I don't think it's a euphemism exactly, although maybe some use it that way. It's supposed to be a broader category than autism, to include ADHD, dyslexia, hyperlexia, savantism etc. — bert1

But all of those conditions refer to conditions that are generally thought of disadvantageous, where you could make an argument that Einstein was neurodivergent or someone who was particularly creative would be as well. Something can be said regarding people in this forum in terms of the thought processes being significantly (in a statistical sense) deviating from the norm. It just depends upon what aspect of one's neural processing you're looking at.

But it's hard to think of medical concept of disability that is normatively neutral. If you just define 'disability' as statistical outliers without making a judgement, then gingers are disabled. — bert1

I guess the issue is that the word "normal" is not normatively neutral, but it designates someone who is appropriate in some respect.

All of these misuses occur in the medical model of disability. — Banno

Words like "abnormal", "strange," and "deviant" contain negative connotations, but for our purposes we need a word that avoids that so that we can discuss those that simply diverge from the way most are. The term "neuro-divergent" is a word that has become euphamistic for autistic, and so despite it being a euphamism, it has picked up a connotation of someone who thinks differently in a way that challenges them socially. However, I heard someone insist that gifted children be considered neuro-divergent, which is not a typical use of that word, but it makes sense, given those children do think differently than their classmates. This just points out the difficulty in creating language truly intended to be neutral. We might just be inherently judgmental creatures and so purely neutral language offers us little use.

The response from Hegelians is the ongoing dialectic. But all this amounts to is our acknowledging that our responses are never compete, that the task and the discussion are ongoing. — Banno

I've found myself less and less dialectical of late. It arises out of my theological bent, where I feel the need to leave science in the lab and religion in the chapel, without any real need to figure out how they can mesh to a higher truth, but instead to give them each their time. It's like visiting divorced parents. You care for them both, you visit them both, but you don't put them in the same room.

The deeper problem here is that you're just appealing to your Moorean meta-ethic where 'good' (or 'special') is undefinable and therefore, if admitted, also mystical and esoteric. So you think that it must be impossible to explain why babies are special (or why anything at all is good), and that if someone does this then they must have said something wrong (hence trying to misconstrue what I've said counterfactually into something that is merely contingent and therefore less plausible). It also follows from this that "you can say whatever you want" (because everyone's claims about the 'good' and also the 'special' are basically unjustifiable anyway). — Leontiskos

It's really not that complex. I'm simply pointing out that your definition of specialness isn't valid because it doesn't work when you evaluate specific examples.

Why we think human beings are special (which seems to refer to a "personhood" definition) can't be determined by some speculative historical analysis nor some post hac explanation. Norms are derived (whether they be moral, legal, basic manners, accepted social protocol) through complex social interaction over thousands of years, not necessarily reducible to a single guiding principle and not even necessarily consistent at any given time given the large amount of individuals involved and time that has transpired.

Of course an anthropologist can examine homo sapiens and describe their language skills, tool using skills, ability to plan for the future, learning abilities, etc. and point out how we're different from the other animals both in degree and type. You can't then use those observations and just declare that we must have created our moral systems based upon that. That is, just because we are different in ability doesn't mean that was the cause of our belief in our moral worth.

The reason you can't is because there are infants that don't have any advanced ability, plenty of cultures historically have held that slaves, women, and certain ethnicities are not of "special" status, and many cultures do not accept Enlightenment principles that "all men are created equally."

You also have no explanation for how embryoes work into your definition, being forced to declare it "silly" that some might not hold embryoes the same value as adults even though they have the potential to become adults. That is, your position isn't even fully accepted within modern society.

So, if I look at the here and now and ask why it is that infants are special, it's because we decree it so. It is a rule that governs our society regardless of where it came from. You can argue the origin of that rule came from certain principles and I can argue it came from God, but all that is an aside because mine is unprovable and yours is empirically invalid. I take mine as more valid because it doesn't pretend to be empirically derivable, but it is clearly axiomatic. It is axiomatic thelogically and secularly. Secularly, it is a principle upon which we have built our society, and enforced it as a non-debatable norm. Kantian dignity and secular humanism demand this principle as do Enlightenment principles of equality, historically responsive to tyranny and hierachical classism. You're just pretending to know why we've ended up where we are and have offered an overly reductive basis, as if we can explain all assignment of moral worth upon humanity to the fact that human ability is greater so we therefore assign humans higher moral worth.

