I apologize. This was carelessly and badly written. I don't see what I can do to make things right but to apologize and delete this paragraph. I hope that does something to make amends.Needs to be said to me suggests a rather dramatic misreading on your part. What part of "liberalism has difficulties with thymos-phobia and logos-skepticism/phobia" suggested to you: "traditional is always good and reason is omnipotent?" was remotely on the table? — Count Timothy von Icarus
See above.What epoch do you believe we would be "returning" to in that case? — Leontiskos
I've developed a habit of using "reason" when I'm talking about a limited sense of reason, which has to do with truth/falsity and logic. When I'm thinking of a more expansive sense of reason - especially a sense that enables one to think carefully and coherently about values of one sort or another especially in the context of action - I use "reasonable". I started doing that so that I at least could keep straight in my mind which sense I was in at any given time."Reasonable" as in "known as true/good by reason," or "reasonable" as in the procedural, safety-centered sense of Rawls and co.? — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'm simply considering your idea from various angles. I don't see a problem. Judging from your reference later on, you classify mathematical propositions as a priori. You could have just said so.Why the tangent? What purpose of ours does it serve to answer such classification questions? I simply cannot afford so many new tangents every few posts. — Leontiskos
I'm not sure whether I completely accept your characterization. But since we seem to agree that "S implies P" is sometimes valid and sometimes not, depending what we substitute for S and P, I don't think there is any need to pursue that any further.You have offered what I see as two basic responses. — Leontiskos
... unless what is at stake is whether P is truth-apt and decidable.But if they must engage in argument to protect P from refutation, then P has already been taken to be truth-apt and decidable. — Leontiskos
I think that means you think accept both "God validates the Christian way of life" and "The Christian way of life validates God". I'm not sure what to make of that. Intuitively, neither seems wrong. I don't see what you mean by "the various reasons will be chronologically limited".Implication can be two-way, even though the various reasons will be chronologically limited. — Leontiskos
"Creation is good" is an evaluation. I expect you are an objectivist about ethics and so would claim that the statement is true. I won't argue with you. But value statements are a distinct category from factual statements such as "God exists", so I don't see how this helps your case.An example of a decidable P which follows from your chosen example of the Christian way of life would be, "Creation is good," or, "Care for the widow and orphan," or, "Do not commit abortion (or else exposure of infants)," or, "Jesus was resurrected from the dead." — Leontiskos
I doubt if it is possible to equivocate with a phrase as ill-defined as "way of life". It's almost completely elastic and plastic.What is happening is that you are equivocating on "ways of life." The equivocation was present even when you were talking about Wittgenstein, for even there you referred to both non-justificatory schemas and justificatory schemas as ways of life. But your chosen example of the Christian way of life certainly does validate certain propositions. — Leontiskos
That's not quite what I meant. I meant that he did not abandon his way of life as a human being when he abandoned his way of life as a Jew. He cannot abandon his way of life as a human being without ceasing to be a human being. It is because he did not abandon the human way of life that he could preach the Gospel and be understood.We could simplify the story and categories a bit and just say that St. Paul encountered something which caused him to decide to abandon Judaism and embrace Christianity. Your objection is something like, "Ah, but Judaism and Christianity have a lot in common, therefore he did not abandon his way of life; he just modified it." — Leontiskos
But there is a third possibility, to recognize that tradition has good and bad elements and that reason has its power, but also its limitations. Less dramatic, but much more reasonable. Sure, those who are addicted to excitement will worry about lack of "conviction", but excitement, in itself, is neither a good nor bad thing - it depends on what one gets excited about.Once tradition is considered evil and reason is considered impotent, a sort of anti-tradition revolutionary mindset is largely all that's left (along with the ascendancy of the victim). — Leontiskos
I can't see why you allow the "perhaps". Socrates would not get started without Laches and Euthyphro and Alcibiades. Equally, Plato needed Socrates to get started on his journey.The discourse sets up a perspective, a world, a game, an activity, whatever we call it. The dissection pulls it apart, exposing its assumptions, underpinnings and other entrails. Perhaps you can't have one without the other, .... — Banno
I hesitate to express a view about world-views in general; it smells strongly of hubris. Perhaps one should remember that if you set out to answer all possible questions, you are likely forgetting that any worldview will generate questions of its own, so a worldview can never be complete in that sense.If we apply this insight philosophically, we see that striving for a complete worldview may not only be impossible—it may be misguided. — Banno
I'm very sympathetic to that idea. But I don't see how one could ever be sure that one has achieved the goal and even less sure that every idea deserves the same charity. On the other hand, I don't see how one could even move towards the goal without claiming the right to opinions from the beginning; what one should not claim is the right to claim exemption from the messy business of dissection and critique.You really don't have a right to an opinion until you're sure you've achieved the most charitable, satisfying reading possible. — J
Yes, of course that's right. I was lazily using what I thought was a standard formulation. Let me try to put the point another way. A dictionary defines word in terms of other words. It is surely obvious that, if that is all there is to it, there will be a massive problem in actually using language for many of its standard purposes, such as shopping lists. Of course, Wittgenstein was right to say that ostensive defition requires an understanding of "where the word is stationed in the language", but he didn't suggest that ostensive definition didn't work, did he?It's a part of the story, not the whole of it. In particular that juxtaposition of a linguistic and non-linguisitic world needs some critique. The individual a and the individual constants "a" could not inhabit seperate worlds if we are going to do things with the one by using the other. — Banno
I get that. But my, possibly naive, point is that whichever we assign first, we must be assigning without the use of whichever we assign second. If we have assignd names to constants, we have something we can assign to predicates. Obviously, we cannot at the same time use predicates to assign names to constants. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, the other way round.It makes no difference if we first assign names, then predicates, or if we first assign predicates and then names. — Banno
