Yes, that's an ontological claim, and of mind-independence. That part is easy, and quite common. The challenge is with where it ends. My topic is about if your opinion is self-consistent, because few think about it further than opinions about what is seen. This is why the moon doesn't matter. — noAxioms

I think I understand that. So "unicorn" is not an irrelevant example. I like it just because it is not straightforward, but requires some thought. That's much more instructive than the moon.

Poorly worded on my part. Typical claim is that "I know the moon exists due to empirical evidence". It's an epistemic claim about ontology, but not directly an ontic claim. — noAxioms

OK.

That's a description of how it was created and already assumes the moon shares the same ontology as those solar system events long ago. — noAxioms

Well, yes. It is an object in the solar system, so it seems a reasonable assumption. Any question about that is pretty much incomprehensible to me.

Imagining something presumably isn't what makes it not real. Again, I'm not talking about the concept of something, but about the thing itself. I have a imagined image of the moon, what it's like up there, which doesn't make the moon nonexistent. — noAxioms

You are right. It is curious that we talk of the imaginary friends that some small children have, meaning that they do not exist. Yet it is perfectly possible to imagine something that is real - such as a friend who is absent. My grounds are precisely the ones that you were reaching for - improbability or impossibility. Those grounds are defeasible, but the implausibility of the idea means that it would not be easy to convince me of the opposite - especially in this age of deep fakes!

As to the distinction between "exists" and "is real", I had assumed that anything that exists is real — Ludwig V
Contradicting your prior quote: "For me, unicorns exist, all right. But they are not real creatures.". — noAxioms

Sorry. I meant to explain that.
My model for "real" relies on the common use of the word, in which something that is unreal under one description will (normally) be real under another. This contradicts the common assumption that "real" and "unreal" are exclusive, which neglects the fact that many things we would describe as unreal do in fact exist and are real under a different description. Hence "A forged banknote is not a real banknote, but it is a real forgery."

As I was writing, I realized that unicorns and mythical creatures and 7-winged birds are imaginary creatures and "unicorns are real mythical creatures" and "7-winged birds are real imaginary creatures" seemed malapropisms. But unicorns and 7-winged birds do not, to put it this way, have the same mode of existence as forged bank-notes and industrial diamonds.

Different definition of 'real' there. We're discussing ontology, not 'being genuine'. — noAxioms

True. I get a bit confused by "mind-indendent reality", which, pretty clearly is about existence.

I've seen whole topics devoted to the latter: "My signature is not mine since it was made by a pen, not by me". Games like that. — noAxioms

If I write something like that, you can be pretty sure it is a joke.

To be a unicorn, all it needs to be sort of horsey-like with a single horn on its head. There's no requirement to correspond exactly to the human myth .... I don't like the unicorn example because it is so improbably that there is not a planet in the infinite universe somewhere that has produced them. ..... — noAxioms

You did cite unicorns in your earlier post. It is true that my disbelief in them is defeasible. (Most claims about non-existence are.) But your argument is wildly speculative and does not even begin to convince me. Until there is better evidence, I shall continue to classify them as mythical and claim they don't exist, except in the way that mythical creatures (Pegasus, the Gorgons, etc.) exist and not in the way that horses exist.

So again, just because there's a myth about it, why does that preclude the reality of one? It's like you're saying that the myth causes its noexistence. — noAxioms

I see your point. Compare "imaginary". My reply is the same.

There are many definitions, rarely clarified when the word is used. Some examples:- ..... There are other definitions, but that's a taste. Your intuitions seem to lean heavily towards 2p . I favor the relational definition most often since it is far more compatible with quantum mechanics. I've been exploring the 4th one. — noAxioms

Thinking about it, I'm really not content to say that past events and future events don't exist. It makes sense to say that all events, past, future and present exist, but in different modes. "X event happend in the past", "Y event will happen in the future", and "Z event is happening now" are all true and all those events are real, hence exist. So I don't accept 2p.
I've worked with 4) most of the time, though I would resist the apparent arbitrariess of "whatever we designate" and substitute "whateven the language we are involved in specifies". But I would insist on the truth value. I've talked about different modes of existence in this post. That reflects the effect of context on the meaning of "exist" .

Reality is an interpretation of empirical data. I want to say this is a mind-dependent definition, but it might be too hasty. The apple exists not because it is observed, but its observation suggests an interpretation of reality that includes that apple. Fair enough, but it doesn't say how the interpretation deals with things not observed, and this topic is mostly about that. — noAxioms

I don't think you've got that quite right. Surely, the data are also part of reality? Also, on the face of it, it looks as if you are saying that reality is not (directly) observed, so your problem disappears. I'm not sure about reality, but I'm pretty sure that what counts as real depends on the context. "Real money", "Real food", "Real champagne" all have different definitions.

A recent Nobel prize in physics was given for proving this again, despite Bell doing it in the 60's. — noAxioms

That's odd. There must be a story about that.

Edit. Text deleted here.

Proving that reality is not locally real means that at most one of the two above principles is true. An example that rejects both principles is objective collapse interpretations. — noAxioms

Thanks very much for that. It was very helpful.

This is all quite relevant to the topic, because under most interpretations, the moon is not objectively real, but only real to that which as measured it, which usually means anything that has in any way interacted with it by say receiving a photon emitted by the moon. — noAxioms

Yes, I've gathered that modern physics seems to have become something that Bishop Berkeley would have approved of, - apart from the refusal to include God. But there also seems to be very little consensus.

I'll venture on one ignorant comment. If you try to define space and time or space-time without any physical objects, you are bound to run in to trouble. At least, it seems obvious to me that those dimensions only have meaning in a universe that includes some actual objects. But then, so far as I can see, a space-time diagram is a method for plotting physical objects, like a map, rather than a description of reality, like a picture.

Well the fact that you reacted to a comment 500 posts means you've been paying attention to this topic, and I must thank you for that and for your contribution. — noAxioms

It's an excellent topic.

I don't think my criteria matter at all. It's something that should be explicitly specified by anybody that claims it (sc. mind-independent existence), so it might vary from one view to the next. — noAxioms

It might well. The variations will be very instructive.

Since I consider ontology to be a mental categorization, there's nothing mind independent about it. I'm not asserting that the others are wrong, but I'm trying to explore the consistency of such a view. — noAxioms

If I believe that the moon is exists independently of what I, or anyone else, thinks about it, is that an ontological claim? If so, the mere fact that we categorize or classify something in some way, in my view, is no ground for claiming that it is mind-dependent, though the classification obviously is.

"The moon is real because of empirical evidence". Presumably the moon's existence (relative to this planet) is not dependent on humans (or any life forms) observing it, and yet it's existence is justified by observation. I challenge that logic, but to do so, I need to find somebody who supports it. — noAxioms

I would not dream of claiming that the moon is real because of empirical evidence, because that is not true. The moon exists because of complex events in the solar system, some billions of years ago. We know it exists because of empirical evidence, but that is an entirely different matter.

