I equate understanding with decoding a message, which entails information. In either case (whether one understands and rejects, or doesn't understand, a message) the result is the same: information exchange has ended. — Galuchat

I don't think that we really disagree here, but I think that what you say could be better worded. It's better put that in cases where one doesn't understand the information, the information has been exchanged, but not... well... understood. I'm struggling to think of a better term than "understood" here. It's a bit like if you upload a video file, and then I download that file, but then the video doesn't play for me. My computer can't process that kind of file at present. You could be talking to me about the video, but I wouldn't be able to fully relate - at least not to the same extent, given that you've watched the video, but I have not, even though we exchanged information.

Is it good to turn away asylum seekers? To build walls against immigrants? To fuck your economy? On at least one of these things, you might agree that it isn't, but is considered by at least a large number of folk to be worth doing. If so, we could move on to considering the difference between the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life, and the good.

But what the open question shows, and the point being made, is that good is different from whatever naturalistic qualities you might claim are good. — Banno

Easily explainable under subjective moral relativism. Firstly, reject "good" except as relative to a subjective standard of judgement, since "good" in any alternative sense is unwarranted. That can be examined if need be. Any difference in judgement under this position would just mean that it's not good relative to my standard of judgement, but is good relative to other people's standard of judgement, and that's that. There is nothing more to it, or at least, nothing more has been warranted. Are you ever going to attempt to justify the transcendent sense of goodness that you keep seeming to suggest without explicitly stating? Or will you concede that it's unjustifiable, and should therefore be rejected?

And you don't need to worry: no term has been lost. — Janus

Indeed. I thought that meaning is use. I'm pretty sure that plenty of people are still using that phrase in the technical sense. Sounds like melodrama to me. :lol:

Of course.

I agree with you, i think; although I might summarise it somewhat briefly as that in the end, it's what we do that counts. And it is "we" not "I". — Banno

Okay. So it's not relevant that I am killing a puppy for fun as we speak? After all, what I do doesn't count.

Allow me to insert my own ideas here on Janus' behalf (he is circling a point that I'm partial to).

I think we both agree that there is necessarily a relative or subjective component of moral truth (concerning the moral values or principles we use as ethical foundations).

On the whole, this idea of ultimate, universal, and objective moral truth is nonsensical given the breakdown of exclusive/competing values, but when two or more moral agents are trapped in a room together, it does not make sense to talk about the moral implications of the values which they do happen to share? Within that room, they can come to sound moral agreements even if everyone outside of it doesn't share their values.

As we're all somewhat trapped together in our respective families, cities, and nations (and ultimately the planet), the strength and consensus of the moral agreements/statements we can make depend on what values are most prevalent within the relevant sphere of moral consideration. If there are indeed some values which are nearly universally present among all individuals and groups, then they tend to make the most functional and persuasive moral/ethical starting points.

Is this helpful at all? — VagabondSpectre

So, because lots of people share moral feelings, and thus moral judgement, on certain issues, then if we stick two people in a room together, then they'll probably agree over these issues, in a normative sense. They'll probably agree, for example, that kicking puppies is wrong, and that you shouldn't rape babies.

So what's the problem, right? Well, the problem is that this is supposed to be a discussion about meta-ethics, not a discussion about normative ethics. It's no different, in principle, than if I turned up to a discussion about Donald Trump and started talking about goldfish. Maybe there's a relevant link, but if so, I'm not seeing it. (Actually, with the latter, the link is probably that a goldfish would make a better president than Donald Trump).

If we switch back to meta-ethics, then I stand by my position, which I get to in part by rejecting moral objectivism as unwarranted, and I wonder why @Banno just kind of wondered off from that discussion, figuratively speaking. I know that he denies that he is a moral objectivist, but that doesn't mean that he isn't one. He seems to be one in spite of all that he has said. The last point that we got to was trying to make sense of his assertion that the objective/subjective dichotomy "fails", but he decided to be uncooperative. (Big surprise).

Then stop looking to me for help. — Banno

Really? That's the lesson you're taking from this? Not that you ought to be more helpful, but that it's my fault for trying to get you to be more helpful? You're a bad student.