As I've said, the facts are not with you. Humans have always had greater ability, but they've not always considered all humans of greater moral worth, and there are even some now that in the animal rights arena that challenge whether any humans have greater moral worth than other animals.

Oh, it definitely is. I should know: I'm the one who wrote it. Even in a grammatical sense the sentence is a counterfactual. You're starting to sound like Michael. — Leontiskos

Here's the quote:

And yet an infant does none of the things you itemize, but it's still special. What makes it more special is that its worth is not tied to what it does, but what it is.
— Hanover

You:

What it is is precisely something that will grow to be able to do those things. — Leontiskos

You're telling me an infant is special because it grow to do those things. But what of those that don't?

That's a counterfactual claim. I am talking about a world where babies never mature into human adults. — Leontiskos

No, it's not a counterfactual and not a strawman. You provided criteria for personhood (specialness), which if it can be shown certain humans don't possess, then you must either (1) admit humans are not special, or (2) admit your criteria are wrong.

Infants do not possess the criteria you itemized for specialness. You then said that since they will one day have that criteria, then that potential is sufficient for calling them special.

My point is not that there is a possible world where no infant grows up, so the counterfactual/hypothetical world disproves your position, but it's that right this second in this very world there are infants born that we know will never mature, never have any significant mental or physical capacity, and never do any of the things you claimed made humans special.

So why hold those beings of no current or future meaningful ability or utility special?

I took your concern to be disability ought be considered an interplay of person upon environment, focusing more upon the deficiencies in the environment than the person. Under this model, we view the environment needing modification and correcting, leaving challenges to dignity of the person undisturbed. This requires we recalibrate the conceptual, pointing to the deficient environment, not the person.

"Normal" talk seemed to smuggle back in judgment of the person, endangering calling some people abnormal and then figuring out what needed be done to normalize them.

That then led us to ask "what is it to be "normal" anyway?" I think that's a tangential rabbit hole to go down. As long as we don't attribute worth to normality, the issue of normality remains only a statistical consideration for the engineer who wants to build a sidewalk ramp as accommodating to as many as possible.

We can recognize that our definition of disability is imperfect where it speaks only of environmental deficiency and not of human deficiency, and we can insist upon such a definition without being disosant just because our goal isn't definitional perfection. Our goal is promotion of Enlightenment happiness. How we refer to people and how we think of people matters in how we treat people, and so if the achievement of better "doing" is served, that is sufficient whether we've sorted out the dozens of varieties of normalness.

Then you are committed to the claim that if human babies did not ever grow into human adults they would have the same value as they do given the current state of affairs, which is absurd. — Leontiskos

What gives human babies inherent value is their current status as humans, not that the majority of human babies go on to be adults or even that the expectation is that they will be adults.

It's not absurd to attribute humanity to babies unconditionally, refusing to accept your criteria that personhoid requires certain abilities either immediately or eventually.

Your position also demands that an embryo is a fully protected person, having the fully expected eventual attributes of a person. That is a position you can take, but its opposite can't be waved away as absurd. Your position is also inconsistent with traditional right to life positions in that it grants person status to embryos, not because of what they are, but what most embryos have the potential to be, even if we know this particular one may never be.

I also don't know what you make of the mentally incompetent person, who lacks your personhoid criteria and who will never achieve it, having personhood perhaps because his brothers and sisters had it.

What it is is precisely something that will grow to be able to do those things. — Leontiskos

Unless it won't, yet it still will have the same value.

The best way to determine the meaning of "normal" is to evaluate its use over as many contexts as possible and statistically determine its most common usage.

Fortunately, ChatGPT already does that for us.

Stay weird my friends.

I don't know of any other species which uses language, composes poetry, mathematizes the physical universe, develops vehicles to fly around within the atmosphere and even beyond, develops traditions which last for thousands of years and span civilizational epochs, and worships God. If humans aren't special then I don't know what is. — Leontiskos

And yet an infant does none of the things you itemize, but it's still special. What makes it more special is that its worth is not tied to what it does, but what it is.

