If you can summarize one or two of the main points of controversy I would appreciate it, as my understanding is there is no issue with that description (though no-one would say it is complete either). — Mijin

Neuronal events are nothing like thoughts, so the question is, how can they be the same thing? And if they are co-dependent in some way, does one cause the other? How does that happen? Why should physical experiences such as neurons firing give rise to conscious experience? Are thoughts "really" just brain events?

If you look into the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" as described by Chalmers and others, it will give you a good sense of what the controversy is.

If I'm actually looking at the TV, it's not a belief that there's a TV there. If I hear it from the other room, it's not a belief that the TV is on. — Patterner

Yet, in ordinary language, if someone asks you, "Do you believe the TV is on?" you'll answer yes. You might also point out that it's a rather strange question: "Why would I not believe it? It's on; see for yourself!" This highlights one of the uses of "believe". We tend to emphasize believing something when there could be doubt.

So what about the phenomenology? I'm actually looking at the TV; do I simultaneously believe that it's on? If belief is reduced to linguistic belief, then clearly not. No such sentence enters my mind. But we've been considering the other, non-linguistic senses of "belief". Is there some mental event that occurs while I watch TV, that's the equivalent of giving credence to the existence of the TV? This seems far-fetched. More likely is the opposite case, when we're watching, say, a pack of elves. The mental event "I don't believe this" is probably present, wouldn't you say? Or least "I don't know whether to believe this or not."

With the TV, we're thrown back on belief understood as analytical philosophy usually does: an attitude, a disposition, not a mental event and not linguistic. To say "I believe the TV is on" is to claim that my experience is factual, and that I am the one having it. It is all but the same as "I assert."

If I say "Julius Caesar is a prime number", the penalty is that I haven't said anything. — Ludwig V

Or, as I suggested to @Metaphysician Undercover, if you continue to say such things you may well be institutionalized.

We can't help eating and drinking in a sense, but there is a huge super-structure of activity at the conscious level. — Ludwig V

Sure. The evolutionary thesis isn't usually applied to the stuff that's biologically obligatory, like breathing or digesting. There, it's just taken for granted that we have no choice, as organisms. It becomes inadequate when applied to most of the rest of our behavior. Our status as Homo sapiens gives us certain drives, certain tendencies to behave, but they rarely -- or so I hope -- determine my behavior unthinkingly. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were making what I regard as polemical points, in opposition to the rationalizing tendency of the philosophy that was current. I find it difficult to think they really believed it, about themselves.

In the case of the signs, I was imagining dying in a crash because of not following the speed rules. In the case of language, someone who didn't follow the rules of their language would likely be ostracized or oppressed -- at least it they did it a lot. Anyway, the severity of the consequences isn't the point. Rather, it's that there is no automatic enforcement of these rules. Compare, for instance, using a passport. There are rules and you have to follow them or else you can't use a passport. No one is ever in a position of being told, "Fine, don't present a valid passport, you'll be sorry." They're simply prohibited from playing the passport game.

Perhaps every assertion is a belief, but not every belief is an assertion. So an assertion is something in addition to a belief. — Patterner

That would be my answer too. And how, exactly, does an assertion add something to a belief? (Neither of us means, I assume, that an assertion has to be spoken. I can mentally assert something, and mentally believe something, and they're still two different things in the way you describe.)

And what about, "The TV was on when I left the room five seconds ago"? Can I know that without having the belief, even unexpressed, even unthought, that the TV is still on? — Patterner

I think not, but what about the opposite?: Can I have the belief that the TV is still on without knowing it? I'd say yes (if "knowledge" is set at a high bar), pointing again to the difference among these terms.

So yes, thoughts cause thoughts, almost all of our conscious experience relies on it. — Mijin

You're not missing the point; our conscious experience certainly seems to rely on something like causation. But the OP question focuses on whether it's the content of a thought that causes another thought, or whether, as you describe, it's the neurons firing. Of course it's tempting to say, "They're the same thing," but as you probably know, that thesis has generated a lot of philosophical controversy.

The further question is whether, if I have a series of thoughts that represent, say, a logical entailment, I am then caused to think the conclusion. This depends on how far we're willing to extend the concept of causation into the rational sphere. I have reasons for concluding X, but am I also caused to do so?

