Comments

  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    It appears that God's alleged omnipotence thwarts all attempts at crafting an argument in favor of God. — “Agent Smith”
    At least any kind of God that most of us wouldn’t consider a monster.
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    If there's no pain, in all likelihood something really bad happens, The Congenital Analgesia link I posted gives you an idea of what a toy world might look like. — “Agent Smith”

    I don’t think you’re properly conceptualizing what a toy world is, though. In a toy world there are no physical dangers for pain to alert you to. The hot stove burner can’t harm your hand. Your body is invincible.

    The idea is that an omnipotent and omniscient being could create a reality in which there is no privation, disease, or physical danger. Thus pain is unnecessary as there’s nothing to alert you against.
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    Having read your outpost again here, I am wondering to what extent you see 'God' as a metaphorical construct for thinking about imaginary worlds. In that way, your perspective about 'toy worlds' for thinking about the nature of objective ways for viewing the wider perspective of moral evil. Or, I am I wrong in my interpretation of your critique and the thought experiment which you describe? — “Jack Cummins”

    I’m unsure how to respond to this. Possible world/modal semantics is certainly useful for talking about the capabilities of an omnipotent/omniscient being, but I don’t think that’s the same as treating God as a “metaphorical construct for thinking about” modal possibilities.

    I myself am an atheist, I doubt that a god exists; but when giving the PoE, God’s existence (and certain properties) are taken for the sake of argument to demonstrate reductio ad absurdum.
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    Sure, although adopting this horn of the dilemma does not commit us to DCT. DCT says that what God wills is Good. Period (full stop). One could, instead, simply say that what God wills is good for God. This leaves human beings with the interesting and burdensome problem of what is good for us, or for me in a world of finite opposing wills. Meta-ethical relativism is maintained, which is good. — “bert”

    Though if God acts in the interest of Himself and not for us in general, I’d argue that isn’t what we intuitively grasp as benevolence. This would simply be ceding that God is not omnibenevolent and the PoE “wins.”
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    A guidance system isn’t required if there is no danger. So physical suffering still demands an explanation on the 3-omni sort of theism.
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    Congenital Analgesia. A curse/a gift, both, neither? — Agent Smith

    In the world that exists as it exists, this can be bad because pain does serve the purpose of letting us know something is wrong: we wouldn't get the warning that we've rested our hand accidentally on a hot burner for instance.

    Since there are physical dangers, physical pain servers an evolutionary purpose and is useful for that purpose.

    However, again, none of this is necessary in a world without physical dangers.

    So if we ask, "why does physical suffering exist?" the answer isn't "because it lets us know that we've put our hand on the hot burner so we can pull our hand away." It misses the point that in a toy world, the burner could never hurt us anyway.

    In other words the question could be posed, "why does the world have dangers to which pain alerts us to?"

    (Though there are obviously some pains that don't serve such a purpose, they are just pains; such as some genetic defects. In any case, I hope this answers the question.)
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    does pain make sense to you in evolutionary terms? Why did we evolve to feel pain and why is pain so damn unpleasant? — Agent Smith

    Sure, it makes lots of sense in evolutionary terms. I think we understand that we feel pain when we touch something hot as a way to quickly learn not to touch hot things.

    However, this is unnecessary in a toy world. You don't need to experience pain when you touch a stove burner to learn not to do that if a stone burner would never hurt you in the first place.
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    It's possible that a universe without the possibility of physical suffering would seem miraculous or a put-up job, and that God has good reasons for not "showing her hand". — RogueAI

    Interesting: so you propose that Divine Hiddenness isn't only a question (e.g., it is typically presented as a question: why, if there is a God, does it seem hidden?) but a means to some end (e.g., God obtains some purpose from being hidden) that's so overwhelmingly good that all the physical suffering in the world is worth it to have it?
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    Very nice clear OP. It does assume that one horn of the Euthyphro dilemma is accepted, that God wills what is good, because it is good. That's an assumption in the OP. There's a reason all this suffering is good that we can't see but God can.

