Fine. I can see a benefit in making the AI's input explicit rather than covert. Lets's see what Jamal's thoughts are. — Banno

There is no fun in playing chess software at grandmaster level. Sometimes it's fun to set it at moron level so you can beat it and feel smart.

So, where I'm going with this is AM, artificial moronism. You have the software say stupid shit and you get to ridicule it and show it what an idiot it is.

I mean that does sound more fun than having it constantly winning every argument.

I know what you're thinking. This post is from an AM generator. Nope, it's truly from yours truly.

In my way of thinking, I just think philosophers don't belong in the lab and scientists don't belong where ever it is philosophers lurk. But to the extent someone suggests an impossibility can occur (as in, "hey guys, I just found an X that's ~X"), I suppose I'd need to see that walking contradiction. If it's there, I guess the scientist can stand smugly with his discovery while the philospher's head explodes.

Ah yes, the bullet-point, the evidence of ChatGPT at work. :smirk:

As to #1, I can intuitively understand that meaning would be internal and be attached to the symbol, as in, I am annoyed (internal meaning), so I roll my eyes (the symbol). What I don't get is why the internal meaning must be attached to a symbol. I am annoyed, so some internal listing of information passes before my homunculous. I'm reminded of the Terminator when he saw the data reveal before his eyes.

Additionally, Pinker doesn't need to convince me that his view is logical. He needs to show me a brain and where all these symbols are. He's not a philosopher seeking consistency. He's a scientist seeking empirical truth.

As to #2, Witt shows the private language argument incoherent.

As to #3, yes, there is an incompatibility in Witt saying X is impossible and Pinker saying X exists regardless of logical impossibility.

I would suggest Pinker abandon his ideosyncratic mentalese position (some computational model he pulled from his ass, surely not from a lab). I just don't understand why one would posit a private sub-symbol that computes and then attaches to a public post-symbol I can see. By mentalese, I would think he would mean the stuff that precedes the sub-symbol, the computation itself, not some strange layer of first symbol to follow a second symbol.

Whether mentalese is salvagable under any imaginable scenerio is a fair question, but I might agree at this point that the Pinker model is not sustainable.

I do see what you're saying, but look at Wittgenstein's comment:

"To the extent that I do intend the construction of an English sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak English."

That is, while you search for the correct Russian term to convey your emotion (which is not denied to exist), you do so with an understanding of how you must do that, as in, what the parameters are. You are working within a publicaly agreed upon set of rules. By analogy, it's like if you're playing chess (another Russian past-time), you create all sorts of ideas in your head about how you will attack or defend, but the underlying requirement is that you do so within the rules of that game. You can't just say you're going to kick the king off the board. That is not within your creative boundaries.

That "language" (and I'm into metaphor here) of the chessboard, as in "I'm thinking of moving Rook to a4 and then the Bishop to c3" is not considered a private language just becasue it's internal. Your actual physical move of the piece was your language. It's how you communicated your decision.

The point here is that when you searched for the move on the chessboard, you were necessarily searching within the rules of the game. If you had a private language, your move would be incoherent because no one would know what you meant to do by moving your piece. However, as everyone plays and watches one another, it becomes clear what language your are using. That is referred to as the "grammar" of the game. There can be no question though that you had some thought prior to making that move, but that thought had to be within the rules of the game and so it was therefore not private.

And that goes back to the Wittgenstein quote above. That you searched for a word in English presumed you spoke English.

In my opinion, this is quite controversial, since the very method of predicting future events based on hindsight is quite dubious. As we know, history develops in fits and starts, and some languages ​​that existed 1,000 years ago (and were even considered global) are no longer used at all. This point is important to emphasize. — Astorre

I concede to speculation, but trending of languages can be observed and general observations noted.

This observation is interesting, but it may be related not to a desire to simplify, but to the native speaker's language itself — Astorre

As I've noted, much linguistic change occurs as the result of the introduction of non-native speakers (of course there's internal drift (caused by all sorts of things) as well, but this really isn't meant to be an all inclusive conversation in linguistics, much of which goes well beyond what I know). That is, people who speak other languages mix up the prior language, trending toward elimination of differences, resulting in a less complex system for the new members of the community. That is, if suddenly we see great change to a previously stable language, we can expect that a good number of adults just arrived and they are all insisting upon using that language.