H'm. I don't know enough logic to comment. But I would be surprised if there were no difference between formal logic and natural language in that respect. The concept of syntax (grammar) was invented long after natural languages developed - and I find it hard to believe that the latter was developed in a systematic way.But your general point carries here, in that the separation between syntax and semantics in a formal logic is deceptively simple, and so somewhat unlike the semantics of a natural language. — Banno
I agree entirely with both your points. But I don't see what the puzzle is? That could only be puzzling to someone who couldn't perceive the difference.The puzzle is why the extension of "red" includes these apples and not those ones. — Banno
That's an interesting thought. Do you have an example?So if our age thinks God's existence is undecidable, then a better P for the Christian way of life would be historical, political, or ethical propositions which are thought to be decidable. — Leontiskos
I'm sorry I made a mistake. I was trying to do your work for you. I should have just asked the question. Given that "3>1" is not empirical (even though it is truth-apt), how do you classify it?I don't follow any of that. And now you are saying, "'3 > 1' is not empirical, therefore it must be necessary [inclusive or] analytic." — Leontiskos
I agree that remark would not help their case. One cannot just announce that a proposition is protected from refutation. One protects a proposition from refutation by the moves one makes in the argument. In the case you give, I would expect the Christian to reject the second premiss "God does not exist".That's a perfectly valid argument, and the Christian can't say, "Oh, but ways of life are not truth-apt, so your argument is illegal. My way of life is, 'protected from refutation.' " — Leontiskos
I'm sorry. I was under the impression that when a philosopher uses the arrow of implication, by convention they are talking about material implication. But you are right, modus tollens etc. are much older than Frege's logic.Nowhere have I claimed that material implication exhausts the point I am making, and therefore your point about material implication does not actually count as an objection to my thesis. — Leontiskos
St. Paul might be a good example. But here's a puzzle. I've got very confused about whether it is the Christian way of life that demonstrates the existence of God or God that demonstrates the Christian way of life. Perhaps even both?Here it seems that you are conceding my point. You seem to recognize that we might encounter a fact about the world (~P) which causes us to change our (S). — Leontiskos
As we get deeper into this, it is necessary to question your use of "validate" here. Ways of life do not, in themselves, validate anything. They are the foundation on which we build our practices of validating things. They establish or enable those practices.I could have more accurately said, "The point here is that if ways of life can validate propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions." — Leontiskos
Partly, yes. But now I'm modifying that concession by insisting that part of the role of ways of life is beyond validation, because it is the foundation on which our practices of validation are built. (Believe it or not, this is new territory to me, and I'm thinking on my feet. So things may change.)Here it seems that you are conceding my point. — Leontiskos
In some cases, like the puzzle pictures, more than one interpretation is applicable and there is no fact of the matter that will decide the issue. In those cases, it would not be wrong to say that both interpretations are true, though I would add "in a modified sense of the word". But one could also say that both interpretations are correct or satisfactory or valid. I think that accurately reflects the facts of the matter.If having many interpretations means there is no fact of the matter, then there can be no truth for indecisive murder cases either, since interpretations vary. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I agree with you that truth and interpretation do not sit easily together. In puzzle picture cases, I agree that it is not satisfactory to simply say that the interpretation of the picture as that of a rabbit is true, or that the interpretation as a duck is true. For me, the truth of the matter is that the picture can be interpreted both ways and even, possibly, as a collection of marks on paper.Truth is not a matter of interpretation―if something is true it is simply true. Beliefs are matters of interpretation. Don't conflate belief with truth and much confusion will clear up for you. — Janus
I agree with you. It's a complicated issue.If you want to talk about reasons to believe, then they shouldn’t be confused with logic implications. If I believe that an apple is on the table because I see an apple on the table, that doesn’t mean that there is a logic implication between my belief and my experience of the apple, — neomac
Yes. But that assignment happens before the assignation of individuals to predicates. So, presumably, predicates can play no part in assigning individuals to individual variables. Hence only rigid designators can be used here.Giving an interpretation to a formal language involves assigning individuals to the individual variables (names, in a natural language) involved. a to "a", b to 'b" in the exemplary case. — Banno
I didn't think I was questioning that.Properties, or more properly predicates, are not something apart from those individuals, but sets of individuals. f={a,b,c} or whatever. — Banno
Yes, he does. But ostensive definition was thought at one time to be the way that language reaches out from the circle of words (as in definitions) to attach to the (non-linguistic) world. Has that changed?Not sure you can seperate these. For example, Wittgenstein points out that ostension is already a part of the language. One has to understand the activity of pointing to follow a pointer. — Banno
Yes, I hoped you would want to add propositions like that. Do we call them necessary or analytic? Or both?Well, I would first say that something which is truth-apt is not necessarily empirical. "3 > 1" is truth-apt, but not empirical, for example. But I would agree that a proposition which is truth-apt is true or false (or else capable of being true or false). — Leontiskos
I don't think this is a key idea at all. It goes nowhere.Well I think <this post> of mine is the thing we have primarily been focused on. The key idea: — Leontiskos
Yes. That was a pragmatic decision. But it's scope is limited. The idea that a fact about the world might persuade to wholesale change in our way of life misunderstands what a way of life is. But amending or revision does not seem impossible to me, though I have no idea what Wittgenstein would say about the idea.You seem to recognize that we might encounter a fact about the world (~P) which causes us to change our way of life (S). — Leontiskos
Yes. Subject to the restriction that propositions emerge from ways of life via practices, so the changes will be changes of detail.I could have more accurately said, "The point here is that if ways of life can validate propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions." — Leontiskos
