Trump can be handled by a) the US economy going down and b) his base getting angry at him. Luckily and thanks only to Trump, you are now facing a recession.

When it's about the sovereignty of nation states and issue of war... who gives a fuck about the stock market? It's a minor detail. People don't give a fuck about losing half of their savings, if the issue is about war or peace, their own lives and their countrymen's lives at stake. This isn't anymore about Ukraine, it's all about the Transatlantic alliance. Only the truly blind and the totally ignorant won't see this. But that is what is at stake. — ssu

Sure the US doesn’t look in an existential danger as Europeans are. But not all Europeans are in existential danger as those which are bordering with Russia.
Threat perception varies over countries and one has to clarify the nature of the threat (which can range from conventional war and occupation to hybrid warfare and political interference which may lead to civil wars and regime change) and the degree of its incumbency.
On the other side, hegemony can be to powerful countries an obsession as much as existential threats are to less powerful countries. And the reason is that once one country loses hegemonic power than it can suffer from dangerous internal instabilities (as it happened in the US) and turn into prey of more powerful countries, especially if they had them as their historical enemies.
To my understanding the problem is and has always been not only about Ukraine, not even about the Transatlantic alliance, but about all the material and institutional conditions that allowed Western-style democracies to prosper.

No, it's not logical to break down the globalization that empowerd the US and made it to be prosperous. You can spend without any limits because the US has been a reserve currency, which IS A POLITICAL decision your allies have accepted, not an economic decision or a thing that has emerged just from the free market. Please let that sink in. The World has gone on for thousands of years without a "reserve currency" and can do that again. It's plain an simple: companies participating in foreign trade can use a basket of currencies and don't have to rely on a "reserve currency". Why should let's say Italy and Saudi-Arabia use dollars for oil trade. There is absolutely no reason for this ...other than the US had provided security guarantees for both countries.. — ssu

Your argument looks rather fallacious to me. Power comes from different sources and in must be assessed in relative terms. If dollar is a universal “reserve currency" that is a tool of power, it gives leverage to the US, but that’s not the only factor. And from the end of the Cold War up to now, the US power has decreased significantly wrt powerful competitors like China and Russia, even more so if they are allying to further erode US power. Europeans are helping China and Russia to erode not only US material power but also soft-power.
“Logic” means beliefs and actions are consistent with certain general premises which are held to be true. One can try to question the validity of the premises but I find the premises if not unquestionably true (also because uncertainty remains part of the problem of assessing political strategies), yet plausible enough to be rationally compelling. Indeed, US people and politicians can widely converge on such premises (remember that “pivot to Asia”, "fuck the EU" Nuland, steps toward disengaging the US from antagonizing Russia and from Middle East happened under Obama’s administration already). So much so that while Russia and China enjoyed greater internal stability and wider popular support wrt the US, the burden of US imperialism was nurturing domestic political instabilities. Hence the need to make American great AGAIN.

And then just think of the immediate consequence of this rift between the US and Europe. What will emerge as an obvious result is strategic autonomy, a thing that France has promoted. Sure, France has been an ally of the US, fought in it's wars, yet has not depended on US arms exports. And that makes total sense, because I can easily imagine the rest of Europe being in situation as Ukraine is with the US when Trump acts like he does. If you really think good relations are gotten with bullying and threats, then think again.. — ssu

As I said in another comment “I think it’s still too early to be optimistic about European reactions. No matter what they are going to decide to counter Russia or to revise the European collective approach to security, European leaders are still slowed down by an aging population which is sticking to mental habits and material privileges coming from the pre-Trump era, but which now do not look anymore adaptive. What needs to be changed is more radical than just re-arming. Europeans need an anthropological change that will take generations” .
Besides there is a lot on the table to digest by European politicians and people that is broader than re-arming or, even, raising a European army: namely, growing a European military industrial complex for strategic autonomy, nuclear deterrence and high-tech warfare (satellite, drones, AI, etc.).
Meanwhile the US and Russia can find ways to slow, destabilise or disrupt the European security collective strategy, also by spinning European countries’ domestic and inter-European polarization.

