I think of Newton, developing calculus to describe physical phenomena. And perhaps some math is created in this fashion today. But by and large it's not an empirical process. Although math is called the Queen of the Sciences, it is not really a science — jgill
The main problem with sensorimotor theory would be the fact that with the same input to the sense organs or sensibilities of different individuals, the behavioural and mental eventual output of the each individuals can be vastly different. And also the same behavioural output can be achieved by different sensorimotor inputs. — Corvus
“…intersubjective (social and cultural) factors already have an effect on our perception and understanding of the world, even in the immediacy of our embodied and instrumental copings with the environment.”(Shaun Gallagher)
” My friend Paul and I point out to each other certain details of the landscape; and Paul's finger, which is pointing out the church tower, is not a finger-for-me that I think of as orientated towards a church-tower-for-me, it is Paul's finger which itself shows me the tower that Paul sees, just as, conversely, when I make a movement towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I do not imagine that I am producing in Paul, in virtue of some pre-established harmony, inner visions merely analogous to mine: I believe, on the contrary, that my gestures invade Paul's world and guide his gaze. When I think of Paul, I do not think of a flow of private sensations indirectly related to mine through the medium of interposed signs, but of someone who has a living experience of the same world as mine, as well as the same history, and with whom I am in communication through that world and that history.
“ In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world. In the present dialogue, I am freed from myself, for the other person's thoughts are certainly his; they are not of my making, though I do grasp them the moment they come into being, or even anticipate them. And indeed, the objection which my interlocutor raises to what I say draws from me thoughts which I had no idea I possessed, so that at the same time that I lend him thoughts, he reciprocates by making me think too. It is only retrospectively, when I have withdrawn from the dialogue and am recalling it that I am able to reintegrate it into my life and make of it an episode in my private history”.
(Phenomenology of Perception, p.471).
Another difficulty of the sensorimotor theory of mind would be, that there are many different factors which affects the state of mind. And it cannot explain most subconscious or unconscious mental events. — Corvus
“From the point of view of a phenomenology of the lived body, the unconscious is not an intrapsychic reality residing in the depths "below consciousness". Rather, it surrounds and permeates conscious life, just as in picture puzzles the figure hidden in the background surrounds the foreground, and just as the lived body conceals itself while functioning. Unconscious fixations are like certain restrictions in a person's space of potentialities produced by an implicit but ever-present past which declines to take part in the continuing progress of life. (Thomas Fuchs)
In the end, I fear that all of us, no matter how well educated in this subject, still need to piss and eat and still need to treat the world as though realism were true, which means avoiding the worst of the cold, trying to dodge cancer and scrounging enough money to live comfortably into old age. — Tom Storm
…the notion finally struck me that, no matter how close I came to the man or woman who sought my help, I always saw him through my own peculiar spectacles, and
never did he perceive what I was frantically signaling to him, except through his. From this moment I ceased, as I am now convinced every psychotherapist does whether he wants to admit it or not, being a realist. More important, I could now stop representing psychology to clients as packaged reality, warranted genuine and untouched by human minds. Perhaps"realism" is not a good term for what I am talking about. It is obvious, of course, that I am not talking about Platonic realism. Nobody talks about that any more. The realism from which my clients and I are always trying to wriggle loose might possibly be called "materialistic realism." At least it is the hardheaded unimaginative variety nowadays so popular among scientists, businessmen, and neurotics.
What actually jarred me loose was the observation that clients who felt themselves confronted with down-to-earth realities during the course of psychotherapy became much like those who were confronted with downright dogmatic interpretations of either the religious or psychological variety. On the heels of this observation came the notion that dogmatism -the belief that one has the word of truth right from the horse's mouth-and modern realism -the belief that one has the word of truth right from nature's mouth-add up to the same thing. To go even further, I now suspect that neither of these assumptions about the revealed nature of truth is any more useful to scientists than it is to clients.
