How do we reconcile these problems as indirect realists that accept that our conscious experience is representational? If we do trust our conscious experience to tell us about the things-in-themselves to some extent (as a necessity and way out), then how do we determine the limits of what we can know about the things-in-themselves? If we don’t trust our conscious experience to tell us about the things-in-themselves to some extent, then what grounds do we have to accept Kant’s presupposition (that our experience is representational)? — Bob Ross

So, in other words the categories of understanding manifest in unique ways that tend to obviate necessity of a purely a priori noumenal conception.

Yes I see what you mean but Heidegger uses the word facticity and factical, to relay these concepts. You are not wrong though.

Yes that is right. Husserl was trying to get to some common ground between various experiences by explaining different tiers of consciousness, in my opinion. They all were trying to describe experience, so I guess Sartre was not so antithetical to phenomenology after all.

Yes I did not see it that way. That is a good point. Is ontology a function of ascertaining abilities or is it a means of delineating the mechanisms behind the abilities? I see what you are getting at, I believe. Yes his title is kind of paradoxical considering an essay in phenomenology was antithetical to Husserl's idea of phenomenology.

Yes I get your point I think. Let me try to paraphrase what you are discussing. There are rational choices and choices that go beyond one's scope. However, Sartre was aiming for a type of freedom that would allow normal citizens to reflect on their habits of thought that could hinder them doing anything about evils that exist in the world. Is this what you are getting at? Yes, Sartre definitely disliked the idea of an essence. I think Sartre disliked it, because he thought it was an excuse to do nothing about what is in one's power to do something even if it is miniscule. Heidegger would understand it as related to Dasein and how "Zuworfenung" or throwedness. I think one's existence is constantly a struggle to actualize oneself as Aristotle might say. Thank you for your insight.

So in other words, questioning is a form of liberation. Therefore, Sartre would spurn biological determinism.

I think I may have found the quote pertaining to universal determinism which would encompass the notion of biological determinism. I am using Sarah Richmond's translation. "Indeed, if we allowed that the question might be determined in the questioner by a universal determinism, it would cease not only to be intelligible but even to be conceivable. In point of fact, a real cause produces a real effect, and a being that is caused is wholly engaged by its cause within positivity: to the extent that it depends on its being on its cause, it cannot contain the slightest germ of nothingness within it; insofar as a questioner must be able to take a sort of nihilating step back to relation to the thing he is questioning, he escapes from the causal order of the world and extricates himself from the glue of being." (Sartre, J.P.; Richmond, S., 1943, 2018, pg. 59)

Sartre, J.P. (1943). Being and Nothingness. New York, NY. Washington Square Press. Translated by Sarah Richmond, 2018: pg. 59.

Fair enough.

Hi. I see your point. The physical world exists but we can never know the true nature of what we are looking at because it is a figment exclusive to the species that "sees it." The sensory systems evolutionarily speaking became capable of registering data according to how the species interacts with the environment. The stimuli that have various types of emissions correspond to pressure, sound waves, chemical, and light which stimulate the sensory apparatuses that result in representations in the brain (transduction). A baby for instance cannot see the full range of colour when they are born. It takes about 5 months to develop to the extent of adults. It takes time to develop as it interacts with the environment. But, evolution does play a role because how else would the baby have acquired vision in the first place which is nothing but electromagnetic frequency stimulating the retina via the cones to project an image in the mind?

Why should a representation of a tree be reducible to brain components which have nothing to do with the tree and are physically separated from it? If that were the case, wouldn't that mean the tree were reducible to multiple mutually exclusive physical arrangements of matter - that seems implausibly incoherent to me? I use the example of a tree but that should be the case for any representational experience that is caused by information at sensory boundaries. Wouldn't it be bad evolutionary design if our perceptual representations were giving us information about what was going on inside our own head as opposed to the things in the world they are supposed to represent? Wouldn't doing so require an implausible neuronal architecture also, transmitting information about its own goings on, which would then interfere with the useful information coming into the brain from the outside world? — Apustimelogist

That is an interesting point but evolution is sometimes a gradual process that happens when the body and mind interact with the environment. Thus, it just creates whatever has shaped its chassis. In other words it indiscriminately develops for no rhyme or reason. But, we need a system in our brains that is effective to organizing the outside world's as manifested by our sensations so that the species can continue to reproduce and propagate their genes. It is a process that involves many factors that intersect to create the brain and the body as we know it. In other words, it does not have a purpose, it just changes according to many factors.

Ok I understand your point. However, I think that if they scab, then the union might oust them from the union as they scabbed even if it is unsuccessful. This will lead to the consequence of starving further down the road.

Hi. I think the best option would be to adhere to the duty of commission. I say this because like John Stuart Mill stated:

"The distinction between these two kinds of moral obligation is practically material to the question of liberty and necessity. A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable for not preventing evil, is, comparatively speaking, the exception.”

https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/utilitarianism/section6/

Therefore, it should be noted that preventing the consequences of not picketing would cause potentially the whole company to collapse because it might result in deterioration as by the attrition of their workers.

Well, thank you for posting. I think like Jean-Paul Sartre said, what is subjective is always directed to something outside itself. Like Sartre says, solipsism fails because solipsism cannot account for the idea of the gaze that can trigger responses that are distinct from our private, unique, mental activity and that we can in essence, direct our gaze on the other to influence their perceptions, and thus, their perspectives. So being immersed in the world involves like Martin Heidegger would say, potentiality-for-being because we are creators in a world dictated by facticity and historicity. Consciousness would then be the crux on which our experiences can derive from. In other words, if subjectivity were predicated on methodological solipsism, then we would fail to consider the interactions that occur on a physical level or we would fail to reconcile the other's perspective. So, philosophy can only cut corners when its foundation is built on its value which is rooted in its utility that takes into consideration the subjectivity of others. If we did not do this then we would not be able semantically relate to one another and would fail to use language appropriately. For example, if I tried to express ideas without recognizing the other's consciousness, I would be unable to have terms that express relation.