That’s what I keep doing, but you do not want to listen. I’ll repeat it in short. Pivot to Asia, the burden of Globalization, EU parasitism are the main premises of the reasoning. — neomac

And I repeat my line and my question to you: Trump didn't make us to spend more in defense. Putin did. Putin is a threat to Europe. Now you are siding with Putin. What does that make the US for us? — ssu

An enemy

So why be friendly with Russia, a basket case of a country with huge problems, which is run by a dictator and could have it's own revolution, and then push away and anger an union of 500 million people that have thought of America and Americans as friends that share the same values? Why make us the adversary? That's what Trump is doing. It doesn't make any sense.

If Trump wants that, OK. The US won't be a superpower anymore. It will loose it's allies. — ssu

Again I totally get that Trump is taking a risk. But European reaction, like rearming, has been taken into account (e.g. see again Miran’s plan). One has to see to what extent it will play to US favour though. The point is that Europeans do not seem in condition to strategically unite (actually their division can even be nurtured by Russia and the US). There are plenty of European bootlickers eager to serve as puppets.
Anyways, even if Europeans manage to join their forces effectively, the primary incumbent enemy is Russia and this condition plays again in US favour, since Russia would be exposed to security challenges coming from both Europe and China, more than the US is. So the US can play the good cop with Russia.
Concerning the 500k people EU market, notice that it was directly or indirectly more protectionist toward American products than to Chinese products and Russian oil/gas. At the same time Euro as a reserve currency was also a potential competitor to the US dollar if not even a tool of European emancipation from the US (read “A Plan for a European Currency” 1969 by Robert Mundell). So why would the US keep a EU/Euro big market which the US can’t benefit from?
Finally, in a multipolar world where nobody can rely on nobody for their security and that of their business, the US has still a good chance to preserve its supremacy as long as it keeps its strong economy, its technological and military superiority, geographic benefits (location and abundance of natural resources) and sound demographic (compared to Europe, Russia and China’s, see https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-chinese-german-and-russian-demographics). And a much narrower network of powerful/threatening countries, like Russia and Israel.

link the entire interview, I saw a few full interviews from Arakhamia and read articles. And commented on his views a while back:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/search?Search=Arakhamia&expand=yes&child=&forums=&or=Relevance&discenc=VWtyYWluZSBDcmlzaXM%3D&mem=&tag=&pg=1&date=All&Checkboxes%5B%5D=titles&Checkboxes%5B%5D=WithReplies&or=Relevance&user=neomac&disc=Ukraine+Crisis&Checkboxes%5B%5D=child

The gist is that Russia can not be trusted, therefore security guarantees are ABSOLUTELY needed.
But any security guarantees that need Western European third parties must take into account their national interest. We both can agree that I need a loan from the bank to repay my debts toward you. That doesn't mean the bank will accept to give me a loan.
Besides Russia wanted to be able to veto the enforcement of such security guarantees while security guarantees were to defend Ukraine from Russia.

Did you watch the interview with Oleksandr Chalyi, where he literally states he believes the Russians were serious and ready for a negotiated settlement during the Istanbul agreements? — Tzeentch

Did you read the lead negotiator David Arakhamia where he literally states the following?

"There is no, and there was no, trust in the Russians that they would do it. That could only be done if there were security guarantees."

Arahamiya clarified that signing such an agreement without guarantees would have left Ukraine vulnerable to a second incursion.

“They would have come in more prepared, because they came in, in fact, unprepared for such resistance,” Arakhamia said.

(source: https://www.kyivpost.com/post/24645)

When actually many Greenlanders do want independence, and it's just 50 000 people, what Bolton here is actually saying something that Danes could perhaps accept without losing face.

Yet Trump wants to annex more territory into the US. His agenda is to increase the territory of the US to cover all of the North of the American continent with the large island next to it. And this is the proposed with a sublte manner of asking a man if his wife can be raped. — ssu

Trump’s communicative approach in foreign politics is coherent with his aggressive style in domestic politics. And he’s aversion toward to the Europeans is not just resentful because he sees Europeans as materially parasitising the US but also due to an ideological gap that aligns Europeans (mostly the EU) with Democrats and the Woke culture.
Voicing moral outrage to somehow induce the US to be more complacent toward the EU can backfire to the extent Trump could use it once more against Europeans (as Zelensky's appeal to common goals and solidarity backfired against Zelensky in the Oval Office).