Thanks.I miffed that a bit. It was actually St. Augustine writing about St. Ambrose, who practiced silent reading. Augustine found it strange. — Leontiskos
Thanks very much. Perhaps I should have paused before posting.Saint Anselm? I'll have to google now. — Srap Tasmaner
Thanks. It's good to know I was not wrong.St. Augustine was considered strange in that he practiced silent reading. — Leontiskos
I don't have one. But I did wonder about feelings like the feeling of falling, or the feeling of an insect crawling up your arm, or feeling sick (nausea) or dizzy. "Feeling" seems to cover a multitude of sins, some of which count as emotions. Feeling confident is certainly something we say, and you seem to recognize that it is not the same kind of feeling as feeling angry or happy when you call them epistemic. I don't have any intuitive understanding of that category, so I feel somewhat at sea. Oh, and by the way, when I draw a conclusion from a conclusive argument, is that also a feeling?But I can also appreciate more subtle conceptual or psychological analysis. If you feel like providing yours, I can try to be more specific. — neomac
Well, there is a theory that reading in the ancient classical world was always reading out loud. Reading to oneself in sllence developed later. Sadly, I have lost my note of where I got this story. However, one can see this process at work by watching small children as they learn to read. Even it is not true, it seems to me to be a plausible myth of the origin of talking to oneself.That's fairly persuasive as a theory of the origin of speech, but I don't think it necessarily indicates that we can't speak meaningfully while alone. The part of the motor cortex that orchestrates speech is separated from the portion that handles comprehension. It's not clear that the unity of consciousness we enjoy today is the way humans have always been. It may be that talking to ourselves has been around as long as talking to each other has. — frank
Is there any reason why we can't distinguish two phases of reference? The speech act and the hearer's response, which acts as feeback to bring into line any misunderstandings.That's not what's private about private reference -- rather, I'm arguing that it's the independence from "triangulation" or the need to have a listener comprehend the speaker's reference. — J
This quote from @Banno is from the other thread, explaining to me how formal logical systems are constructed. This process seems to me to assume that assigning properties to individuals presupposes the assignation of names to their references. But perhaps I have misunderstood.We assign an interpretation to this syntax by assigning an individual to each of the individual variables, a to "a", b to "b", and so on.
So, assigning a property to an individual happens in a different part of the logic to assigning a name to an individual. — Banno
Oh, I see. Emotions = feelings. That's a new one to me.I can feel more confident about the disposition of business partners to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those I decided not to partner with, as much as I can feel more confident about the disposition of friends or relatives to act in certain ways in certain circumstances than it is the case with those who are not my friends or relatives. — neomac
It certainly is. I'll do my best.Listen, this conversation is getting long and unwieldy. Rather than answering the whole bevvy of issues you are now raising, why don't you just point me to two of them that you deem most central, and I will answer those. — Leontiskos
This is the remark that I responded to. I took truth-apt to mean true-or-false, (i.e. empirical) and responded because I do think they are not true-or-false. We've discussed some of the reasons for that. I admit it may seem counter-intuitive, because it is said in philosophy that all claims of existence must be empirical. The alternative (unless all religious beliefs are pseudo-propositions) is that they are analytic or meaningless. Neither of which really make much sense. However, empirical or analytic are not the only options. Wittgenstein has richer resources. (I realize you won't like them.)The intellectually honest naysayer needs to start admitting that they don't think religious claims are truth-apt. They can't have it both ways: — Leontiskos
Well, I was thinking that beliefs about people name, age, address place of work - neutral facts - don't count for anything like as much as about how they behave with us.Beliefs do not need to be about what exists, their identity or properties, beliefs can also be about how people behave. — neomac
But to describe these relationships in that bloodless way does not distinguish these personal relationships from business partnerships etc. This is where the idea of faith as involved emotion does have appeal. Friends and family are the people that you love and are committed to; that goes beyond approving of their behaviour - it precisely means that you won't walk away whenever you disapprove of their behaviour. There is a lot of variation here, so I think that all we can say is that commitment when times are rough is at least on the table, and walking away will need justification.It is precisely because friends, parents, and dogs behaved in ways we approved of in the past, that we can believe they will do it again, and rely on it in our life (maybe even under daring circumstances). — neomac
I think your view is being skewed by the religious use of faith - which does seem to be about beliefs. I agree that one can be faithful to one's beliefs (or principles). But if you think about common-or-garden phrases like " faithful friend", or "supporter/fan" or "husband/wife", or "servant" or "dog", I think you will see that in those cases, it is not about belief at all. It is about how someone behaves - different behaviour in each case, as required by the relationship in each case. "Faithful picture" or "account" are different, but obviously not about any beliefs.“emotion” because it has to do with “how I feel about something” and “epistemic” because faith is about “beliefs” (e.g. God exists, Jesus has both a devine and human nature, God is a trinity, etc.). — neomac
Yes, that is clearly true. The question is, what more can we usefully say?What I’m getting at is that a person is able to self reflect and carry out a restructuring of the psychological make up of themselves. — Punshhh
There's two more difficult terms. Sometimes the self is me, not a part of me. Sometimes not. Equivalent to the ego or not? But then, we do want to talk about processes going on "within" the person (as opposed to the body). Sometimes they are conscious and sometimes not. But there doesn't seem to be any agreement how this can be done. (In one way, ordinary language sets our starting-point, but it seems too limited for what we want to do.)I would place this in the context of an internal process within the self, which does not necessarily require a thorough analysis. — Punshhh
I would like to treat "ego", "self", "mind" as all equivalent to "person" - unless and until a more detailed and more objective framework can be developed.When you say “ego”, presumably you are referring the the thinking person, the mind. — Punshhh
Not in so many words, but you did say this:-So if P is not truth-apt, then S might or might not be truth-apt.