If one is to avoid dogmatism entirely he needs to alert himself against realism also, for realism, as I have already implied, is a special form of dogmatism and one which is quite as likely to stifle the client's creative efforts. A client who is confronted with what are conceded to be stark realities can be as badly immobilized as one confronted with a thickheaded therapist. Even the presumed realism of his own raw feelings can convince a client that he has reached a dead end. I am not a realist-not any more and I do not believe either the client or the therapist has to lie down and let facts crawl over him. Right here is where the
theoretical viewpoint I call the psychology of personal constructs stakes out its basic philosophical claim.
There is nothing so obvious that its appearance is not altered when it is seen in a different light. This is the faith that sustains the troubled person when he undertakes psychotherapy seriously.
To state this faith as a philosophical premise: Whatever exists can be reconstrued. This is to say that none of today's constructions-which are, of course, our only means of portraying reality is perfect and, as the history as the faith expressed of human thought repeatedly suggests, none is final. Moreover, this is the premise upon which most psychotherapy has to be built, if not in the mind of the therapist, at least in the mind of the client. To be sure, one may go to a therapist with his facts clutched in his hand and asking only what he ought to do with them. But this is merely seeking technical advice, not therapy. Indeed, what else would one seek unless he suspected that the obstacles now shaping up in front of him are not yet cast in the ultimate form of reality? As a matter of fact, I have yet to see a realistic client who sought the help of a therapist in changing his outlook. To the realist, outlook and reality are made of the same inert stuff. On the other hand, a client who has found his therapeutic experience helpful often says, “In many ways things are the same as they were before, but how differently I see them!"
This abandonment of realism may alarm some readers. It may seem like opening the door to wishful thinking, and to most psychologists wishful thinking is a way of coming unhinged. Perhaps this is why so many of them will never admit to having any imagination, at least until after they suppose they have realistically demonstrated that what they secretly imagined was there all the time, waiting to be discovered. But for me to say that whatever exists can be reconstrued is by no manner or means to say that it makes no difference how it is construed. Quite the contrary. It often makes a world of difference. Some reconstructions may open fresh channels for a rich and productive life, Others may offer one no alternative save suicide.
Funny about the crows. Europeans never came up with 0 on their own. :rofl: — Patterner
If the dog had the capacity to understand mathematics, and it was our inability to teach it that was the problem, it would not need teaching any more than we did. It would have developed mathematics as we did — Patterner
We often think of mathematical ability as being uniquely human, but in fact, scientists have found that many animal species—including lions, chimpanzees, birds, bees, ants, and fish—seem to possess at least a rudimentary counting ability or number sense. Crows can understand the concept of zero. And a study published in April found that both stingrays and cichlids can take this rudimentary "numerosity" to the next level, performing simple addition and subtraction for a small number of objects (in the range of 1 to 5).
If the dog had the capacity to understand mathematics, and it was our inability to teach it that was the problem, it would not need teaching any more than we did. It would have developed mathematics as we did — Patterner
In any case, the principle of transcending egoic consciousness is fundamental to many faith traditions — Wayfarer
We don't educate children the way we train horses, and this is for more or less the reasons you gave. When a 4th grader is taught math, or is taught the golden rule, or is taught to think before they act, or is taught to recognize when they are angry and count to 10, they are being educated in the form you indicated. But in fact it is the parents who are primarily responsible for education in this deeper sense of civilizing the child and teaching them how to be human. — Leontiskos
In discussing the most basic interactions of non-human animals, Mark Bekoff and Jessica Peirce consider data from the study of animals in the wild and suggest that a basic sense of justice is interwoven with cooperative behavior (including a cluster of behaviors that reflect altruism, reciprocity, honesty, and trust) and empathy (including neighboring phenomena of sympathy, compassion, grief, and consolation). Although it still may be controversial to think that non-human animals engage in practices that can be considered moral or just, clearly some of these aspects of cooperation and empathy are to be found in the earliest intersubjective interactions among humans.
