. My 1940 Family Law book holding family responsible for family, no longer applies. Have we made this social change with much thought? — Athena

This is an absurd re-writing of history, as if there were a time in the past when rigid bright lines divided the family and society, where only through aggressive invasion could the powerful state impose its will on the family and provide for it food, shelter, clothing, education, and other means of social assistance. There never has been this dichotomy, with society properly "out there" while the family worked its magic independently and efficiently, leaving us now to lament a wonderful lost past.

If you wish to argue that society at large is taking too large a role in what could better be handled independently by families, that might be a sustainable argument, but I don't think you have a point when you try to harken back to a time that never was prior to all this societal interference.

In truth, secularized society is a fairly new idea in itself, with prior interventions being made by religious institutions. Regardless, you're talking about a time that never was and are trying to advance the ideal of a rigid family/social distinction. Appreciate at least that your ideal is fraught with all sorts of problems, as it allows the unfortunate offspring of disadvantaged families to remain disadvantaged despite the many resources the greater society could be providing them. You need to ask yourself why you would want to perpetuate such a system that allows inherited disadvantage when it so easily remedied.

This is all to say it's a matter of degree, with how much social assistance each person receives for family matters as opposed to whether there should be any at all.

that be the case i think it's inaccurate to call him a fascist in the same sense that Hitler and Mussolini were fascist. — Wheatley

Yeah, but they were a bit hawkish.

Perhaps with a threat of economic sanctions because Americans care passionately about their economy. It's better than tempting another world war (supposing there is an up-rise of right wing nationalism). — Wheatley

Oh please. The EU fears US sanctions more than the US fears the EU. Trump, despite his many many many flaws is dovish, if for no other reason than he's protectionist.

2) It still seems very intriguing to consider my theory that a single book in an ancient language, containing only consonants, could be many books all at once, each book emerging from the same text by using the correct vowel permutation. Perhaps there's a key in these texts itself. — TheMadFool

If you're looking for a deep religious reason for why no vowels in the OT, see: https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/3087993/jewish/Why-No-Vowels-in-the-Torah.htm

Choose to buy into that as you see fit.

BTW there are other ways of indicating vowel sounds in writing, without using separate letters. I think modern Hebrew does this, though I'm not sure. — jamalrob

Not just modern Hebrew, but the vowel marks have been in existence for over a 1,000 years. For example, the word for dog is (spelled right to left) "כלב", which does not contain vowels. An exact transliteration would be KLV. However, if you added the vowels, it would look like this: כֶּלֶב, with those dots indicating it should be pronounced kelev. The dot on the inside of the backward "c" looking letter indicates it is pronounced like a K as opposed to that throat sound you hear in Hebrew, without which you wouldn't actually know how it is to be pronounced. It's sort of like the C in English, which is sometimes an S and sometimes a K (although the French use the C with the cedilla ç to clarify). Our G and J can be ambiguous as well, but that rarely poses any confusion for the native speaker.

Even consider words like "thought" (and countless others) that are not phonetic, and even some Asian languages that are not phonetic at all, yet are easily read and spoken by native speakers. The point being there is nothing unusual about a written language not directly representing the sounds of the words when spoken.

When Hebrew is written among speakers, they don't use the vowels because it's not necessary to be understood. For example, here is a Hebrew version of a newspaper and it does not contain any of those vowel marks: https://www.haaretz.co.il/ When they choose to insert them and when not, I'm not sure, but I would assume the less sophisticated writings would be more likely to include them, considering it can be generally understood without them.

saw a black dog on the sidewalk, lying down but trying to move get up. It was disturbing. On closer examination it turned out to be a black plastic back being moved by a breeze. It was a strong resemblance until once examined, it was not. — Bitter Crank

I saw a dog beside a child outside a store and asked if his dog would bite. He said he wouldn't.

I pet the dog and he bit me.

"You said your dog wouldn't bite!"

"He's not my dog. "

Sometimes you hear things and they're not what you thought you heard.

My life feels like it's falling apart around me — ArguingWAristotleTiff

That means you must be standing firm.

The game of life" refers to a cellular automaton created by John Horton Conway. Since you are obviously not talking about the cellular automation, nobody really knows what you are talking about. — Wheatley

That's what you think of when you think of the game of life? We must have had very different childhoods.