— Ludwig V
Well I never said that. The problem here is that implication doesn't make sense among non-truth-apt things, but that's a separate issue. — Leontiskos
and I think that what I said follows from that.If P is not truth-apt, then of course S need not be truth-apt. — Leontiskos
It is trouble because you have to covince me that "God exists" is truth-apt before I'll be convinced by your argument.The trouble is that we might well disagree about whether a given proposition, such as "God exists", is truth-apt or not.
— Ludwig V
How is that supposed to be "trouble"? Try presenting an argument to the effect that, "We might disagree about whether P is truth-apt, therefore Leontiskos' claim is false." — Leontiskos
Yes, you are right. I carelessly continued using S without remembering that you had already assigned a value to it. I should have used a different variable, such as T. I'm sorry.These two claims contradict one another. One moment you say that S cannot entail true or false propositions, and the next moment you say that S implies P and P is true. This is a good example of the problem with Wittgenstein's approach. — Leontiskos
Why on earth do you suppose he abandons that?He won't make an excuse and abandon the obvious fact that where S implies P and P is truth-apt, so too is S. — Leontiskos
Thank you for clearing that up. I mention his name because I had the impression that it is courteous to identify the source of other people's arguments when deploying them and because it saves time if you accept the argument. If you don't, then we may have to do this the hard way.Of course if you think he makes a good point you can introduce that same point in your own words, but appeals to his name will be ineffective for me. I have no regard for his name, and these topics help explain why. — Leontiskos
That is indeed a more nuanced understanding. But now I need to ask why you think it is wrong in this case.I don't think the argument is wholesale invalid. The idea behind it is that intractable disagreement among intelligent persons can signify a more fundamental problem (and that this problem could be related to what is or is not truth-apt). There is a rationale to the idea, even if I think it is wrong in this case. — Leontiskos
That would be correct if "God exists" is true-or-false, like "Unicorns exist". You seem to think that it is. I think that it isn't. Until that is sorted out, your schema above does not apply. I believe that "God exists" is comparable, not to "Unicorns exist" but to "Matter exists" or "Consciousness is an illusion".As far as I'm concerned, wherever it goes, it supports my point. Suppose I present an argument and it is convincing. In that case an atheistic way of life will be falsified (or invalidated) by the propositional truth. Or suppose I present an argument and it is unconvincing. In that case a theistic way of life will be less plausible given the propositional truth. Either way the propositional outcome will bear on ways of life. — Leontiskos
I'm speechless. What on earth does that have to do with it?The theories are therefore empirically inadequate given the way people often change their mind with regard to religious propositions (and faith propositions more generally). — Leontiskos
How would you prove that? Only by begging the question.If the atheist says, "I believe God does not exist, and nothing will ever convince me otherwise," then I would say they are just being stubborn and irrational. If there is nothing that would convince him otherwise, then he is not taking the question seriously. — Leontiskos
Yes, you are right, of course. I wrote that passage badly, without explaining myself. It doesn't matter, so I withdraw the claim.P.S. I think you need to address this in order to ensure that our whole conversation is not based on a misunderstanding:
Well if something is false then it is truth-apt, so this makes me think that you don't understand what "truth-apt" means.
— Leontiskos — Leontiskos
Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. S could be a way of life or practice. — Leontiskos
If P is not truth-apt, then S need not be truth-apt; but then S might be truth-apt. So if P is not truth-apt, then S might or might not be truth-apt. The trouble is that we might well disagree about whether a given proposition, such as "God exists", is truth-apt or not.If P is not truth-apt, then of course S need not be truth-apt. — Leontiskos
That's a typo. I mean "protected from reFutation". To illustrate what I mean, let me sketch an argument in which this protection occurs. The point here is not whether the argument as stated is a good one, but just to illustrate what I mean by "protected from refutation". Suppose someone asserts that God always answers prayers. A possible reply might be "But yesterday you were praying for fine weather to-day and look, it's raining." The protective answer is "But sometimes the answer is No."I don't know what "being protected from reputation" means, but the point is that truth-apt things are open to scrutiny. — Leontiskos
No, that's not what Wittgenstein thinks. His discussion of ways of life and practices is not extensive; it's little more than a series of hints. But the foundations of language cannot possibly entail true or false propositions; if they did, they would already be language and therefore not the foundations of language.I suppose I just stand by what I already said. If Wittgenstein thinks his "ways of life" are not truth-apt and yet entail true or false propositions, then he is in a pickle. — Leontiskos
That seems a very sound policy. I was looking for examples that would show what I was trying to assert. I was not looking to engage in those arguments. I've outlined a couple of arguments above, and I hope they help.I don't usually engage that question in these contexts, as the inquirer is just looking for something to try to debunk. I'm also not sure what it has to do with this conversation, especially given that you said my point about relativism, "Would be a bad argument." — Leontiskos
When I said that's a bad argument, I was agreeing with what I thought was your point - that the conclusion does not follow from the premiss. I don't know whether you think that "God exists" is an empirical statement or not, but I think it very unlikely that there is any empirical fact that would persuade you to abandon that claim. Equally there is for me no empirical statement that would persuade me to accept that God does indeed exist. Hence, I do not believe that "God exists" is an empirical claim.But yes, relativists will say, "People endlessly disagree about proposition X, therefore it must not be truth-apt." That's a common argument. — Leontiskos