Is this such a bad thing? — Banno

No, but I wasn't arguing it was a bad thing as much as I was saying we were agreeing with the happiness principle.

This said, I actually agree with Banno on the restriction on enforced surgery. I think consent is fundamental. — AmadeusD

All of this implies the disabilities we are referencing don't affect one's ability to give consent. Intellectual and psychiatric disabilities raise entirely different questions.

Why? No one is ever average... — Banno

If we are to consider disability a spectrum, with no one fully disabled and no one fully abled, but all of us at some point on the spectrum, then it would logically hold that we capture as many people along the line to allow them as full a life as possible, limited by our resources. That is, there is a bell curve of abilities, with most of us grouped in the middle (with me being an outliar of brilliance, a sage of the ages), and so we build a world that attempts to accomodate as much of that bell as we can, moving out to the extremes as much as we can. Those societal accomodations would flatten the curve, offering everyone closer to equal opportunity, leaving as few outside as possible.

I appreciate the generosity principle you identify in characterizing disability in terms of society's ability to accomodate as opposed to referencing the limitations inherent in the individual when compared to others, but I'd leave it at that, which is that the chararacterization is presented in order to provide respect and acceptance. If pressed though, I wouldn't be willing to then start suggesting there really aren't important physical differences that can be chararacterized as being less advantageous just because that position loses credibility in not recognizing certain truth.

Where we do agree is that human worth is not diminished by ability, and so I am in favor of doing whatever is required to keep that clarified, which includes creating a language that preserves that dignity and in modifying the landscape so that it is more universally navigable.

A bit more than personal preferences. — Banno

I'm not trying to over-simplify and can't disagree with Nussbaum's wish list of available capabilities, but I still abstract out the fundamental principle sounds something along the lines of advancing Enlightenment rights for the "pursuit of happiness."

So there is something a bit more sophisticated here than "happiness". — Banno

Happiness principles aren't unsophisticated. Given the centrality of the concept to Utilitarianism and the role it plays, 1000s of pages have been written trying to explain what happiness is.

But the quibble seems to be the way we wish to portray the same thing, less so the substance.

If they don't want an implant, I won't make 'em have one. — Banno

That is what I was agreeing with and suggesting your comments implied otherwise. You argued the maximization of happiness wasn't a proper objective but instead said maximizing benefit was the objective. While I suppose we could have talked past each other, I read "maximizing benefit" as something that could be measured by some observable criteria, whereas happiness is determined just by asking the person what makes him happy.

So, if you're saying maximizing benefit simply meaning maximizing personal preferences, then the distinction with that and happiness collapses for all practical purposes.

Anatomy tells the story. Analytic philosophy has never even been in the game. — apokrisis

Absolutely agree. They are different categories. It would be absurd if Wittgenstein weighed in on the neurological underpinnings of thought.

I'd ask you sort that out or we just talk past each other. You cannot offer empirical evidence that defeats Wittgenstein"s claims not because he's some God who can't be wrong, subject to worship and cult leader status, but because he's not making an empirical claim.

Notice the absence here of "tacitly admitting their former state was wanting" ? instead we look towards maximising benefit - but not in terms of happiness so much as of capability. It's not worth that has increased, but capacity - they can do more things — Banno

But how would you justify a cochlear implant in someone feeling full fulfillment within the deaf community, having no desire to leave its comfort? Would you feel justified in insisting upon it even should the person feel overall greater unhappiness for having been pulled into the general world of the hearing?

Measuring "doing more" isn't just in counting new abilities, but in the value the person receives from them. If the person enjoyed that special comraderie of the deaf community, that thing will be lost, and it might have received great weight from him in terms of personal value not gained from hearing.

Consider SRS, for example.

A counterpoint to consider. I met a gentleman who was deaf from birth, now in his middle years. His parent refused to provide any remediation, including contact with other deaf people, in the belief that this would build his ability to adapt to "normal" hearing society and so position him well for a good life. However the result was that although he could not fit in well with the hearing, he also could not fit in with the deaf community, and so found himself isolated.

The attempt by his parents to maximise his opportunity had the exact opposite result. — Banno

I know of a person exactly like this, and it was and remains tragic just due to his social isolation. He did go on to get a cochlear implant, but he still has significant limitations understanding, likely from the limited language skills he obtained prior to receiving it.