"the rules" implies principles which people are obliged to follow. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't quite see this. By "obliged," do you mean "forced"? Not many sets of rules come with their own enforcement. Or, if it's merely a matter of "Either follow them or face the consequences," then this applies equally well to ordinary language, which exacts stern consequences for the non-followers. In this, they're no different from road signs.

Life's quite bleak from the evolutionary point of view. — Ludwig V

I suppose some might find it a kind of comfort -- the idea that we can't help doing what our biology (or unconscious, if you prefer) insists on. But this is so manifestly untrue that I've never really understood the appeal.

The strange magic of evolutionary theory is that it creates a sense of purpose, of intent, that does not depend on any conscious activity. — Ludwig V

I'm reminded of this, from Schopenhauer (I don't know if he was aware of evolutionary theory):

Nature can attain her end only by implanting in the individual a certain delusion, and by virtue of this, that which is merely in truth a good thing for the species seems to him to be a good thing for himself, so that he serves the species, whereas he is under the delusion that he is serving himself. — The World as Will and Representation, 538

This expands the "sense of [unconscious] purpose, of intent" into the moral sphere as well, as so many contemporary exponents of evolutionary explanations do.

Depends on what we agree a belief to be. I've changed my tune on that, and now allow that a belief can be non-linguistic. But I think it's still helpful to keep "belief" separate from merely being certain of a fact. The question we'd probably need to address is this: Are "I believe the TV is on" and "I assert that the TV is on" saying the same thing? Conventionally, loosely, they usually are, but does that settle it?

I don't think I believe there's a television in my living room. It's a fact that there's a tv in the living room. What's the difference between belief and certainty of facts? — Patterner

One reply would be: "Oh, so you don't believe there's a TV in your living room?" But I think your point is rather that belief doesn't enter into it at all.

If I go in and the tv isn't there - that is, there isn't a tv in the living room...? Was it only a belief? Is that what being mistaken of the facts is? — Patterner

Sort of, yes. "There is a TV in the living room" doesn't assert the same thing as "I believe there's a TV in the living room." The first statement can be false while the second remains true. But . . . if you assert both statements, then, conventionally, they do mean the same thing; they both express something you claim to be true. This isn't really mysterious, just a matter of equivocal usages.

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree? — creativesoul

Long answer: We'd need to be sure we're on the same page about what "meaningful" is supposed to represent. Short answer: But yes, probably.

All good questions. I agree that the instinctual practice precedes any actual mice. And the story you're telling seems plausible: At a certain point, a cat "gets it" and discovers a purpose for all that kitteny stuff. When that happens, when a mouse appears, what does the cat believe? As you say, the behaviors she's practiced are always available; she doesn't have to rethink them, or give them any thought at all. But when she stalks a mouse, waiting patiently outside its mouse-hole, I think she does have a belief of sorts. In other words, she's not just along for the ride: "Oh, how interesting what my body is doing now!" Her mind, harboring the beliefs it does, can control her body towards a purpose. At any rate, if you grant her an intention or purpose -- to catch the mouse -- then a (non-linguistic) belief doesn't seem such a stretch.

What would be an example of a belief that you wonder if a cat might have? — Patterner

The one @Dawnstorm offered would be a good example:

for the cat to want to catch that mouse over there she would have to believe there's a mouse over there. — Dawnstorm

And see my somewhat chagrined response below!

This is persuasive. You've done what I asked, which was to paint a convincing picture of how we might think about, and use, the concept of a non-linguistic belief. You've helped me realize that what I called "our current analyses of belief" don't have to commandeer the conversation simply because a robust philosophical tradition -- analytic/language philosophy -- has adopted these analyses. This is ironic, because I'm the one who so often warns against being beguiled by a certain word or term, and believing we can find the Correct Definition.

So: I would still say that propositional or linguistic or "belief that" beliefs are probably not accessible to most non-human animals. The interesting discussion instead focuses on the other kind, about which I was skeptical but now see as a legitimate way of thinking about what a belief is. What should we understand, and say, about the cat's beliefs concerning the mouse, or about your own beliefs concerning the traffic-light situation?

I make all these decisions without words. I just look. It's all thought habits. — Dawnstorm

Yes. What you describe (very well) is similar to the idea of background beliefs, which have always given trouble to the analysis of belief as a mental event. But in your case, the necessary beliefs you hold in order to act as you do are not exactly "in the background"; they come into play in this actual situation, and are probably mental events. This contrasts with "I believe the Earth revolves around the Sun" as a background belief, which is merely available to the mind.