I have a problem with any theory that divides the person/self into separate elements like this. When we do the wrong thing, we are usually anxious to shift the blame away from ourselves. One of the tactics is to attribute the agency to something that is not us (not our selves). I didn't do that, my appetites did it. I don't want to say that it is never appropriate to think in this way, but I do want to say that it is sometimes inappropriate to think in this way. We find addictions very hard to classify, with some people seeing the addiction that is not the person, but which takes over control of the person, and other people thinking that it is just the result of a "weak will" - as if going to some sort of gym would sort the problem out.So I would say, it is the being, working with the personality who wrestles with the ego. — Punshhh
Yet you seem to be able to tell this story without the help of the analysis, until the very last moment, when you revert to the "ego", and I want to say that it is your ego that took you through the process of training that allows you to grab hold of the ego and tether it (yourself). I have no idea what a Zen master would say about this story, but I say that the point is that you have not tethered yourself, but set yourself free. Or rather, you were taking the process as a process of tethering, but now you can see it as a process of freeing yourself. Life in the wild, we might say, is not freedom; it is suffering. But No, it is both. The paradoxes are endless. That, no doubt, is where the Zen master comes in.A tipping point is reached beyond which there is a strength of feeling and knowledge that one is living a gooder life and yet not feeling the lesser for it, but the more for it. Again a tipping point is reached beyond which one can grab hold of and tether the ego. — Punshhh
I agree that ways of life and propositions cannot be neatly separated. For me, at least, that was the significance of accept Hadot' remark.I mean, you could give your definition of "true," but the point here is that if ways of life can be validated by propositions (facts) then they can also be invalidated by propositions. Ways of life and propositions cannot be neatly separated. — Leontiskos
Thatl would be a bad argument. So, could I ask what arguments you propose as evidence that God exists?But yes, relativists will say, "People endlessly disagree about proposition X, therefore it must not be truth-apt." That's a common argument. — Leontiskos
Hinge propositions are not non-truth-apt. They are true, in such a way that whatever else gets questioned in the debate, they are protected from reputation. "God exists" is a good example - unless you can tell me what arguments you would accept as evidence that God does not exist.I think hinge propositions are another example of the confusion I outlined, insofar as they involve the claim that non-truth-apt axioms entail truth-apt propositions. — Leontiskos
The question will always be, then, whether P is really truth-apt and not false.Suppose that S → P, and P is truth-apt. It follows that S is truth-apt. It doesn't really matter what kind of thing S is. S could be a way of life or practice. — Leontiskos
We do indeed see a great deal of stuff about people who have succeeded against the odds, and, as you point out, not only in fiction. We don't see nearly as much about the people who try to follow in their footsteps and fail - and they are the vast majority. Anyone who looks at the numbers for successful and unsuccessful business start-ups and thinks rationally will walk away. Ditto careers in music, acting &c. Even philosophy!Except that we know that some people achieve success despite all the odds and setbacks, just look at any list of entrepreneurs or Hollywood stars. This evidence of success, despite barriers and failures is why some people think it's worth taking chances. I'd argue that faith in something which cannot be demonstrated follows a very different trajectory. — Tom Storm
I was also trying to tease out why you said that faith often implies those things, which suggests that sometimes faith does not imply those things.For me, “faith” often implies belief without evidence, possibly without good reason, and perhaps even in the face of contrary evidence. — Tom Storm
Yes, I understand that the ego is the ox. But who is it that tames the ox/ego? The story would lose its point if we could imagine the ox willingly submitting to the tamer. You speak of "one" or "me", which seems to be neither ox nor ego. I sometimes think that the journey is something that happens to us adn which we cope with as best we can, rather than being something that we decide to do.Again a tipping point is reached beyond which one can grab hold of and tether the ego. — Punshhh
I suppose the only way to see any value in faith is to think about the times when it implies something different.For me, “faith” often implies belief without evidence, possibly without good reason, and perhaps even in the face of contrary evidence. — Tom Storm
I can see that. I can also see room for a good deal more philosophy. But I think that going there would be a bit off topic for this thread. Thank you for all your help.What we can do with formal logic is to show the coherence of some fragments of natural language. — Banno
Forgive me. I get your drift. However ways of life, unlike propositions about them, are not true or false. But they can be validated by or founded on facts which are articulated by propositions; those propositions need to be true if they are to do their job.For example, if S is the "way of life" of theism or atheism, and P is a proposition like, "God exists," then we have a case where a way of life is truth-apt. If P is true, and yet is made false by a way of life, then that way of life is to that extent false. — Leontiskos
I don't want to waste time bickering about whether your argument is valid or not. I'll skip to agreeing with you and Pierre Hadot. OK?When Pierre Hadot emphasizes the way that ways of life and discourse are mutually influencing, he is crucially aware that latter also influences the former. — Leontiskos
(copied from [url=https://ojs.st-andrews.ac.uk › index.php › aporia › article › download › 2027 › 1496]Fluharty - Hinge propositions[/url])Wittgenstein, drawing much from Hume, formed the idea of ‘hinge propositions’, in which there are particular propositions that one may believe but in addition, one may exempt from doubt. It is the belief in these particular propositions that enables one to begin one’s scientific investigations. They are not supported by reasons.