    Embracing the other horn of the dilemma, that is to say that x is good because God wills it, is much more defensible in terms of intelligibility without recourse to special pleading. However this horn almost certainly involves disagreeing with God. It's all very well for God to will earthquakes and god knows what - it doesn't affect Them (my God is woke). But from our point of view these things are shit, so fuck God, you Divine Cunt. This conclusion should be embraced by theologians, but it's not a message that sounds well from a pulpit, no matter how philosophically satisfactory it is. This conception of the good, as that which is willed by a subject (even if that subject is God), and thus entailing the subjectivity of the good, nicely allows for God to be omnibenevolent (everything They will is good from Their point of view), and for us to violently object, saying that's all very well for God but from my point of view a whole bunch of stiff is shit. The human condition is very much about coming to terms with reality, that is, a world that does not obey our finite will.
    — bert

    You're right, I did only consider one horn of Euthyphro. Though as you note, the PoE isn't really a problem on Divine Command Theory since by definition, anything at all that God does on DCT, even torture for torture's sake alone, is "good." So, I guess I grabbed hold of the only Euthyphro horn where the PoE even matters.
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    A game you cannot lose is a dull game where winning is no achievement and has no value. Games have to have baddies so that they can be overcome. A life without danger and suffering is a life without meaning. Heaven is intolerably dull, and that is why we are all here in this miserable world, trying to imagine heaven, and realise it on Earth. When god makes everything right, it's game over. No point in cooking, everything tastes wonderful, no point climbing mountains, you can never fall off. No point in philosophy, all the answers are available to everyone already. — unenlightened"

    Yes, as an ex-Christian I've long harbored these sorts of reservations about the concept of Heaven: wouldn't it be boring? I think there's enough there to merit its own topic, but I'm hoping to stay focused on greater good theodicy here, and I think I'd be shocked if anyone's defense of leukemia is "so we don't get bored."
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments

    Left to the reader as an exercise. — Agent Smith

    As a physics grad student I'm going to need you to put a trigger warning on this please. :lol:
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    I read a lot of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus so I shouldn't bother; yet, at every step of the way one would have to avoid the valence of suffering (suffering itself being 'bad') with negating core features of suffering such as loss of a loved one, death, and pain itself that physics couldn't hope to ever do or even care to do ... — Shawn

    Let us say that I create The Matrix and populate The Matrix with real people with actual consciousness. The rules that govern what happens when an object is thrown is the "physics" of this world. I can amend some code -- change the simulation of gravity -- and make a thrown object follow a different trajectory. All I have to do for instance is change how "G" is defined (as one example of how to do it).

    Now, if you agree that I can change the physics of The Matrix, let's talk about physical suffering. Have you ever played a video game and used a "god mode" cheat code where, no matter how much damage you're supposed to take, you don't take any of the damage? Bullets hit you, but your health doesn't go down, for instance. Well, that is very crude, but isn't it conceivable that I could change this Matrix so that the people in it don't suffer damage from being hit by bullets in the same way?

    Now apply the same logic to any kind of physical suffering. It's easy to conceive how I could simply write some code or change the way things work in The Matrix so that they don't actually experience the physical suffering. Disease? Easy, I can write the code so their body simply does not suffer from disease. Bullets? Easy. Earthquakes and tornadoes? Also easy: again, just turn "god mode" on (in video game terms) and nobody is hurt.

    Well, this is the "physics" of the Matrix. The physics of a world are the way its objects behave. I can write The Matrix so that the real people in it don't experience physical suffering: we don't have to call this the "physics" of the world if it's just that term that's causing problems for you.