OK, so you draw a distinction between 'exists' and 'is real'. As a mythical creature, it is a common referent. People know what you're talking about, but it seems no more than a concept of a thing, not a thing in itself. I am not talking about the concept of anything, but about the actual thing, so perhaps I should say 'is it real?', or better, come up with an example that is not a common referent such as a bird with 7 wings, all left ones. That at least eliminates it existing as mythology. But instead let's just assume I'm talking about a unicorn and not the concept or myth of one — noAxioms

I don't quite see your point. We can agree that your birds do not exist. But, since you have imagined them, they are imaginary birds, and consequently not real birds, and not real. They don't seem at all problematic. That makes them different from mythical creatures. Mythical creatures such as unicorns have an additional feature. Why would we ignore that?
As to the distinction between "exists" and "is real", I had assumed that anything that exists is real. A forged banknote is not a real banknote, but it is a real forgery. The reality of the banknote depends, so to speak on how you classify it. The difference is that there is no classification under which I can say that a unicorn exists. That's a difference in meaning between "forged" and "mythical".

Your definition of 'exists' seems to be confined to 'exists at some preferred moment in time', which implies presentism, and only membership in this universe. I consider a live T-Rex to exist since I consider 75 MY prior to my presence to be part of our universe. The notion of 'cease to exist' makes like sense to me. I also don't confine existence to our universe which is why I call it 'our' universe instead of 'the' universe. I find presentism to be a heavily mind dependent view. Just saying... — noAxioms

I must confess that I don't have a firm view of about presentism and eternalism. We seem to have a difference in our understand of "exist". I wouldn't dream of saying that dinosaurs exist in the sense of being alive. I accept that dinosaurs exist in the sense that their remains are still to be found in various places. On the other hand, I do maintain that they did not exist before they evolved in the Triassic period.

The bottom line should be an answer to my question. Do real unicorns (not the myth) exist or not, and how might that answer be justified? Perhaps unicorns are again a bad example of mind-independence because they presumably implement mental processes of their own. Perhaps we should discuss some questionable inanimate entity. — noAxioms

The bottom line, then, is that the answer depends on your definition of "exist" and "real".

So an alien-made device on a planet out of our access cannot be called a thermostat by us? How about the temperature regulatory systems that the first warm-blooded animals evolved? Both those are sans-human-context. — noAxioms

Yes, that's true. I wouldn't hesitate to call either of those cases thermostats, because in each case, they are part of a living system or part of a living being. On the other hand, if we found an inanimate system that included a feedback loop that tended to maintain itself in a steady state, I would hesitate to call it a thermostat, but probably come down on the side of doing so, on the grounds that it is at least analogous to what we now call a thermostat.

Reality is an interpretation of empirical data. That's what I'm calling an interpretation here. People interpret that data differently, so there's all these different opinions of what is real. If being real is no more than an ideal (a mental designation), then there's no truth to the matter. — noAxioms

"Real" is more complicated that "red" or "large". Many, if not all, objects can be classified in several ways, according to context and point of view. Things can be real under one designation and not real under another. As to reality as philosophers debate it, I don't really understand what they are talking about - unless they mean real things in general. But since what is real depends on how it is described, that doesn't mean very much to me. "Real" does not mean "Ideal". On the contrary, the real is quite often opposed to the ideal.

Yes, local realism has been falsified. — noAxioms

Could you please enlighten me - What is "local realism"?

Having said that, and having floated the idea that ontology is a mental designation, it would seem to follow that presentism and eternalism are the same thing, just interpreted differently, an abstract different choice without any truth behind it. I hadn't realized that until now. — noAxioms

I must confess, when I've come across that argument, I haven't found it particularly interesting. So I'm not disappointed by that conclusion.

As first responder herein, I admitted to unabashedly supporting mind-independent reality, which makes explicit something that is, and is necessarily, regardless of what I think about it. — Mww

I agree. The interesting part is which items qualify as mind-independent and under what criteria.

But is 'temperature' a property of things outside our conceptual categories or is a concept we introduced to make sense of our experience? — boundless

I'm a bit puzzled by this. Why can't it be both?

Perhaps 'understood in its own terms' was what I meant. — Wayfarer

I think it helps. I don't think there is much missing in the physical explanation of a rainbow. A rainbow, understood as we perceive it and conceive of it, is one lange-game or practice. However, the same - what shall I call it? --phenomenon understood in physical terms, is another.

The same, I would say, applies to colours and sounds.

the question of this topic is not about the moon, but about the unicorn. If the unicorn exists, why? If it doesn't, why? Most say it doesn't, due to lack of empirical evidence, but if empirical evidence is a mind-dependent criteria. Sans mind, there is no empirical evidence to be considered.
— noAxioms
Here we are 500 posts in, and I don't think this has been answered. Lack of it is why I suggests that nobody really supports mind independent existence. — noAxioms

Well, I guess that's an opening for me to chip in. I do have a problem, however, that I haven't got my head around what the criteria are for mind-independent existence. But I can explain what I understand about unicorns. Perhaps that will help.

But first, can I ask whether you say that there is no question about the moon because there is no question whether it exists independent of any mind? If so, your general question is already answered, and we are dealing with the much more interesting question which things exist independent of any mind and which don't. A lot depends here on what "independently of any mind" means. I'm relying on my intuitions here. Perhaps we'll get a definition later.

For me, unicorns exist, all right. But they are not real creatures. They are mythical creatures. So I say that their existence is the existence of myths. Can we say that they are real mythical creatures? That sounds odd because "real" and "mythical" pull in opposite directions. We might say that they are really mythical creatures, contradicting anyone who might claim that they are real.

Myths are a complicated concept. Their existence does not depend on any specific minds, but does depend on the circulation of stories which cannot be tracked back to any specific people. If those stories stopped circulating and got forgotten, those myths would cease to exist and, although it seems odd to say so, unicorns would also cease to exist. Yet it would remain true that the myths and unicorns existed at some time, and that gives a sense to our feeling that even forgotten myths exist in the way that forgotten things continue to exist. So, in that sense, they are mind-independent, but in another sense, they are not.

The bottom line, is that, in the case of unicorns, our intuitions pull in opposite directions. Unicorns don't fit our, perhaps naive, common sense.

If I may add a comment on thermostats. We made them to meet certain purposes in our lives. In that sense, they are mind-dependent. And yet, there is a physical object that, we would like to say, exists independently of our minds. I would say that what exists indendently of our minds is a physical object shorn of its place in our lives. Without that context, it is misleading to call it a thermostat. But we can easily provide another description of it as a physical object. In that sense, it exists independently of our minds. One might add that the components of the thermostat all exist independently of our minds. It is their arrangement into the causal cycle, that makes those objects a thermostat.

I should have summarized the last pargraph. A thermostat qua thermostat is mind-dependent but qua physical object it is mind-independent.

Big 'if'. If mind (or life, or intelligence) is truly not reducible, then it's also not really explainable in other terms. — Wayfarer

Perhaps we should resist the equation of explaining something with reducing it. Physics can only explain things in certain terms. We live with things in different terms. But it's a matter of point of view - context and use - not a metaphysical problem - unless we choose to make it so.

I'm no expert, either. But somehow you are presenting the issues in a way I can get my head around.

