Here is the rewritten formulation of my interpretation of your representation of my argument:

A. ((¬3 → ¬2) ^ 2) → 3
B. ((¬3 → ¬2) ^ 2)
C. ∴ 3

Premise B and conclusion C complete the modus tollens. Premise A seems to be something extra. And actually, I think it would make more sense to make premise A a second conclusion as herein:

B. ((¬3 → ¬2) ^ 2)
C. ∴ 3
C2. ((¬3 → ¬2) ^ 2) → 3

It is a second conclusion because it is more of a conclusion derived from premise B, rather than an independent premise that is doing work in the argument.

I do not mind saying my argument metalogically can involve modus ponens, but only incidental to and dependent on it first requiring modus tollens.

I really think Adorno is aiming at exposing thought for what it is, namely thought; he wants to show thought qua thought. This is achieved through concretization as a mode of thought, (non-conceptual cognition?).

I think Adorno would say social process is equivalent to ideology. In that way, it is most distinct from Hegel's Absolute Spirit because Absolute Spirit thinks itself to have achieved objectivity. Negative Dialectics, on the other hand, is not a peering into reality, it is not truth through dialectic, rather it is a revelation about the presuppositions that sustain the ideological system.

Negative dialectics stands opposed and is not committed to reality qua thought or thought qua reality. To expose Hegel's Absolute Spirit for what it is, namely subjective thinking is to have achieved a negative dialectics by means of concretized and particularized cognition that is able to discard all non-fundamental elements of the ideology. I think that in this specific paragraph, Adorno's use of the terms "truth" and "objective" may be taken in quotes.

The most obvious problem is that you seem to be misrepresenting your own argument. — Leontiskos

I would not say I misrepresented my own argument, I would say I miswrote your representation of my argument.

Would you agree that your representation of my argument:

(1 ^ 2) → 3
(1 ^ 2)
∴ 3 — Leontiskos

could also be written as follows...

A. not-3 then not-2. And 2. Then 3.
B. not-3 then not-2. And 2.
C. Therefore 3.

If you agree that this is accurate, it seems to me that we can see that the argument will be correct because of modus tollens. In particular, we can see that the "A" premise is already agreeable because of modus tollens. If you had instead forwarded premise "A" to be "not-3 then not-2. And 2. Then not-3...," then it's clear that the conditional would not be doing any of the work. The modus tollens makes all the difference does it not? It confirms the truth of the conditional in premise "A" that serves as the basis for the argument's modus ponens. In other words, premise "A" is true "a priori" (if I can use that term here) because of the modus tollens logic, and the truth of that premise gives the basis for the rest of the argument. Premise "B" becomes the only questionable premise. Given it's truth, the argument necessarily works because premise "A" thanks to modus tollens, cannot be questioned.

So maybe you are right that any argument can be written metalogically as a modus ponens, but I think it cannot be so written without the logical inferences that the argument require, in this case a modus tollens is necessary to the argument and cannot be written off as being a hidden modus ponens.

What do you think?

Good questions. I would tend to think MT is another inference rule that cannot be "derived" from a different inference rule like MP; that is, MT is not a theorem that can be derived from MP. At that point I think we are left to our intuitions about what inference rules to assent to. I think MP, MT, and RAA are all equally intuitive and so they all fall or stand together; that's the idea behind the coherence argument I forwarded earlier in the thread with RAA, MP, and MT. In effect, you can prove, or argue for, MP based on affirming RAA and MT. Or, you could instead argue for MT based on affirming RAA and MP.

Not that it is an instance of MP, which is a logical "move," not a merely formal property.

My point in these last few comments is just that MT is not an instance of MP metalogically. I think it would be more accurate to say that formally, the argument you just stated makes use of a material conditional that when applied to natural language will turn out to not make any sense or be an instance of bad argumentation.

Negative dialectics is a term of irony. Thought negatively appropriates the thing in the conceptual, a concept that is broken off from the non-conceptual (experience, especially suffering is deadened in its conceptual 'reality').

