - to be housed in a men's prison if she's deemed especially dangerous.

Yet the furor over Isla Bryson? Please notice that statements aren't hte whole picture. You might trust the scientist, but I've outline very good reason for the author to state what they did, despite their paper showing something else. This also happened with that Scientific American infographic a few years ago that seemed to say that because intersex, sex wasn't binary - the author said as much. The author was not a scientist, but that aside, the infographic itself required a sex binary to make sense and stated exactly that.

I hope the analogy is sufficiently on the nose that I don't need to substitute things into it. — fdrake

I have literally no clue how this analogy relates to our stats.

The MoJ is hesitant to conclude that the trans folk in the data are representative of trans folk's patterns of offending, why? — fdrake

To avoid the inevitable backlash. The courts are dealing with it now, including several attempts to have it reversed on EHRC appeals (absolute nonsense, and I think none will go far). If you don't think this is likely, I can only say "hehe". The fact which you put forward doesn't actually change anything - these are the prisoners we care about. The ones who end up not included in the data don't move the needle on what the data is telling us (particularly as the 100% is a calibration favourable to trans women at an exceptionally generous degree)

particularly dangerous sex offenders of women in men's prisons. — fdrake

Ambulance, meet bottom of hill. As the facts show, on those many cases I provided.

So what was the purpose of the bill, if we need to talk about it in terms of trans women in prisons? — fdrake

Trans women are male. Males are housed in male prisons. This isn't hard, is it?

Determined by what? — Michael

SRY.

They’re intersex — Michael

Intersex is a misleading term. No one is neither male or female - almost all intersex conditions are conditional on which sex you are.

s a transgender woman more likely to sexually assault a cisgender woman in a women's prison than a cisgender man to sexually assault a transgender woman in a men's prison? — Michael

It seems so, yes. But I do not have data on that. It is also not quite the right question, and this wants us to retroactively assess whether or not X is occurring. What the policies on "this" side, let's say, want to do is avoid the risk entirely. I understand you're putting forth a separate risk that might outweight this one, so putting aside the retroactivity, I think its patently clear males are a higher risk to females than they are to other males, regardless of identity. Your point is not lost, though. It is far more likely that consensual relationships between non-trans males and trans women would occur in my view, than assault. So it may be that your scenario plays, but I have no reason to think so. Particularly as this was the case, for decades with no notable uptick in those types of assault, from what I can tell.

What about biology determines if someone is male or female? You don’t seem to recognise that being intersex is a biological condition — Michael

It is a biological condition which affects phenotype due to aberrations in sex differentiation, after determination is complete.

biological sex is determined by outward appearance — Michael

Humans are (around) 91-99% accurate in predicting sex from facial appearance alone

the English words "male" and "female" refer to two clearly defined, mutually exclusive, and exhaustive biological qualities — Michael

They do. It is easy to think otherwise, given the potential for aberration. And it is reasonable to take those aberrations into account in terms of how to deal with those categories in society. But they are 'true' categories, in that they admit of no exceptions (that I am at all aware of, even conceptually).

every human is either male or female, even if it's difficult for us to determine which. And that's simply not the case. — Michael

It is the case, though, Michael. Ambiguous phenotype doesn't affect sex. Otherwise particular phenotypic aberrations within unambiguous sex would alter sex determination, but they don't. Intersex is phenotypically intersex. Not that you are literally between the two sexes.

Why should transgender women have to be exposed to cisgender male violence for cisgender women to be protected from transgender female violence? — Michael

Because they are male. This is, obviously, uncomfortable but the reverse risk is perverse. All males run that risk in prison with males. Females do not, as they are not housed with males. Perhaps comes down to any opinion.

This is the incorrect way of assessing sex determination. SRY is the correct way, with other genetic abnormalities appearing during sex differentiation. You can tell, because the article runs its premise on: "determines the development of sexual characteristics in an organism.." and that: "Some species (including humans) have a gene SRY on the Y chromosome that determines maleness." further on.

So it's good to be careful whether you're wanting to assert determination or development are variable. Only the latter is.

There is no single determinant in these cases. — Michael

There is; as above.

This is simply not a complicated topic, until you want to pretend Sex isn't binary. Then it gets weird. Luckily, that's not the case.

Who gets to decide whether or not someone is passing? — Michael

The person who can tell that they aren't. That's what passing is about, no? :up:

And yes, unisex toilets are one way out of this difficulty. — BitconnectCarlos

Unisex + female-only.

Your thesis here seems to be that you have a moral system and your wife has a moral system and everyone else has a moral system, and that none of these moral systems really interact with or shape one another (e.g. you say the Christian and the Muslim have different values and that's that) — Leontiskos

No quite, but that they do so brute. There's no particularly convincing principle that would ensure people are moved by anyone else's moral views, but to become closer to avoid rejection (I assume you would agree that this is visible in social groups whereby the opinion of the group prevents members from dissenting at risk of either ejection or abuse). There's development, but it seems lateral to me. So maybe I'm being a little hasty, and merely positing that moral progess isn't coherent.

