Hello!
I appreciate the thoughtful analysis you've presented on the problem of evil in relation to both naturalism and theism.

Naturalists have no way of explaining mental health issues as an example of the problem of evil. — Ishika

It wouldn't be accurate to say that naturalism cannot explain mental health issues. In fact, scientific research has shown that many mental health problems can be traced to factors such as genetics, diet, and environmental factors (This is a huge field of study, but for example, there's this study published this February). A naturalistic explanation posits that mental health issues are part of the complex interplay of biological and environmental factors that have shaped the human experience throughout history. From an evolutionary standpoint, certain traits that may contribute to mental health issues might have been beneficial to our ancestors in certain situations or environments, but in the modern world, they may lead to mental health struggles.

Addressing the problem of evil from a naturalist standpoint does not mean dismissing the existence of moral values. Nor does it suggest that suffering is inherently good. The concept of suffering can be explained as a consequence of natural processes, but we as human beings have the ability to reflect on these processes and make choices to alleviate suffering when possible.

For example, there are many cases of people having personal struggles which turn them to God, which is significant evidence for theism. — Ishika

Naturalism acknowledges the complexity of human experiences, including emotional and psychological needs. Turning to religion or spirituality can be seen as a natural response to human needs for connection, purpose, and meaning. This doesn't inherently contradict a naturalist perspective. It also doesn't confirm the existence of a morally perfect, all-knowing, and all-good God.

In fact,certrain emotions, like depression seems like a setback in biological processes, and the better evolved humans would be void of these emotions. — Ishika

It could seem that certain emotions, like depression, are setbacks in biological processes if evolution is supposed to yield perfection. However, evolution does not necessarily lead to perfect adaptations. Sometimes, traits or features that were once advantageous become maladaptive or counterproductive. Additionally, genetic variation can result in a wide range of emotional experiences and responses, some of which may be more challenging than others. That's not even to mention genetic mutations, which can lead to the emergence of traits that were not present in previous generations. Although a natural and "random" process, mutation adds even another layer of complexity to the problem of suffering. Despite the complexity, there's nothing inconsistent about these naturalistic explanations.

Naturalism doesn't claim to be an easy or simplistic explanation of everything. However, it does offer a rational, evidence-based framework for understanding the natural world. While theism might offer some individuals comfort and meaning in the face of personal struggles, a naturalistic approach can help us better comprehend the world around us.

Some argue that Pascal’s wager fails because it ignores the importance of belief in theism. They say that the wager says one should weigh out the options of theism and atheism, then choose which to follow. — Katiee

Hey Katiee!

I think there are quite a few arguments for why Pascal's Wager fails that don't even require one to submit to Pascal's Wager in the first place. Although it certainly does seem misguided to For example, there's the "many gods" objection.

Laid out, it essentially comes down to the following:
1: If Pascal's Wager is a valid argument for belief in God, then it should provide a rational basis for determining which god to believe in.
2: Pascal's Wager does not provide a rational basis for determining which god to believe in.
3: Therefore, Pascal's Wager is not a valid argument for belief in God. (1,2 MT)

To explain why premise 1 is true, consider someone who needs to decide whether to believe in the Christian God, Zeus, or the Flying Spaghetti Monster. Each of these deities comes with its own set of rewards and punishments, making the decision more complicated than what Pascal's Wager originally suggests.

Suppose that Pascal's Wager provides sufficient reason for believing in the Christian God. Accepting this premise means that an individual must also accept the potential rewards and punishments offered by Christianity. Makes sense, but what if other gods exist, like Zeus or the Flying Spaghetti Monster? The existence of other gods and religious belief systems introduces additional sets of rewards and punishments to consider. As a result, following Pascal's Wager would also require belief in alternative deities to avoid their respective punishments and obtain their rewards. This could become even more difficult if their punishments and rewards were of a similar caliber and not easily dismissible.

Such belief in multiple, contradictory deities is logically incoherent. Thus, Pascal's Wager cannot be a sufficient reason for believing in the Christian God, as it would lead to the absurd conclusion that one should simultaneously believe in incompatible deities.

For the sake of argument, it appears like you're laying out something like:
1. If God exists, then good and evil must exist.
2. God exists.
3. Therefore, good and evil must exist. (MP 1,2)

If we are granting premise 2 here, then premise 1 is the only thing to object to, and is where lots of discussions revolve. Many thiests would respond to this sort of argument by saying God only has positive properties. (strong, smart, good, etc.) These thiests would describe the "lack" of being evil as part of them being maximally good. (Since it wouldn't make sense to say someone is both the most good, and the most evil person) This mostly overcomes the problem because then there's no longer any issue about God being maximally everything because they assert that he's not maximally everything, just maximally everything good/positive. Those "bad" traits are claimed to be weaknesses rather than maximalities. If a theist wanted to claim God is maximally everything, then I'm not sure if there's a strong response there.