On the other hand, a negative dialectics is...what? Is not a critique, is not a systematization. It is to go beyond the concept, to particularize. To disclose the moments of dialectic in the manner of their disclosure without implications. To realize thought as such.

The concept qua concept is mimetic, but it does not present itself as mimesis. It is as though philosophy were a really good work of art that one has become absorbed in, mistaking the art for the real.

Thinking, conceptual analysis, fails to grasp the thing itself in its totality, though thought pretends that it can do this, imagining itself to have a hold of the essence of things and eschewing the infinite.

I thought we were differentiating between a use of the material conditional versus modus ponens as a mode of discursive thought. In what world is "1 and 2 therefore not 1. 1 and 2. Therefore, not 1." a sensible or logical maneuver? It most certainly is not modus ponens so understood.

You're right that the conclusion utilizes modus tollens, but here is the way that modus ponens is operating metalogically:

(1 ^ 2) → 3
(1 ^ 2)
∴ 3 — Leontiskos

I was reviewing this thread and it occurs to me that I disagree with the contention that the argument I stated:

1. If MP could be false, then RAA could be false.
2. But RAA is not false.
3. Therefore neither is MP. — NotAristotle

is metalogically an MP argument. In fact, I think the argument is metalogically neither MP nor simply making use of a material conditional. Instead, I think it is independently an MT argument structurally and does not collapse into MP. If it were a conditional metalogically, it would have to be a degenerative case. Instead of:
1 and 2 therefore 3.
1 and 2.
Therefore, 3.

The initial argument I forwarded would, I think, be more like:
1 and 2 then not 1.
1 and 2.
Therefore not 1.

But, whether such an argument is valid, an argument of this form surely is not convincing, and is therefore a bad argument. And so, if I am correct that the initial argument concerning RAA, MT, and MP is a good argument, then it must not be a degenerative instance of a conditional and must instead be a true to form example of MT structurally and irreducible to MP.

I am a novice with quantum mechanics, and it has been awhile since I've seen Schrodinger's wavefunction equation. Could you spell out what you mean by "evolves" and "quantum state?" It will help me evaluate the implications of your statement.

admitting the autonomy of inertial motion — SophistiCat

Going to have to disagree with you here as it appears to me that all motion, including inertial motion (by which I understand you to mean constant velocity) depends to some degree on another. In fact, all motion is relative motion and insofar as it is relative to another, all motion, including inertial motion, depends on another. But then all that means is that the metaphysical foundation of everything, God, cannot be in motion.

Seems plausible to me although I do not have a specific argument in mind.

You say that change depends on time, I don't see why that would be wrong. But it also seems to me that a specific thing or substance cannot change itself and must rely on something else to change it.

For example, when a billiard ball moves and changes position, it does not do so of its own accord, but because another billiard ball has imparted motion to it. Similarly, and in accordance with Newton's (1st?) Law, the billiard ball will remain moving unless it strikes another ball or hits the boundary of the table, or encounters friction. And so, all change (of some thing) really depends on another to change it.

I'm not a scientist so I have no idea what you mean by a "pure state quantum system" or that it "evolves." Would you explain?

If you have an argument for God's existence on the basis of belief, truth, or justification, I'm all ears.

Because I think change or alteration implies a kind of dependence on another. If the foundation merely changes form, then it is dependent on what changes it and so is not really a foundation. That is why I think a metaphysical foundation has to create, not merely transform.

Point being: "A" would have to creatively make everything else in order to be a veritable metaphysical foundation. A mere alteration of "A" would render it no longer foundational.

I would think that the metaphysical foundation of everything must be different than what it is the foundation of. If it were not, then the metaphysical foundation would not be a foundation at all. Put another way, if "A" changes, then there must be something that changes "A," but in that case "A" would not be the foundation because there would be something else changing it of which it is not the foundation. What do you think?