If the “rhymes and reasons” were arbitrary then none of this interaction between moral systems would be possible — Leontiskos

This makes no sense to me. There's nothing in your argument that makes the agreement/disagreement non-arbitrary and prescriptive. Its a description of two independent systems happening to overlap. I understand that this creates what you're calling 'force' but it is plainly self-referential and it is your own system which is influencing you to give a toss about old mate's suggestion. I do thikn I've been over this though, so if we plum disagree that this creates what you're suggesting, I can't see we can go further.

Specifically, my contention is that <If there were no substantially shared values, then moral persuasion and influence between individuals would be impossible; But it is not impossible; Therefore, there must be substantially shared values>. — Leontiskos

Ah. Well, i think that's silly. The first seems correct. The second is non sequitur in a sense. That we influence each other's values doesn't give me a reason to think there are any moral facts about the interactions. All we do is describe them, post-hoc. That could be wrong, but it is why I can't get on with the transition being made to the conclusion here. I agree, there are substantially shared values and I'd be an idiot to deny that - but that this makes interpersonal communication moral doesn't work for me. We can only predict people's responses to NHOs with respect to their pre-existing values. The "influence" you speak of only seems to occur in intellectual exchanges, not moral ones. And there, rarely, as this exchange is showing hehehe.

I'm not convinced that something which is incoherent can be described as a unity. The only way to rigorously define an system which is thought to be incoherent is to delineate its contradictions. An incoherence is a mishmash, and thus if the description does not point up the mishmash it is not a description of an incoherent system — Leontiskos

I have done so, though, plenty of times, throughout this exchange: The reliance on "right" and "wrong" are incoherent in a theory which requires that they are set by the theory itself. And this is described, at least in my version of morality, clearly. It seems implicit in the standard tellings ("system for delineating right and wrong" and all similarly-worded concepts).
Basically, the tautology of a " moral 'right' " means that, while we can describe people's morality, as it occurs, we cannot predict it because these terms gives us nothing with which we could apply some rule/law/principle to aught but our own sense of morality. We can only predict it statistically. I do not think this provides us 'force' in the way you speak of it.

With respect, "A set of personal or social standards for good or bad behaviour and character," actually strikes me as considerably different than, "The debate between right and wrong." — Leontiskos

Understandable. The former is simply the result of the latter, and given there is no universal moral system, that seems implicit, and hte only thing available for discussion. Perhaps I should have noted this.

For example, when you regret a past action and judge that you should have acted otherwise, you are engaged in a non-hypothetical ought-judgment, but not an imperative or a prescription. — Leontiskos

That is plainly hypothetical?

(A) requires that you think drinking water is right. (B) requires that the Egyptian thinks it is not right. (C) requires that you are persuaded that it is not right. (C2) requires that you are not persuaded that it is not right. — Leontiskos

I don't see this moving my comment on the structure of that exchange. B to C is a matter of fact. Would this apply to whether or not to go outside without an umbrella? Would you say that someone saying "Hey, its raining, take an umbrella" and you doing so, means that was a morally forceful suggestion? I don't, so I can't apply it here either (again, other than over a 'death'. So your (A) being simple, yeah, I think drinking water is good. Not poisoned water, though. So I want to avoid death, not poisoned water per se. I realise that's a bit recursive, but I think it illustrates that the point is the 'ought' is about avoiding death. If death isn't a possible outcome, then the suggestion is arbitrary in a moral sense (for me, and on
my understanding of common conceptions)).

And if you give his NH due consideration then you yourself are assuming a shared value — Leontiskos

Or, I am considered their values as compared to mine and understanding whether or not, in the exact context, their value might be more practically effective. Is that still moral, to you?

I think NHs really exist. — Leontiskos

As do I. just don't see them as moral propositions.

you can't make the guilt go away by changing your morals, right? — frank

Yes. I was a sociopath for several years, partially to achieve this.

"A possible world is a complete and consistent way the world is or could have been. Possible worlds are widely used as a formal device in logic, philosophy, and linguistics in order to provide a semantics for intensional and modal logic."

LOL.

"Although ‘possible world’ has been part of the philosophical lexicon at least since Leibniz, the notion became firmly entrenched in contemporary philosophy with the development of possible world semantics for the languages of propositional and first-order modal logic. "

Just finished re-reading The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

About to start The Sceptical Feminist.

The plain fact that one believes in a personal God is enough to dismiss their arguments about said God. It doesn't even get of the ground as a concept, so the arguments around what the God should or shouldn't do are basically a way of making fun of those types of people.

If you truly think the Christian God is the author of reality, whether or not he likes priests to bum infants is hte least of your worries.

Mahalia has to be one of the most underrated artists/singers of all time. And she's fairly well known, so that says alot.