The question of the cochlear implant raises is another one as well, which is whether one ought provide a cochlear implant if available. To do so requires a belief that normalization is better than allowing the person remain within the close knit and proud sub-culture the deaf have created. That is, it touches upon your question about whether being normal is the goal. It seems intuitive though to increase one's ability to interact with the world by providing hearing where it was previously lacking. The final rule therefore likely being that one ought do what increases the overall happiness of the individual even if it means tacitly admitting their former state was wanting from the state you are moving them to.

In any event, I draw a rigid distinction between ability and worth, with infinite worth taken as a given, undiminishable and not measurable by ability. That is, to suggest the worth of the deaf person has increased when he has been given the ability to hear is offensive. His worth is not to be measured in terms of the things he can do.

I rather agree with Wittgenstein, that language is a vehicle of thought, not a reflection of thoughts happening elsewhere. — hypericin

This suggests thought is language, words traveling throughout our brain, which is a metaphysical claim, arguing about what the internal thing going on in our head is. That would not be consistent with Wittgenstein, but a better phrasing would be that thinking is shown through use, namely language.

That said, when I think verbally, I don't think in the compressed manner that you suggest — hypericin

This points out the problem with ascribing a metaphysical claim to Wittgenstein because here we're now being baited into a conversation about how different people might think. Witt can't answer that question. He's not a scientist or linguist. He's only saying that whatever the mystery in your head is, it's not something we can speak of, but what we can know about it and talk about is the linguistic expression.

I dont recognize anything you've said. — AmadeusD

I guess we're at an impasse, not understanding what one another are saying. Alas.

. But they are objectively not special in any sense other than a theological one. — AmadeusD

To the extent this suggests some sort of objective basis for the determination of value in the sense there are agreed upon criteria that can be measured in some empirical sense, this strikes me as a category error. Value is not measured that way. If you don't see it as a category error, but you insist no distinction between value based judgments and empirically measurable ones, then it's just question begging, assuming what you've set out to prove, which is there is no difference between value judgments and empirical ones, placing within the premise your conclusion: humans are not special.

I am very much against this binary scheme, and I like the philosophers who have challenged it. Nietzsche, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Adorno. Generally, 20th century scepticism towards reason, and its inclusion of the body, saved philosophy from becoming a complete idiot. — Jamal

And don't forget Rabbi Shneur Zalman's Tanya, Hasidic mysticism, pre-20th Century. The idea that our animalistic side is base or evil is not a universal religious doctrine.

Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, who is said to have wept near the time of his death and explained:

"In the World to Come, I will no longer be able to put on tefillin or perform a mitzvah. Only in this world is that possible — and that is why I weep as I prepare to leave it."

Heaven is lesser because you can't carry out good acts without a body. A different perspective.

They are the largest surplus resource we have. They are not special. — AmadeusD

This is the Lounge so I can say whatever I want. Not only are babies each special, but so is every child of God, regardless of age, and you are as well, each of us with a divine soul of infinite worth, regardless of whether you agree or not. We are not born into sin, but perfection.

My view is unapologetically theistic, but it's no different than what a secular humanist would say, minus the holy talk.

I just wonder how other areas of thought might be different if we did. — Patterner

We count to 60 and say we have 1 minute, then we count 60 of those and we say we have an hour. We divide circles in 360 degrees. And of course outside the US, there are 100 degrees between freezing water and boiling water, but not in the US. There are all sorts of ways of doing it, mostly just convention. Maybe it changes our brain structure, but I doubt it. That's why I have no idea what it means for it to be 50 degrees celcius but I do know what 50 degrees Farenheit feels like.

My third thought is another question. Why do we use Base 10? Doesn't it make more sense to go to the next value after you have used up all your fingers? I hold up fingers for 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, then my friend holds up one finger for 11. Although I guess I should rewrite that. My tenth finger could be *. Then we would write:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, *, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 1*, 20, 21... — Patterner

Typically, you move to letters when your base extends past 10, like in hexadecimal: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,A,B,C,D,E,F,10... The base one uses is dependant upon the purpose, where hex is used in computer applications.

We use 60 for minutes and hours.
12 for clocks

I'm sure there are others.