Back to the twenty first century, we are seeing more people break away from religion, and from my point of view, there is less religious talk. And instead of talking about souls, many of us are talking about our lives (at school or at work, for example). Which is more in line with twentieth century existential thought rather than traditional concepts of souls. — Wheatley

An atheist can be as or even more concerned about the future of humanity as a theist. Focusing on the here and now can also be the interest of the theist.

I at least own goats. @Shawn just chose a random mascot.

The point I'm generally making here (and this goes for Hanover as well) is that no-one assumes all of their models are exact representations of an external reality, and no-one assumes none of them are. The choice over which we behave as if were true and which we approach with uncertainty is a psychological issue, not a philosophical one. — Isaac

You say this as if your responding to something I've said.

More importantly, whether a person will have a fundamentally positive outlook on life or not appears to be beyond a person's immediate control. It appears to be something that one must be born or raised with, but isn't something that can be learned later on in life. — baker

So he must be he and I must be me? Why seek to move the immovable with this thread then?

Anyways, no this isn't about me not cleaning the dishes or wanting to do "my fair share.." The whole point is that it is unjust to be put in a situation where you cannot opt out unless you die of depredation or suicide.. Hence I said (predicting your free rider snark): — schopenhauer1

Your point is that life isn't fair?

As to the OP, being anti-work isn't wrong if all you mean is you gripe about work. Hearing people gripe is annoying and I"d rather see you figure a way to a better job so I don't have to hear it, but being a complainer by itself isn't immoral.

But if you mean you are capable of contributing to your own care and even perhaps contributing some amount to others, but choose to be more a burden than need be, yeah, you suck and are therefore immoral.

If you're the guy who waits for others to clean his dishes, and we all do have dirty dishes, you're not the roommate any of us want, especially if you try to justify your sloth philosophically.

1. people always act in their own interest. — stoicHoneyBadger

Some people are self-sabotaging, suicidal, and are terrible stewards of their lives and all that is important to them. They don't always do this thinking they're doing right, but many probably know that the next drink, the relationship they're about to embark upon, or the punch they're about to throw probably isn't in their best interest. I've made knowingly stupid decisions and would not have wasted anyone's time trying to justify what I did later as being what I thought was going to do me best.

It's both. Vague propositions often don't have a single truth value, precisely because they're vague. — Michael

A vague proposition that is so vague that it doesn't have a truth value isn't a proposition. A propositional statement is defined as a statement with a truth value that is either true or false. https://penandthepad.com/propositional-statement-6943651.html

If no statements, as you've argued, have single truth values, then no statements are propositional. That is the result of removing the truth component from the equation. If I say "The hat is green" and I cannot define what a hat is, what it is to exist, and what green is, then I've said nothing about the world and not asserted a propositional statement.

My token identity is maintained, despite the flux of my physical body, by the way I think and talk about myself (and the way others think and talk about me). I'm the same person that was alive 20 years ago because that's how I think and talk about myself. That's anti-realism — Michael

How do you know that your memories and consciousness aren't also in flux? That you believe you have maintained a constant experience of your consciousness from childhood until today may or may not be objectively true, especially considering the many distractions and sleep states you've been in that have interrupted that consciousness. That is, it is no more a forced delusion for me to claim that I'm the same string of consciousness today than what I was since childhood as it is for me to say that I'm the same physical component today than what I was since childhood.

Whatever undefined thing that lingers in your brain that keeps your consciousness stable throughout life seems no more or less incorruptible and absolute than your DNA that keeps your corporeal composition stable.

It just seems like you've removed objective reality from the equation as the anchor for truth and replaced it with objective consciousness, but I don't see why the latter avoids the problems of the former.

Yes, I would have thought so. Hence my question - is any precedence for the view that one sentence can have two truth values? — Banno

There was the philosopher who came here and argued such a thing. Is this the guy? https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/

We don't start by defining "ship" according to some strict criteria and then use it in conversation. Rather we talk about a ship leaving, a ship returning, and then assess whether or not the two are the same (and then possibly derive the meaning of "ship"). — Michael

We do have strict criteria, which is why we can use the term meaningfully. Only when we use the term in a way previously unintended do we run into these challenges.

And what we do for ships isn't what we do for everything. We define "firearms" in a fine tuned sort of way, especially where the law says "no firearms allowed." The specificity demanded is context dependent and not always the same.

We all agree that the material has changed but the function remains. — Michael

If we can't agree as to what is a ship, why can we agree as to what is material and to what is functionality? Are holustic objects the only thing we can't agree upon, but we can agree upon their attributes?

something new, is seems - at least to me: that a statement can be assigned more than one truth value. — Banno

A statement with 2 truth values is 2 statements.