That's right. I was feeling for the point at which dogma etc. becomes a problem that needs to be addressed by social action. Which is a delicate but important matter.I think those are problems in themselves. And they are behind most of the culture wars, genocides, and brainwashing of children and the gullible. Also given that they are intellectually dishonest, in that they claim to know more than can justifiably be claimed to be known, I believe they should be disavowed and even disparaged. Of course I'm not suggesting that people should be punished merely for being ideologues. dogmatists or fundamentalists, though. — Janus
I believe that to be true as well.Those who are reputedly "touched by the divine" are usually the saints and the sages and they would seem to be the least likely to be ideologues, dogmatists or fundamentalists. — Janus
OK. But when I hear "There's a possible world in which P", I understand this to be equivalent to "It is possible that P". So far, I haven't identified any difference that matters in my world. Am I right?Roughly, any other alternative interpretation would be equivalent to possible world semantics. — Banno
Well, from my point of view, the question where natural language sits in relation to the formal system is important. I don't think the difference between the two gaps is a problem at all.I somewhat regret suggesting a third level, since the gap between a formal modal and a natural language is no where near at the level of the gap between a syntax and a semantics. — Banno
Broadly, I agree. But I think we have to modify what we have been saying a bit. Putting it crudely, it is not dogma, ideology and fundamentalism in themselves that are the problem. It is the bad behaviour that those things lead to - no, sorry, correction - often lead to. I don't mind people being dogmatic or even fundamentalist, so long as they behave themselves in a civilized fashion - that is, adapt to the world as it is, as opposed to eliminating or attempting to eliminate those features of the world that they disapprove of. (Since everybody has an ideology, we should only condemn ideologies that seek to suppress, by inappropriate means, other ideologies.)Right, I haven't been saying that I see a problem with people interpreting their mystical experiences, and entertaining whatever personal beliefs they do. The problem I see is when they conflate their interpretations with knowledge and make absolutist truth claims. In other words dogma, ideology and fundamentalism are the problems...thinking others should believe as they do. — Janus
That is indeed asking a bit much. But the practicalities of existence do demand that one not use inappropriate methods to compel (insofar as that's even possible) belief amongst other people.Are we really expecting those touched by the divine to say, ‘I encountered a higher power and I know we are all one, but I’ll keep it in perspective because intellectually this is the right thing to do?' — Tom Storm
Yes, but how do I decide who is the ego and who the ox-tamer?The ego has to be tamed like the ox in Zen is tethered to the post. — Punshhh
I'm a bit cautious about a general claim about all religious claims. I don't exclude the possibility that some, even many, may be truth-apt. But I do think that an important part of religious claims are interpretations of the world that are the basis of various ways of life and practices and that those interpretations are not truth-apt. The same applies to secularism and atheism.The intellectually honest naysayer needs to start admitting that they don't think religious claims are truth-apt. They can't have it both ways: — Leontiskos
Yes. It is certainly true that the successes of liberalism in, let us say the 19th and 20th century were the result of deep commitment and dogged determination. So it is odd that you think that people of that kind are "thumos-phobic" (if I've understood what you mean by that correctly). Their positions were based on rational argument, so it is also odd that you think that they were "logos-sceptical" (If I've understood what you mean by that correctly).I think the voices that helped develop our current thymos-phobia and logos-skepticism were themselves plenty dogmatic and stuck living out their own myth, — Count Timothy von Icarus
My understanding of thumos is that everybody has it - the capacity to adopt and pursue values with commitment and effort. The problem with it, for Plato at least, is that it needs to be directed correctly. It may be true that reluctance to forego current consumption may be part of the reluctance of Europe to support Ukraine properly. But a big part of it is a reluctance to go to war. I don't think that's a bad thing, (so long as it is not overdone!)people who won't storm beaches or resist sieges (who lack thymos) also won't stand up to public corruption or resist the temptation to public corruption, and won't forgo current consumption for the sake of future goods — Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't think this distinction would stand up to analysis. But perhaps you are channeling the distinction between epithumia and thumos? In any case, it seems to me that the widespread condemnation of epithumia is wrong-headed. Our appetites include things that are not merely pleasurable but essential. The problem arises when they are pursued to excess or in the wrong way.One way this manifests, in classical terms, is essentially the claim that man only has concupiscible appetites (i.e. an attraction to pleasure and aversion to pain), while ignoring the existence of irascible appetites (i.e. an attraction to the pursuit of arduous goods, where hope, not pleasure, is the key positive motivating force). — Count Timothy von Icarus
That, or something very like it, is indeed the traditional argument for them. But, for many, what happened in Germany in the first half of the 20th century has more or less destroyed that argument. At the very least, we have to note that love of the humanities is not sufficient to prevent people going down some very wrong paths.They (sc. the humanities) are the ground, as you say, for making men capable of self-governance and self-rule (collectively and individually) as well as the ground for a common stock of ideas for political life, the pursuit of a common good. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I can see that it is not part of the first level. "Semantic interpretation" looks like the second level.If I'm understanding Banno correctly, he's agreed with, and explicated, my talk about a "different level." To say, "The fact that 'a' has the reference it has is not a feature or property of a" is basically the same as saying, "Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure -- it belongs to the semantic interpretation." Or so I believe, and if that's wrong, it's on me, since Banno has been perfectly clear. — J
For what it's worth, I think reference is on the third level, because that's where we encounter the Eiffel Tower etc. I expect Banno will put us right.And to this we might add a third level, where we seek to understand what we are doing in a natural language by applying these formal systems. So for propositional logic, we understand the p's and q's as standing for the sentences of our natural language, and T and F as True and False. For predicate logic, we understand a,b,c as standing for Fred Bloggs, the Eiffel tower and consumerism, or whatever. — Banno