OK, I do understand where you are going. And I'm just trying to say that this is absolutely loony.

Autocratic regimes of Russia and China aren't more prosperous than us. — ssu

American-led globalisation empowered Russia and China so that they could challenge US global supremacy. If this is the case, then it’s logic that the US is compelled to break down American-led globalisation which includes a system of alliance and international institutions which are no longer functional to the US. Given that the premise bears enough plausibility, especially to the Americans who supported Trump, and the consequence is logically consistent with the premise, then the argument is compelling. If the argument is compelling, and actions are substantially consistent with this argument, then focusing on how distasteful or shocking this foreign policy u-turn by the US is, hoping that US people and politicians will come to their senses and renormalise relations, looks more a waste of energy to me. Unless that’s a way to wake up not the US, but Europeans so they become more reactive in supporting policies aimed at countering/mitigating US aggressiveness.

Now, why the fuck would you want the same type of reaction against yourself? Really, nobody has answered here what is the reasoning behind alienating your allies and bowing down in front of your enemies? — ssu

That’s what I keep doing, but you do not want to listen. I’ll repeat it in short. Pivot to Asia, the burden of Globalization, EU parasitism are the main premises of the reasoning. Russia is needed to contain China (Israel helps too) and keep it isolated from Europe. To Trump Russia looks enough depleted of power projection means and always jealous of the US attentions. While the EU looks too opportunistic about US economic and military support while being too snobbish about US global policing.
Now both the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and Israeli-Palestinian conflict must end to redirect energies where they need to be.

If you want to say, the US will fail because Europeans are going to do this and that, well first let’s see if they are going to do this and that, and if doing this and that is enough to change the US revolutionary approach to the multipolar world in favour to Europeans, or to sustain the US antagonism.

if scolding and badmouthing Zelensky, demanding a huge minerals deal without giving any security guarantees, cutting all aid and intel is bad — ssu

Very very very bad, but still consistent with the premises. Notice that the US with this deal has:
- Still one strong reason to remain in Ukraine
- Without Russia feeling military antagonized, since it’s officially about business not security (Putin even wants a deal on rare earth with the US on Russian territory)
- With strong benefits for the US (so the US will have a return of investment to make US people happy)
- And anticipating China’s protectionism over rare earth supply as a retaliation against the US tariff war

Trump doesn't quite get it, because he cannot quite say publicly why Zelensky is insisting on fighting on — Tzeentch

Trump could say anything against Biden's administration. And indeed he blames Biden's administration for this war. Besides Trump has a penchant for conspiracy theories, so really it's very hard to understand why he couldn't say this... Ah, you mean that at this point Trump is clearly a Blob's puppet (as much as Biden) and he can't say anything against the Blob, right? But even in this case Trump could blame everything on Biden exclusively. His supporters aren't going to question him anyways. Why couldn't he do that? You have to speculate some more.

Since you do not need any evidence to support your factual claims, then no evidence are needed to dismiss your factual claims. Easy peasy.

But most of all why do you need all these elaborated speculations for, when the US strategy has clearly changed? Why on earth are you so badly looking for an almighty villain to blame everything on?

Why aren't Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems not bribing Trump to push for the war in Ukraine, so they can sell more weapons? — neomac

First, in terms of general principle, the war profiteering contribution from the war in Ukraine, especially in terms of defence contractors, is in creating a far less stable world generally speaking in which it is "common sense" that more arms are needed by all parties. I.e. in stoking a new arms race.
Once adequately stoked, a fire no longer needs further kindling.

Second, even defence contractors don't want a nuclear war and even they would recognize the need for drip feed theory. Which, as the name connotes, is far from the maximalist approach to "whatever it takes" to supply arms to Ukraine. Indeed, defence contractors don't even want too much war!!

Too much war, even in setting policy too ambitiously in arming Ukraine, would be bad for defence contractors as it would be necessary to transition to a war time economy, at least partially. What a war time economy means is a central planning and low wage, if not volunteer, basis to war production (think women building planes in WWII). — boethius

May even open pandoras box of the defence contractor world in that socialism is a far more efficient and strategically sound approach to arms production. — boethius

As far as I can recall, that’s the first time you are bringing this argument up with me. And I really appreciated it. No irony. At least it’s something new and definitely worth discussing.
Some more questions: what empirical evidence support your claim that “socialism is a far more efficient and strategically sound approach to arms production”? And what do you mean by “strategically sound”?