It's there, in most of the stuff I've writ over the last ten years. Or ask me next week. I might care about you by then. — Banno

There's that typical unhelpful Banno one-liner for which you've become notorious. — S

Actually, calling them one-liners might be a mistake. I don't mean by that term to suggest that you're being witty. I just mean by that term to suggest that you're making a very short remark, typically just one or two lines.

Yep. The dichotomy fails. Think I mentioned that. — Banno

Mentioning something isn't sufficient. Where's your demonstration of that conclusion?

Let's take my feeling that kicking puppies is wrong. It can't be both hidden to everyone else, and public to everyone else, at the same time, and in the same sense, and in the same respect.

It doesn't follow from this that the subjective/objective dichotomy "fails". There can't be a contradiction, and there isn't one - at least not going by my model - so that's not a problem - at least not for me.

Why not both? — Banno

It can't be both simultaneously, in the same sense, and in the same respect. That's what I meant. Do you doubt that?

I don't think your suggestion to chat about goldfish is going to take off. — Banno

Shame. It would've made for a nice bit of collective humour with a moral to the story.

What I denied was that this made it subjective - somehow hidden; or simply a question of feeling.

I say one thing is not the case, and folk think that implies I must think that the extreme opposite is the case. — Banno

If goodness is not subjective, which you're using here to mean hidden, or a question of feeling, then it must be objective, which would be public, or not a question of feeling, since it can't be both or neither. So please explain why you believe that to be the case.

Indeed, you have.

This is why I found one of S's recent threads ironically amusing.

So here is my reply, yet again.

Consider: goodness is what accords with the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life.

Now the Open Question Argument would have us look to this and consider, could something be what accords with the most common, cross-cultural human feelings of communal life, and yet not be good?

And the answer, it seems to me, is yes.

So I conclude that this part of what you are asserting is not right.

And I don't think that this part of my argument has been responded too. I may have missed it. — Banno

I don't recall defining goodness. At least not in any way relevant to Moore's argument. Someone will have to show me where I've allegedly done that. I did recently say that it's a concept used for moral judgement, but that's not defining it in a way relevant to Moore's argument, and I've said stuff about morality, moral judgement, moral statements, and so on, but that's not the same thing.

Regarding your question, I can't answer it, because it needs clarification. In hindsight, maybe I don't entirely agree with Moore here. I think it can be unwise to define goodness in the way that Moore talks about, but unless the sense in which you're using "good" in that context is clarified, then I can't give an answer, except "It depends". It could be a "yes" or a "no" depending on the interpretation. I think that you only say "yes" because of the way that you're interpreting the question, which you've conveniently left implicit.

You do remember that there are people here of a position which doesn't accept a simplistic, objective, non-relative, "good", don't you? That's what @Janus was just trying to explain to you, and others have made this point also, myself included. This seems to be your interpretation, and you seem to want to hide it, because it is inconvenient for your argument.

but as if one did not have anything to say about the other...

No. Meta ethics feeds on, and shits into, ethics. — Banno

Then tie them together for me. I'm not seeing how this is supposed to tie together and lead somewhere relevant.

Here's a reminder of how our discussion went:

Your conclusion is simply about kicking puppies and stuff like that being not good. Yes? Well, that doesn't do anything for all of us who agree that it's not good, which is all of us besides moral nihilists (who deny good and bad) and sickos (who disagree because they'd say that it's good).

We disagree over other issues, like the issue of how moral statements should be interpreted. — S

Sure. But it seems that we agree, at least most of the time, as to what we ought do.

And isn't working out what to do the point of ethics?

We blow our points of disagreement out of all proportion. — Banno

That's the point of normative ethics. This discussion is about meta-ethics. You should know, you created it. — S

I have an old bathtub out the back. Several generations of goldfish have lived their lives out there.

Every now and then a Grey ibis comes to visit and wipes out the larger fish. It will catch fish larger than it can eat, and leave them next to the pool to die.

The result seems to be a diminution in the colour of the fish over time, to a sort of muddy-gold colour.

I rather like it. — Banno

And what did you have for breakfast today? Eggy weggs? What I had for breakfast was a nice bowl of the original topic is meta-ethics and we hadn't properly finished with it before you inappropriately changed the subject, accompanied with a cup of coffee. It was lovely.