I suspected as much.The thing is, "a" has no properties at all. It's a name. So there is actually a symmetry of sorts! "'a' refers to a" is not a property of a, and "a is the reference of 'a'" isn't a property of "a", not because it isn't included in the list of "a"'s properties, but because there is no such list. — J
Thanks for this. It does make sense. I'll have to take it for granted that there are no other successful interpretations. I know that logicians accepted this as the only viable possibility.In order to give a coherent interpretation to these systems, Kripke taught us to use possible world semantics. In a way all this amounts to is a process to group the predicates used previously. So we said earlier that "f" stands for {a,c,e}, and to this we now add that in different worlds, f can stand for different sets of individuals. So in w₀ "f" stands for {a,c,e}, while in w₁ f stands for {a,b}, and so on in whatever way we stipulate - w₀ being world zero, w₁ being world one, and so on. Now we have added a semantics to the syntax of S4 and S5. — Banno
Many thanks for this. I can see the sense in it.For these two reasons, having a name is not usually considered as having the property of having that name. Being referred to by a name is not part of the logical property structure — it belongs to the semantic interpretation. — Banno
But part of my puzzlement was because of an apparent asymmetry between referring to something and being referred to by something. You don't explicitly say much about "a". But fixing the reference must involve both "a" and a. So I would have thought that "a"'s referring to a is also not a property of "a". Is that right?if I additionally ask about how "a" comes to stand for the Eiffel Tower, we can't answer that in terms of the interpretation of "a" -- that is, the various properties that can now be predicated of a based upon our interpretation. We have to move to a different level and talk about how or why "a" has the reference it has, which is not a feature or property of a, any more than my name is a property of me. — J
OK. So now the question whether the concept of a rigid designator is part of the formal system and must be assessed in that context, or part of natural language and assessed in that context. (There's something odd about classifying philosophical logic as "natural language", so perhaps we need a third alternative - not quite natural, not quite formal, but bridging.)And to this we might add a third level, where we seek to understand what we are doing in a natural language by applying these formal systems. — Banno
I think you are missing an important point. For many in the aftermath of the two world wars, it was clear that the Grand Narratives that they had inherited were a busted flush. They perceived that those narratives involved a great deal of irrational myth-making, which could not stand up to a rational critique. New departures were an absolute necessity in order to avoid any repetition of history. (OK, that's an emotional sketch. But I don't think it is wrong. It is an appalling failure and a great sadness that they project appears to be on the brink of falling apart. But perhaps it never really stood a chance.)By "logos-skepticism," I mean skepticism about the capacity of logos (reason, rationality) to be the organizing principle and asperation of society and individual life. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That's true. But the embrace of reasonableness was intended to avoid the necessity of storming beaches and resisting sieges, which were regarded as grossly uncivilized activities. Risks, by all means, but avoidance of barbarity as a priority.More to the point, people are unlikely to want to storm beaches or resist sieges in the name of "reasonableness," i.e., to take the sorts of personal and collective risks that civilization requires. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That is certainly true. Are you suggesting that it is not a problem? Things have moved on since the fifties, though the Arts and Humanities are still in a perilous position. But then, so are the (pure) sciences, which seem to survive as the hand-maidens of Applied Science and Engineering, which is where the money is - or, if you prefer, are essential to the modern economy.*There is a lot going on there, but one theory I like is that the reason the humanities latched on to this sort of style and thinking so readily is that the early-20th century focus on the primacy of science left the humanities as "a mere matter of opinion and taste." — Count Timothy von Icarus
I mean the latter. Raw perceptions are a myth - a construction from our recognition that there are interpretive processes at work. The moment that the light or sound or whatever arrives at our sense organs, the process of selection, editing and interpreting begins. A perception that was raw could not be perceived by us, and a perception that can be perceived by us is not raw.What do you mean by perceptions here, exactly? Are you referring to raw sense data? Or the entire process of observation and interpretation of observations? Because sure, we might misunderstand what we see. But that's different from questioning the validity of raw sense perception - to reality. — karl stone
Can we just concentrate on this? It doesn't help me much, because I don't understand what you are tryinng to say. It is true that experience of an objective reality requires two poles. That's because it is a relationship. The perceiver (subject) experiences the reality (object). I don't see that any metaphysical consequences follow.All this is supplemental to the point, that there's really no alternative to accept the dualistic nature of subjective experience of an objective reality. — karl stone
.. and you interpret all that in dualistic terms. But that's an interpretation, not a fact.Traffic lights. Their very existence presupposes a commonality of perception. And they're everywhere! As is art, colour coded electrical wires, signs saying Keep Off the Grass! etc. This very sentence assumes your ability to see, and psychologically translate perception into meaning similar - if not identical to, that which it is intended to convey. — karl stone
I'm not a subjectivist and I don't doubt the validity of perception as such, though I do doubt the validity of some of my perception - often rightly.However, the subjectivist takes the implications of the existence of interpretational models far too far - and does so with the intent of casting the validity of perception into doubt, to undermine the empirical basis for scientific knowledge. — karl stone
In one sense, it is not possible that they conflict. But people think they do, so an explanation is in order. It is true that Newtonian physics is intuitive now. But it wasn't before he came up with it and many people found it seriusly counter-intuitive. Ditto Relativity.Does physics conflict with common sense? I don't think it does. Certainly not Newtonian physics; it's very intuitive. Relativity gets a bit weird, but at velocities approaching the speed of light. And quantum physics gets weird, but again, by virtue of being as small and lightspeed is quick! It's hardly surprising that conditions far removed from our experience, to the absolute extremes of velocity and scale, are difficult to understand in common sense terms. — karl stone