In terms of behavioural implicature, you could say that I believe "green means go", even though I never think this. — Dawnstorm

Again, this could be understood as a background belief, one which you hold at all times. But the traffic-light situation is a little different. When preparing to cross, you don't think "green means go" in words, but aren't you proposing that the belief is activated and present for you, as your behavior demonstrates? I want to say that therefore you do think it, in the same way the cat thinks that the mouse is present. So I'm agreeing with you about non-linguistic beliefs but going even further.

But what exactly is "the same way"? What actually happens in the cat's mind, in your mind? The only clue I have is a common experience (for me) that I've alluded to earlier in this thread (I think). I am often aware that I've formed a thought or an idea much more quickly than I could form the corresponding language, assuming there is any. I then backtrack, as it were, and "say it to myself" (often, as you point out, having trouble finding the right words). So I'm claiming to have had an extremely rapid thought that is non-linguistic yet contentful, something to which words can then be put. Is this how the cat thinks? She can't find the words, of course, but she may very well think in this same rapid manner. I would add that it's not a matter of thinking in images either, thought that sometimes happens. The non-verbal thought I'm trying to describe is also non-visual or non-imagistic.

Now to claim all this is to explain nothing. But it leads me to agree that we shouldn't insist on narrowing "belief" to its linguistic uses. We can corral such uses into a pen and call them Beliefs1 or whatever, and go on to say very interesting and significant things about how they work. The challenge is to better understand what we can say, philosophically, about the other kind(s).

puzzling out what the difference between language-accompanied and language-less thought is seems at the core of this thread. — Dawnstorm

I agree, that's central to a lot of what's been discussed on the thread.

As the referential piece of reality the human and the cat may have, under a theory of comparison, similar believes: compatible ones. Their tied together in a situation: both the human and the cat might like for the cat to catch the mouse. — Dawnstorm

But this already presumes a tentative answer to the question. I'm trying to inquire into something even more basic: Does a cat even have a belief? To sharpen the question: A cat has a desire, arguably even an intention, but can she have beliefs that accompany either desire or intention?

humans and cats have comparable "thoughts" — Dawnstorm

The scare-quotes around "thoughts" are meant to indicate, I presume, that a thought in this sense is not linguistic. You agree that some thoughts depend on language. So here we're talking about the other kind, the kind that don't. Since we know very little about this kind of thought in ourselves -- or I, at any rate, find it mysterious -- and nothing about this kind of thought in cats, we're speculating at this point. But my speculation is that you're right, there is something cognate in my (instantaneous, language-less) thought "Mouse!" when I see one, and the cat's thought. In such a case, the language?/non-language? division isn't so important, as you suggest. My "Mouse!" thought is not couched in terms of the word "mouse," though usually it's instantly followed or categorized by the word, since I'm a very language-oriented person. This doesn't happen for the cat, presumably.

the putative difference between a langauge-having and a language-less creature is mostly that a language-less creature cannot and does not have to think about language. — Dawnstorm

Here I would take issue. Yes, thinking about language is one of the things that a language-using creature can do, that a language-less creature can't. But the more central difference concerns language as symbol, as a potential designator of universals. A dog unquestionably understands how the sounds I make refer to his world, and what he's supposed to do about them. But I find it very unlikely that he understands what "toy" means. He knows what that sound means for him. But he doesn't see that the word "toy" could be uttered in any other context (unless I've taught him another association) and with any other purpose. He can't, quite literally, think about "toy," because "toy" doesn't exist for him as a symbol. Can he, in his doggish non-linguistic way, have an image of a toy, or a desire for one? I'm sure he can. But he doesn't know it's a toy!

Circling back to the question of beliefs, I would say this: We ought to keep an open mind. If you can illustrate what a non-linguistic belief would be like, perhaps I'll come around to believing (sorry!) that it's possible. It would of course involve a major reform of our current analyses of "belief," which emphasize that a belief requires an object of belief, and that one cannot set out a belief without language. But I'm game to try!

that it might be relevant that I grew up bilingually. — Dawnstorm

Yes! I'm sure that helped you recognize that what we do with words is quite arbitrary, in a way. We try to match them with the important stuff -- the concepts, the ideas, the perceptions, the events -- but which words we pick for the job aren't the point. Also, of course, that different languages emphasize different conceptual nuances. I'm always astonished, for instance, when intelligent Christians don't seem to care what New Testament Greek meant to its readers. They accept an English translation of, say, logos or agape, and build theological worlds on what they would have meant, had they been translated that way into English!