Responding to the part about imagining a world with no evil, my thinking is similar to what's been said above; that good and evil are used in perspective. Even if I think of the most evil thing imaginable, one could still hold a consequentialist view and say that that "evil" actually could manifest into a far greater good. There is no way to disprove that possibility.

If we were to live in a world without evil, as you describe, the "lesser" evils we experience today would become our "maximal" evils today. For example, if murder and all other extreme evils were eliminated, we would all say that stubbing your toe is the most evil. Being that good and evil are concepts we do to describe our perceptions, I'm not sure that it would even be possible to fully eliminate them.

Premise 1: The concept of a designer necessarily requires a starting point.
Premise 2: If the designer was designed, then there must have been another designer that preceded it, leading to an infinite regress.
Conclusion: Therefore, the designer must have been the starting point, and not designed by another entity. — gevgala

Hi, gevgala, I appreciate when people lay out their argument; thank you!

Premise 1 seems to assume everything has a starting point, but research in quantum fluctuations has really questioned our assumption of this. Although, saying not everything has a starting point would seem to push me towards the Humian “there is no cause and effect” camp. I think if at all possible, it seems like we are best to agree with the overwhelming evidence in favor of causation. But that alone doesn’t seem to resolve our debate.

Premise 2 definitely highlights the problem of infinite regress, but I don't think this allows us to assert that a designer must've been the starting point. If we assume that everything indeed must have a starting point, then isn't it equally plausible that the universe/cosmos itself is the starting point or that it's the result of some other non-designer process? It seems like there’s an infinite array of theories one could come up with for what a necessarily basic anything would be.

The conclusion here does not necessarily follow from the premises. The existence of a starting point does not automatically imply the existence of a designer. It is possible that the starting point could be a natural event or process, which could be explained without invoking a supernatural designer.

Regarding the analogy with Helio Gracie and jiu-jitsu:
The difference seems to be that we have a large amount of historical evidence for Helio Gracie inventing Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu. In our case, the designer's existence and role as a starting point are purely speculative. Additionally, Helio Gracie was a human being, a product of natural processes. This would differ from the concept of a supernatural designer that exists beyond the natural world.

It seems like your view explained here might fall under the "God of the gaps" fallacy. If you don't mind sharing, I'm curious how someone could hold that stance.

Thank you! I appreciate the alternative perspective and the flipped argument you presented. However, I'd like to address a few aspects of your argument and offer some clarifications.

This is largely echoing what Tom said, but I think it's important to note that the burden of proof typically lies with the one making a positive claim, in this case, the theist. It does seem true that neither theism nor atheism (as we know them) has sufficient evidence to warrant an end to the discussion. However, atheism is often seen as a rejection of the positive claim (i.e., the existence of a deity) due to insufficient evidence rather than making a claim in itself. In this sense, atheism does not necessarily rely on faith and personal beliefs, but rather a healthy dose of skepticism and a demand for evidence.

Regarding Pascal's Wager, it is indeed an interesting thought experiment, but I don't think it's without its flaws. In this case, it assumes a binary choice between belief and disbelief in a specific deity. This seems to neglect the multitude of religions and dieties that've surfaced through history. It seems that choosing to believe in one deity could lead to "infinite loss" if the true deity turns out to be another, for example.

As for the Cosmological and Teleological arguments, they do offer interesting perspectives on the origin of the universe and the apparent order within it. However, these arguments are not without their criticisms, either. For instance, the Cosmological Argument relies on the assumption that everything must have a cause, which we don't necessarily know to be true at the quantum level. It sounds crazy, but much of what was previously unknown to science sounded crazy as well.

Take, for example, ancient cultures and religious texts that said things to the effect:
"How can water fall from above? Ah, it must be an ocean above us held back by a dome. That's how we get rain."

While it's true that there are many aspects of reality that we are yet to fully understand, invoking a deity to explain these unknowns seems wrong (the "God of the gaps" fallacy). Historically, gaps in human knowledge have often been filled with supernatural explanations, only to be replaced by natural explanations as our understanding advances. I will accept that the existence of a deity might be possible. But relying on it as an explanation for the unknown might hinder our pursuit of knowledge and understanding.