"The ship that left is the ship that returned" is true if we define "ship" in terms of functionality. It is false if "ship" is defined as that which contains all the same boards.

X=X always. As long as we maintain definitions, we don't have this absurd result of X=Y and X<>Y.

doesn't require a narrative description, but your example of a person being both young and old is a good example. "Young" and "old" don't have a clearly defined age-range. Is someone who's 40 young or old? A 10 year old and an 80 year old will likely disagree, and as a young-at-heart 33 year old I'm on the fence. But it doesn't make sense to say that one of them must be wrong, or that I must commit to one side or the other (which would be the case if the principle of bivalence holds). — Michael

This isn't a rejection of bivalence. This is just pointing out certain words are vague. If the law were only old people are allowed to enter and old is defined as over 40, then that's just a clearer form of language.

What you're getting at is much more than this. You're claiming that what a 40 year old is cannot be determined because there is no single truth value to the statement "a 40 year old is X."

doesn't. If you say that it's the same ship and I say that it's not the same ship then it's not that one of us is right and one of us is wrong. — Michael

That means it has no truth value, not that it has a true and false value. Is it a non-propositional statement, like "Hello there!"

The ship that leaves is the ship that returns. — Michael

It has but one truth value unless you've got an equivocation fallacy. "Ship" must vary in meaning in order for "the Ship is X" to be true and false in differing contexts. Or, are you saying "X and not X" is not a contradiction?

Anti-realism argues that truth isn't recognition-transcendent and/or truth isn't bivalent. Realism argues that truth is recognition-transcendent and bivalent. — Michael

Provide an example of a statement that is both true and false. Are you saying within exact contexts and with exact definitions the same statement can be both true and false?

Right. So in what cases does the dubious know-ability of reality come in to play? Is it a model you often use to counter the argument of your fried Bob, that he can fly to the moon? I'd wager no. It's a model used to counter the argument of Bill that he can lift 170kg if he believes he can. "No, your belief doesn't make something real, you either can lift 170kg or you can't" Of course you may already know about the placebo effect and so not counter this way, but this is about the effects you don't know, not the ones you do. — Isaac

If your point is that there is minimal practical import to the questions posed in this thread, I think it's obvious that most navigate the world successfully without philosophical contemplation at all, particularly without ever challenging fundamental assumptions about reality. What this means is that the answer to your specific question is that I would respond to Bob whether he could fly to the moon in the way we all would in the normal world, but if he were posing the question in this thread as it related to challenges to realism, I would point out that we must first establish the correlation between perceptions and reality before discussing the moon and the physical properties he believes he has deciphered from his perceptions.

In any event, your argument is the "appeal to the stone" fallacy which was named after the following event:

"After we came out of the church, we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus."

— James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appeal_to_the_stone

The ship leaves port. The mast is replaced, then the keel; the various planks of the hull are replaced. At each step something is taken and something replaced. Take out the word "objective" and it's clear that the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" is made true by features of the world. — Banno

This raises an interesting point to @Michael's claim. If we replaced each plank one at a time, but with planks dissimilar enough from the original that the ship returned an airplane, we'd be hard pressed to call it the same boat. The material composition then matters, which means that external reality is critical for identity.

If we commit to the idea that the ship is the same ship even when it's a plane just because we continue to call it a ship, we are left with the odd result of an airplane being a ship.

But, consider the caterpillar. Is it now a butterfly or do the two not share any identity? Why do catterpillars maintain identity through their metamorphosis but not boats that turn into airplanes?

I do take Michael's position to be substance doesn't define an object but only words do, leaving the question of composition irrelevant. I'm still left with the question of what is the composition of this entire enterprise, as in what substance allows us to make these definitions in the first place.

And the anti-realist will say that this is how our everyday conversions work. The anti-realist's position is an accurate representation of truth and statements as we ordinarily use them and the world as we ordinarily understand it. — Michael

There is a belief among ultra-religious Jews that the name of a person defines the person in a particular way. I suppose this comes from the fact that within the Bible certain characters have their names changed when major events occur in their lives. Jacob, for example, became Israel when he wrestled with an angel. So in current day ultra-orthodoxy a treatment for the dying is to change their name as that will change the person.

Anyway, was Jacob the same person after he was named Israel or the sick person the same person after he was renamed if the community of meshuggenehs all think he's changed identities.