In my experience, I've noticed that expressing your thoughts in nuanced language is always slower than the thought itself. I like the flow of complexity and duration, because as I speak, I have time to think about what I'll say next. — Astorre

This is more specifically on topic with the OP. The critical distinction here is whether you are saying (1) you had a thought and it was in a primordial language, not something identfiable, but a constructed idea that had not yet seen language or (2) you had a full language that identified your thought but it was compressed and then you expressed it fully into complicated words and syntax. If you go with #1, you are arguing a mentalese. If #2, you are giving room for a Wittgensteinian analysis.

Ergo, language was simpler because times were simpler. There just wasn't much to talk about or perhaps even not much time to idly ponder the things the average person does today. — Outlander

Consider the number of cases in the following languages:

Modern English - 2
German - 4
Old English -4 or 5
Middle English - 2
Cherokee - 6
Mandarin - 0

A common cause for this simplification is the introduction of adult non-native speakers into language. Adults are poor learners of language and as diverse populations enter, the language corrupts through simplification, but, interestingly does not affect the ability of the language to convey information. This points to the fact that much of language serves functions other than direct communication of thought.

Any marker that comminicates one's ethnicity, country of origin, educational level, etc. serves sociological functions. It obviously matters greatly from an evolutionary perspective that I immediately know you were raised in Germany, you were born in Boston, that you were not formally educated, etc. Consider Cherokee, unless you are very adept at language learning, you will never convince a native speaker that you grew up on the reservation if you didn't because you'll never master the complexity of the language. You'll also never match their accent.

But this is all (an interesting) aside. My point wasn't to wander down the path of language evolution as much as to say that it's entirely possible that our internal language (and please don't confuse"private language" with "internal language" in the Wittngensteinian sense) bears limited resemblance to the full expressive language we use in public where we're trying to get others to understand us.

And Wittgenstein went to great lengths not to catagorize what a language is (as in requiring particular syntax or form), but only to require that it comport to a grammar, which he defines very liberally to mean that it follows rules within a particular community of speakers and is publicly confirmable.

I will concede of course to the speculative nature of AI's attempt at extrapolation of English in the year 3500. So you know, it could not reverse engineer from 2025 backwards simply because it's not possible to predict what arbitrary elements might have existed in a language over time and then fell out.

That's why you get the phenomenon of not being able to find "the right word". There's something there we can't say. Maybe a passage in a novel gets it, maybe a scene in a movie. Sometimes nothing. — Manuel

This very issue is discussed at length in Philosophical Investigations, starting at 335 and going to 339. The critical line comes at the end of 337 where my hand is, "To the extent that I do intend the construction of an English sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak English." That is, sure, you're word searching, but you must have an appreciation for the rules of the language game you play to even engage in the search. You might not know which chess move you'll make until you find it, but you necessarily searched within the confines of the rules.

If the mind computes symbolically, we'd be heading in support of Fodor and Pinker, and we really would have to conclude that all thinking is symbolic, linguistic, and indeed, algorithmic. — Banno

This comment suggests it matters how the brain computes things and lends support does it not to the idea that Pinker and Wittgenstein operate within the same sphere, which is to offer an explanation for how the brain uses language?

I see Wittgenstein"s objective is to show us how we use langauge in our everyday lives and clarify its limitations.

I sense a category error in throwing a cognitive scientist into the ring with a philosopher.

I agree generally that Pinker et al appear facially contradictory to Wittgenstein because they assert an a priori sort of linguistic underpinning while Wittgenstein is purely posteriori in outlook (he requires public usage for langauge to exist), but I don't think there is true contradiction.

Even if langauge emerges from symbol manipulation, that doesn't suggest private langauge can exist. Under my compressive language challenge, you can preserve Wittgenstein only if you deny that shorthand language is primordial, but you must insist it is full language, publicly confirmable to grammar rules.

If I think in Latin as the last Roman, I don't have a private language as long as it can be spoken in the common language among the people.

I think this is the essence of compressed language the idea of an in language as in an in joke between the parties partaking in communication with each other. — kindred

The idea is that all language is compressed, which is to say it's contextual, to degrees greater or lesser.

