Anything but theism is “irrational,” in the strictest meaning of the word. Logic’s a-priority highlights, & doesn’t, rather can’t, falsify, theism’s truth; & “it is what it is.”

If anything is an appearance it is known mediately,
The individual knows that he (or she) acts non-mediately
Thus, action cannot be an appearance. — KantDane21

This argument isn't technically a modus tollens, but it can definitely be converted into one; in which case, it's most definitely valid; & its rightful conclusion would be: what's not known mediately (which is an "individual's action," in the case of this argument) can't be what's known mediately (which is an "appearance," in this case).

Yet, as to it being sound, I must remain undecided about that until I have a better understanding of how this argument's maker defines its terms.

Are you claiming my question is (somehow) illegal because it asks you to respond to a claim you haven't made? — ucarr

"Illegal"? No. Yet I don't have the burden of proof by an example for something I that didn't assert. So, to be sure, not "illegal," but illogical.

Assuming the above is the quote, is this a correct interpretation: causal relationships are always continuities? — ucarr

I'd like you to ask my previous question first: how do you define the word "continuity" or "continuous"? Besides, even if I'd affirm it, that still wouldn't undermine my point. For, given that all "xs" are "ys" doesn't necessarily mean that all "ys" are "xs."

Do you agree that the above quote allows that continuities can sometimes also be causal? — ucarr

Still, even if I did, that wouldn't defeat my point, & would rather support it. For, that some "xs" are "ys" precisely means that all "xs" aren't, & therefore "x" can be without "y"; in other words, "continuity, i.e., 'x,'" can be without "causality, i.e., 'y'"; which was precisely the point that was to be proven.

One thing may precede another thing without the preceding thing being the cause of the succeeding thing.

Is my above interpretation of your quote correct? — ucarr

My quote that you're referencing there, when I say that "a thing may be the former without being the latter," isn't about precession & succession. So, it's a "no" as to the interpretation, but, yeah, I've said that before & hold it still.

Continuity alone does not imply causality.

Is my interpretation of your above quote correct?

Can you cite an example of causality without continuity? — ucarr

Yeah, your "interpretation" is correct. As to an example: firstly, my assertion was that continuity isn't causality, i.e., not conversely, & so I can't be asked to cite an example of there being causality without continuity, because I've never claimed that. Secondly, I've already provided an example of that assertion in my post before last, as well as a definition of "continuity" in the latter. Yet that's a better way to approach this one point, that is, to settle on its definition before I restate my given example. So, before I give you an example of continuity without causality, please tell me: how do you understand that term?

Can you take your above quote and apply it to your below quote? — ucarr

I can't 'cause I neither observe causes nor effects within it. Although, honestly, I'm not sure that I get what it's that you're asking. So, if you just happen to elucidate it, that won't be a bad thing.

I'm curious how you can do that. :chin: — jgill

Well, seeing as, at https://www.dictionary.com/browse/continuous, "continuous" is definable as "being in immediate connection or spatial relationship," it should seem quite distinctly. :cool:

I was looking through my old comments, & I came across this. You replied to my first post, & I never noticed it. Pardon this extremely late reply & re-upping of an old thread, but I'd like to know what you'd say to my reply here.

The parachutist has jumped out of a plane airborne at ten thousand feet. What happens next...? — ucarr

Well, according to the O.P., he plummets.

Yet the point's that the relationship that's merely between these states of experience can be represented in terms of precession & succession, without any physical cause being required in order to do so. In other words, when the parachutist was inside of the plane that was up in the air, he wasn't plummeting, but when he was subsequently completely outside of it, at some point, he was; the former state temporally preceding, & the latter state temporally succeeding, the other; without any physical cause being required in order to represent this series of events, as I've literally just done so.

A film script is also known as a continuity. Characters behave and their behavior causes reactions in other characters. Action with emotional impact drives the story forward. As the story moves forward, characters change. This is the arc of the story. As we watch a film continuity, we feel and know the middle of the story is not the same as the beginning of the story because things have happened that have brought us to a new place in the story of people's lives. What Joey did to Cathy last night has made her become a more confident woman next morning. — ucarr

Continuity isn't causality. A thing may be the former without being the latter. For example, one point in space can be represented as being continuous with another, & yet neither depends on or is the "effect" of the other in existence. Therefore, continuity isn't causality.

The "middle" & the "beginning" of the story are temporal determinations, not causal. The "beginning" & the "middle" of the day may be lit out, with the "end" of it being dark at night, & yet neither the light of the "beginning" & the "middle" our story, or day, nor the darkness at the "end" of it are either the causes or the effects of the other. Thus, just because something, like a story, can be represented with a "beginning," a "middle," & an "end" doesn't presuppose causal reality within it.