But I've made this point already, I just thought I'd do it with a citation this time. — Isaac

I miss your point. I've not argued for naive realism. It was very far from it. I argued for reality mediated by perceptions, with an assertion there was an objective underlying reality that was dubiously knowable. To hold otherwise is anti-realism, which sounds like idealism of a sort. I also don't follow how the placebo effect disproves naive realism even if it were held. Typically the direct realists argue from a linguistic or pragmatic perspective and tend to be anti-metaphysical.

Anyway, maybe I misunderstood your post.

This "metaphysical definition" is useless then. The ship becomes a new ship every instant, atoms rubbing off in the wind or water, electrons absorbing photons from the Sun, etc. And it's still not entirely clear which material stuff is referred to when you talk about "the ship" in this metaphysical sense; there's no objective cut-off point that says that this particle is part of the ship and this particle is just passing by. — Michael

If the world is in the flux you suggest, then are you asserting a lack of identity of any object without a perceiver?

@Srap Tasmaner@Michael

Do you guys think it would be possible to match your avatars even closer just to make this more confusing?

On the one hand we have the realist who says that statements are made true by objective features of the world, but what objective features of the world must obtain for the ship that leaves to be the ship that returns? Presumably that the mind-independent material stuff that leaves is the mind-independent material stuff that returns. Which in this case doesn't obtain, and so the realist must commit to "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" being false. However that might not be a commitment the realist is willing to make, and so they must accept an anti-realist account of "the ship that leaves is the ship that returns" being true; that it's true because we think of the ship that leaves as being the ship that returns. — Michael

The realist does commit as you've said they would (and as I've bolded). The realist defines the ship as the specific matter that was there originally because he's offering a metaphysical definition within the context of that conversation. That is, the ship is exactly what it is.

In the vernacular however, "the ship" is a social construct, subject to whatever definition the speakers want it to have. We call it the same boat because it maintained a sense of apparent identity through time and continued its same function. Regardless of why we keep calling it the same name has no metaphysical impact. We're just identifying something consistently because we happen not to care what its material composition is through time for our definitional purposes.

So, yes, the ship (defined as a ship of material composition X) that leaves is not the ship that returns, but the ship (defined as a boat that serves the same function through time) that leaves is the ship that returns.

As long as we know what we mean by "ship" and don't equivocate, this can remain clear.

So truth is only --- not even "also" but "only" --- a matter of our choices.

That's not much of a realism. It looks like idealism + "Oh yeah, and there's some stuff, I guess." — Srap Tasmaner

This is consistent with my comment to @Banno, which was was:

What part of the planet do you propose is restricted by the world? — Hanover

Maybe my point was missed or not well stated, but it asks how does reality restrict anything we do, perceive, or believe? We can say it does, but exactly how? How does the noumenal affect the phenomenal? Maybe not at all, but somehow?

This is the quandary, and there isn't an adequate answer, thus leaving philosophers with plenty to talk about forever and ever.

Our choices: (1) idealism and just declare everything is just imagined, and then are left wondering what causes us to imagine in such a way, (2) direct realism and declare the world is just as we see it to be, ignoring the fact the different beings perceive in different ways, or (3) indirect realism, declaring we can interpret reality, but we have no idea how that interpretation is consistent with reality.

The other solution here is to ignore things as they are, admitting that such is an impossible inquiry and then to talk about word games, pretending that ignoring the problem resolves the problem. Or maybe pragmatism, which asks why even ask when we're going to do what we're going to do anyway.

Does it? As I brought up the Ship of Theseus then let's consider that. The ship that leaves is the ship that returns but the material that leaves isn't the material that returns, therefore the ship isn't the material.

Or would you commit to saying that the ship that leaves isn't the ship that returns, which it would appear the realist must. If so, then how much of the material is the "true" substance of the thing? If only half the parts are replaced does it remain the same ship? A quarter? A tenth? — Michael

Whatever of the same returns is what returns. If a single atom of the old boat returns, then we have a single atom of the old boat.

Whether you wish to call the boat Theseus isn't a metaphysical question. If I have a jar of 100 marbles that I call "Tommy" and I replace 99 of them with new marbles, whether I still have Tommy is a definitional question, not a metaphysical one. What I can say is that I have one original marble. If we decide I no longer have Tommy, we haven't defined that single marble out of existence to where we can now say since Tommy is dead there's nothing left of him.

Whether those marbles are Tommy isn't the question. Which marbles might exist is the question, and if you want to call them Tommy or not isn't part of that question.