So briefly and dogmatically, mentalese as an innate, computational system is incoherent. — Banno

Perhaps "incoherent" is the proper term, but there's no suggestion that thoughts emerge without all sorts of unknowable brain processes. What is incoherent is how those pre-linguistic whatevers can "mean" something. Meaning requires use of the language I say this for @T Clark's benefit as well, so as to avoid some suggestion we're delving into neuroscience. The question is whether the neural goings on can have meaning without public use, and the answer per Witt is no.

The brain’s architecture (neural nets, not symbolic computation) supports this derivative view. — Banno

Let's say it didn't, and we discovered the mind computed symbolically, why would that matter? That seems problematic, as that would suggest Wittgenstein is only valid insofar as science reveals him to be, but I'd assert his claims are entirely non-science based..

This of course is the problem. Assuming all thought is verbal is clearly not right. — T Clark

No one suggests that though. The quote only says that there are not meanings outside language but the meaning is the language.

As I noted elsewhere, the answers to your questions are not philosophy, they’re science. — T Clark

This too is incorrect because if you look at what I said above, I made no reference to brains or neuroscience. We're defining terms: language and meaning.

Seems to me honestly a cavalier attitude. — boethius

Living on the edge, flying by the seat in my pants, relying upon the kindness of strangers.

I'm going to go out on a limb and predict the regulators will never come over and try to curb stomp our lemonade stand into the ground, nor will they seize our data and read your musings one day and herald you as a prophet for having tried to save us from ourselves.

At this point you talk to yourself, agreeing with your wisdom, while everyone else wonders why.

If you're sure it's pearls before swine, just accept our stubborn moroness.

Freedom of speech does pretty much exist in America, land of the free. — boethius

I mean it's probably safer in the US, but not worth the hassle for that added safety. It strikes me as overkill to make us bulletproof. It feels like you might be catastrophizing and overburdening.

In other words, if we do our best to be above board, we'll be fine in the UK.

That post was a cross-post, posted before you chastised me. :up:

Like an amalgam of everyone on TPF? Tempting though it is, my instinct is that the wider the range of data, the more it would approach a regular LLM like ChatGPT and lose its own point of view. — Jamal

You believe the posters here represent a cross section of the public at large?

I have asked ChatGpt to mimic me based upon its interactions with me, but it does a poor job. I'm much funnier. If @Banno wants a convincing mimic, no need to turn towards AI. I could do a fine job, but I'd quickly be outed. Again, I'm much funnier.

but I find myself wondering why you would need to. — Jamal

Well now, curiosity killed the cat didn't it?

Actually, I could see no need for the entire database. There've just been times when I enter a thread and it's on page 12 or so and I'm Johnny come lately and I'd like to review it, and I hate to say, then maybe I could use AI to summarize where we are so that I could pick up and enter the fray without being repetitive to what's already been said.

So I was more envisioning an individual thread data download feature.

Will the old data be downloadable and searchable off line? I always thought that would be a cool feature.

Otherwise, I'd like to know precisely what "lounge-like and not chat-like" means. — Jamal

I really don't know yet, so I think we probably just have to let things develop and see. I guess what I think of when I think of a chatbox is an ongoing text group conversation, where the comments are brief and move back and forth quickly. That does describe the Shoutbox as it currently exists, although the comments can become longer and more involved, sometimes being used as a place to test out discussions as opposed to starting a thread. It's the longer conversations I wonder if will get lost under a chatbox feature. But, as you're describing the chatbox, it sounds like it might not have the limitations I've brought up.

The role of the Shoutbox has been discussed in the past (as in putting it on the main page versus relegating it to the Lounge where it had to be searched out), with some seeing it as an important feature to build and maintain community and others maybe seeing it as too much a diversion from real philosophy. I fall obviously into the former group, and so as long as the new site maintains that, it's really not that important how it looks and feels.

I also know that nothing is ever set in stone and that if something isn't working we can always discuss it later and figure it out. The Shoutbox as it currently exists was actually a work around after we lost the chatbox feature available under the old software. Click on the Shoutbox and go to the first page and you'll see a discussion of how we were trying to create what we lost.