Shadows on the Hudson by Isaac Bashevis Singer.

If night is the period before sunrise, then yes, you can. Look to the East. I'd allow Wittgenstein into the lab, in the hope of helping Pinker get his conceptual foundations in order. — Banno

Well, my analogy means to be forced, meaning if the morning star is defined as that in the morning, it can't exist not in the morning. No need to stare at the sky in the morning hoping to catch a lazy evening star that forgot to go inside. It's not subject to empirical disproof.

When I was a kid, I was hopelessly confused when night was, given that I was told a day was 24 hours. Then I learned night was part of day, but then I didn't have a word for the time the sun was up. How could that be day if it lasted less than 24 hours?

Then this: "God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And there was evening, and there was morning—the first day." Day starts in the evening?

I define "tolerance" as how much disagreeable activity someone will put up with. It's not a particularly kind gesture to tell someone you'll tolerate them, but it's not as bad as rejecting and not as good as accepting. It's somewhere in between. .

To say I "tolerate" homosexualty, for example, means I'd rather it not be, but I'll endure it.

With that understanding, does the right put up with more behavior it finds objectionable than the left? Maybe, but that might just speak to changes from conservative values to more liberal ones and the right having to accept the existence of what they disagree with.

So then the next question: Is the left more embracing of (not just tolerant of) change than the right? I'd think so, which is why the word "conserve" attaches to the right and "progress" attaches to the left.

One embraces change, the other less so. Who is more tolerant of each other? It seems there's sufficient polarization to say neither are terribly tolerant of one another to the extent they're each willing to peacefully endure one another.

There is also a question unasked, and that is whether tolerance is a virtue? Ought we let our neighbors who don't adhere to our moral interpretations endure our silence, or must we speak. up?

I suspect I don't disagree, which is most disagreeable. But I'm not confident that I understood what you said, so I may be wrong. — Banno

You have to tell me what you disagree with.

To restate, where P is a private language: ¬◊P.

Pinker cannot show us an example of P. One can't locate the morning star at night because it by definition is present only during the day. That's not to say nothing is there.

If there were enough interest, we might try a discussion on ChatGPT to see what happens. — Banno

I'm interested in participating, but is the suggestion that we all appear in real time and go back and forth with a discussion, or can it be adaptable to our format where we post at our leisure? I'd rather the latter only because conversational debate is very different than posting in terms of the thought and research going into each post.

Also, if it's live, the world generally operates on US Eastern Standard Time.

The insight is that private language is an all black penguin where a penguin is defined as requiring some white. You search forever for the all black penguin and you quibble over whether it has some white here or there, not realizing you don't engage in a synthetic inquiry when the inquiry was analytic all along.

"Bans are permanent and non-negotiable." — Outlander

That's true, and I don't want to suggest a change in the text of the rules so people might think there are simple ways back, but there are imaginable scenarios where things can be reconsidered, which is just an admission sometimes further review is warranted.

My point is that this case isn't such an extraordinary instance because it's all so speculative that the person even wants back or regrets his request.

No, because that's proof they're treating the root issue by avoiding the problem by using their own willpower. — Outlander

Maybe @Michael was compelled by the same powerful forces that @ProtagoranSocratist was when he asked to be banned and he couldn't stop himself from banning him, and here you go blaming Michael for what he could not control. And maybe I'm just doing the same with whatever I'm saying, and then your responses aren't to be blamed either because you're just being immovable you.

Or maybe we just take things at face value. He wanted banning, he asked for banning, and he got banning. We're not impossible to reach out to, so if he pleads temporary insanity and wants to return, we can consider it then. At this point, defenses are being made for him that he hasn't even claimed himself. It's possible he's happy not being here.

Perhaps not.

I keep coming back to language being inherently social. It follows that an explanation solely in terms of an individual's brain or cognition or whatever must be insufficient.

So that part of what you suggest must be correct. — Banno

I'm just a category police here, trying to keep the philosopher captive in his study and the scientist in his lab.

When Wittgenstein says language can't be private, he's not a sociologist, neurologist, or anthropologist. His view isn't dependent upon whether humans are lone predators or highly social. That is, language would theoretically exist on the day the last man stood before the world ended (and the sound would be a whimper).