But my current philosophy/physics book, by James B. Glattfelder*1 inadvertently raised an economic issue that also has political-philosophical significance. — Gnomon

There are definitely strange things going on in physics. I don't pretend to understand them, or even like them, but I suspect it will look very different in the future and our current obsessions will begin to seem as antiquated as Aristotle.

*4. The feudal system — Gnomon

The feudal system was developed in a much simpler society, in which money played a much smaller part than it does in ours. It was more concerned to regulate brute power rather than financial power. The development of international (in fact global) trade and of technology changed all that. I don't think there's any going back, though now that inheritance of money or at least the advantages gained for children through money is so much more important than it was does re-introduce an important element of the feudal system.

Money equals power; Power makes Law; Law makes Government

That's not wrong. Money equals control of resources in a functioning political system. One of the primary duties of a government is to ensure that is maintained. However, money is also a power base that is an alternative to the vote, and is perfectly capable of subverting it. That's why distribution of financial resources is not just an ethical question, but a political one.

There is a myth about democracy which sees it as both good and natural. With this myth comes ideas which say that non-democratic rule in Russia or China or the United States is an aberration, and that any deviation from pure democracy must be bad. Historically speaking, these are not aberrations at all. In fact democracy is historically recognized to be a rather dubious form of government, which is why even before the constitutional convention we had significant checks on democratic forms. — Leontiskos

You are quite right about the myth of democracy. It has been incredibly damaging and arguable led us to the crisis that we are now facing.
The traditional objection that democracy leads to anarchy is not wrong, and for a democracy to survive, there need to be checks and balances on the power of the vote. There's nothing special about that. An unchecked oligarchy or monarchy is also very likely to break down - especially if it forgets the ultimate power of the people. No regime can survive unless it has at least popular acquiescence. (French revolution, Russian revolution, American independence).
There's no doubt that democracy is fragile. But it is not unnatural. There have been democracies from time to time for a very long time. They come, they go. But then, so do authoritatrian regimes.

One of Aristotle's many contributions is that the goodness or badness of any particular regime must always be judged relative to where it began. This is true regardless of one's regime hierarchy. — Leontiskos

That I disagree with - although I don't know why Aristotle thought that, so I could be persuaded. I think the outcomes are what matters. After all, almost every regime is based on pure force. Though if you start with a selfish dictatorship, it does seem unlikely that the regime will turn into a benevolent government any time soon.
However, I remain convinced that a regime that gives equal consideration to the needs and wants of all its people and does not inappropriately discriminate between its citizens is ethically preferable to one that is founded on false ideas of differences between people.

Even if someone thought that democracy was the greatest thing since sliced bread, it would nevertheless remain true that the Soviet Union cannot be expected to shift from communism to democracy in the blink of an eye, and that the fall of the Berlin wall is not necessarily teleologically oriented towards a democratic regime. — Leontiskos

That optimism is a major cause of our problems now. That's why I think that revolution is, of itself, a Bad Idea. Reform is more likely to succeed.

Well the notion of in extremis is a central part of ethics, and I don't see why one couldn't be ethically prepared to accept conscription while at the same time being ethically unprepared to accept the conscription of children. — Leontiskos

I don't disagree with that. The problems with conscription are partly ethical and partly practical. So conscription even of adults is a step over the line. Conscription of children is worse than conscription of adults. All I'm saying is that in time of war, ethics often comes under pressure and people often step over the line rather than lose. Perhaps they may justify it as the lesser of two evils - and others may well disagree.

I guess conscription is different if we think it is okay to conscript children, but I don't think that. It seems as though conscription also entails adulthood. — Leontiskos

I don't think conscription is OK. Period. Nobody likes it, not even the army. If you have to force someone to join the army (or navy, air force, whatever) they are somewhat unlikely to make good soldiers, beyond getting lined up to be shot at. But it is a fact of life.
I think my point was that if you are prepared to conscript soldiers, you have already abandoned ethical thinking beyond your own survival. Questions of adulthood or not have been set aside.

strategic tolerance is motivated also by a perceived common ideological enemy: Christianity and Capitalism can ally against Communism, progressive socialism and conservative nationalism can ally against Capitalism, etc. — neomac

Yes. Good point. Thank you.

I just see some moves made in politics as being about gaining immediate votes rather than creating a better system. — I like sushi

Yes, indeed. I suspect that motive is very much present in this case.

It was one time where Labour and The Conservatives joined forces as it was mutually benefical for them to keep the current system. — I like sushi

Yes. Getting those in power to vote for something that will make their lives more difficult is not easy. IMO, In 2010 the Libdems, once they were in coalition, realized that they might one day get power without PR. They accepted a feeble compromise rather than put their power-sharing deal on the line.

Here again we find the issue tha both Popper and Berlin talked about, — I like sushi

Yes. They both make a lot of sense to me.

Would be better return to 1969 where the minimum age was 21 imo. — I like sushi

One reason I didn't much like that reform was precisely because of the slippery slope. But that works both ways. I don't see a good reason for not raising the age of majority to 25, for all the reasons that you give for not reducing it to 16. Impossible in practice, I know. On the other hand, I don't think it matters very much, so long as there is consensus, or at least acquiescence, and the system works reasonably well.

Infants do not question or ask, they simply live according to their biological requirements and remain largely passive. — I like sushi

Infants don't have a lot of power. But they don't hesitate to use what they do have, in my experience. Children are always pushing at the boundaries. Just like adults.

The argument that military service entails adulthood is very strong. — Leontiskos

Yes, it is, if you are thinking of volunteering. It's a life-and-death decision. Conscription is different. There's an ambivalence here between the soldiers as heroic defenders laying their lives on the line and soldiers as cannon-fodder.

Is true coexistence between ideologies even possible when they’re wired to see each other as threats to their own legitimacy? Maybe the real obstacle isn’t just disagreement—but the fact that many ideologies survive by creating an ‘us vs. them’ narrative. If you’re only making room for another worldview because you think yours will still win, is that coexistence... or just strategic tolerance? — Alonsoaceves

Insofar as recognition of another ideology as disagreeing with oneself means recognizing (often at the same time as denying) that the other side are also human beings. In a rational world, that should be a basis for working out how to co-exist. But I realize that's somewhat idealistic.
That little word "true" makes this a bit complicated. But I don't see why strategic tolerance can't count as co-existence, though I would have to agree that it is unstable. I think the best way to think about this is by analysis of actual examples.
The conflict between capitalism (USA & co.) and communism (USSR & co.) was complicated. There was an element of strategic tolerance in that neither party really wanted an all-out war. But there was endless competition between them in other ways. A complication is that, IMO, the conflict was not purely ideological but was also an old-fashioned competition between what used to be called Great Powers. Paradoxically, it kept some sort of peace for quite a while.
There's a rich variety of examples if one thinks about inter-religious conflict. There are all sorts of disagreement and conflict between the religions and churches within the religions. But they are, as a matter of fact, co-existing. The co-operation between religions in Jerusalem is an interesting case study. Sometimes, one finds movements that explicitly aim to develop peaceful co-existence, often on the basis that all religions face competition from secularism and there's a feeling that co-operation would be a more helpful strategy.