Thanks for all this. I will give it thought.

I really want to respond to your interesting post, but I have to be out a lot of the day. I'll check in later . . .

This notion of existential dependency is not to be confused/conflated with subsistence. It's better understood as initial emergence requirements. — creativesoul

OK, this seems important. I hadn't seen the distinction you want to make between subsistence and what you're calling existential dependency.

textile technology is existentially dependent upon language and mats are existentially dependent upon textile technology. — creativesoul

So the idea is that some objects can't come into existence without a language-using community. That makes sense.

The challenge here would be: But natural objects also "come into existence" as a result of language use. For this challenge to bear weight, I think we have to deny the familiar skepticism which says that every single thing out there is somehow created by our identifications of it. No; there are natural kinds, and it seems silly to maintain that sunlight, for instance, is an arbitrary designation that humans make. But nonetheless, a significant amount of what we designate by language is artificial and/or arbitrary, and "created" by us in the sense that we choose what counts as an "object" or a "thing" or an "event." (This is not "subsistence creation," to observe your distinction. We don't somehow bring into being the raw materials of our physical world.) Is a sand dune a natural object? Yes and no. The human intention to see it as a dune -- because we have uses for which the term "sand dune" is needed -- can't be ignored.

Now does any of this matter for your schema? I'll go back to your initial reply:

language less belief can include (consist of) some things that are existentially dependent upon language (like mats, tables, cars, etc.) and all things that are existentially dependent upon language could sensibly/rightly be called 'linguistic' things — creativesoul

Does it matter if we include some non-artifactual objects in the list of things that are existentially dependent upon language? I don't think so. We can add sand dunes and the like without changing your schema.

Now, let's say we do reject the dichotomy between linguistic and non-linguistic things, on the grounds that it is "lacking in its ability to further draw and maintain the distinction between the belief of language users and the belief of language less creatures."

That's the point I want to return to. How does the question of whether a belief concerns a) something that is existentially dependent on language, or b) something that is not so dependent, affect whether a non-linguistic animal can be said to have linguistic beliefs or not? Do you simply mean that we ought to extend the normal meaning of "linguistic belief" so that it can also mean "A belief about something that is existentially dependent on language"?

It's a bit disheartening that you say what you said at the end. — creativesoul

Sorry, but don't be disheartened. Philosophical ideas always need repeated unpacking, in my experience.

Hope that helps. — creativesoul

Yes, a bit clearer. One thing first, though: Is the reason that "some things are existentially dependent upon language (like mats, tables, cars, etc.)" because those objects are human artifacts? Or could you just as well have included trees or sunlight? If it's the human-made aspect that makes the difference, how would a language-less animal know about it or be aware of it? In any case, I'm a little puzzled about why a mat, e.g., would depend on language for its existence. If I make an object but don't give it a name, does it exist in some lesser way? Probably I'm just not seeing what you're getting at.

the above words are mine, and they're misleading at best, and downright false at worst. — creativesoul

I appreciate your willingness to re-examine and self-correct. A good model for all of us.

Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

I have no burden regarding that terminological use. You first invoked it. I rejected it. — creativesoul

But you said:

I reject the idea that language less animals' belief(s) have propositional content. — creativesoul

So if a language-less animal has a belief -- moreover, a belief without propositional content -- isn't it by definition a non-linguistic belief? I'm confused.

Pretty good for a sleep-deprived philosopher! :smile:

what we are conscious of is not what consciousness is. — Patterner

This is unproblematic until we consider what I've been calling the experience of being conscious. I agree that con is not self-awareness, but when we are self-aware, we are having a conscious experience of . . .. what, exactly? Is it multiplying terms too far to discriminate between "con" and "being conscious"? Sorry, I'm wide awake, and I already feel like I'm drifting into a Husserlian dreamworld, where terms and loops proliferate!

Maybe it helps to refer once again to meditative states, in which it's possible to experience a very simple, seemingly objectless state of awareness. Am I "viewing con itself" in such a state? What's especially interesting is that the literature of meditation claims that the ego, the (possible) source of conscious awareness, is largely absent in such states. Should we conclude that "I" am not doing anything at that moment, so the whole loop question can never get started?