I also thought the layout from the old site was better in certain ways (although it had countless bugs and unreliability problems) because it showed the categories and the posts by recency by each category and not just everything at once. What happens under our current system is that if 10 people come up with new religion posts (for example), the main board is overwhelmed with that and it looks like that's the ony thing being discussed. If posts are divided by category, that doesn't happen because you can just not pay attention to those categories you're not interested in. I don't know if the new software addresses that or not though.

It sounds like there is not anything our current software can do that the new software cannot do. If that's correct, then we can not only fully replicate what we had, but we can also add to it.

I say this in response to @Outlander, who is concerned that the Shoutbox as we know it will necessarily disappear with the introduction of a live chatbox. I would think (or suggest) that if there were a desire to start a thread that was lounge-like and not chat-like, that could be done?

If the two turned out the same, there'd be no need for both, but if there were an important difference, maybe have both, but that to be determined as we go along.

We'd have married had we met.

What is your worldview? How do you justify your worldview? — Truth Seeker

Assuming the following to be true, "Man's search for meaning is the primary motivation in his life and not a "secondary rationalization" of instinctual drives.” ― Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning.

My worldview seeks to address that primary motivation. How is a microscope a better tool for that than religion?

Yeah. Granted, I think a society does value citizens who care about truth, but I don't think care for truth is incentivized in overtly material ways, such as by giving out money. — Leontiskos

I actually think that those whose driver is truth aren't incentivized by money anyway, or at least not to the point where that will keep them interested. Managers love those who work for the good of the world because their fulfillment comes from within and they're less interested in keeping score in terms of salaries, bonuses, job titles, corner offices, or whatever. The danger these people pose is that they end up with a disproportionate amount of responsibility and they'll be intolerant of a work environment that lacks respect or otherwise violates some value of theirs, which means they'll be needed but they'll have no loyalty to something perceived lacking virtue and there will be no way to keep them once those values no longer exist at the company.

A company built around those folks will take a massive hit when new management arrives and they'll start filing out the door.

The problem is who or what decides what we need? Do we need more content managers? Do we need more diversity officers? Do we need more oil drillers, do we need more art historians? The need for X is defined by the institutional structure of society. — Tobias

The invisible hand decides and provides.

In the US, do we have such a deficiency in academics and artists that we need to subsidize these industries in order to obtain more? My understanding is that we get far more philsophers (for example) than we need each year, leaving many highly qualified people without work.

So, setting aside the question of what a good capitalistic, socialistic, or even communistic country ideologically might be inclined to do, shouldn't we first decide if need more of X before we produce more of X?

But, if the question is whether I think we ought all get paid for what we do here (research, discuss, learn), then of course. I've been here like 10 years, and still no paycheck. The problem of course is that I keep showing up, and they won't pay me if I'm going to show up anyway. My guess though is that if I said I needed to get paid in order to keep showing up, I'd still not get paid.

Sorry for the late response. I overlooked this. I saw it and then read on where everyone is now trying to decide who's the better bigot.

My view of "rights" is that the word means something important and just reducing them to regular law loses an important distinction. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a law, but even if it weren't, we still understand the right to be treated equally predates 1964. We don't say the same thing regarding the Trump tax changes, as if the right to certain write offs existed before they were passed.

We (the US and it's ilk) have a hybrid church/state system, which is an Enlightenment contrivance, designed to end theocracratic rule but to otherwise compromise by allowing continued appeals to heaven. You either look at this compromise as protecting the sacred or just a pragmatic annoyance to appease those still clinging to their Bibles.

My point: The rights you shun are those remnants of theocratic rule, where the distinction between law and morality didn't exist. All came from God. Your position is the final cleansing of the divine from the system, leaving us with nothing but laws, written declarations of men and women.

My position is the full collapse into the secular isn't in order, but there is something morally commanded, and should the lawmakers legislate its opposite, the positive law will violate the natural law and should not stand.

Intertwining the moral with the law is not just a bothersome vestige from our past, but exists because it retains independent value worth preserving.

Why do you think prioritizing belief over science in this situation is rational? — ucarr

Vaccine avoidance isn't typically based upon religious objection, but upon a misunderstanding of science. That is, they think they are being scientific, but they're not.

But there are real examples of true foolishness, like those who would die instead of getting a transfusion. That is a matter of choice in the sense they're living up to their ideals, but I can't accept any moral system that allows for unnecessary death.