The argument doesn't prove a "God" exists. It proves there is an autonomous, bottom layer of reality. This is metaphysical foundationalism. — Relativist

Are you suggesting any other candidates?

To say there is a way the world ought to be seems, to me, (and whether it were actually that way) to make a transcendent statement.

Okay, hmm, so we both agree with premise 1. When I say there is a way the world ought to be, I have in mind the sorts of things people say from a rationalistic or emotional frame of mind: "I wish x" or "I want/desire x" "x is wrong." These sorts of statements seem to imply an "ought."

Would it make sense to say that, while an offense may be against one with infinite dignity, if the effects of the sin are only finite, not infinite, a proportional punishment may justly be finite?

Doesn't sound plausible given that the God of the bible is anything but kind. — Janus

Why do you say that?

I think there must be a source of kindness. People aren't always kind, so people can't be the source of kindness. Only one who is kind necessarily, God, could be the source of kindness. People are sometimes kind. And so there must be a God who is the source of that kindness.

I think I already know what Banno will say, but what do you three make of this argument:

1. There is a way the world ought to be only if there is a God.
2. There is a way the world ought to be, even though the world is not the way it ought to be.
3. Therefore, there is a God.

Interested in your thoughts.

from God.

Okay, where does kindness come from?

Thanks, yeah I think you may be on to something when you say the desert is not merited due to the infinite dignity of the offended. I would tentatively suggest the desert is due to the objective nature of the offense, that is to say, the intentions and actions of the offender.

That depends, when you said:

the only coherent notion of goodness we have to work with is the human one — Janus

did you mean kindness?

Okay, then why can't an offense against a being with infinite dignity come in gradations?

Goodness

Implication?: the creator of life is good.

Implication?: the Creator of all life is supremely good.

What do you make of a sacrificial act that is done for the sake of another? Good or bad?

"Wisdom is vindicated by her deeds."

Can offenses against "finite dignities" come in gradations?

Where does it come from?

Who said that sin is transient? There is, I think, no way to erase a sin; the only way forward is through forgiveness.

Okay yeah, agree with 1.
2. What do you mean by "upshot?" Jesus is considered the Word of God, what God the Father has spoken, according to my faith tradition.
3. Disagree with 3 on the basis that I don't think Jesus is "animated" by God (as though he were once inanimate) but rather is God fully just as He is fully a person who shares in the divine life of the Godhead and is eternally begotten by, and consubstantial with, the Father.

Having started the introduction but with no specific quotations in mind, my impression is that "contradiction of concept" may also refer to the tension between the thing and the noetic thing/concept. That is, a concept at the same time is and is not that that it conceptualizes.

Or, thought, that is to say negation, concretizes itself so that the thing is what it is to the mind, thereby negating, in a sense, the real individual thing and replacing it with a conceptual/mental object. Concretion?

Just a hypothesis so far.

Pretty sure it is illegal to yell "fire" in a crowded theater.

Based on SEP, something like Hegelian dialectic, or just that, appears to be Adorno's target.

I am not sure if Adorno is saying teleology failed in enlightenment. I am speculating, but perhaps he may argue that the "teleology" (or point of arrival) of Enlightenment is self-destruction (have you ever spent a really long time thinking about something, it's exhausting). Maybe telos' relation to enlightenment is discussed in DoE.

Yeah, I think he wants to maintain the negatives that appear to result in synthesis as "determinate" or unqualified or unsynthesized, rather than saying that those negatives are committed to any kind of teleological function. In fact, a telos to negatives would mean the sort of positive affirmation that Adorno wishes to deny, or "negate."

I am equating telos with synthesis, but I guess they could be disparate concepts.

Why those negatives constitute a dialectic is not clear, but maybe that's the point, the recognition of negatives in their negativity is to negate the dialectic itself.