I would agree to this when it comes to Putin, Netanyahu, Bush etc. But Trump really is an exception here. Let me put it this way:

Was there a drive in the US for the territorial expansion of the US as Trump has put it? If you haven't noticed, this has truly angered the Canadians to feel that this isn't just a trade issue at stake here. Really, before Trump I didn't notice this thinking that the Northern Hemisphere ought to be belonging and annexed by the US anywhere inside the US. If someone (correctly in some events) called the US policy neo-imperialist, this is actually quite old-school imperialism. The fact is, nobody, no political movement was asking for territorial expansion that Trump has declared his objective. This really is Trump's own designs that he's taken on. — ssu

No political or popular “movement” ok, but American analysts have been on these issues for a while now
(For example, see this article: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1944-10-01/iceland-greenland-and-united-states, or here: https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-importance-greenland-us-national-security, or here: https://www.politico.com/news/2022/10/23/china-diplomacy-panama-00062828).
Also the hawkish Bolton was among such analysts as much as part of Trump’s advisors in his first mandate:
https://www.thefp.com/p/john-bolton-trump-greenland-denmark-casino
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/03/bolton-builds-anti-china-campaign-at-the-u-n/
(Notice that even though Bolton seems now willing to question Trump, that’s more about Trump’s aggressive diplomacy than about his strategic motives).

Concerning the Neo-imperialist attitude this looks to me still functional to counter the perceived challenges posed by the current multi-polar environment infested by powerful authoritarian regimes, as I already said. Since I don’t know if you read it, I’ll repost it for the third time:

As I wrote a while back, the problem the West must face is that if rising anti-Western regimes do not evolve into more Western-style liberal democracies, the West may feel compelled to adopt the characteristics of these anti-Western, militarized authoritarian regimes in order to balance the asymmetry. Meanwhile, nationalist and religious motivations, as well as propaganda, are likely to take precedence over universal human rights motivations and/or propaganda. Imperial ambitions may also become more openly territorial, which AT BEST could lead to a form of agreed-upon, stable (?) spheres of influence. In this scenario, minority groups and non-hegemonic states will likely face oppression, exploitation, or will be used to serve the interests of the dominant powers one way or another through local populist bootlickers.

Trump seems to be reasoning along these lines:

* If Russia can make territorial claims over Ukraine and China can do the same with Taiwan, then the U.S. could claim territories like Greenland, Panama, or even Canada.
* If Russia commits genocide or ethnic cleansing in Ukraine, and China does the same against the Uyghurs, then Israel can act similarly in Palestine.
* If Russia and China can leverage economic pressure or political division to exploit Europe against the U.S., the U.S. can retaliate in the same way against Russia and China.
* If Russia and China reject green agreements, the U.S. can do the same.
* If China exploits Russia to counterbalance the U.S., the U.S. can attempt to exploit Russia against China.
* If Russia and China promote nationalism or religious extremism to advance their geopolitical agendas, the U.S. can follow the same path.
* If Russia and China adopt protectionist policies against the GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft), the U.S. can similarly oppose China’s technologies and Russia’s attempts to exploit them against the West the US.

And so on.
(Source: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/963479)

I think professor Timothy Snyder explains best the view I have about Trump. Snyder correctly explains what the Trump plan for Ukraine is: "It's not a peace plan yet, but a warmongering process" as "literally everything that Washington has done under Trump, has made it easier for Russia to carry out the war". Snyder observes that Russia itself isn't talking about a peace process and it hasn't given away on any of it's objectives, It's just that the US stance has come aligned with it. Making concessions to Russia just enables them far more. And Snyder also notes how Trump views the issue at a personal level, Trump and Putin personally. Similarly Snyder noticed in the scolding of Zelenskyi that Trump told that "he and Putin have gone through tough times together". — ssu