Oh, surely, what he says is stronger than that. "The world is all that is the case." and "The world is the totality of facts, not things. — Ludwig V

I agree, it's open to several interpretations. Consider the first dictum. Is it definitional? That is, should we read it as "'The world' is 'all that is the case'"? Or is it descriptive: "The world is all that is the case"? i.e., there is nothing beyond the world. I favor the first reading, because I find it more provocative.

The same bifurcation of interpretation can be applied to the second dictum.

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." - which sits oddly beside "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world." — Ludwig V

This one also seems to fit with the "definitional" interpretation, where it doesn't appear so odd. The limits of my world are not the limits of the world. I may know that there are more facts, more "things that are the case," without being able to find them or speak about them. A great deal hinges on the question, "What does a limit do?" Does it prevent knowledge that there is more, or only knowledge about whatever that "more" is?

But [terms like 'reality'] are so deeply embedded in philosophy, that it seems impossible to not use them - and I can't resist joining in the discussion. — Ludwig V

Yes. My proposal for reform is quixotic. But at least we can be more conscious of how we use them -- and maybe use them a bit less often.

There's another term I would like to avoid. — Ludwig V

Which one? "Proposition"?

Interesting how this connects to the previous considerations about "reality." Like "reality," the term "the world" is capable of being used in many ways. Wittgenstein's insight is valuable whether or not we want to use "the world" the way he uses it. His point is that, apart from objects, there are states of affairs, facts, construals, propositions, ways of thinking and speaking -- and when we ask "What is the case?" it is those items we're asking about, not the objects.

ADDED But propositions are made true by whether the arrangements of objects (crudely) are that way. We need the objects to help make a Wittgensteinian world.

what is denoted by the symbol is an intellectual act, not a phenomenal existent. And I say that is a real, vital, and largely neglected distinction. — Wayfarer

If I may . . . This is right, and perhaps not so neglected if we see the connection with the many discussions we've had about the status of propositions. The whole point of trying to separate out something called a proposition is to preserve that very distinction. Sentences denote propositions (when they have the appropriate form), not objects or even individual thoughts. Nor are propositions objects in the world, though they may be about objects in the world. At least, that's the standard account. See Rodl though . . .

definitions like that are contextualized in a specialized field where the definition is a stipulation rather than a codification of an existing practice. — Ludwig V

Yes. As you say, very few philosophical terms could undergo such an evolution. It's for that reason, as I've said so often on TPF, that I'd like to see philosophers avoid terms like "reality" whenever possible. Or else put it in Peirce-marks or Kant-marks or Carnap-marks etc. if that's what you mean. :smile:

Yes, I also think I can have a self-aware experience, without running into the "eye seeing itself" problem. What I experience, in such a case, is not a "pure" experience without an object, but rather "what it's like to experience X" (warmth, in this example). In my phenomenological world, there is a difference. Being warm is certainly an experience, but not the same one as "experiencing warmth."

The threat of the infinite regress is hollow, I'm pretty sure: How many iterations can a mind really retain?

What is binomial nomenclature? — Ludwig V

The system, begun by Linnaeus, of identifying creatures by genus and species, e.g., Homo sapiens. I offered it as an example of a single, useful definition that can save everyone a lot of trouble. It has to be agreed to, of course.

What are you wanting to know? — creativesoul

As above:

what [do] such thoughts or beliefs consist of, if not words? Does the cat perhaps think in images? Can she believe using images? — J

All thought and belief reduce to correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

But what is a correlation? In what mental process does it happen? If animals can do it, then a correlation doesn't use words. What correlates with what? -- again, perhaps you're thinking of images and sensations. OK, is holding two images in some relation the same thing as having a belief about them?

It sounds to me, if I can say this without giving offense, that you've grown used to your own views in this area (and that happens to us all, of course) and you may not realize how un-obvious they are without further explanation. It's a topic that interests me, and I'm genuinely curious to see if we can put together a picture of how non-linguistic creatures may or may not engage in a rudimentary form of reasoning. But you have re-interrogate each of the terms you're using and try to say exactly what they mean. Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat . . . . [these are] elemental constituents of the cat's thought/belief. . . The cat is a language less animal capable of forming thought/belief that consists of elemental constituents — creativesoul

But you're just re-asserting all this. I'm asking why you believe it's true, and what such thoughts or beliefs consist of, if not words? Does the cat perhaps think in images? Can she believe using images? I'm not trying to be difficult, or imply that there are no good answers to my questions, but we need a lot more clarity on what's being proposed. What is the "stuff" that allows this account to go forward?