    In any case, if something can be simulated (or thought experimented), then an omnipotent/omniscient being could actualize that state of affairs. If we can agree in a thought experiment that a clever programmer can make a universe where the actual minds present in that universe don't experience physical suffering, then we should agree an omnipotent/omniscient being could create the actual world to be that way.
  • Greater Good Theodicy, Toy Worlds, Invincible Arguments
    I don't think suffering can be encompassed by physics or toy worlds. What makes you believe that is so? — Shawn

    I do mean physical suffering (as opposed to, say, emotional suffering), I should have probably made that more clear. Physical suffering is governed by physics. An omnipotent being could make it such that if you rammed your toe into the doorframe it wouldn't actually hurt your toe. An omnipotent being could make it so fire doesn't hurt you, so that your body doesn't develop diseases or cancers, so on and so forth.

    If there is a creator-God, then all of physical suffering exists because God set up the universe to work that way deliberately.
  • Response to Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism

    Suppose that omniscience entails R (as is no doubt true). It follows from this that R will be necessarily true of God. But everything entails necessary truths, so everything willentail R. — GodlessGirl

    What is meant by "but everything entails necessary truths" here? I don't think that omniscience implies that "everything" is a necessary truth; if there is contingency for instance (and I am happy to shrug and suppose that it looks like there is), then contingent truths still wouldn't be necessary just because God omnisciently knows them. However, I feel as though I might be misinterpreting what you said. Could you clarify?

    if God is omnipotent, then he is capable of ensuring the reliability of his cognitive faculties. And, as a rational being, he would no doubt seek to do this. — GodlessGirl

    I agree, and I think this is an important thing to make explicit.

    So, when confronted with the claim that P(R/D*) is low, God could happily grant it but hold that he has no reason to accept D* he has no reason to think that he did not intervene to ensure that R holds for himself (since he is a rational being and is omnipotent). — GodlessGirl

    I'm familiar with Plantinga's argument (though the iteration I'm accustomed to gives the supposition that our cognitive faculties are geared towards the truth as K, I think R makes more sense); but I'm not sure what D* represents in your argument and don't see it defined. Same thing with O. What are D* and O?
  • Divine Hiddenness and Nonresistant Nonbelievers

    p1. If the round Earth exists, then "nonresistant" flat earthers would not exist.
    p2. "Nonresistant" flat earthers do exist.
    c. The round Earth does not exist.
    — 180 Proof

    I assume the reason this is different from OP is because the round earth isn't a person that desires people to know it's a round earth, isn't omnipotent/omniscient (so can't perfectly make that happen).

    The argument in OP is that if God desires people to know God exists, that God is omnipotent/omniscient, then non-resistent non-believers wouldn't exist (I am interpreting "nonresistent nonbelievers" as being people that are open to the idea of God existing if given sufficient evidence).
  • Approaching light speed.


    We call it "high noon" because of the high star formation rates, but there's still plenty of quenching especially at the "nearer" z (but that's the point, I end up making a lot of figures splitting into four redshift bins of equal comoving space against different metrics so you can kind of "watch" galaxies march towards quiescence under different definitions and with different metrics: sersic n vs. z, axial ratio vs. z, sersic n vs. axial ratio, UVJ in different redshift bins, SFR vs. compactness). I only wish it were possible to more easily cognize a higher dimensional plot so put more of them together in a single plot lol.

    I actually haven't had the pleasure to use ANY JWT data even for fun, I've been so busy with CANDELS. :( (They are lovely to look at, though!)

    Pleasure to meet you
  • Approaching light speed.



    Are you folks in astro? I'm graduating with an MS in astro in a matter of weeks (though starting PhD bridge... probably in the fall, I'm taking spring off). Right now I'm researching galaxy quiescence at 0.6 < z < 2.5 and hopefully publishing morphological metrics from CANDELS soon. Happy to see others at least with a cosmo background here
  • Are blackholes and singularities synonymous?


    This. Also, let's dispel the notion that black holes are "holes," they are clumps of degenerate matter that have overcome degenerate pressures. Once realized this way, it becomes easier to see why there isn't an actual, physical "singularity."
  • Does god's knowledge of propositions make him a contingent being?