My view is that there are many instances where belief in God offers greater meaning than without and there will be no negative consequences as might exist at extremes.

But there is a flip side to this. Religion can be therapeutic, meaning it could save lives (particularly addicts), which would suggest truth can be an impediment to happiness.

In the above, are you articulating a type of pragmatism? — ucarr

I am.

If you are linking religious value with practical results, is it not necessary for you to embrace truth value propositions pertinent to achieving goals systematically by rational means? — ucarr

You'll have objectively measurable results to determine if you've met your subjective goals, which would not necessarily mean accepting truths (particularly those with weaker levels of proof) damaging to your personal well being.

For example, if evolutionary theory leaves me in a state of despair by relegating me to the level of ordinary animal and its rejection offers me greater meaning in my life, I am rational to reject it.


It would not be rational if my values require acceptance of scientific truth no matter what, but we have to accept our values are choices. If I were an evolutionary biologist, my rejection of evolution's truth becomes more complex, but if I'm satisfied maintaining dissonance, and compartmentalizing my beliefs leads to my happiness, then that is a rational decision by me.

Subordinating truth to value is a valid worldview and is no less rational than a scientific one that does the opposite.

Objectively judged"? What is that?
A "positive lifestyle"? What is that? It really depends on whom you ask. The various religions do not agree on what exactly a "positive lifestyle" is. Nor on what makes for "objective judgment". — baker

It's the basis for all social decisions we make. Why do we pass some laws and not others? Why do we build some buildings and not others?

Your asking how we decide (as in what is our specific calculus) to live a preferred life misses the point. My point is that we decide whether to be religious for the same reasons we decide to do anything that achieves our goals. Choosing to live in a way that accepts a reduced significance for human value is a choice, even if it's justified upon valid scientific grounds. Doing what is most consistent with scientific grounds is a choice and is not a requirement. That goes to my original statement. The value of religion is not rooted in the scientifically arrived at truth values of its claims.

One thing I've consistently observed in religions, theistic and atheistic ones, and especially in the ones that aim to make adult converts, is that they operate by the motto, "Talk the talk and walk the walk", whereby the talk and the walk are usually two very different things. — baker

I don't follow the relevance. There are some horrible religions, horrible governments, and horrible people. Let's even assume every religion bar none is horrible, leading to misery and sadness. That still has zero impact on my position, which is that the value of religion is based upon its outward manifestations. As in, does it lead to a happier more productive person and society. If it does not, it should be rejected. If you can show that the religious life is empty and sad, then let's rid ourselves of it. If you can't, then don't.

What this means is simply that if Joe Blow finds great meaning and value in his religion and he has a community and friends he has built around it, all to their mutual satisfaction and happiness, it would not be a valid basis to dismantle it due to the fact it's claims are false. That is, whether there is a god up high as Joe Blow preaches is wholly irrelevant to whether the religion is of value.

My comments are responsive to the general atheistic claim that projects the idea upon the religious that the primary purpose of sacred text and religious life is at all the same as science, which is as a tool to study the mundane. Religion does delve obviously into origin stories, but those must be judged (again) on how well they provide for a meaningful life by their sanctification of humanity, not by their propositional truth value.

And just because his books were banned doesn't mean anything. The RCC also opposed general literacy and reading the Bible for a long time because it thought that the ordinary people could not properly understand it without proper guidance. — baker

His books were not generally banned due to concerns about limited literacy. They were officially and specifically banned for all readers because they were considered heretical. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Index_Librorum_Prohibitorum

Also, the Catholic Church never banned the Bible for anyone. They banned certain translations they thought inaccurate.

Descartes wasn't banned because Catholics just didn't like books generally. They chose him and others to ban, but still let people read other works.

He and his followers are responsible for the quasi-rationalistic approach to questions of faith and God. This man who made a point of inventing arguments through which atheists and Protestants were supposed to be convinced that the RCC is the only true church and religion. And somehow, the history of philosophy ate it all up, this Trojan horse. — baker

Maimonides attempted to offer a philosophicaly rational basis for specific religious revealed beliefs centuries earlier. Descartes' required a rational God who guaranteed rationality without reference to revelation. Making an argument that Descartes' writings were particularized to specific Catholic dogma presents him a priest of some sort. His comments were generalized, not the sort of thing you could claim of Maimonides, which were directed at presenting a rational basis for revelation.