This is because to attend to a feeling with a describable symbol marks it language, regardless of whether the confirmation of the symbol is by human or inanimate means.

If the validity of Wittgenstein is science dependant, he loses, even if scientificly correct, because he would then be speaking of the world of beetles and not words.

Empirical refutation or confirmation is therefore impossible.

DO you find it interesting how ubiquitous and indelible the idea of deficit is? — Banno

The idea of deficits is entirely foreign in systems that place infinite value on human life, with such designations only existing in purely pragmatic contexts, as in, I am wholly insufficient to play short stop for the Yankees, but of exact worth to all others in all ways moral.

Not sure why you inserted his race or why you thought the motivation mitigated the outcome.

Should it be true that only certain. races are afforded appropriate care, that should be remedied, but the opposite shouldn't be suggested, which is that the privileges should be flipped.

You also needn't reject every aspect of an economic system to where you must reject even its positive outcomes, especially in this instance where you suggest purely altruistic motivations would have left him not fully attended.

Thanks for your thoughtful responses. A few interesting things are happening here.

The most obvious is the prominence of the deficit model, in various guises.

The idea that disabilities need fixing.

The idea that a person with a disability cannot pay their way and will require more than they could provide.

And the related way that the focus moved so quickly from disability to care, to re-centring on the able bodied.

Offered as something for consideration, not as a negative. Why did this happen? is it justifiable? How? — Banno

I think we all wish to do what is best to make everyone's lives easier and not harder, and it's difficult to really to know what to do in contexts one has little famiilarity with. I guess my question is what might you propose the best response to the disabled would be if there are some well intentioned faux pas occuring?

This is just to say that I stand for the elderly on the bus because that's what I have been told to do and it seems the right thing to do, but now that I'm dilgently working on being more elderly, I don't know I'd take a young person's seat. I'd tell the whipper snapper to sit back down while I struggled to stand the whole time in spite of myself.

Fine. I can see a benefit in making the AI's input explicit rather than covert. Lets's see what Jamal's thoughts are. — Banno

There is no fun in playing chess software at grandmaster level. Sometimes it's fun to set it at moron level so you can beat it and feel smart.

So, where I'm going with this is AM, artificial moronism. You have the software say stupid shit and you get to ridicule it and show it what an idiot it is.

I mean that does sound more fun than having it constantly winning every argument.

I know what you're thinking. This post is from an AM generator. Nope, it's truly from yours truly.

In my way of thinking, I just think philosophers don't belong in the lab and scientists don't belong where ever it is philosophers lurk. But to the extent someone suggests an impossibility can occur (as in, "hey guys, I just found an X that's ~X"), I suppose I'd need to see that walking contradiction. If it's there, I guess the scientist can stand smugly with his discovery while the philospher's head explodes.

Ah yes, the bullet-point, the evidence of ChatGPT at work. :smirk:

As to #1, I can intuitively understand that meaning would be internal and be attached to the symbol, as in, I am annoyed (internal meaning), so I roll my eyes (the symbol). What I don't get is why the internal meaning must be attached to a symbol. I am annoyed, so some internal listing of information passes before my homunculous. I'm reminded of the Terminator when he saw the data reveal before his eyes.

Additionally, Pinker doesn't need to convince me that his view is logical. He needs to show me a brain and where all these symbols are. He's not a philosopher seeking consistency. He's a scientist seeking empirical truth.

As to #2, Witt shows the private language argument incoherent.

As to #3, yes, there is an incompatibility in Witt saying X is impossible and Pinker saying X exists regardless of logical impossibility.

I would suggest Pinker abandon his ideosyncratic mentalese position (some computational model he pulled from his ass, surely not from a lab). I just don't understand why one would posit a private sub-symbol that computes and then attaches to a public post-symbol I can see. By mentalese, I would think he would mean the stuff that precedes the sub-symbol, the computation itself, not some strange layer of first symbol to follow a second symbol.

Whether mentalese is salvagable under any imaginable scenerio is a fair question, but I might agree at this point that the Pinker model is not sustainable.

I do see what you're saying, but look at Wittgenstein's comment:

"To the extent that I do intend the construction of an English sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak English."