By ‘X’ I am thinking of something like capitalism. — Leontiskos

Not sure I agree; I think it is important that we distinguish liberal practice from the ideology that many identify as liberalism, and I think it is that ideology that is taken issue with, not most liberal practices. I think the problem you are noting with capitalism as it relates to liberal practice, is whether the liberal institutions we have can adapt to the problems that technology and something-like-capitalism have presented. I personally think the answer is yes and that rights should remain part of our discourse, as well as private property, and limits on state incursion. The historical story of liberal practice should not prevent us from making it better today - the same is true for capitalism.

Timothy noted that it is a certain conceptualization of freedom that is most problematic with liberalism. That is, the conceptualization of the self in an atomic way whose self must be asserted and where freedom is optimization of my choices, voluntarism, homo economicus, the procedural (and what Michael Sandel calls) unencumbered self, that vestige of enlightenment thought.

So towards an alternative, I would argue that there is freedom, not in the reification of desires since this probably just leads to addiction, but rather in, in a word, self-knowledge. To demand others acknowledge my desires is to make myself and them at the behest of those desires, and really to control another seems to me to control oneself in some sense, that is, to construct a mental prison for oneself and others.

Greater freedom is surely to be had in recognizing the limitations of reality that are constituted by my mortality, biological self, and others. This bounded system gives me a space that, precisely by its closure, allows me, no, compels me, to have goals; boundlessness gives no reason to pursue goals.

But of course there are alternatives to Marxism. Liberal government is one such alternative! OSHA is an example of a peaceful political change to accommodate the then extant problems with industrialization.

Predicting a rights violation before it happens would be great, if you have any recommendations of how we can do this, I am all ears. But really I think this kind of predictive ability is not beyond only liberal governments, but any government that does not have a crystal ball or precogs or something like that.



When you speak of the atomization of the individual, I understand you to be noting a certain lack of community ethos, but also a refusal to engage at the level of rational discourse. This is to an extent, your criticism of liberalism thinkers, that they refuse to submit their own beliefs concerning liberalism to scrutiny. I think it is a valid criticism to an extent, although I again would not accuse liberalism (which I see as a kind of solution), but I would agree that the sacredness with which some purportedly liberal beliefs are held is lamentable, whatever the source of that conception of self may be.

Liberal society has always permitted what has been called a marketplace of ideas; this is the arena that enables and encourages rational discourse and I think an appreciation of this liberal idea is likely to facilitate resolution of the societal maladies.

That is to say, what we need is a more liberal attitude, greater charitability in our rational discourses, not a closing down of dialogue.

I appreciate the problems you are confronting, but I really do not see them as a problem with "liberalism" understood as a political association relating governed to governing whereby rights have an exigent status relative to other social goods. Might "modernity" be a more appropriate description of your target? Seems to me that this would capture the comprehensive nature of the social problems without implicating a form of government in the process.

I think some of your concerns are overstated.

Freedom of speech is a qualified right in the US and probably in most liberal countries. It's true that the qualification isn't explicitly liberal, but it is within a framework that is largely liberal, and by that I mean freedom of speech is protected extensively.

Your concerns about collective power and algorithmic control will turn out to be true If you ignore successful lawsuits against companies like Facebook as well as lawsuits initiated by the United States government for anti-trust violations.

Regarding gene appropriation, have you heard of the case of Myriad Genetics vs. Association for Molecular Pathology?

I would say these can be seen as cases involving rectification of rights infringements, which is a core liberal value.

A primary problem for liberalism, however, has been its historical failure, including the failure perpetuated by Roe v. Wade in recent history, to recognize righthood as such. That is, the rights of all people including the unborn.

But as has already been stated, this is an internal criticism of liberalism according to a freedom that it has itself failed to live up to, not an external criticism involving a failure to define freedom in different terms.

I want to note that liberalism is, to my understanding, entirely compatible with aristocratic or monarchial structures, but I think you are right that it is anti-autocratic.

Lastly, as Banno and Vera Mont have both already acknowledged, critiques alone won't suffice; if you want to change minds, you have to have a recommendation of how to update, modify, or revise the liberal paradigm.