We split up the world into so-called objects, on such a view, and thus all statements that presuppose there being multiple objects are strictly false, just a manner of speaking. — Srap Tasmaner

That we split the world into arbitrarily assigned objects doesn't challenge the fact that there is external existence. Any object and any particle theoretically can be subdivided and grouped with other objects, but there is something in existence and we can choose to grab an arbitrary bunch of that stuff and call it X.

X designates what is in existence, but assigns no particular property to that existnece.

What makes Pluto one thing, and not trillions of different things? What we call "Pluto" is "really" a mass of particles in close proximity. Which of those particles are part of Pluto, which are part of some separated rock, which are a passing photon from the Sun? — Michael

Existence is not an attribute or property of an object.

To say an object exists is different from saying an object has certain properties. Pluto exists as a random allotment of particles (and the particles in themselves are also a random allotment of smaller particles, thus an infinite regress). Whether Pluto is a planet is a question about what specific properties we assign to the term "planet" and whether the object of Pluto has them.

In the event of a prolonged shut down, Defcon 1 would be declared and TPF would execute its Emergency Readiness Protocol. Rest assured, the mods and admins here are committed to philosophical interaction regardless of circumstance.

Cheers. Hence my puzzling about direction of fit. Consider Srap's planet example - what counts as a planet is imposed on the world, and yet restricted by the world. That same process is in place for maths. and perhaps for ethics. — Banno

What part of the planet do you propose is restricted by the world?

We could look at ancient Athens, employ our abstraction, and say that there are buildings there; but those are not buildings in the same way that our buildings are buildings, are they? — Srap Tasmaner

I'd say there are things and there are categories. Pluto was a planet, then it was not, but it was always there. All sorts of criteria must be met for us to call Pluto a planet and we can choose those criteria for whatever purposes we have, but Pluto remains regardless of what we call it and regardless of what category we assign it. That I take to be the fundamental tenant of realism. There is an independent substance sustaining the thing; otherwise the thing exists as a pure construct of our imagination.

Moral realism requires that good and bad exist, just as Pluto exists, but good and bad don't exist in just the form that planets exist. That is, I can decide if Pluto is a satellite or a planet, but I can't decide it's not there. Pluto exists whether there are people to categorize it or define it.

Moral realism posits goodness and badness at the ontological level. It claims that it is the moral that is real (ergo "moral realism"), not just what we happen to call it. So, rape is bad. It doesn't become bad depending upon our purposes. That goodness and badness exist outside of us, offering it a place in reality, apart from our imagination.

To state otherwise, I contend, leaves us in a subjective state of morality, which is what you either accept or you accept what I've stated above. Both are fairly difficult to swallow, to be sure, because moral relativism and subjectivism require an admission that abhorrent acts are bad until we decide they're not. Moral absolutism is bizarre in that it has concepts floating about, truly existing, seeking a god to hold them firmly in his bosom.

If nothing else, God's Bosom is a pretty good name for a punk rock band.

No, I'm not saying that bad buildings are akin to bad acts. As I said above, I'm saying that the use of the word bad is not always subjective, it depends on what our point of reference is.

I do, believe rape is bad or morally wrong because of the objective nature of the harm done. It's just as objective, in my view, as the existence of the building. And ya, rape is bad regardless of what anyone thinks. — Sam26

This is moral relativism.

A building is "bad" if it does not fulfill its purpose, contextualized to the needs of the person building the building. The key here is that the "bad" judgment of the building is relative entirely upon human needs. A building designed to collapse under minimal strain for experimental purposes is a good building under that context, but if it fails to fail, it is bad. We can agree then, it's a matter of context when talking about good and bad buildings. We judge the building based upon pre-agreed criteria, and once those criteria are agreed upon, we can be objectively right or wrong in saying whether those criteria are met.

It's the criteria that aren't objective here, and that's the problem I'm pointing out. The criteria are relative to our needs and possibly arbitrary.

Turning to moral realism: Rape isn't bad relative to the needs of society. It's absolutely bad. It is bad not like the Leaning of Tower of Pisa is a bad building. It is bad like the Leaning Tower of Pisa is over 50 feet tall. It's just part of reality that rape is bad. That's what moral realism means. If you want to say that reality is entirely subjective, created by humans for humans, that's not realism, that's idealism. If you want to say that what we designate as morally bad is a human creation, that isn't moral realism either. That's subjectivism.