Policy wise I don't think so. Voting exams are bad news. — fdrake

Yes. I know. But I thought it was a theoretical discussion.

It is unreasonable to assume something when there is plenty of hard scientific evidence showing how adolescent brains are far less risk averse, immature in term of planning, managing emotions and delay gratification. — I like sushi

I didn't suggest assuming anything. On the contrary, I suggested evaluating the information and making a decision on that basis. I'm also suggesting that If you are so worried about 16-year-olds voting on the wrong criteria, you look at all the other voters who do the same thing.

"Yesterday I didn't know there was a curriculum, and today I'm writing it". — Banno

Do you mean that someone will have to write these tests of competence - with the issue that a miracle of dispassionate objectivity would be needed? The history of tests of voter competence is, how shall I put it, compromised.

Someone who's 14 is not expected to analyse literature, write a discursive essay, or read and interpret a graph though. — fdrake

Is that because they can't, or because we don't ask them to?

I'm not saying that you ought to be able to do these things to vote — fdrake

Wouldn't it make more sense to test for what you are looking for. Awareness and balanced judgement of public affairs. Such tests as these can't give us what we want. They can't provide an objective, impartial, accurate qualification for voting. It has to be fully automatic and undoubtedly will be rough and ready.

As for senile dementia, I see no reason they should still be able to vote. — I like sushi

That seems reasonable. But once you have set that criterion, doesn't elementary justice mean that it should be applied to voters of all ages?

There is a big difference between 16 and 18 yrs of age. — I like sushi

Sure. But the question is whether that difference makes a difference. Given that the system is very rough and ready, it doesn't seem unreasonable to me to think that it does not. Intellectually, we're on a slippery slope and political views are, of course, in play.

The prefrontal cortex needs to develop. This is not something we can simply dismiss. — I like sushi

If I've got it right, the prefrontal cortex doesn't stop developing until around 25. So that ship sailed long, long ago.

Yes, it is true that younger people are more prone to impulsive behaviour. But older people are prone to rigid views that have become inappropriate.
Perhaps then we should not simply dismiss the mental decay that sets in later on in life. Where would you put your cut-off?

The difficulty is that, if you are interested in the competence of people, there is no age at which everybody becomes competent. It is a gradual process. I'm sure that there are 16/17 year olds who are not well qualified to decide on the next Government as well as some that are. The same is true of the loss of competence at the other end of life. I agree also with the remark "The best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter."

If you are going to assess the competence of voters, then you should assess all voters, of any age - and, preferably, convince them that your assessment is correct. Good luck with that.

Democracy may not the best way to select the people who are to govern. But it is the best way of ensuring that those who cannot govern (that is, at least keep the peace) are, in the end, thrown out. Popper, in "The Open Society" is very keen on this point. He's not wrong. An election is much less damaging than a revolution.

Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.… — "Churchill

Enough said, I think.

Let them vote it'll be good for them. — fdrake

Quite. I can't see that they will wreck the overall result.
But what shall we say when the 14 year olds start complaining?

If we create a poltical body that is increasingly dependent upon the short-term whim of inexperienced minds - who are biologically driven by a myopic perspective - then I fear for the long-term future. — I like sushi

That's been the classic arguments against democracy since the Athenian expedition to Sicily 415-413 BCE. Plato builds a political philosophy around it.
The classic reply is the Latin proverb "The voice of the people is the voice of God". This means that if you create a political body that is increasingly dependent on the short-tem interests of a small group - who are driven primarily by their own short-term interests at the expense of everyone else - then you should fear for the long-term future.
I'm sure you know who I'm looking at. I leave it to you to work out which is closer to our situation.

BTW. I've always seen "vox populi, vox dei" attributed to Cardinal Bellarmine. But apparently it is much older than that. Wikipedia cites a letter from Alcuin of York to Charlemagne in 798 CE as "an early reference".

Either way, our intuitions will lead us on more than our knowledge. When they meet each other then we have a period of relative harmony and peace (like now). — I like sushi

Yes. People do seem to focus on the fact that there has not been a world war since 1944. Whether it is appropriate, on that ground, to call the last 80 years a period of relative harmony and peace is not obvious to me. But I do agree that we seem to be in a particularly critical and unstable time. We live interesting times, unfortunately.

Sure. We learn where to use the syllogism, and where not to. We might do much the same with Ramsey's idea. We are not obligated to shoe-horn. — Banno

OK.

Again, I'm not seeing a substantive point if disagreement. — Banno

I agree it's not going to change the world.

The betting structure shows gives us a way of understanding what a belief and preference amount to, using just behaviour. — Banno

This reminds me of the Aristotle's practical syllogism, which is supposed to give a structure that applies to all actions whatever. In a way, it does, in the sense that you can shoe-horn actions into the formula. The same applies to Aristotle's syllogism, which was thought, for a long time, to give the structure of all arguments. What in fact happened was that arguments were shoe-horned into that structure, which was not particularly helpful. What tells you that the betting structure applies to all actions? The fact that you can shoe-horn things into the structure is not enough.

Better entails worst and best, in itself, by definition, in every appropriate use. We need that to be the case, to use “better” at all. — Fire Ologist

I'm interested in the limitation. Can you give me an example of an inappropriate use? Do you mean that in the inappropriate uses, better does not entail worst and best?
My problem is that although what you say applies, in a sense, to many cases, whether it applies to all cases is not clear to me, so your inappropriate uses might be rather interesting.

So good philosophy can completely forego the devotion to “ identifying and clarifying consistent/inconsistent and coherent/incoherent relations internal to systems/models”? — Fire Ologist

"Consistent" and "Coherent" only apply to a number of elements that relate to each other - that is, to a system. "Inconsistent" and "incoherent" mean "not systematic".

Ramsey offers a minimal account of the nature of belief, while the Bayesian account assigns a value to a belief without specifying what that belief might be. Ramsey gives an account of belief’s nature; Bayesianism gives a rule for belief’s revision. — Banno

You put the difference very neatly. Only, I didn't intend it as a criticism, but as an analysis.
BTW, yes, I had thought of Ryle when Ramsey first came up. I shall take the opportunity to say, because it needs to be said as often as possible, that Ryle is not a behaviourists the sense that Watson and Skinner are. (I can't say whether that's true for Ramsey, since I haven't read the texts). He has a "thick" conception of what action is, whereas Watson and Skinner have a "thin" conception. To put it another way, where Watson and Skinner think of the brain as a telepone exchange - a switching mechanism - Ryle and (I guess) Ramsey think of the mind as what enables us to act rationally.

Got it: — Moliere

Well done! I found a copy of the chapter on some obscure web-site, but couldn't find any attribution - which was a little frustrating.

You notice, I hope, that Kant's account of the incident is entirely true to life. But he considers his "victim" as a person like him. He doesn't consider how much a peasant would stake, given that they have virtually no money.

I'll bet the same against you, on the odds that it doesn't -- given I have nothing and I could win on the bluff I might as well. — Moliere

Yes. You see how your thinking is conditioned by risk and reward in relation to your resources. Yes, of course, it is a non-standard, even contrarian, decision, but nonetheless, the amount you will bet is not an index of your belief, but the result of several interacting factors. To fnd the strength of belief, you have to work through all those factors.