Play involves action and interaction and the ability or possibility of the participants to continue in play. It's defined by a set of interactive affordances. When one animal starts to dominate in playful interaction, closing off the other's affordance space (or eliminating the autonomy of the other), the interaction and the play stops. Self-handicapping (e.g., not biting as hard as the dog can) is a response to the other's vulnerability as the action develops, based on an immediate sense of, or an attunement to what would or would not cause pain rather than on a rule. Role-reversal (where the dominant animal makes itself more vulnerable) creates an immediate affordance for the continuance of play. If in a friendly playful interaction one player gets hurt, becomes uncomfortable, or is pushed beyond her affective limits, this can generate an immediate feeling of distrust for the other. That would constitute a disruption of the friendship, a break in this very basic sense that is prior to measures of fairness, exchange, or retribution. Robert Solomon captures this idea at the right scale: “Justice presumes a personal concern for others. It is first of all a sense, not a rational or social construction, and I want to argue that this sense is, in an important sense, natural.”
Here is another short video for his talk on "Your brain hallucinates your conscious reality." — Corvus
…to perceive the world isn’t to hallucinate and get things right. To perceive is to explore the world with your sensing and moving body. Perception creates meaning through sensorimotor exploration. You don’t get a being with a sense of self by taking a hallucinating brain and tacking on some sensory inputs and motor outputs. You get a being with a sense of self by taking a brain with a capacity for imagination—for imaging its past and future—and embedding it within a sensing and moving body. Perception, therefore, isn’t online hallucination; it’s sensorimotor engagement with the world. Dreaming isn’t offline hallucination; it’s spontaneous imagination during sleep. We aren’t dreaming machines but imaginative beings. We don’t hallucinate at the world; we imaginatively perceive it.
Merleau-Ponty maintains that the relation between self and world is not primarily that of subject to object, but rather what he calls, following Heidegger, being-in-the-world. For a bodily subject it is not possible to specify what the subject is in abstraction from the world, nor is it possible to specify what the world is in abstraction from the subject: “The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects”. To belong to the world in this way means that our primary way of relating to things is neither purely sensory and reflexive, nor cognitive or intellectual, but rather bodily and skillful. Merleau-Ponty calls this kind of bodily intentionality “motor intentionality”. His example is grasping or intentionally taking hold of an object. In grasping something we direct ourselves toward it, and thus our action is intentional. But the action does not refer to the thing by representing its objective and determinate features; it refers to it pragmatically in the light of a contextual motor goal effected by one's body.
Liberalism as we now understand it is the idea that no conception of the good life is to be imposed, and everyone is to be allowed to pursue their own notion of the good life — Leontiskos
They are similar because how we learn is similar, and because the proximate goals of "reinforcing x behavior," are similar.
I'd argue that they can't be the same thing. When we train animals, a behavior, or lack of it, is the end itself. The Aristotlean distinction between continence and virtue makes no sense with animals. But with people, we want them to want what is good — Frankfurt's second order volitions — and we want to convince them that it is good to act in this way.
The difference is that the person and their excellence, excellence in our eyes and theirs, is an end in itself. — Count Timothy von Icarus
But without a conception of the human good, virtue, and freedom, education and training for human beings degenerates into the sort of thing we do for animals — Count Timothy von Icarus
What would be your explanations or arguments on the gaps and the model and modeled? — Corvus
“ Whereas physical structures, such as a soap bubble, obtain equilibrium in relation to actual physical condi-
tions of force and pressure, living systems seek equilibrium, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “with respect to conditions which are only virtual and which the system itself brings into existence; when the [system] . . . executes a work beyond its proper limits and constitutes a proper milieu for itself.”
“ Thus, Merleau-Ponty says, whereas physical structures can be expressed by a law, living structures have to be comprehended in relation to norms: “each organism, in the presence of a given milieu, has its optimal conditions of activity and its proper manner of realizing equilibrium,”and every living being “modifiesits milieu according to the internal norms of its activity.”