Do you mean that our experience confirms it? If not our experience, then what?It is everywhere confirmed that there's an internal world, and an external world - mediated by the senses. — karl stone
Gestalt psychology, gestaltism, or configurationism is a school of psychology and a theory of perception that emphasises the processing of entire patterns and configurations, and not merely individual components. It emerged in the early twentieth century in Austria and Germany as a rejection of basic principles of Wilhelm Wundt's and Edward Titchener's elementalist and structuralist psychology. — Wikipedia - Gestalt
Yes, but given the way that physics conflicts with common sense, it is important to point out that observations themselves tell us that some observations are wrong, mistaken, misleading and that observations themselves enable us to correct those mistakes - usually.Observation in science, is thus a valid basis for knowledge of the external world, particularly when observations are confirmed by an independent observer. — karl stone
I agree with you about what really matters, but your downright no to the question about these experiences seems to me to be over the top. So far as I know, mystical experience does not lead to harm to the mystic or to others and, on the whole, does seem to encourage peace and loving-kindness. That's important. Also, if it is important to those who follow the disciplines and/or have the experiences, then it has a certain importance for the world. But, whether it is/leads to our final destination or not, it does not seem to make any difference to the majority who do not have these experiences. Their relevance to the only life we know is not at all clear. All this is my opinion, not my dogma.Does it matter? I would say no—all that really matters is how we live our lives—how we live this life, the only life we know or can be confident we can really know, the only one we can be confident that we actually have or will have. And even knowing this life is not the easiest or most common achievement. — Janus
So I still want a way to characterize the difference between saying "The Eiffel Tower is tall" and "That object [pointing] is called 'the Eiffel Tower'". Yes, the first is a property and the second is not, but where do these statements fall on the syntactic/semantic spectrum? — J
I see that. But then, it seems to me to be a matter of how one thinks about it, or perhaps what question one asks. "Homer" designates just that person every time it is used. Whether we know or how we can establish just which person that is, is not a relevant question. What bothers me is that it reminds me of the power of "+1" to define an infinite numbers of steps in advance - an astonishing fact. But, of course, it isn't astonishing at all. We apply the rule and discover or generate (I don't care which) the answer. It seems to be specified in advance because we are so sure how the rule will be applied in every case. In the same way, it seems to me, "Homer" identifies the same person in every possible world (in which Homer exists) not because it can somehow reach out across all possible worlds, but because we will decide, in all possible worlds, which person is Homer - and we will decide on the basis of the facts of the case. There's no list of facts that will determine every outcome in advance, but some facts or other will determine it.Sort of. We might say Homer is the guy we think wrote the Odyssey. But turns out it was Kostas who wrote it. Now at stake is the difference between thinking of "Homer" as denoting exactly and only "the bloke who the Odyssey", and thinking of it as denoting Homer, that person. That's what this group of thought experiments target. And that in turn is the difference between the descriptive theory of reference and the idea of a rigid designator. If "Homer" and "Kostas" are rigid designators, then we can say that it was Kostas that wrote the Odyssey, and do so without fear of our system of reference collapsing. If we think in terms of the descriptive theory, and so "Homer" refers to "The guy who wrote the Odyssey", then "Homer" refers to Kostas. — Banno
Oh, I agree with that. I count myself among the don't knows. On the other hand, I'm not committed to a binary option for theories, though intention doesn't have anything to recommend it that I can see.There's the point, too, that we might well see that the descriptivist theory is inadequate and yet not have at hand another theory to replace it. We sometimes have to be comfortable to say "I don't know", and to see that doing so is better than trying to repair a defunct theory. — Banno
OK. Interpretation sits outside both syntax and semantics, but links the two. Since it isn't a formal system, it looks to me as if it may be conducted in natural language?It's not a property because that "a" designates a is not a formula within the system, but part of the interpretation, of the model. — Banno
H'm. I'm an old dog. But if all this is something that logicians need, I have no problem - any more than I do about what mathematicians get up to. It's when ideas get out into the rough country beyond logic (or mathematics) that I sit up and take notice.Much of the apparent bumpiness here might be worked out by your looking at the formal system and how it functions. You seem to have. good intuitive grasp of the ideas involved. — Banno
That's a very interesting idea. It has occurred to me that some philosophers present their anti-realist arguments together with some account of what reality actually is. Which might get round Austin's objection. I'm thinking of Plato, Berkeley, Dennett and perhaps Descartes. You wouldn't know where I could find some discussion of this, would you?David Chalmers, who agrees more or less with the Wittgensteinian argument that we usually don't use "real" in this way, but goes on to ask why we couldn't. He proposes a room in to which we can go, within which we can ask such questions, and discuss the consequences. — Banno
On the face of it, there is something wrong here. We are frequently misled by our senses, and yet we have survived - or at least enough of us have survived.I think knowledge obtained via the senses can be justified as providing an accurate picture of reality because we evolved, and could not have survived were we misled by our senses. — karl stone
But doesn't a work of fiction have to present something that is possibly true? The anti-sceptical arguments that I've seen aim to prove that the sceptic's conclusions are not even possibly true.Radical Skepticism acts like a work of fiction. A work of fiction does not make assertions to prove or disprove, the very nature of a work of fiction is an absence of any assertion about the world. There is nothing to confirm or falsify in a work of fiction. So, like a work of fiction, there is nothing to confirm or falsify in the skeptic's argument as well. — Richard B