I distrust betting on the whole. It's a test of who is right and who is wrong -- so I can persuade a person to bet against that the LNC* is false in at least one circumstance, and then provide the argument from the liar's sentence (which will certainly not persuade), and we'd be right back doing philosophy again rather than betting. — Moliere

I like the twist that events will take you back to philosophy, because there has to be agreement on the outcome.

That's what I meant to imply by the 1 million dollar buy in before. — Moliere

I'm sorry. I don't remember what the buy-in was.

The philosophical move is from the action representing the belief to the action constituting the belief. — Banno

I'm sorry. I don't see what you are getting at.

So, bets, promises, posts on one hand and paying up, following through, and reading on the other. — Moliere

I can see the link between the two. But I don't see how that fits with what @Banno says.

I don't think Zizek is denying the possibility of changing views. He just remarks how painful it can often be and how often that this change can hardly come by our own intellectual initiative. — neomac

That's a rather charitable interpretation of "forced".
It's an interesting issue. On the one hand, it seems ideologically loaded and it is hard to believe that anyone would voluntarily leave one's own ideology. Hence the labelling that goes on. On the other hand, it is possible that there is empirical evidence that the separation of ideologies may be less radical than it seems at first sight. It will depend heavily on interpretation.

I don't think however that any of such considerations clarify the nature of ideological thinking and how it epistemically compels us. — neomac

Perhaps I just don't understand the situation very well.

The betting structure shows gives us a way of understanding what a belief and preference amount to, using just behaviour. — Banno

Well, gambling was important in the development of probability theory from the beginning. So it's no surprise that it crops up here. More than that, it's true that people do sometimes challenge a claim that they disagree with by suggesting the proposer puts their money where their mouth is. But I'm irritated that, in this context, people talk as if the size of the bet is somehow an index of the strength of the belief. Outside of artificial situations in labs, that's just not the case. A bet is a balance between risk and reward assessed in the context of the degree of confidence and in the wider context of the bet.
Of course, if you use a bet as a model for all behaviour under uncertainty, the scope of the theory is extended. But it seems at least possible that there are limits to that scope. Insurance is like a bet in some ways, but quite different in other ways. Is it helpful to think of a decision to buy a particular car or house as a bet? And so on.

This needs a good example. I'll work on it. — Banno

I'll look forward to that.

Common to Wittgenstein’s forms of life and hinges , Heidegger’s worldviews, Foucault’s epistemes and Kuhn’s paradigms is a rejection of the idea that social formations of knowledge progress via refutation. It sounds like your critique of ideology is from the right, which places it as a pre-Hegelian traditionalist thinking. — Joshs

It's a good point. Yet arguments do fly back and forth between ideologies, even though in principle they do not recognize how radical the break is at this level. However, here's a problem. If a given conceptual scheme is incommensurable with another, not even opposition or rejection are really possible.
1. So it is in the interest of each side to find and exploit such common ground as there is. (Since both sides are human beings, it is not unreasonable to suppose that there is some.)
2. More than that, it is in the interest of both sides to pretend that the other side is vulnerable to such refutations. How else is one to persuade them?
3. But there is also the point that even though refutations may not be effective in persuading the other side, but they are quite likely to be effective in strengthening the support of one's supporters.

On the contrary, scientific, legal, professional reporting practices presuppose supporting ideologies for such practices to thrive and inform social life. Indeed, all these procedures can as well be compromised by ideological struggles. — neomac

Yes. My only qualification is that the practices are likely not only be based on ideological positions, but will also tend to re-inforce, even enforce, them.

Why are these the only two options? Why couldn't I teach someone a different way of looking at world, the way which grounds my own arguments and facts, so that they can understand the basis of my criteria of justification? It would not be a question of justifying the worldview I convert them to, but of allowing them to justify the arguments and views that are made intelligible from within that worldview. — Joshs

Well, people do change their ideological stance from time to time. We're more or less committed to the view that standard rationality does not apply at this level. So the question becomes, what approaches and factors actually work? And, crucially, can we distinguish between fair and unfair ways of doing this. I suspect that, in the end, it will be a matter of teaching and allowing the persuadee to absorb and reflect on what they learn. (Very roughly).


I agree with a lot of what you say. But, inevitably, I have some disagreements.

he link between “necessity” and “irrationality” of ideological thinking as discussed in the opening post, and distances itself from more psychological understanding of ideologies (evil intentions, stupidity, comforting delusions ) which I find rather misleading (if not even, ideologically motivated!). — neomac

Strictly speaking, in my view, it is not really appropriate to call an ideology irrational, because usual standards of rationality do not apply between ideologies. There's also the point that it is misleading to dismiss one's ideological opponents as irrational - unless one is happy to accept that one's own ideology is irrational.

So ideology is the most basic form of coordination for social grouping to support a given informational flow within a society and political mobilisation. — neomac

Yes. That's how philosophers will need to think about it. But there's more than thinking involved in ideology. Praxis is also very important in understanding what it means.

Zizek, in that video, is giving a psychological explanation for why liberation from one own’s ideology needs to be forced on people — neomac

Zizek is wrong. Some American PoW's in the Korean War switched sides. I've seen one interview (which doesn't make a summer, I accept, but..) in which an American ex-PoW switched sides because he came to see American ideology through Chinese eyes - no force was required. The fundamental point was that the Chinese treated him better than the Americans. There's more to the story, or course, and I'm sure Google will find it for you if you want. But I don't accept what Zizek is saying. Seeing through one's own ideology is not easy, but it can be done.

Do we have a disagreement? — Banno

I think I may be a bit more sceptical than you. But I agree that you have outlined the context in which we need to think about this technique.

The distinctive feature of Bayes is that it enables us to articulate a single case. So it will always be an good place to start.

I keep recalling a slogan I remember from the days when computers were new. Maybe you also remember GIGO - garbage in, garbage out. I don't see how that doesn't apply to this process as well. This is why an algorithm cannot improve on the data it start from. What it can do is to articulate intuitions suspicions and prejudices and reveal where they are wrong and where they are right. That's not nothing.

We have it from Ramsey and others that there are solid statistical methods for comparing and revising various beliefs, and we agree that these are A Good Thing. — Banno

The key word there is "revising".

Repeated applications of the Bayesian process, in which the first run uses whatever starting-points we have and subsequent runs feed back the outcomes from that. Perhaps in the context of an scientific investigation of some problem or project - which I understand was the context that Bayes had in mind. Wouldn't that develop more accurate predictions - not necessarily to the point of developing a universal law, as simple induction does, but it could develop a more complex collection of laws and it could certainly develop more accurate probabilities?

It's a more formalized and accurate process of trial and error.

That's just a sketch on the back of an envelope.

Better to drop induction all together and instead look at how a bit of maths can help show us if our beliefs - held for whatever reason, or no reason at all - are consistent. — Banno

Help with consistency is always a good idea. Dropping induction, I fear, may be more difficult. Pavlovian conditioning works at levels beyond the reach of voluntary control.

