I’m getting the feeling there’s been a bit of a leap-frog here.

If truth is mind-dependent even if about mind-independent objects, how are we assessing what is “true” in terms of definition?

If true statements are merely a mind communicating a mind-independent truth then none of this really works because we’re just discussing the subjectivity of lnguahe but if “true” is actually taken as a relation between the mind-independent world (ie any given object) and the mind who would potentially make a statement about it - ie that “true” just means the clearest transition from the world, to the mind, then the statements considered true require there to be nothing more than minds that can achieve a relation with the world to such a degree that other minds consider their statements to in fact carry that relation which is, to be very gentle, unhelpful in my estimation

This would metaphysically turn on whether determinism is wholly true, constrictively true or not at all true I think.

I go with the former on the information I have which says humans exist without the latter and even a single example trumps the latter imo.

thanks very much for your reply.

I still think you are seriously misapprehending what personal identity is in this context (the thought experiments). I’ve actually found the wiki page prettt darn good at explaining this concept https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Personal_identity

It’s a fascinating set of questions that theoretically should have an empirical answer once we figure out the necessary and sufficients

This speaks to, but doesn't answer the problem. Multiple personality disorder is, even on a laymans interpretation, many 'personalities' within one 'person' which is why it's a disorder.

Does this entail that there are multiple persons? Or multiple personal facades?

I think your terms a little muddled here but i could be fully misunderstanding you.

I believe you're referring to what Parfit thinks 'matters' after deciding there's no such thing as personal identity. Which is to say, the psychological continuity is what matters, and that your actual identity (i.e the state of being identical with oneself) isn't important.

I take that to be somewhat a way to comfort himself after realizing we may not actually 'be' any 'one'. Which is daunting to some degree, i feel.

Hi Vaskane,

I take you to be speaking about social identity, and not numerical identy.

From my understanding the identity problem is one of what makes you 'actually' you across time - not your subjective identification, which you're right to point out is a constantly changing chimera of various elements in various ratios.

But how you are yourself (i.e, the person who is you - not the person you think you are) across time is entirely askance from your subjective understanding of yourself.

Mine is variations on the Branch Line Case from Parfit,

It’s just so juicy