I really appreciated Timothy Snyder’s insights in this video (I’ve been always his fan).
Surely Trump is playing a risky game. And one should keep in mind also the points he makes starting from min 12:43:
If you get to a situation where Ukrainians are in effect given the deal that American power and Russian power will overwhelm them unless they accept what is in fact a surrender, if you get to that solution, here are the precedents you're setting:
1. you're setting the precedent that National sovereignty and the legal World Order don't mean anything because Russia invaded Ukraine in a very straightforward violation of the most basic principles of international law.
2. the second precedent that you're setting is that the aggressor will come out ahead um and you'll be setting that precedent in dramatic fashion because at the moment American policy seems to be and I would love to be wrong about this but it seems to be to reward Russia with things that Russia's not capable of getting on the battlefield on its own
3. perhaps even more significant is that you're encouraging nuclear proliferation because if we get the outcome of the war where Ukraine is forced to surrender then every medium-sized country is going to draw the conclusion that they need to have nuclear weapons to prevent a Russian style scenario

My only objection is that he also dismisses too quickly the Trumps approach without considering the reasoning that makes it more compelling than it looks.

Why aren't Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems not bribing Trump to push for the war in Ukraine, so they can sell more weapons?

war profiteering going. — boethius

Who are they? List 3 of them.

Wtf, no Iceland? At least I heard Icelandic leader being quite on the side of Ukraine. — ssu

You may be right (https://www.icelandreview.com/news/icelands-foreign-minister-accuses-trump-of-humiliating-zelensky/). I don't know how they prepared that map. But, a part from Hungary and Slovakia, see Italy.

PKK declares ceasefire in 40-year conflict with Turkiye
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/3/1/pkk-declares-ceasefire-in-40-year-conflict-with-turkiye-kurdish-media

But now my argument is strong, that this crisis will weaken this nationalism and increase unity and cohesion across Europe. Some proponents of this nationalism are in disarray. They don’t know what to make of Trumps pivot to a Putin fanboy. Many of them while flirting with Russian talking points don’t take seriously the idea of swapping sides, so to speak. Nigel Farage is in this position in the U.K. There are Reform(his party) supporters abandoning Reform over the unpleasant taste of being aligned with Putin. More broadly nationalist support is based primarily on the immigration issue. Not some kind of appeasement, or support for Putin.

All this Putin stuff seems to have come from Trump, who isn’t a nationalist. Although hiding behind the banner of nationalism, he is a demagogue, who aspires to authoritarian rule. Politics doesn’t figure, it’s raw power. — "Punshhh

I think it’s still too early to be optimistic about European reactions. No matter what they are going to decide to counter Russia or to revise the European collective approach to security, European leaders are still slowed down by an aging population which is sticking to mental habits and material privileges coming from the pre-Trump era, but which now do not look anymore adaptive. What needs to be changed is more radical than just re-arming. Europeans need an anthropological change that will take generations.
What’s worse is that the burden of democracy and multilateral agreements within a multipolar world infested by powerful authoritarian regimes, and which Trump looks pretty much determined to unload from the US’s shoulders, is still what European countries are suffering from. As long as they had the US on their side, European political leaders and people could easily ignore this problem, so much so that Europeans myopically abused of their comfort zone. But now European democracies (with their appeal to freedom of speech and universal human rights, and self-deprecating or anti-American rhetoric) do not only have to face the challenges coming from Russia and China, but also from the US.
Good luck with that.

Look. Trump takes these issues quite personally. Notice his rant about "He and Putin" being thrown into fire with the Russiagate. How was Putin under fire? That is the real Trump. Soft-skinned and vindictive narcissist, who has a lot of hate and revenge to give after all those court cases. When Europeans try to be diplomatic, he sees weakness. But when they dare to talk about the Atlantic Alliance, the rules based order, Trump sees just Biden loving liberals who he resents. That's why Europe and Trump are on a collision course and there's no way out of this. — ssu

I think we make a real failure of thinking that somehow Trump has logic and reason behind his actions. He doesn't. People desperately wish there would be and want to see that there is. You see, in his first Administration he didn't actually get much done, which is actually great. — ssu