“...autopoiesis (in a broad sense that includes adapativity) is the “self-production of an inside that also specifies an outside to which it is normatively related,” and thus that autopoiesis is best seen as the “dynamic co-emergence of interiority and exteriority.” “the (self) generation of an inside is ontologically prior to the dichotomy in- out. It is the inside that generates the asymmetry and it is in relation to this inside that an outside can be established.”
↪Joshs Do you think Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Husserl are postmodernists???
You think Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is postmodern thought? I beg to differ. I think that what Wittgeinstein says about mathematics there is quite true philosophy of mathematics. — ssu
Do you agree with these speakers' points? Why or why not. — Corvus
I don't have enough maths knowledge to drill down into this, but no doubt axioms or presuppositions (and their justifications) lie the core of postmodern investigation.
— Tom Storm
I don't think so. I still think that their focus is on the societal aspects of mathematics, starting perhaps with the way it's taught. What they will (unfortunately) refer to is Gödel's incompleteness Theorems, but... basically I get the feeling that the just mention it to say that they are aware of incompleteness results existing. But that's basically it. If they say something more, it's quoted by Alan Sokal in "Fashionable nonsense".
Or if I'm wrong, please quote the text that shows your point. — ssu
In the logic thread I proposed "logos" for the logic-like function of the world. I wonder what a good term would be for "the apparently mathematical in nature?" Quantos? Mathematicularity? Máthēma? Quanticularity — Count Timothy von Icarus
We can bypass the whole reality vs illusion mentality by focusing on the inexhaustible variety of ways our constructions of the real can allow us to do things in the world, and find ways of making those constructions more inclusive and open-ended, rather than reifying one construction as more ‘truly real’ than others.
I don't really know how this works either. Didn't we just reinstate the Cartesian veil? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Such constructions might well be open ended, and inexhaustible, but they aren't unconstrained. Many — most really — ways of trying to do things run into immediate problems. If you want to patch a tire, there are myriad ways to do it right. Yet, just as certainly there are many more ways to do it wrong (e.g. pouring spaghetti on it, drinking potions, etc.) than ways that will make the tire hold air. These constraints I think, can usefully be thought of as reality, without losing the insights re intersubjectivity. We could take Husserl's conception of the "zig-zag" in perception as the phenomenologically basic case of this. — Count Timothy von Icarus
“…consciousness discovers its path in an indefinite reduction, always already begun, and wherein every adventure is a change of direction and every return to the origin an audacious move toward the horizon.
…the denial of order in the Universe tends towards nihilism, in the sense that it denies the possibility of causal connections and any intrinsic meaning. That is what made me think of Nietszche and Heidegger, as it was among their central themes. — Wayfarer
“Thinking becomes I-think; the I-think becomes: I unite originarily, I think unity (in advance). By virtue of the guiding-thread that already dominates, knowing as self-knowing is the utmost identity, i.e., what is an actual being; and as such a being it is at the same time in the possibility for conditioning every other objectness in its manner as knowing…”
In order to feel sandpaper:
The sandpaper must contact our skin.
The contact must register with sensory nerves.
The nervous signal must conduct to our brain.
Our brain must translate the nervous signal to sensation. — hypericin
“…traditional neuroscience has tried to map brain organization onto a hierarchical, input-output processing model in which the sensory end is taken as the starting point. Perception is described as proceeding through a series of feedforward or bottom-up processing stages, and top-down influences are equated with back-projections or feedback from higher to lower areas. Freeman aptly describes this view as the "passivist-cognitivist view" of the brain.