I did. All conceptions are linguistic. Not everything conceived of is. Goodness is one such thing. — creativesoul

I don't think you did, but never mind. So you're saying that goodness is a thing that's conceived of that's not linguistic? I have said that it's a concept. Unless you claim that a concept is a conception, then, based on what we've explicitly said, there's no contradiction between our respective claims to be found here; and I don't find your claim that goodness is a thing that's conceived of that's not linguistic disagreeable enough to pursue an argument against it.

So, the trick is as old as many a historical debate. How do we distinguish between our conceptions and what we're conceiving of? If you cannot answer the question, then you cannot know how to acquire knowledge of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our naming and describing it.

How do we know if or that something exists in it's entirety prior to our naming it? — creativesoul

I asked you to give me an example of what you meant when you said that "not all conceptions of goodness can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions" to help me understand what you're getting at. I brought up a rock, but that didn't seem relevant. You still don't seem to have provided an example. You instead seem to want to skip ahead and pursue your own agenda, turning this back around on me, responding to a question with another question which redirects, which I find quite annoying.

So the question is, what's your favourite goldfish?

I'm just trying to understand which of my premises you disagree with, and why you think it's a matter of begging the question. Then we might be able to discuss our differences on that particular issue. Is it my premise that the human temporal perspective is very specific, and unique to the human being, or is it my premise that "an hour" is a measurement of time dependent on the human temporal perspective, or both? And, please give me some indication of the fault or faults you see in the premise or premises which you disagree with.

You haven't yet told me exactly what it is that you disagree with, and what it is that I am claiming which you think is "begging the question". — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I've already made that very clear, if we assume a usual context, but that this is an unusual context, because it seems to me that, with you, I have to put way more effort into making things clear than I do with others. I think that it's more the case that your "clarity receptors" are the problem here, like a windshield in need of a good wipe.

At least this latest reply from you strikes me as a sign of progress compared to what has preceded it.

Anyway, moving on, I certainly do reject your premise that "an hour" is a measurement of time dependent on the human temporal perspective. Our disagreement here isn't just a matter of logic, it's a matter of semantics. You use some of your key terms in a manner different to how I use those same terms. For example, what you've called a judgement, I would call a fact. And what you've called a measurement also seems to imply, by definition, a subject. So if that's the case, then obviously I can't reasonably adhere to that definition, either. Please tell me you find this as obvious as I do. If you do, then that would at least be a step towards fully understanding the problem with what you've been doing.

I told you ages ago that I wouldn't even speak in the ways that you do, but in different ways. Do you remember ages ago when I mentioned units of measurement? An hour is a unit of measurement. I wouldn't even say that an hour is a measurement. You seem to overlook important details like this. Or it just comes across as sophism, where it looks like you're deliberately trying to exploit ambiguity or beg the question by including your conclusion in the definition of your terms. These are examples of the kind of things which I think that you've been assuming as part of your attempted refutation, and given what I've just explained (and what I have in fact been trying to explain for a long time now), that's why I think that you've been begging the question in your criticism. You have a burden to first argue in support of these things before moving on to my argument, but instead, I think that you've just been assuming them, and then jumping ahead to my argument. I think that you need to stop, slow down, and reverse your tracks back to where this problem is stemming from. Ideally, I think that you should have done that a long, long time ago instead of charging full steam ahead.

Go and have a little chat with Hume about reason and passion, guys. — unenlightened

I can't. He's dead.

Anyway, is anyone that good a philosopher to find others unreasonable and him/herself perfectly rational? — TheMadFool

Have we not met? :wink:

You asked me for my honest thoughts. I am not going to prove to you that I am right. You can consider what I said or you don't. — Echarmion

All I did was ask you a few questions and express a few thoughts. You don't have to do anything you don't want to. No one has a gun to your head, do they?