I deeply disagree with your approach. And I think this deep disagreement has manifested already in other occasions when we talked about Bush’s war on terror or Netanyahu's war on Hamas.
To me, leaders matter to the extent they are supported (actively or passively). Leaders matter to the extent they aggregate, represent, and guide collective interests coming from ordinary people, powerful economic and media lobbies, geopolitical experts, political entourage and advisors. And such interests are related to domestic and foreign challenges. So to make it all about the “erratic” or “vindictive” psychology of the leader or his official speeches or his personal conflict of interests is very myopic to me. One has to understand what are the perceived challenges from whoever supports Trump’s views, approach, official speeches in his background. That’s why I’m talking about logic: the exercise is to understand what could possible be the more widely shared premises (no matter how implausible they look to you) by collective interests which support Trump and then what most coherently can follow from such premises. This holds for Trump, for Putin, for Netanyahu, as any other political leader.
Besides Trump is the product of a political regime which is different from Putin’s. In the US political regime power is much more distributed and therefore constrained than in Russia. For sure Trump has amassed lots of power more than any of his recent predecessors, given the current US regime, and, given his mindset, he could very much exploit such favourable institutional conditions to push further for a regime change in the US in an authoritarian sense. The problem for the Europeans is that they have now not only Putin but also Trump as enemies.

Hegseth Orders Pentagon to Stop Offensive Cyberoperations Against Russia
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/02/us/politics/hegseth-cyber-russia-trump-putin.html

You should not convince me. You should convince Trump. I'm talking about his views as I understand them, I've tried to reconstruct his reasoning, from premises to conclusions. For Trump, abandonment could be a policy goal or a bargaining chip. Europeans now have to prepare for both scenarios: https://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/briefs/trump-card-what-could-us-abandonment-europe-look
Besides I'm not saying Trump will succeed. That doesn't mean Europe, Russia or China will succeed either. What Trump is injecting into this multi-polar world is the idea that the US has the means to undermine trust and commitments of all the players by exploiting others' weaknesses and making threats: that's not only true for the West but also for the Rest, since Russia can break e.g. from China and Iran. But if anybody is on their own, then the bigger beasts have greater chance to eat the smaller ones and the biggest wins the competition.

In politics, there is nothing more exploitable than feelings. In the West moral outrage as much as anti-Americanism so publicly advertised were exploitable, were exploited and will be exploited by powers hostile to the West AGAINST the West. Looking cynical or hypocritical (or deceitful about one own's feelings), can very much work as defence mechanisms against emotional exploitation and blackmailing.
What's worse is that religious and nationalist fanaticism can be more valuable to politicians than moral standing and pacifism, for the simple reason that the former create the psychological deterrence (they are ready to kill and be killed with not much qualms) the latter is incapable of inducing in perceived enemies.

I'm not really seeing a carrot here though. Threatening to withdraw security guarantees isn't a carrot, it's another stick. It's all stick.

Trump seems to operate on an extreme version of the door in the face policy where he ramps up the rhetoric, then turns it down a bit, only to ramp it back up again if there's no immediate reaction.

If Trump wanted to peel of countries from Europe to firmly anchor to the US, the obvious target would be Britain. Yet by ramping up the rhetoric and questioning US support, the Trump administration is instead causing Britain to deepen it's ties with France. — Echarmion

Right, it’s stick and stick, not carrot and stick, but whatever you want to call it, that’s Trump’s advisor’s proposed strategy. Britain has to deal with Trump’s extortionist approach and to try to hedge against it, if things go sideways but the instinct is still the same: insist on the “special relation” and try to bridge the divide with treats like an “unprecedented” invitation for a second state visit from King Charles.
The US wants to maintain the upper hand in dealing with other countries, it doesn’t matter if they are allies or not, since also allies can defect, betray or abuse of the benefits coming from superpowers' protection. While enemies are more willing to cooperate when they feel too weak.