From an enactive viewpoint, things look rather different. Brain processes are recursive, reentrant, and self-activating, and do not start or stop anywhere. Instead of treating perception as a later stage of sensation and taking the sensory receptors as the starting point for analysis, the enactive approach treats perception and emotion as dependent aspects of intentional action, and takes the brain's self-generated, endogenous activity as the starting point for neurobiological analysis. This activity arises far from the sensors—in the frontal lobes, limbic system, or temporal and associative cortices—and reflects the organism's overall protentional set—its states of expectancy, preparation, affective tone, attention, and so on. These states are necessarily active at the same time as the sensory inflow.
“Whereas a passivist-cognitivist view would describe such states as acting in a top-down manner on sensory processing, from an enactive perspective top down and bottom up are heuristic terms for what in reality is a large-scale network that integrates incoming and endogenous activities on the basis of its own internally established reference points. Hence, from an enactive viewpoint, we need to look to this large-scale dynamic network in order to understand how emotion and intentional action emerge through self-organizing neural activity
There are similar arguments against systems being complex versus simple. But once you start deciding that key ways we cognize the world are illusory, it seems hard to know where to stop — Count Timothy von Icarus
I think there is a deep, unsettled conflict between humanism and naturalism in modern philosophy, and it lies at the heart of the inability to move past the appearance/reality dichotomy.
Humanism wants man as the measure of all things, and proclaims our freedom when it proclaims that ethics, aesthetics, meaning, and even the objects of sense perception are our own invention. And yet naturalism would say these all have a causal history, having come into being through the same step-wise progression of physical state evolution (the logic of the world) that moves planets and dust particles. — Count Timothy von Icarus
“Thinking becomes I-think; the I-think becomes: I unite originarily, I think unity (in advance). By virtue of the guiding-thread that already dominates, knowing as self-knowing is the utmost identity, i.e., what is an actual being; and as such a being it is at the same time in the possibility for conditioning every other objectness in its manner as knowing…”( Heidegger)
I'd argue that the claims of liberals and collectivist identify movements can't be adjudicated because they each have the origin of the good lying not in reason, which can adjudicate, but in the individual or collective's desires. — Count Timothy von Icarus
. The left has a consistent difficulty in distinguishing someone who doesn't oppose Trump from someone who endorses Trump. They assume that everyone who hasn't opposed Trump therefore endorses him. From what I have seen Peterson hasn't opposed Trump in this upcoming election, but neither has he endorsed him — Leontiskos
How do we know whether quality or quantity is fundamental? Or rather two sides of the same coin? Does a quality, to exist, need not to show quantity too, being either one or many, zero being not existing?
The idea of the mathematical universe is not that quantity or quality are fundamental, but that all the properties that there are are mathematical. There are no non-mathematical properties, science seems to support this — Lionino
“Bergson presents duration as a type of multiplicity opposed to metric multiplicity or the multiplicity of magnitude. Duration is in no way indivisible, but is that which cannot be divided without changing in nature at each division.'On the other hand, in a multiplicity such as homogeneous extension, the division can be carried as far as one likes without changing anything in the constant object; or the magnitudes can vary with no other result than an increase or a decrease in the amount of space they striate. Bergson thus brought to light "two very different kinds of multiplicity," one qualitative and fusional, continuous, the other numerical and homogeneous, discrete. It will be noted that matter goes back and forth between the two; sometimes it is already enveloped in qualitative multiplicity, sometimes already developed in a metric "schema" that draws it outside of itself.
The mathematical universe does not address matters such as solipsism, différance, phenomenology or idealism. It takes our perception of things as they are and goes from there, just like science does. Just like the correspondence theory of truth assumes there exists an outside world to which beliefs would correspond to — Lionino
“Each individual object (each unity, whether immanent or transcendent, constituted in the stream) endures, and necessarily endures -that is, it continuously exists in time and is something identical in this continuous existence, which at the same time can be regarded as a process. Conversely: what exists in time continuously exists in time and is the unity belonging to the process that carries with it inseparably the unity of what endures in the process as it unfolds. The unity of the tone that endures throughout the process lies in the tonal process; and conversely, the unity of the tone is unity in the filled duration, that is, in the process. Therefore, if anything at all is defined as existing in a time-point, it is conceivable only as the phase of a process, a phase in which the duration of an individual being also has its point. Individual or concrete being is necessarily changing or unchanging; the process is a process of change or of rest, the enduring object itself a changing object or one at rest. Moreover, every change has its rate or acceleration of change (to use an image) with respect to the same duration. As a matter of principle, any phase of a change can be expanded into a rest, and any phase of a rest can be carried over into change.”