That is, while you search for the correct Russian term to convey your emotion (which is not denied to exist), you do so with an understanding of how you must do that, as in, what the parameters are. You are working within a publicaly agreed upon set of rules. By analogy, it's like if you're playing chess (another Russian past-time), you create all sorts of ideas in your head about how you will attack or defend, but the underlying requirement is that you do so within the rules of that game. You can't just say you're going to kick the king off the board. That is not within your creative boundaries.

That "language" (and I'm into metaphor here) of the chessboard, as in "I'm thinking of moving Rook to a4 and then the Bishop to c3" is not considered a private language just becasue it's internal. Your actual physical move of the piece was your language. It's how you communicated your decision.

The point here is that when you searched for the move on the chessboard, you were necessarily searching within the rules of the game. If you had a private language, your move would be incoherent because no one would know what you meant to do by moving your piece. However, as everyone plays and watches one another, it becomes clear what language your are using. That is referred to as the "grammar" of the game. There can be no question though that you had some thought prior to making that move, but that thought had to be within the rules of the game and so it was therefore not private.

And that goes back to the Wittgenstein quote above. That you searched for a word in English presumed you spoke English.

In my opinion, this is quite controversial, since the very method of predicting future events based on hindsight is quite dubious. As we know, history develops in fits and starts, and some languages ​​that existed 1,000 years ago (and were even considered global) are no longer used at all. This point is important to emphasize. — Astorre

I concede to speculation, but trending of languages can be observed and general observations noted.

This observation is interesting, but it may be related not to a desire to simplify, but to the native speaker's language itself — Astorre

As I've noted, much linguistic change occurs as the result of the introduction of non-native speakers (of course there's internal drift (caused by all sorts of things) as well, but this really isn't meant to be an all inclusive conversation in linguistics, much of which goes well beyond what I know). That is, people who speak other languages mix up the prior language, trending toward elimination of differences, resulting in a less complex system for the new members of the community. That is, if suddenly we see great change to a previously stable language, we can expect that a good number of adults just arrived and they are all insisting upon using that language.

In my experience, I've noticed that expressing your thoughts in nuanced language is always slower than the thought itself. I like the flow of complexity and duration, because as I speak, I have time to think about what I'll say next. — Astorre

This is more specifically on topic with the OP. The critical distinction here is whether you are saying (1) you had a thought and it was in a primordial language, not something identfiable, but a constructed idea that had not yet seen language or (2) you had a full language that identified your thought but it was compressed and then you expressed it fully into complicated words and syntax. If you go with #1, you are arguing a mentalese. If #2, you are giving room for a Wittgensteinian analysis.

Ergo, language was simpler because times were simpler. There just wasn't much to talk about or perhaps even not much time to idly ponder the things the average person does today. — Outlander

Consider the number of cases in the following languages:

Modern English - 2
German - 4
Old English -4 or 5
Middle English - 2
Cherokee - 6
Mandarin - 0

A common cause for this simplification is the introduction of adult non-native speakers into language. Adults are poor learners of language and as diverse populations enter, the language corrupts through simplification, but, interestingly does not affect the ability of the language to convey information. This points to the fact that much of language serves functions other than direct communication of thought.

Any marker that comminicates one's ethnicity, country of origin, educational level, etc. serves sociological functions. It obviously matters greatly from an evolutionary perspective that I immediately know you were raised in Germany, you were born in Boston, that you were not formally educated, etc. Consider Cherokee, unless you are very adept at language learning, you will never convince a native speaker that you grew up on the reservation if you didn't because you'll never master the complexity of the language. You'll also never match their accent.

But this is all (an interesting) aside. My point wasn't to wander down the path of language evolution as much as to say that it's entirely possible that our internal language (and please don't confuse"private language" with "internal language" in the Wittngensteinian sense) bears limited resemblance to the full expressive language we use in public where we're trying to get others to understand us.

And Wittgenstein went to great lengths not to catagorize what a language is (as in requiring particular syntax or form), but only to require that it comport to a grammar, which he defines very liberally to mean that it follows rules within a particular community of speakers and is publicly confirmable.

I will concede of course to the speculative nature of AI's attempt at extrapolation of English in the year 3500. So you know, it could not reverse engineer from 2025 backwards simply because it's not possible to predict what arbitrary elements might have existed in a language over time and then fell out.