    Well, in a sense, but I think there must have been propositions that God could not have created: for instance, that A = A for any A. God would have to be God, after all, in order to actualize propositions; yet He couldn't have actualized that one (logical self-identity) without putting the cart before the horse.

    I think it's slightly awkward to put it in terms of propositions though and could instead be commented on as properties.

    God can't both exist a se and have absolute sovereignty at the same time because God has a set of properties (such as being omnipotent, being a person, etc.) but couldn't have had anything to do with why God has those properties (He couldn't have chosen them) as it would put the cart before the horse. In order for God to decide on what properties to instantiate, God must already have properties such as the power to instantiate them and the knowledge of how to do that: so He couldn't have "created" those properties, they had to have already been there, and they had to have been there in a way that was outside of His control.
  • Introducing myself (always the most awkward post)
    Sorry, have been away for a bit since the semester has officially kicked off. I'm doing physics on the astro side.
  • Could we be living in a simulation?
    The main argument for living in a simulation is that simulated worlds would also simulate worlds such that a vast majority of worlds that exist would be simulated. I do not think it's possible to simulate a universe that's remotely the same size (and filled with the same amount of stuff) as a "parent" universe, so this complicates any kind of calculation that might be attempted: too many of the prior probabilities are simply inscrutable.
  • Is dark energy the outflow of dark matter from a universal black hole?


    Thanks for your welcomes!

    Well, I will try to keep the science a little more sane around here then (I know how it goes, I've been posting on a couple of other philosophy forums as well). At least whenever it falls within my purview anyway!
  • Same-Sex Marriage


    I'm in the US and I'm looking to get married some day (I am a lesbian). However, I have sometimes felt like marriage should be a personal affair for many of the reasons that you cite. I feel as though some of the legal aspects to marriage (involving things like visitation, inheritance, household taxes, etc.) should have some "marriage secular" equivalent and then leave the aspect of some kind of formal union up to people themselves altogether.

    For instance, I've had family members that had permanent roommates in their old age: not sexual partners, just "life partners," friends. Why should they get a different legal status if they just happened to be in a romantic relationship? It's kind of silly.

    So I think really the government should just stay out of marriage but give the same sorts of legal protections to those who want them ("married" or not) in some kind of reasonable way (e.g., in the case of a polyamorous marriage, someone that's better at policy than I can figure that out; but a group of people in a household that aren't "married" should be able to get the same sort of status).
  • Introducing myself (always the most awkward post)
    Welcome!Jamal

    Thanks, I'll keep that in mind! Also, this post is testing whether I understand the quotation system -- so nevermind it if it doesn't come out correctly, lol!
  • Is dark energy the outflow of dark matter from a universal black hole?
    Hi, I'm new to the forum. I'm a physics grad student, and some of my first research was to assist in constraining the dark energy using Type 1a supernovae at high redshift ranges.

    The title asks, "Is dark energy the outflow of dark matter from a universal black hole?"

    No, that wouldn't be right. Despite the term "dark" appearing in both terms, dark energy and dark matter don't have anything to do with one another. Dark matter is just a form of matter that is non-baryonic and that doesn't interact with electromagnetic radiation (because of this, it behaves very differently: it doesn't clump, for instance, because most clumping mechanisms depend on radiating energy away).

    Dark energy is a negative pressure (meaning it is repulsive): it has a negative equation of state (probably exactly -1, if it is a cosmological constant -- but we have only constrained it to <-0.6). If the universe is imagined to be like a fluid (an assumption that is apt), then there has to exist some kind of negative pressure in order to get a universe that looks like the one that we see. We just call that negative pressure "dark energy."

    (I'm trying to keep this within layman's terms, but for the more adventurous: we observe a universe that is isometric and homogeneous at scales above a few hundred Mpc but which is also apparently asymptotically flat. If we add up all of the energy densities of radiation, baryonic matter, and dark matter, we should see a universe that is not flat: in order to get a universe that's flat like the one that we see, there must exist an energy density with a negative equation of state. That's dark energy.)