What Joey did to Cathy last night has made her become a more confident woman next morning.

What's going on inside of Cathy? — ucarr

An "effect" can't be separated from its "cause." One can witness Cathy's confidence without knowing of what "Joey did to Cathy last night." Thus, it can't be claimed that Cathy's confidence is an effect of the latter, unless you're saying that the knowledge of that "effect" can be separated from its "cause" (which is contradictory, & so a reason why this scenario can't be an example of causality). Not mentioning that "last night" & "next morning" are temporal determinations, which, as I've just pointed out above, aren't inherently causal.

Bottom Line: Did George Berkeley mean that the existence of the entire world was dependent upon human perception, or divine perception? — charles ferraro

Bottom Line: The latter, ultimately. For, according to the good ol’ bishop, without the divine mind, there would be no human perceivers, & so neither their perceptions.

There’s no sensible or empirical phenomenon as such; if that’s what you’re asking? Now, if it’s claimed to be defined, in any way, then it’s made up of all negatives; & yet Kant still contradicts himself on this point.

I'd like to go this whole discussion without defining it. — Tom Storm

L.o.l., man, that’s hilarious.

I literally did not. — Tom Storm

So, you didn’t say...

No. I already made this point. Both are assumed. — Tom Storm

... ???

Yeah, bro, it’s cool, man, l.o.l.. Leave it alone, man, it’s cool.

Yes — Janus

So that means that you accept that “x = not-x,” or “a tree = not-a-tree.” I’m sorry but there’s no greater reduction to absurdity than that, being led to say that a thing is not what it is.

It’s now to be understood why your theory on relativity is, in my opinion, incomprehensible (no disrespect is meant here). It’s because the basis of your view is contradictory.

Sorry, I'm not trying to be difficult, but the question is incoherent to me: I cannot get any conceptual grasp on it. — Janus

It’s quite simple actually... do multiple things make up a relation? If so, what’s the fewest amount of things that can form a relation? If you don’t get the question now, then, yeah, I think that you’re just being difficult, l.o.l.. Yet that’s no problem.

From memory and roughly paraphrased, Hegel said something like "every determination is a determinate negation". So a tree, for example, is defined as much by what it is not as what it is. It is not a shrub, or a mountain, a river, or an animal. This is how the game of "twenty questions" proceeds. — Janus

So, you’re saying that the definition of “x” includes “not-‘x,’” or the definition of tree includes not-tree?

In fact, it's hard to imagine you don't understand it since you used the same word in the same way as me when you wrote this: — Tom Storm

What have I missed? You seemed to have grasped my point rather well for someone who doesn't understand how assumption was being used. And it remains curious that you missed me saying this: — Tom Storm

L.o.l.,, why won’t you just (simply) define “assumption”? It’s actually quite funny that you won’t & avoid it by referring to a single reader for the purpose, such as myself.

Although, yeah, I used it however you originally or firstly used it, as a term to describe things. Yet I never considered a definitive definition for it because I was ready to use it, & thus ultimately understand your meaning, in whatever way you were to choose to express your argument.

You literally just said that both the thinker & the idea of thinking are assumed. I just then merely asked you, for affirmation, if you mean that the thinker & the idea of thinking are assumed, i.e., is that how you’re choosing to describe them? To which you replied positively. Okay, now that that’s out in the open, the next is question is or was: what do you mean by an “assumption,”i.e., what makes something an “assumption”? Yet you refuse to do that, oddly yet not surprising enough. If you go this whole time without defining it, that’s really something, l.o.l..

But the absolute is thought as the polar opposite to the relative. — Janus

A lot of this turns what you mean precisely by “polar opposite,” & yet that’s ultimately unimportant, so allow me to ask you: does the definition of “x” include “not-‘x?’”

Do you mean relations between the smallest possible things? — Janus

Sorry, but, no. I mean exactly what I asked: according to you, is there a relation wherein the number of members can’t possibly decrease, i.e., a “smallest possible relation”? If so, how many things comprise it, i.e., is it in the single, double, or however many, digits?

I think that the only information about things is given by their relations, not by their identity. — Janus

I'm saying that the nature of anything which depends on its relations with other things is relative, not absolute. — Janus

According to you, is there a smallest possible relation? If so, how many members comprise it?

Tautologies don't tell us anything about the nature of things. — Janus

They actually do, just no novel information.

There’s no way to argue that “X = X” can’t express “the nature” of “X,” granted that it doesn’t express any (relatively) new information about it.

It means 'not relative', not relative to any other thing or context. — Janus

Is what’s “not relative to any other or context” conceivable? If not, why do you speak on something that’s not thought?