“Now if we consider the constituting phenomena in comparison with the phenomena just discussed, we find a flow, and each phase of this flow is a continuity of adumbrations. But as a matter of principle, no phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession, and therefore the flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous "change", and this change has the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither "faster" nor "slower." If that is the case, then any object that changes is missing here; and since "something" runs its course in every process, no process is in question. There is nothing here that changes, and for that reason it also makes no sense to speak of something that endures. It is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of its duration.
“Can one speak in the strict sense of change in a situation in which, after all, constancy, duration filled out without change, is inconceivable? No possible constancy can be attributed to the continuous flow of appearance-phases. There is no duration in the original flow. For duration is the form of something enduring, of an enduring being, of something identical in the temporal sequence that functions as its duration…Objective time is a form of "persisting" objects, of their changes and of other processes involved in them. "Process" is therefore a concept presupposing persistence. But persistence is unity that becomes constituted in the flow, and it pertains to the essence of the flow that no persistence can exist in it. Phases of experience and continuous series of phases exist in the flow. But such a phase is nothing that persists, any more than a continuous series of such phases is.
This is related to your newer thread, where you make the point that reason must be allowed to transcend its conditions and environment, having authority in itself — Leontiskos
Each night for a month, an angle came to me and took me on a tour of the heavens, and I was as awake and aware as I saw the wonders there as I ever am in my everyday life.
Further, my wife, and some reputable friends I had over heard me talking in my sleep and claim on their lives that they saw me glowing and levitating of the bed. Additionally, the angle who proclaimed God's revelation to me told me about the future, which I wrote down, and all that was said came to pass — Count Timothy von Icarus
I'd say this is actually the claim that any non-Scientistic methodology is dogmatism, which is a remarkable claim. Also, is Joshs statement itself a form of dogmatism? Ironically, these forms of Scientism are very often themselves forms of dogmatism — Leontiskos
The complexity of integrated circuits in modern computers approaches rapidly the complexity of the human brain. Traditional computer-programs give the program a limited range and programmers can quite easily foresee the possible outcomes. AI is different though. Not even the designer can predict what will happen as these programs in a certain way program themselves and are able to learn depending on the scope of available data. — Pez
let's just assume for the sake of argument that D. C. Schindler is a giant hypocrite, and you were able to decide this by scrambling after short YouTube videos. Who cares? What does it have to do with the arguments of the OP? Is this not more ad hominem? — Leontiskos
Despite themselves, Deleuze, Foucault, and Lyotard predicate much of their political work on several intertwined and not very controversial ethical principles. The mistake, made by Deleuze and Foucault in avoiding ethical principles altogether and by Lyotard in trying to avoid universalizing them, is that their avoidance is itself an ethically motivated one. In the conversation cited above, where Deleuze praises Foucault for being the one “to teach us something absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others,” he is laying out a principle of behavior that it would be unimaginable to assume he does not think ought to bind the behavior of others. In resisting an essentialism about human nature, there may have been a resistance to telling people not only what they want but also what they ought to want.
Where they must form an ethical commitment, and this is a commitment in keeping with poststructuralist political theory, is at the level of practice. Some practices are acceptable, some unacceptable.