Instead of seeking justification for induction, he explains how we act as if inductive reasoning were valid. — Banno

I prefer this Humean explanation. But I thought that since the fifties and sixties, we had all given up worrying about the deductive invalidity of induction. Why are we revisiting the past? I'm sure the Bayes process has its place, but I don't really see why induction needs to be replaced or even can be replaced. There is one thing the Bayes process can do that cannot be done any other way - it can give us some help in dealing with one-off probabilities. (Not even induction can do that!)

The model is your idea of how some aspect of the world works. It provides the probabilities of various outcomes. — GrahamJ

OK. That makes sense.

You have talked quite a bit about making decisions under uncertainty - about medical treatments, weather forecasts, coin-tossing, and beer in fridges. I was replying to all of that and I may have confused things by quoting a particular paragraph. I wasn't trying to 'run it backwards' to interpret a decision. — GrahamJ

I'm trying to keep the enthusiasm for Bayes in proportion by anchoring our conversation in how we do things, or how we think we do things, when we aren't relying on Bayes. I'm trying to work out whether we can rely on Bayes or not. At present, the assumption is that we can. My mind is not made up.
As for running the Bayesian process backwards, I didn't think you were trying to. The idea came from me alone. It may seem a bit crazy, but we have two questions to ask about these situations. There are two question. One is forward-looking - what shall I do? The other is backward-looking - why did that person do that? So far as I can see, Bayes helps with forward-looking. My question is whether it can help with backward-looking. I don't see why we couldn't use Bayes to reconstruct a decision after the event. That would be an analytic process that could clarify what was going on.

I just realized I missed a comment of yours to my quote — neomac

There's so much going on that it is very hard to keep up with everything. I'm afraid I don't even try.

I do not disagree with your general claims but they do not offer any concrete path toward peaceful coexistence. — neomac

There's a reason why I'm not. I oscillate between thinking that if only everybody would play nice, how much better it would be and thinking that we need someone even heavier than the heavies we have to knock heads together. Neither suggestion is particularly helpful, I know.
There is also a part of me that thinks that the perpetual struggle is how it is. Sruggle may take different forms from time to time, but there is always struggle.

Often competing ideologies can converge when there is a third ideology perceived as common threat — neomac

Yes, the enemy of my enemy is my friend - at least until our common enemy is defeated, when any thing may happen. One of the differences between our situation now and the situation up to about 2000 is that we no longer live in a world with just one dominating struggle, but a multi-polar, multi-struggle world. Whether that's better or worse, I wouldn't like to say.
Human beings are very strange. Sometimes they will sink their differences to deal with a common enemy. Sometimes they fall apart and fight each other instead of dealing with the common enemy. Climate change is an example of the latter, unfortunately.

In Bayesian probability, Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti required personal degrees of belief to be coherent so that a Dutch book could not be made against them, whichever way bets were made.

Well, I can see that a Dutch book would be a bad idea. On the other hand, there is the possibility of a "Czech book", in which the probabilities add up to less than 1. Wikipedia, which is never wrong, tells me that always pays out to the gambler.

He tells us what it means to be coherently uncertain — to reason, act, and believe in a way that fits together, even when the world is incomplete, and we are fallible. — Banno

That sounds wonderful, and better than the sceptical bewailing of our failure to match the traditional expectations.
I can see that conforming to the requirements will avoid some nasty traps, so that's good. But I can't see that it will do more than that.

Quite right. Well put.
It's odd, isn't it, how people yearn for peace when they don't have it, and cannot resist starting a conflict when they do? There seems no way of changing that.

I think any boundaries between distinct ideologies are theoretical and made for a purpose. Consider, that no two people really share all their believes, so in that sense we could say that everyone has one's own distinct ideology. But on the other hand, if we limit a particular "ideology" to just a small set of very. general ideas, then many people have the same ideology. So the drawing of lines between ideologies is complex and purposeful, yet somewhat arbitrary. — Metaphysician Undercover

That seems to be right. Given the hostility that there so often is between ideologies, I would expect that to be a major factor in how people decide to draw the lines.

But neither of us want to say that. — Banno

Perhaps "correctly" is over-stating it. But it is also possible to revise my interpretation in the light of more and better information or even to actually misinterpret my action

One can go to the fridge for many reasons apart from taking out a beer. One can take a beer out of the fridge for many reasons apart from feeling thirsty.

I'm not saying that there is not a range of equally acceptable answers, though my report is helpful in narrowing down the field. But there are also answers that may look right and turn out to be wrong.

I assure you, my mind is completely unfurnished.

If another group’s norms and beliefs don’t ground our system of validation, then we can’t refute those norms and beliefs because we won’t be able to understand them. Refutation only makes sense when it is based on normative criteria provided by the same Wittgensteinian hinge proposition as that which is to be refuted. — Joshs

That's not quite right. Obviously, if you want to refute a belief in order to persuade the believer to give up their belief, then you must, as it were, speak to/with their norms and beliefs. But it is perfectly possible to refute someone's belief to one's own satisfaction without speaking to them at all. I mention this because I suspect that situation arises much more frequently than it ought to. BTW, it may seem a bit pointless to refute someone's beliefs only to one's own satisfaction, but there is a point. You prevent the other side recruiting your own followers, which is much more important than convincing the opposition.

On the other hand, there is a process of - let me call it - conversion. Communists becoming capitalists and even vice versa. So far as I can see, this is not, and cannot be, a rational process. Certainly psychologists have taken an interest in it - no doubt for practical reasons. This is extremely uncomfortable for philosophers. Sadly, I'm going to have to leave that there - I'm falling asleep as I write, which is not a good way to philosophize.

You may be groping your way towards Bayesian statistical decision theory. As I have said before, there are 4 components: model, data, prior, utility. That is enough to make a 'rational' decision. I'd prefer to say it provides a principled or formalized decision-making process. It doesn't stop you having an unreasonable model, prior or utility. — GrahamJ

I'm not sure what the model is, but the other components are pretty obvious. Perhaps the Bayesian theory works - I wouldn't know how to assess it. Can we run the process in a lab and assess whether it gets the answer right - or what?
The thing is, it runs decision to action. The question here is whether you can run it backwards to read from action to decision. The difficulty is that most readings will be underdetermined, I suppose.

That our deliberations rarely fit propositional or predicate logic clearly and unambiguously does not undermine the use of propositional or predicate logic. It may still provide a model for our reasoning. — Banno

I didn't know I was challenging it - though one might have thought that a two-valued logic would have a problem - not with the probability of a coin toss, but with degrees of confidence.
I don't quite understand the concept of a model for our reasoning.

He shifts the question from “Is this belief true?” to “Is this belief coherent with my other beliefs and actions?” — Banno

I see. Do we care whether the two are the same thing?

So will you go to the fridge or keep watching the game? Your choice showsyour preferences and what you think is so. — Banno

Only if you can read it correctly.