Even if we assume everything must have a cause through our current understanding of nature (and ignore emerging quantum theories), it still seems like quite the stretch to posit a particular deity or religion. The Cosmological argument seems to advocate that the diety is exempt from laws of causation because it's necessary, but I don't see how the same couldn't be said about the cosmos itself. Additionally, the Teleological Argument has been challenged by the theory of evolution, which provides a natural explanation for the complexity and order we observe in living organisms.

These replies are grossly short considering the expanse of the topics, but hopefully it helps to continue the conversation :)

Thank you all for your thoughtful replies!



EnPassant, regarding the definitions you set forth; I'm not sure they're ones I could accept. It seems to conflate existence and being as properties and assumes that they are distinct entities.

From a naturalistic perspective, it seems that one could argue that existence is not a property, but a precondition for properties. In other words, for an object or concept to possess properties, it must first exist. Therefore, when we talk about X having the property of existence, it's not a property that X possesses, but rather, it describes the state of X.

Moreover, the distinction between being and existence seems to be based on a metaphysical assumption that is not universally accepted. Instead of assuming that being is developed existence, we could view them as synonymous, describing the same state of existence.

1. X exists. This makes existence as a property of X superfluous whence X is existence.

2. X does not exist. It is incoherent to say as non existent X has properties. Whence existence has properties but is not a property of anything. — EnPassant

In response to the two above scenarios:

1. If X exists, then it's not that existence is a property of X; rather, X is in a state of existence, which allows it to have properties. This doesn't seem to imply that X is equivalent to existence itself.

2. If X does not exist, it indeed cannot have properties. However, this doesn't imply that existence has properties, but rather, that the discussion of properties for non-existent entities is irrelevant, which I would agree.

To me, these counterexamples and explanations seem to provide a robust alternative here.

As Kant pointed out, personal experiences are the only evidence of ding an sich Reality that we humans have, from which to construct our worldviews and belief systems. Everything else is hearsay. — Gnomon

I'm totally happy with accepting this :)

This seems to agree with my first premise. I don't think empirical evidence is needed or available in all cases. However, there seems to be an important distinction between personal experiences.

We have various personal experiences in our lives. We daydream, we work, we play. Whatever we do, there are some experiences that stand out. For example, let's say I had a dream that I took out the trash. In a vacuum, that seems totally normal, and I have little reason to doubt that I didn't take out the trash. That entirely checks out with all of my other personal experiences. I take out the trash all the time. However, it becomes a moot belief upon waking up and realizing that everything that just happened wasn't real. I, too, could walk into the kitchen and see that the kitchen trash is still full. This reality, although potentially also fake, seems more real to me. It would be preposterous for me to hold still the belief that I took out the trash.

My claim, then, is that even when operating without empirical evidence, it still seems like we can apply probability to our experiences. The difficult torch to pick up becomes the claim that someone has a spiritual experience that presented itself in an unquestionable manner. Beyond the illusion of water on a hot summer day, one would have more confidence in their spiritual experience's legitimacy than in its falsity.

This is a great objection!

It seems like you’re objecting to premise 1:

1. If there is no empirical evidence for something, then belief in that something is based on faith and personal beliefs, not fact.
2. There is currently no empirical evidence for the existence of a deity.
3. Therefore, the existence of a deity is based on faith and personal beliefs, not fact. (1,2 MP)

I agree with you that empirical evidence for the supernatural is a contradictory notion because the very act of sensing something makes it a natural phenomenon. However, it is important to consider the role of faith and personal belief when it comes to claims about the existence of a deity.

While it is true that belief in a deity can be based on faith and personal belief, we must recognize that such beliefs cannot be objectively verified or falsified. In other words, they are not based on empirical evidence but instead are based on subjective experience and interpretations. This raises the question: can subjective experiences be relied upon to make objective claims about the existence of a deity?

Furthermore, I think it’s important to differentiate between what can be considered objective fact and what can be considered subjective belief. While beliefs about the existence of a deity can be based on subjective experience and interpretation, we must recognize that subjective experiences cannot be relied upon as a means of verifying objective claims. This is because subjective experiences are, by definition, unique to each individual and cannot be independently verified or falsified.

For example, two people may have a subjective experience that they interpret as evidence of the existence of a deity, but these experiences may differ in significant ways. One person may interpret their experience as evidence of an all-good deity, while the other may interpret their experience as evidence of an all-bad deity. The fact that there is no empirical evidence for the existence of a deity does not necessarily mean that a deity does not exist. However, it does mean that belief in a deity cannot be considered a factual claim in the same way that, for example, the law of gravity can be considered a factual claim. That is, of course, unless a deity were to appear before us and become natural – rather than supernatural.

That being said, I don’t believe there being no empirical evidence for the existence of a deity necessarily concludes that a deity does not exist.