Cursiously, though, you seem to be the only one who is hell bent on enforcing those kinds of rules in their conversations. Everyone else seems to be able to engage in a discussion without putting up lots of barriers that dictate what can and cannot be said. You seem to be indicating that you think your behavior is somehow necessary self defense. But against what? — Echarmion

If it seems to you that I'm the only one here who acts like I do (and no, I wouldn't word that in your obviously loaded way of putting it), then I suggest that you observe others more, and give it some more thought.

And isn't it clear what it's in defence of from what I said? I spoke of unfairness, the wrong purpose, and exasperation. One shouldn't make a reasonable effort to protect oneself against these kind of things? :brow:

What reasons do you have to assume established members like Terrapin or Michael are arguing in bad faith? It doesn't come across as particularly reasonable to me. — Echarmion

I just explained, did I not? This response from you doesn't seem to have taken into account that explanation. When I'm most reasonable, I don't assume such things, I express reasonable beliefs or suspicions. When I've become exasperated, I'm less likely to be at my most reasonable, and so I might make such assumptions where I would otherwise be more careful.

This sounds awfully self-absorbed. If you're afraid of putting in effort that isn't rewarded, what are you doing here? There is no guarantee that anything you write on an internet forum will be appreciated. Everyone else is dealing with that, too. Noone here is obligated to deliver results to you, and you are not in a position to dictate the rules of discussion. — Echarmion

I don't think that that's a charitable interpretation of what I said.

As a side note, I like the irony of the situation we're now in, where it seems like you are biased against me, in a discussion which began with you suggesting that I was biased.

In my experience, by calling someone unreasonable they are likely to think you are being unreasonable... — Judaka

So? They can think what they want. What matters is whether they're right.

...because how can a reasonable person call a reasonable person (like themselves) unreasonable? — Judaka

That's probably how they would see it from their perspective, yes. So?

Alternatively, it's just ad hominem which is also unreasonable. — Judaka

No, it's not an ad hominem. Believe it or not, I genuinely think that people, sometimes, are unreasonable in certain respects, and that that includes every single one of us. But some people are worse than others, and some people here on this forum are worse than other people here on this forum. I don't need to name names.

It is entirely possible that many reasonable people think other reasonable people are unreasonable because of miscommunication, information asymmetry, the difference in opinions being perceived as too stark. That's why I think people should
1. Constantly question whether they are being reasonable or not
2. Constantly question whether the other person is being unreasonable or not
3. If someone is genuinely unreasonable, just avoid them

If someone really is unreasonable, it's not worth trying to reason with them. There's not much you can do and you will lose the argument even if you win. — Judaka

That sounds sensible. I admit that it may well often be the case that I'm not sensible insomuch as I probably continue to keep trying when I should have just given up already. Some kind of naive optimism? Some kind of masochism?

In my opinion, if someone has been:
1) Unreasonable (illogical),
2) Informed of this, and
3) Persistently unreasonable (illogical),

Then, they are not trying to be reasonable (logical). — Galuchat

What if you inform someone, but they don't understand? That way, is it not possible that they could still be trying? Or, with your second premise, do you mean to suggest that they'd understand by virtue of being informed? I wouldn't use the term that way. I think it makes sense to say that I informed him that such-and-such, but he didn't understand.

To clarify, my view about whether there's a fact of the matter with regards to morality is no different in logical form to my view about whether there's any truth in moral statements. My answer is either no, there's neither: which is the case if we interpret moral statements in the way that yourself and moral objectivists interpret them; or there's both, but the statements and facts would only reflect morality in the subjective and relative sense. For example, the statement "For me, kicking puppies is wrong" would be true, and the corresponding fact would be that, for me, kicking puppies is wrong. Of course, I wouldn't accept that "Kicking puppies is wrong" is true in a simplistic, objective sense. Nor would I accept that it's a fact that kicking puppies is wrong in that same sense.

I wouldn't be inconsistent and claim that there's no fact of the matter, but that there are truths, in the same sense and respect. If there are truths, then there are corresponding facts.

For why I think it's natural, see my earlier comment on natural focal points here.

The diamond ring example was just to show that there can be a distinction between perceived value and actual value (by some metric). — Andrew M

I followed your link, but I didn't find any explanation for why you think it's natural there. Just a few assertions that it's natural, and few references here and there without a clear link between the one and the other.

