there needs not be a reason for every thing we do. also, we can have multiple equally compelling reasons to do different things.

know you understood the terms correctly, I was just not understanding you.

I interpreted judgement as an inference, like "If I hear a loud ringing noise (seeming?), and my friend next to me does not (defeater), then the ringing noise could be tinnitus" — fdrake

I agree with this case

in that case, the

Where does this "at least some justification" come from when applied to a judgement/experience like seeming? Interested in how the inference works. — fdrake

the justification comes from experience. I think we agree. I don't see anything wrong with your assessment. what exactly is your question?

That doesn't make sense to me. If something seems like it's true, but we know based on evidence, or at least believe strongly, that it's not, do you really propose that we have "at least some justification for believing that P." — T Clark

if we have some justification to believe that P and that justification is overridden by other evidence, then we still have some justification, it's overridden.

I've been called and called myself a pragmatist. The pragmatic approach to skepticism is to do the best you can with an understanding of the uncertainties of your knowledge and the risks of being wrong. What more is needed? — T Clark

I guess I would ask exactly how you have knowledge of our common sense beliefs. Is it because they are useful? because they are true?

Where does this "at least some justification" come from when applied to a judgement/experience like seeming? Interested in how the inference works. — fdrake

I would need an example of what you mean by "judgement" and "seeming"

They don't. Otherwise they wouldn't be free will sceptics. They clearly have an experience like "it seems that I'm not sure if I have free will". — Isaac

I guess I'll have to talk to more free-will skeptics about it. of course, I'll never reject anyone's experiences, they are the expert of their own experiences. However, I will say that I had a professor in learning and behavior say that he doesn't accept free will, but never-the-less he said it feels like we are making choices for ourselves. I'll also like to say that belief does not equal experience. I may experience something to be true, but just believe it's an Illusion for example the Ponzo Illusion and other Illusions. Ultimately though I'll have to consult the skeptics, and I agree that if they don't have an experience like I said, then my principal is in trouble.

Once more you're denying the prima facie evidence that other people experience things differently to you and replacing it with your rational analysis that they probably deep down have such an experience. — Isaac

again, I'll never claim someone's mental life is different than what they report it to be. they are the masters of their own mental life. however, every single person that is a subjectist I have talked to says they think murdering people for fun is bad, even though they believe that's just their opinion.

let me be clear: I someone reports that they don't have any feeling of free will and if they report that they don't have a feeling that "murdering people for fun is bad". I'll have to change the way I view things.

that being said, I'll like to ask you what your experiences with free will and values are. do you experience a sense of free will? do you experience something like "It seems to me that I shouldn't murder people just for fun"? if you don't experience them, then my principal is in trouble.

You say seeming does not mean belief, but it does. It's just a belief for which you don't have a very good justification. — T Clark

I'm having a hard time seeing how "seeming" equals belief. can you explain more?

I see belief and seeming are separate things. for example, in the The Ponzo Illusion it seems to me like the lines are different lengths, but I believe the lines are the same length. in this case, seeming and belief are two completely different things.

I do think that it has some use. for example in defending the belief in free will. free will skeptics still have an experience like "it seems that I have free will". Also, in defending objective moral values, since the moral skeptics still (in my experience) have an experience like "it seems to me that I shouldn't murder people for fun" though they interpret it to instead be a personal feeling.

You need to make the case that god is good first — Tom Storm

I only attempt to argue against an all-good God, so any evil Gods are not part of the scope of the argument

It presupposes in specific terms what a particular account of a god would want - how can anyone demonstrate this? — Tom Storm

If the theist claims that even though we cannot think of a reason for God allowing evil, this does not entail that there is none, they are similarly entailed to believe that even though we cannot think of a reason for God lying to us, this does not entail that there is none. So, the theist would not be able to rule out the possibility of divine lies, and has to concede that God could be lying about any number of things, like the eternal world, and even though we cannot think of a reason for his lying, this does not entail that there is none.

I guess I don't understand quite what you are saying. what do you mean by 'passive' nonbelievers?

a nonresistant nonbeliever is one who either wants to believe in God, but doesn't, or at least isn't hostile toward the idea of God existing. The only reason they don't believe is because of evidential reasons, not psychological reasons.