Describing Descartes as a shill for the Catholic Church isn't historically correct either. He was at best guarded so as to not offend the Church, particularly being a contemporary of Galileo. Descartes' books were later banned and burned by the Church.

There is a modern annoyance among analytics with Descartes related to his metaphysical framings, but that's not a church/reason dispute.

Yet when theism is preached, it is always preached as a proposition with a truth value.


As a Jew, you don't relate to that, because Jews normally don't preach. But Christians and Muslims do preach. They make claims that they expect (demand!) that the people they are preaching to will accept as true. — baker

You can't acknowledge an exception and say "always." The best you can say is "mostly , " but then you'll have to start counting. Maybe we can say "sometimes." But a rabbi certainly believes he speaks absolute truth, so I don't see your distinction. I'll agree Jews and Christians prostelisze differently, but so do Baptists and modern Catholics. Jews do reach out to unaffiliated Jews, but only some (compare Chabad to Litvak).

Regardless, it misses my point. I described how religion is to be objectively judged for its value. That is, even if it fails a correspondence theory of truth, if it advances a positive lifestyle, then it can have positive value.

You might say it fails in that regard as well, which also would miss my point, and it would be agreeing with me. It'd be agreeing that the way religion is judged is by use, not upon its metaphysical correspondence.

Sad Socrates thrives (reason) whereas a Satisfied Swine merely survives (faith). — 180 Proof

Yeah, that's not at all how Mill seperated the higher and lower pleasures. It had nothing (as in zero) to do with epistemic methods. Moral concern was specifically among the higher. The virtue of religious practice would be measured by utility.

I agree with you. Religion should be a practice, a life-enhancing practice, and not a set of propositional metaphysical beliefs. If people look at belief in God and all its trappings as truth-apt propositions then the dangerous road to fundamentalism opens up. — Janus

Yes. Theism is not of the same category as science. The latter is but an empirical gathering tool, occasionally at odds with religious claims. The former an entire way of life.

There's no such thing. — 180 Proof

So atheism is no belief, just an empty set?

Also, whereas theism is a belief (either noncognitive or cognitive), religion is an institutional practice; and 'false hope to pacify false fear' (e.g. E. Becker's terror management) seems, as far as I can tell, the primary motivation for most persons throughout recorded history comforming to either or both of these complementary forms of life (i.e. traditions). — 180 Proof

Assuming that's a correct bit of psychoanalysis, how does it change what I said? A belief is not to be measured in terms of its truth value but in terms of whether it's a preferable form of life.

I'll accept the condescending. If Billy and the rest the world is happier by all measure in belief in Santa Claus, why tell them otherwise unless you think scientific truth adherence has inherent value? And this is a hypothetical, so you can't change the antecedent. It is assumed. That is, he and the world will not mysteriously be unhappier for some reason.

Unless you're willing to commit to my reasoning and thereby claim happiness is advanced by atheism and therefore preferable, then we'll be speaking past each other. So, if the real reason atheism is the best belief is because it makes us most happy, then let's stop submitting all these other reasons and instead advocate it in the market of ideas just like any other, showing how following your belief brings the joy unbeknown to the theist.

It's possible that the better part of the life of the theist isn't spent fretting over the epistemological differences between scientism and the various secular definitions of faith, but instead in practices and perspectives.

That is to say, the rationality of theism, like any behavior, is judged by the objectives it achieves. If your highest objective is to live your life according to the implications of science, even if that should mean accepting a certain level of meaninglessness foreign to a theist, then do that. It's not irrational to do otherwise though.

The atheistic belief that belief is the primary reason for religion and not behavior leads you guys down interesting little paths.

Theism is to be judged as a form of life, not as a proposition with a true value.

I read a good portion of it many years ago when I had access to a theological library. — Leontiskos

Amazon is my theological library.

They must have really small mountains where you live. They're just bumps. — frank

I live at the foothills of Mt. Everest and I'm going to level that fucker with a shovel. That is true faith. Belief in yourself.

Good memory. Actually I don't know what caused me to buy the Buber book, but maybe it was implanted long ago by you. Have you read it?