Here are some things which it makes sense to call natural: trees, grass, oxygen, mountains, rocks, rivers. Morality is like this??

Also, regarding your analogy, okay, but that depends on how you're using "actual value". I can see some people reserving the use of that term for value that is not relative to an artificial standard like monetary value. An anti-realist on value might say that monetary value isn't actual value.

And the analogy wasn't great, given that you're trying to argue that morality is natural. Bit weird to use an analogy with an artificial standard in this context.

I probably do have it wrong. But in trying to pin down what your getting at I just couldn't see what exactly was true about the moral statements anymore. It seemed like the statements were truth-functional, as you admit, but then they had a different kind of truth -- a subjective truth. So that "P" is true in F, where "P" refers to some moral statement and F refers to some frame of reference, usually the moral actor.

But I am unable to differentiate this from the notion that moral statements are just whatever we happen to feel is right -- which seems to me to fall squarely in with non-cognitivism.

So I just feel confused in trying to parse your account, I guess. — Moliere

Okay, so you accept that they're truth-functional (that's a useful term, I'll have to remember that one). That's a start.

Now, why say "just" whatever we happen to feel is right? Is that supposed to indicate that it's trivial or that there's a credible alternative or both? Because I would argue that there's no credible alternative in light of the logical consequences of these proposed alternatives. And I'd also argue that moral judgement isn't trivial.

And why non-cognitivism here?

But that thing about meta-ethics and normative ethics is odd. Do you really thing them distinct? As if one did not have anything to say about the other... — Banno

They're distinct. If you don't know the distinction, look it up.

You want me to stay on my own topic.

A thread has a life of its own. Better to treat the topic as a strange attractor than a fixed point. — Banno

Okay, a thread has a life of its own. I want to talk about goldfish. Let's all talk about goldfish now, instead of the original topic or whatever Banno wants to talk about. It's goldfish now.

So long as we're talking about goldfish instead of the original topic, Banno can make a get away without having to come up with a proper reply to criticism or conceding.

What's that you say? Red herring? No, no, no, let's just talk about goldfish instead. What's your favourite type of goldfish? Mine is a Fantail.

Here's why the op is nonsensical S. The human being has a very particular temporal perspective. We don't see events which are a picosecond in length, and we don't see events which are a billion years long. We live at this particular time and we only see things within a very limited temporal perspective. If human beings are removed, then the human temporal perspective is removed. But your op talks as if you could remove human beings, yet maintain the human temporal perspective. Don't you think that's nonsense? What would maintain the human temporal perspective when there is no human beings? — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course it's not nonsense on its own terms. It's only so as a consequence of you begging the question once again. You simply assume your own understanding instead of mine. You're stuck in your own little world. I've tried to help you out of it, but you seem truly stuck. Ask yourself, for example, whether I accept that hours passing is a temporal perspective to begin with. Do I accept that premise: yes or no? If no, then the logical consequences of accepting it along with my other premises simply does not apply to my position. That would be a non-identical position, even if you successfully refute it. Do you understand that?

Given that begging the question is fallacious, what else have you got? Ah, that's right, just assert that it's nonsense without argument, which is also a fallacy, or revert back to begging the question again. Repeat to infinity, or until I stop trying to get through to you.

Can you not see how inappropriate it is to ask me questions like, "What would maintain the human temporal perspective when there is no human beings?"? It's inappropriate because that doesn't follow from my position. If you throw in one or more of your own premises that I don't accept, then it is not my argument. Doing that is to commit a fallacy of irrelevance. Do you understand that? Are you able to stop yourself from doing this? Or are you stuck? I think that it would help for you to think real hard about what premises you're assuming when you criticise my argument. Think real hard about whether I accept them, or whether they're your own premises which I never accepted to begin with.

I'm way ahead of you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed you are, if "ahead of" means "behind", which it may well do in your topsy turvy world.

Per part two: "Rock" as a sound or any other way delineated or detected is information attempting to be transmitted. The sound or word has meaning and existence as long as their is a least one conscious being left to understand it. — Aadee

What are you referring to as the meaning, then? The information? But that's already there. What do you mean by "transmission"? Whether there's a person there to "receive" or interpret it is a matter relating to understanding, yes? So we could say that it has meaning, but the meaning is not understood. Why shouldn't we talk about it in this way?