I agree it is a skimpy version of the idea, and it is a fragment of the practice itself. I was thinking to highlight the history, the origin and purpose the idea represents, rather than its manifestation as a practice. — Mww

So we are not really in conflict - just talking about different things. Fair enough. As it happens, I regard the history, origin and purpose of ideas as of interest, even importance, in understanding their meaning. However, if your quotation is indeed from Kant, I'm not equipped to do more than try to follow the conversation. For the record, I think I'm talking about what it is to act rationally in the context of probability, an issue that puzzles me greatly.

“The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is (…) his firm belief, is a bet.” — Mww

It is indeed a test that is often proposed in real life. So it is relevant to say, not that a bet is no test of confidence, but that interpretation of a given decison is complicated by the fact that a bet is the result of weighing risk (disutility) against reward (utility) in the context of one's confidence. Confidence alone does not determine a (rational) decision.

Furthermore, in Kant, there are those beliefs in the purely empirical domain of which maintaining the firmness of them is irrational in which case some tests are failed, but there are others in the purely moral domain, the firm maintenance of them is necessary, in which case every test is passed. — Mww

I sort of understand this and don't disagree with it.

When push comes to shove, it seems to me elaboration of the idea into a practice degrades the dialectic regarding it, to a psychologically-bounded exhibition, when it started as a metaphysical idea. — Mww

I'm not sure I quite get this. Mind you, my grasp of what people mean by metaphysics is, let us say, weak. I don't quite see why what I am saying about betting degrades anything that you are doing. After all, you know it all already and don't seem to have any problem putting it aside for the purposes of your conversation.

And this is what happens when skimpy versions are filled out. Or….bloated, as some might say (grin) — Mww

Well, your reaction is not unhelpful to me, so thank you for that. I won't bore you any further on the subject.

quote="neomac;1000226"]The fact that there are beliefs universally shared doesn't spare us from the predicament of non-shared beliefs. And attributing these non-shared beliefs to evil intentions or stupidity (or ideology, in a derogatory sense) shows an ideological attitude which can suffer from analogous accusations.[/quote]
I agree with all of that. I was, rather, suggesting that what we can agree on might be a basis for working out a way of co-existing in spite of the things we do not agree on.
After all, different ideologies will either compete or co-exist, and we might all do better if we worked as hard at co-existing as we do at competing.

The relativist's plea for universal acquiescence can't be a long term solution — Kym

The interesting question is what makes universal acquiescence impossible. I suppose it is possible that two different ideologies might be compatible, in the sense that it is possible for them to co-exist in the same society. One way is for an agreement to be struck, or worked out, which recognizes the other and makes room for them; I have in mind something rather stronger than passive toleration. One problem is the tendency for one ideology to define itself against the other.

Too bad it went sour, because it would otherwise be a useful word, to describe the necessary set of ideas and ideals one needs to organize one's life. — BC

Ah, well, once we have acknowledged that we also have an ideology, we will inevitably be drawn into thinking differently about all those irrational other people. That might be very healthy, but, unless the others make the same acknowledgement, it may be rather dangerous.

If the method of validation is grounded on a set of norms and beliefs, such norms and beliefs can not be refuted, since the refutation must presuppose them (like Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions). — neomac

That is a most uncomfortable thought. What Wittgenstein regards as our ground turns out to be something quite different. My form of life, my facts turn out to be the other guy's ideology.
I'm consoled by the thought that what Wittgenstein was gesturing at was something shared by all human beings. If we could delineate that, we might, just might, find a basis for unity (within diversity, of course).

In the first, what is described is the agreement amongst people, as to what they believe, and this constitutes their "ideology". In the second, we acknowledge that not only is there agreement amongst people as to what they believe, but their is also disagreement between people, and this produces a multitude of social groups with distinct "ideologies". — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that is correct.

So the first describes a general concept, "ideology", while the second describes what distinguishes separate, distinct and specific, ideologies. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't disagree with that, except that, at least as things are, the distinction between ideologies is extremely obscure. The lines are drawn on the level of praxis rather than intellect.

Do you have more? Didn’t mean to shut you off. — Mww

Thank you. But it is better not to bore on about something to someone who is not interested. But since you've opened the door.... Even if you are not interested, there may be others who are.

Those conditions incorporated in a bet I make, what kind and how much, or even the one I wouldn’t, give YOU the evidence of the degree of my belief, and the confidence in it. This becomes quite apparent, when I admit you are more justified in betting greater on the sun rising tomorrow, than I am betting there is life on other planets we can see. — Mww

I don't have a problem with the general idea. But I do have a problem with the skimpy version of the idea that we have here. It is a fragment of the practice of betting - a gesture towards something that could be much more illuminating if it were taken out of the arm-chair and into real life.
1. The measure is not a measure of confidence alone. A bet is a combination of risk and reward and a decision to bet is the result of balancing, one might say, the disutility of one outcome against the utility of the other outcome in the context of the likelihood of each outcome. Confidence in the outcome is only one factor. The one virtue of this idea is that it takes a step to articulating what it means to act rationally in the context of probabilities.
2. Utility and disutility are the result of a wider context. For example, if you have 20 units of currency, the utility of 1 unit is one thing, but if you have 100 units, it is quite different. That can work in artificial situations, such as a laboratory experiment (or an armchair or seminar room), but in real life the context is much more complicated.
3. It is one thing to explore probability or confidence in the context of a decision about a single specific action, but there are subtler effects on rational action that also deserve to be taken into account. If the probability of rain is 80%, you may well decide to go to the gym rather than your walk/run/bike ride. If it is 50%, you may well decide to go out, but take an umbrella or wet weather gear in your back-pack. The most prominent example of this is the practice of insurance. Here, one bets on an outcome that is unlikely, but has high disutility, not because one wants to win, but to provide for that eventuality.

Ehhhhh….dialectical precedent has it that responses to a quote are subjectively more honest without the influence of the author’s name, which is often detrimental to the message on the one hand, or tautologically affirms it on the other. — Mww

I can see that. On the other hand, it can help to know the context....

That, and my clandestine supposition that 1787 would be a sufficient clue. — Mww

Not enough for me. But I can manage without that information.

There need be no inner fact about belief that can diverge from one’s consistent actions. — Banno

Believe me, there is no chance that I am going to knowingly posit anything "inner" or "private" in the sense that Wittgenstein was talking about.

It seems that for Ramsey the degree that one is willing to bet constitutes the partial belief. A belief is not "private" or "subjective", but measurable, and comparable with other beliefs. — Banno

In one way, that's fair enough. But if you think it through, you find a world of complication and illumination. At least, I do, because I keep returning to the puzzle what probability actually means. (I'm particularly interested in what probability actually means in a single case.) The betting issue brings that out. Hower, Ramsey is only taking a first step. See above.