There is no such thing as unarticulated proposition. — creativesoul

But at this very moment (or so goes the usual story) there are propositions about all sorts of things, which are either true or false, yet unarticulated. Your objections are very much in line with Rödl's concerns. He's a tough read, but Self-Consciousness and Objectivity has a lot to recommend it. There was also a long thread jumping off from his re-evaluation of what a proposition is; I believe it's the thread called "p and 'I think p'".

OK, I see what you're saying. Yes, a physicalist would probably agree there are things that humans can't know, but fortunately you don't have to be a physicalist to reach that conclusion!

The idealism question is a little harder. A hardcore Wittgensteinian/Davidsonian position on what we can talk about meaningfully isn't idealist, by my definition. That position raises doubts about going beyond human experience on what I'd call methodological grounds, rather than a skepticism based on some interpretation of Kantian idealism, say.

there are uses of "real" and of "reality" that are not problematic in the way that this peculiar, specifically philosophical, use, is. — Ludwig V

Maybe. Even in ordinary conversation, it can get vague really quickly. I guess I'd agree that we know how to use "real" in the context of "Simone de Beauvoir was real" vs. "Santa Claus is not real".

"P-real" could become a (real) word. There would be a swarm of other, similar, words. It would be interesting to see which of them would survive for, say, ten years. — Ludwig V

Yes, it would! Have there been other philosophical definitions which had to compete for survival against competitors using the same term? I feel there must have been, but I can't think of one at the moment. Maybe "logic"?

I'm also deeply suspicious of any definition that sets out to define a single word. — Ludwig V

In philosophy, yes, since we lack a reliable means to go and check whether we've got it right. Binomial nomenclature, in contrast, seems a noble and successful task.

Because what 'is' for us is all there is for us. Anything beyond is not anything. — I like sushi

I'm not being stubborn, but I just don't see how it follows. If you said, "Anything beyond is not anything for us," I'd see your point. But why would you assert that "for us" encompasses all there is?

These guys are idealists masquerading as physicalists. — Punshhh

Who are "these guys"?

I think everything is an object of experience. But I don't think the experience is an object that, itself, can be experienced. . . . A bacterium experiences greater or lesser warmth, just as we do. But it doesn't think about it, or comment on it. — Patterner

This gets at the gnarly, self-reflexive quality of the con* problem. Can my experiencing of, say, warmth also itself be an object of experience? Rather than give my answer, I'd toss it back and ask, What do your observations of your own mentality in this regard tell you? How does it seem? -- let's start there.

As for the bacterium, yes, it has no self-con, no self-awareness. Once again, this raises the question of how "experiencing experience" may relate to human con. I'm not saying we're the only animals who can do this -- I'm sure many others are to some degree self-aware -- but it characterizes so much of our sense of what it means to be conscious, of "what it's like to be a human." And let's not forget that the practice of meditation can show us the opposite: what it means to experience non-experience, if I can put it that way. Or at least it may do; some doubt this.

*consciousness

Right, that's the question.

OK, but I still wish I understood what the "stuff" was.

"Reality" is an example of the common philosophical mistake of over-generalizing, or perhaps better, of decontextualizing a perfectly useful word, which then becomes virtually useless. What counts as "real" and "unreal" depends on the context, which is specified when you complete a sentence and specify what the context is. The idea that you can lump everything real into one group and everything unreal into another group is just wrong. Things are often unreal under one description and perfectly real under another. Similarly, what existence depends on what kind of thing you are thinking of. Superman exists - as a character in comic books, but not as someone you might meet at a bus stop. — Ludwig V

Nicely summarized. I might question whether the word was ever "perfectly useful," but other than that, you've said it well.

Nabokov said, "'Reality' is the one word that should always appear in quotation marks." He meant pretty much what you mean here. We could, for instance, create "Peirce-marks" to indicate when the word is being used as Peirce defined it.

I reject phenomenology. — creativesoul

OK.

Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Where there has never been language, there could have never been propositions. I'm not sure if I rightly understand what the W3 sense is. — creativesoul

Popper agrees that all W3 objects, such as propositions, are human-made. The reason he puts them in a separate "world" (and of course that is metaphorical) is that propositions have the peculiar property of being true or false (for example) regardless of whether anyone asserts them -- at least, that's the usual construal, though Kimhi and Rödl are both raising questions about that. So in that sense they don't seem to depend on being instantiated in particular minds.

the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof. — creativesoul

Say more about that? Do you mean, the dichotomy is too rigid?

what you mentioned about it only being an extension of reality, rather than it being outside of reality, I find very valid. — javra

Indeed - notice that my objection is to the way the issue is phrased. As "there is stuff beyond our reality" when it should be "there is stuff that is true but unknown" — Banno

Yes, I think we're all in accord that the culprit here is the word "reality," no surprise. "Stuff we can know as humans" and "all the stuff that can be known" are fine with me instead, as long as the two aren't supposed to mean the same thing.

A non-linguistic inference/conclusion is one that is arrived at via a language less creature. — creativesoul

Well, yes, it would be. But I'm trying to puzzle out whether that's a category mistake. You may well be onto something, but help me understand: What is a conclusion that is not put into words? Do you mean a behavior? Probably not, so it must be some mental event that is the equivalent of a conclusion we would express in language. Can you say more about what that would be, phenomenologically? Taking the bear's point of view, so to speak. :smile:

On my view, thought and/or belief cannot be reduced in/to purely physical terms or mental terms. That is because thought and belief consist in part of both and are thus not properly accounted for by either a purely physical or a purely 'mental'(non-physical) framework. — creativesoul

So you wouldn't allow that there could be a "thought" in the World 3 sense. All propositions must appear as items in the physical world? Interesting.

I think you made a mistake there. — I like sushi

I meant all of the "therefores" to be mistakes, trying to show that they don't follow from the initial statements. For this one, the idea is that we can't speculate about anything we can't comprehend, which is quite true. But why would that mean that what we can speculate about and comprehend is all there is?

I wasn't really trying to imagine an alien encounter. I agree that would certainly pose all sorts of conceptual problems. It's more a logical or intuitive idea: Why should we think that humans represent some sort of pinnacle of what can be thought or said? The only way to get that, it seems to me, would be by defining "what can be thought or said" in human terms. But is that realistic?

Because we can only experience what we experience. We can discover only what is availble to us via experience-- because that is all there is for us.

We cannot even speculate about what we cannot ever comprehend. — I like sushi

Even if that's (more or less) true, how do these follow?:

We can only experience what we experience; therefore there is nothing else.

We can discover only what is available to us via experience; therefore there is nothing else to discover.

That is all there is for us; therefore that is all there is.

We cannot even speculate about what we cannot ever comprehend; therefore, there is nothing we cannot speculate about or comprehend.

Can you explain what you mean by "experience being conscious"? we come at consciousness from different directions. I'm happy to explore your idea, but not necessarily sure what it is. — Patterner

Fair enough. We'd have to start by agreeing on what can be an object of experience. As you know, many philosophers believe that con* can never be an object for itself, that it is properly a transcendental ego of some sort. To "experience consciousness," for these philosophers, would be like saying that the eye can see itself.

I don't find that persuasive, but let's say we agreed that it was a good description. In that case, we need a different term -- not "experience" or "be conscious of" or "be aware of" -- for what happens when con reflects on itself. Whatever term we decide to use, that's what I'd be referring to when I spoke about experiencing being conscious.

Or, we can allow, as I do, that self-con or the awareness of one's con is an experience on par with any other mental event. In that case, when I talk about the experience of being conscious, I mean the experience I have when I merely look at my looking (doing meditation is an excellent way to get there). It's separate from any content, whether perceptual or internal.

But I don't think we even need anything this esoteric to answer the question, "Do you experience con?" We can just reply, "Is experiencing con the same or different from being conscious?" If it's the same, then we all agree that we have that experience. If it's different, then we return to the Sartrean exegesis I began with. But in neither case is the phenomenon -- call it what you will, "experience" or not -- in doubt.

*consciousness. I'm tired of typing that word incorrectly!

I reject the idea that language-less animals' belief(s) have propositional content. — creativesoul

I agree. I chose the expression "shadow of propositional content" to try to express something closer to what's going on.

Feeling pain after touching fire causes an animal to infer/conclude that touching fire caused the pain — creativesoul

But if we agree that this does not occur in the space of propositions, then what do you mean by "infer" or "conclude"? What is a nonlinguistic conclusion?

That's the problem I want to home in on. If it's only a matter of one neuron-firing pattern causing another, then we shouldn't call it inference or conclusion at all.