I believe that when someone writes a serious and thoughtful OP the initial posts have a particular responsibility to respond in kind if the thread is to succeed. Ad hominem quips intended to provoke are particularly pernicious at the very early stage of a thread. At best they derail. — Leontiskos
even Nietzsche would agree with it (namely that we cannot pretend to go back to a pre-Christian era). The second prong is that liberalism as Schindler defines it requires a denial of the ontological impact of the Incarnation, and that this is objectively evil (as privation) regardless of any good intentions involved. The second prong requires Christian premises, namely that the Incarnation had an ontological effect, and Schindler is not unclear about this fact — Leontiskos
I honestly have no clue who he is outside of having had the book recommended to me. The book doesn't seem particularly conservative so far; — Count Timothy von Icarus
Another top-rate contribution from Joshs. :roll:
At least this time your ad hominem doesn't have such elaborate wrapping paper. — Leontiskos
However, in his "Plato's Critique of Impure Reason," D.C Schindler makes a solid argument that these are two sides of the same misological coin. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Numbers are not assigned to things, but they are all that things are, and our scientific theories seem to support this to a certain extent. Fundamental particles are in fact a collection of numbers, among which mass, electric charge, isospin, weak hypercharge, spin, lepton number. You may say these are the qualitative core(s), but that is a simple rebuttal that suffers from the same gaps as just stopping at the fact that they are quantitative. — Lionino
Ball would be a human label (baggage) emerging from a collection of things (atoms and such). It is always changing as everytime it bounces it loses atoms off its surface, but then we end up not in metaphysics but in a discussion of semantics — Lionino
a lot of philosophy relies on the validity of the idea of repetition and of identity. We can throw those out at a very fundamental level, but at some point we will have to grant them if we want to progress.
There is no such thing as tissues, just a collection of cells that are made of molecules. Yes, but we can't derive biological laws from chemical laws due to the sheer complexity and also to possible emergent features. We must grant that there is such a thing as tissues if we want to come up with medicine. — Lionino
you could say sociology comes from psychology, which comes from neurology, which... from physics. But you can't say the converse, that physics comes from biology or that chemistry from neurology. The more derivative a field is, the more baggage it has, specifically because it goes away from the foundations of the universe. Another issue is that sociology and psychology are very unreliable (papers have very low reproducibility) while physics is almost always reliable — Lionino
The poststructuralist can claim all he wants ("every change in degree is simultaneously a difference in kind"), but until he proves Π, I can just ignore him on this topic because it has explanatory power for me to do so. Mathematical universe is a theory about the universe, it takes our perceptions as they are, without doubting our modes of cognition as they appear, without taking phenomenology into account. — Lionino
It stands that, unless we admit of computers being conscious or souls or the like, the only relationship between being alive and consciousness is that the former is a necessary condition for the latter — a counterfactual if you will — Lionino
“…the genuine interiority of life is a precursor to the interiority of consciousness, and hence the conception of nature presupposed in standard formulations of the hard problem or explanatory gap for consciousness-namely, that living nature has no genuine interiority-is misguided.
I think consciousness is what dictates the term “alive.” — Arbü1237
Art is distinguishable from philosophy because it is evocative, and can be supremely so through the ability of an artist. Philosophy tries to explain, sometimes in dull detail. These are different things. When philosophers try to be artists, they fail miserably because they don't have the talent. — Ciceronianus
the mathematics of the phenomenon is pretty much the phenomenon itself lato sensu — when a neutron decays into a proton and an electron, the only things happening are numbers changing — Lionino
“The most insidious manner of forgetting is the progressive "repetition" of the same. One says the same with a constantly new indifference; the mode of saying and interpreting changes.”
The universe is not math unless the regularity of the laws of physics is true? I have not read "Our Mathematical Universe" but I am convinced Tegmark addresses that — Lionino
This summary of Tegmark's mathematical universe is interesting — Lionino
It takes a bit of mental contortion to construe the kind of object people are talking about in a direct vs indirect realism debate as transparently an intentional one…At least on the forum, productive discussions of direct vs indirect realism tend to require pinning down where the disagreement is between disputants. — fdrake