The relationship, then, is not between "degrees of belief and belief in probabilities", but between degree of belief and willingness to act. Consider willingness to act as an extensional substitute for degree of belief. — Banno

Yes. I was talking about something else. I think I can be a little clearer.
It seems crystal clear to me that we know, for sure, that a toss of a coin has a 50% chance of coming down heads. It's not even empirical knowledge, but an "analytic" result of the rules. We also know that the empirical probability will be only roughly, and not exactly, the same. I think that we also know that various empirical probabilities (I think the mathematicians call them estimates) based on past experience. The proportion of smokers who get lung cancer is higher than the proportion of non-smokers, etc. etc.
All this is quite different from my confidence in, for example, that I have 6 cans of beer in my fridge. It is a binary question, and perhaps I remember that I bought a pack on my way home. But I also know, perhaps, that my memory is not what it used to be, so my confidence is less than 100%.
Of course, there is a relationship between the two. Insofar as I am rational, I will adjust my confidence to conform with objective probabilities and also to conform with my evidence for my beliefs. All I'm saying is that the two are not necessarily co-ordinated and are, let me say, different states of affairs. Ramsey is presupposing a perfectly rational being with access to all relevant information.

But enough of this, yes? I was only pointing out the peripheral notion of bets in historical metaphysical investigations. — Mww

As you wish.

I would very much like to know who wrote the passage you are quoting. Just curious.

The nature of and how much the bet, and by whom the validity of the ground of the bet is judged, is irrelevant, with respect to its occurrence. — Mww

Yes. But those details are what give you the evidence of the degree of belief, or confidence.

Hence the implied correspondence to induction, which serves a subject as sufficient rational justification a priori for the construction of his empirical beliefs, while not being sufficient for their proofs. — Mww

Yes, I can see that - roughly. But Ramsey, apparently is not doing that. Ramsey is by-passing induction

altogether.

The point being, of course, all of this has been done before, in which case should be found, if not the congruent thesis, then at least a conceptually similar initial condition, merely clothed in new words. — Mww

Well, given that it was written in 1787 and Ramsey was writing in the 1920's, it would seem to follow. Which would be interesting, but I don't think it would change any of the arguments.

I'm sorry but who wrote that - I can't work it out.

My response is to point out that betting £1000 on the truth of a given proposition is a very different matter if your annual income is £10,000 or £100,000. It is also a different matter if you are single or have a family to support. And so on.

I am willing to bet a very large amount of money indeed (everything that I own or can beg, borrow or steal). that the sun will rise tomorrow morning. Who will take my bet, and at what odds? Should I be prepared to trust anyone who did take it?

we can have degrees of belief, and deal with them in a rational fashion. — Banno

There's an intricate relationship between degrees of belief and belief in probabilities, which I find confusing. It looks to me as if "S has a x degree of belief in p and S believes that p has a probability x. Are they equivalent? If there's a difference, what is it?

What makes you say that Bayes is rational? If you are prepared to call Bayesian epistemology rational, how is induction any less rational?

You've probably seen customer satisfaction surveys that ask people to assign a number to their degree of satisfaction with a service or product. Once you have a number, you can do all sorts of interesting things with the statistics. But if the number is little better than arbitrary, what is the significance of the statistics? Well, there's an empirical test. If predictions based on those statistics are accurate, then the methdology does have at least some validity (meaning). But what outcome confirms or refutes a Bayesian prediction about a single case?

I'm torn about Bayes. Intuitively, there's at least some justification for assigning a probability to a single case. We do it all the time. So Bayesian epistemology seems to me to work on the same sort of basis that one can assign a number to my degree of satisfaction. But it is very hard to know how to factor any probability in to decisions about individual cases. If there's a 10% chance of some side-effect from a medical treatment, 1 in 10 patients will suffer that side-effect. How do I rationally factor that in to my decision about whether I accept the treatment, bearing in mind that accepting the treatment is all or nothing? Making a bet is one thing, because if one loses a bet, one can just make another bet. But getting ill from a medication is not necessarily like that. (yes, that's from the heart and live experience).

He's not claiming that "induction is really just about probability" so much as dropping induction as a justification and instead considering degrees of belief. — Banno

Do you mean "He's not claiming that "induction is really just about probability" so much as dropping induction as a justification and instead considering degrees of belief as a justification." or "induction is really just about probability" so much as dropping induction as a justification and instead considering degrees of belief as a datum even though it is arbitrary from a rational point of view".

He's not saying that f(a) and f(b) implies f(e) is a better bet than just f(a). He;s not saying anything about f(a)'s truth or falsity at all. He's instead talking about the degree to which you and I believe f(a). — Banno

Shouldn't that sentence end with f(e)?
But he might find that people do in fact bet more on propositions that are backed by inductive evidence. (And, yes, he might not.)

You are right that there is a lot going on here, and plenty more to be said. People do not act rationally. Leaving aside the question of whether they ought act rationally, Ramsey has given us a part of the way to understanding what it is to act rationally. Not a theory of how people actually think, not a theory of what beliefs are true, but a framework for what it would be to act coherently, given one’s own beliefs and preferences. — Banno

I don't understand your enthusiasm for Ramsey. (Not that I've actually read him!). But the idea that induction is really just about probability is not that uncommon.

For two reasons
First, if you would bet more on f(e) given f(a), f(b), f(c), f(d) than you would on (f)c given f(a), f(b), then aren't you just betting on induction?
Second, if we need to find some sort of account of how we behave, what's wrong with Hume's custom or habit, based on our general heuristic of association? Or Wittgenstein's "This is what I do."

Or we could just stop treating induction as a poor man's deduction. We've given deduction this hugely special status as the only form of rationality. Given how limited deduction really is, it seems a bit irrational.
In practice, induction is more complicated than "the future will resemble the past". We know darn well that it won't - what we're trying to do here is to get a grip on how things will change as well as how they won't. I'm sure you know about J.S. Mill's much more complicated, and realistic, account of the methods of induction.

(sc. the tortoise) challenges Achilles and us to force his agreement. — Banno

So he does. So I think that Dodgson's focus is on the force (!) of the logical "must", which we all take for granted. One might perhaps think that this scenario suggests that it is not what settles disputes but a paper tiger.

This relates to Wittgenstein's answer to the problem he raises of what it is to follow a rule. — Banno

Yes, indeed. Though I think that Dodgson is suggesting that the tortoise knows perfectly well what it would be to follow the rule and is deliberately misbehaving - which is quite different from misunderstanding the rule. Again - it's about what it is to be forced to do something in this context. The best that we can do is to say that if you don't follow the rule, you aren't playing the game.

And again, "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do." (PI§217). — Banno

One is inclined to say that the tortoise needs training in a drill, rather than explanations. Once the tortoise has mastered the drill, it will be possible to explain things to him.

Clarity is not final - but if things are sufficiently clear for us to move on, that'll do? Seems to be so. — Banno

Perhaps it is. But I think this creates room for doubt about the meaning of, for example, "perspicuous representation", which is somehow meant to be final. Contrast the ways in which a teacher might try to clarify or explain something to a student; it's entirely a pragmatic practice, with no pretence that what works for one will work for all.

The point of the practice - expressing belonging and individuality? - has been lost, the purpose and rules being followed now sit elsewhere. — Banno

I've read stuff that claims that the modern practice of introducing new designs to stimulate the market rather than anything else was actually invented and first practiced by Wedgwood in the market for china. That was the real basis for his success. But fashion worked in much the same way before modern industrial practices came along. Naturally. the practice flourished more or less exclusively among the rich and in social contexts like the royal court.