Meaning what? All our judgements and knowledge, whetger true or false, are relative to us, so none are absolute. — Janus

... “relative to us.” Does that imply that if wasn’t relative to just “us,” it’d be “absolute”; that is, that it’s just because that it’s just related to “us,” that it’s deemed “relative”; as if a relation to someone beside(s) “us” would qualify it as “absolute”?

Or are you saying that any relationship excludes a thing from being “absolute”?

No. I already made this point. Both are assumed. — Tom Storm

... & you’ve yet to define what disqualifies a thing from being “assumed” or an “assumption.” When I first asked you, this was your response...

It's not about what I think assumption means. — Tom Storm

This may be one of the least philosophical things that I think that I’ve ever heard (no disrespect is meant here, truly). Of course what you think a word means within your argument is significant. If it’s meaningless to you, how am I ever to grasp your meaning?

The salient point is that there may not a straight forward 'I am' as the Cogito suggests. The experience of thought insertion leads some folk to doubt that they are a self and that their thinking may not be their own. — Tom Storm

Saying & thinking a thing are two different things. In other words, just because something is vocalized doesn’t mean that it’s true.

The idea of thinking assumes there is a thinker — Tom Storm

So, the thinker is assumed but the idea of thinking isn’t? What makes it that the latter isn’t but the former is?

I have known many people who experience thoughts who are convinced those thoughts are coming from someone else. How do we determine that any thinking you experience is yours, that there is a you, an 'I am'? — Tom Storm

Doesn’t the fact that those people think that presuppose that they’ve already determined themselves as thinkers in contrast to others? If not, how could they think that they were getting thoughts from someone else, i.e., distinguish between a sender & a receiver mind (so to speak)?

The cogito is a tautology; if it is true that I think, that there is an "I" that thinks, then of course it is also true that I exist. Something is going on, that much we know, and thinking certainly seems to be one of the things going on. Perception is another, sensation is another, desire is another: if it is true that there is an "I" perceiving, feeling, desiring, then it is also true that I am. — Janus

Does something being a tautology make it false, if it’s really so? A tautology, just because it’s one, isn’t a falsity.

All our knowledge is relative...to how things appear, so in that sense none of it is absolute. We can think 'absolute' as the binary opposite of 'relative', but it does not follow that we can know anything absolute. — Janus

How do you understand the term “absolute”?

Aren't there problems with the cogito? Assuming that there is an 'I' doing the thinking. And what exactly is it we know about thinking? — Tom Storm

What makes something an “assumption,” according to you?

A universal negative judgment is absolute.

It has always been so. I have always been in the present. The present is where I am now and where I’ve been my entire life. The present never ends. I am always in the present, even if my mind is elsewhere. — Art48

Does what’s present change?

That the concept of time only makes sense in the context of awareness. — Pantagruel

Okay. So, that leads to another question, which I've noted in my original comment:

... then why even ask that question (in your O.P., i.e., "Does what we designate as time really only refer to the awareness of time?")? For, in that case, it's obvious that what we designate by "time" refers only to "the awareness of time," since, by your own admission, it can't even be considered & designated in any other way than that (& so you've answered your own question [from the O.P.]). — ItIsWhatItIs

Before I can make up my mind about how I think your O.P. should be answered (as if it even matters [l.o.l.]), allow me please to ask you, what did you mean in the O.P. when you asked "Does what we designate as time really only refer to the awareness of time?"

Does your question imply that we can even consider time & thereby designate it in any other way than in the sense of "the awareness of time"? If, & only if, not, then why even ask that question? For, in that case, it's obvious that what we designate by "time" refers only to "the awareness of time," since, by your own admission, it can't even be considered & designated in any other way than that (& so you've answered your own question).

Pardon the late reply, 180 Proof.

I think that to observe a change in nature which within the constraints of the 'laws of nature' could not be caused, even in principle, by any natural event, force, or agent implies that that causal "something" is inconsistent with – not constrained by – the 'laws of nature'. — 180 Proof

Okay. So, logically a follow-up question for me is, how's it determined what, in principle, "the constraints of the laws of nature" are?

....; more precisely, 'any X that contradicts, or is inconsistent with, the laws of nature' is what I understand by "supernatural". — 180 Proof

It seems to me supernatural is synonymous with necessaeily fictional (i.e. impossible). — 180 Proof

How's it known that something is "inconsistent with the laws of nature"?

A mere series of events can never constitute a causal relationship. The frames within a film-strip precede & succeed each other but are neither the causes or effects of one another. So, in the series of events that's referenced in the O.P., neither causes nor effects are demonstrable, but only temporal predecessors & successors.