OK. You’re just saying there is a condition where there are possible objects yet unthought. If that’s right, then I can say, sure, there’s millions of things I haven’t thought yet. And right now, this minute, every damn one of them is immersed in a hypothetical scenario. — Mww

Okay. But it's also true that there were unconceived objects before beings like us even existed. That's not a hypothetical scenario.

Still, again, if that’s right, I can’t call any of those things a rock, for to formally name an object presupposes its conception. — Mww

Under your model it might do. Under mine it doesn't. That's why my model is superior.

Finger/moon.....funny. I know for a fact my finger isn’t green cheese. — Mww

Are you sure? How do you know that it isn't green cheese when you're not looking?

If you like. — Banno

What I would like is for you to stay on topic. But I suppose that that's asking too much of you?

Let us simplify by performing the following operation...

Not all conceptions [snip]of goodness[endsnip] can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

...and we'll all see that we're left with the following...

Not all conceptions can account for that which exists prior to our conceptions.

How do we know if something exists prior to our naming and describing it? — creativesoul

No, please just clarify what you meant. That's all that I was after. I don't need to answer your question for that.

This distinction is that important to you? Ok. — Banno

They're two different things. You started a discussion on one of them, then switched to the other. Why? Because your argument isn't faring too well? Okay.

SO... and help me out here... you think that we cannot move from the is in "it is moral to do X", to the ought in "we ought to do X"? — Banno

Let's put it this way: I am sceptical. Now, if you think that you can logically demonstrate otherwise, then please give it a go.

You missed it. Terrapin Station was most insistent. — Banno

No, you missed it. We both read what Terrapin Station said. The only difference is that I understood it. I'm confident in my ability to go over it with him and get his confirmation that I do indeed understand it. Whereas I doubt that that would work out with you and him.

When people are kicking off all around you about how you're interpreting something that someone said, that should at the very least give you pause for thought.

Sure. But it seems that we agree, at least most of the time, as to what we ought do.

And isn't working out what to do the point of ethics?

We blow our points of disagreement out of all proportion. — Banno

That's the point of normative ethics. This discussion is about meta-ethics. You should know, you created it.

I suppose I can't get over the notion that the subjectivist accounts wants to claim that such and such statements are true subjectively.

The way I parse that is to say that the subjectivist thinks that all moral statements are in some way reducible to or are really saying something other than what they are saying on their surface. So that

(1) "Kicking the pup is wrong" is true

is reducible to or is actually saying

(2) "I feel that kicking the pup is wrong" is true


But these sentences do not mean the same thing. One is referring to the action "Kicking", and the other is referring to the speaker's state of mind or attitude towards the action.


We can set up some rules around subjective truth, I suppose, but then it seems to me that we're not talking about truth anymore. Truth is a property of statements. And (1) does not mean the same thing as (2). I could say that if a speaker says (1) then (2), but I could not say that the truth value of (1) is the same as the truth value of (2).

In the case where someone says, just to make it easier to see, that kicking the pup is right for instance -- (1) would be false, yet (2) would be true. — Moliere

Well, I'm a moral subjectivist, but as I explained earlier, you'd be parsing it wrong with me if you did so like that, because for me it's not so much about what people mean, but rather what's the best interpretation in terms of the results. It's a practical way to look at it, I would say. There are problems with other interpretations in terms of the logical consequences, and moral subjectivism avoids this. All moral statements are false or unwarranted? Not a good consequence. That's counterintuitive. Therefore, interpret in accordance with moral subjectivism and Bob's your uncle.

Indeed. We see eye to eye yet again.

So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't see the moral import.
— Banno

So, this should be "So, you look at the broken pup and crying child and don't feel any compassion?"

Of course if you feel compassion then your moral feeling is engaged. If you don't then you may well be what is commonly referred to as a sociopath or a psychopath. — Janus

Yeah, that's what it boils down to. Might as well just cut to the chase instead of deliberately concealing it with vague terminology. The moral feelings are what's fundamental.

Pretty much spot on, again.