My understanding is that on one side, the pivot to Asia, namely the incumbency of competing superpower like China, has been a strategic concern for the US politics for a good decade. So an economically/military weak Russia, subordinate to China (which is also eroding Russian influence on its eastern flank), in desperate need to regain its superpower status (like at the end of the Second World War) can be instrumental to the US in exchange for a strategic partnership. — neomac


Eh, I'm not buying it. Russia is in no position to help contain China. Russian demographics don't support it and it's diplomatic capital in Asia is in decline. Russian efforts in Africa seem to have fared somewhat better, but a bunch of mercenaries aren't competitive with the economic incentives China can offer.
And at the end of the day Putin's regime would have trouble selling it's role as the US' new junior party to the russian public. — Echarmion

Russia has a nuclear arsenal, oil and gas to fuel the Chinese economy. Its extension and geographic position can be used to constrain routes from China to Europe and to the arctic region. If the US helps Russia to end the conflict in Ukraine and remove the economic sanctions, Russia won’t feel the pressure to rely on China any more, it will have time to recover its resources to re-assert its dominance against those Russian federal states more vulnerable to the Chinese influence. But the US could help Russia even more to overcome its weaknesses (for example by providing needed technology). Go figure if the US sells weapons which Europeans are not willing to buy to Russia.
BTW also China has a problem of demographic decline.

I'm not really sure what you're talking about here. The US is China's biggest single customer. And Europe has been moving in concert with the US regarding China for the most part.

Russia has been a bit different due to Europe's reliance on Russian gas but the war has already "fixed" that.

And in terms of military support, European forces where involved everywhere from Afghanistan to Lybia. Sure US relations have been contentious with various European parties, but accusing Europe of "spinning populist anti-Americanism" is just a really weird take. — Echarmion

But you must read more carefully. I wrote “Europe has spent 30 years of globalisation enriching themselves and the US enemies (Russia and China) at the expense of the US”. Germany, France, Europe didn’t buy enough American to balance their business affairs with China.
Surely you too are right to observe that also the US contributed to enrich China. To Trump however that means pro-globalization American establishment is responsible for enriching the enemies of the US. They have to be blamed, not Trump nor the US he represents.
Concerning European populism (especially far right populism), from the US perspective the issue is still the same. The problem is not much the legitimacy of US foreign policy criticisms. The problem is that the combination of aversion to NATO, EU (both instrument of American dominance), US imperialism (see criticisms toward “war on terror”), and Anti-Zionism (see criticisms against Israel seen as instrument of American imperialism) were infiltrated/supported by enemies of the US (Russia, China, Iran), while still Europe was hypocritically enjoying the benefits of the US protection. And their advocates were rising to mainstream politics. So now how can Trump reverse this trend? How can Trump use far right nationalists against Russia, China, Iran, etc.? Starting by reneging NATO, EU (both instrument of American dominance), US neoliberal imperialism, pushing their support to become more mainstream can help, but what about Israel? Trump needs more christian fanatics who are more anti-muslim and anti-arabs, than anti-Zionist not only at home but also in Europe.

Turn European countries into submissive client status and then what? I'm missing the strategic objective here. You talked earlier about the US wanting to avoid being overstretched, but turning allies into clients leads to more overstretching, not less. — Echarmion

The overstretching came from overcommitment to allies and from policing a liberal world order which allies and enemies could benefit from more than the US. Indeed, European allies (in particular Germany as the EU leader, but also France and Italy) didn’t pay their due for the security the US was offering, on the contrary they increased the reputational costs of American foreign policies, while still doing business with Russia and China and without any concern for their hegemonic ambitions and competition with the US. Now there is no liberal world order to police, nor obligations toward allies which do not pay American support as requested. Anybody who wants the US economic and military support has to sacrifice a bigger piece of its economic, political and military independence: markets must be wide open to American products, politicians should literally turn into American cheerleaders and European defense feed US military industry to offset security threats (like Russia). Clients do not lead to overstretching in the racketing business, that’s how mobsters ensure their criminal business to perpetuate.

Honestly I do not think the policies of the current administration correspond to the kind of traditional power politics you're outlining. I think we're seeing attempts by at least some people in the administration to engineer a radical break with all US "entanglements". Elon Musk today tweeted support for the US leaving both NATO and the UN. There was an angry message from Trump towards Europe and Zelensky, followed by significantly more conciliatory tones at a press conference.

The obvious result of this is chaos and uncertainty, not any strategic improvement of the US' geopolitical position. Perhaps the chaos is indeed the point. — Echarmion

What do you mean by “traditional power politics”? My understanding is based on comparing Trump’s current strategy wrt his predecessors’ (given the problems his predecessors had to face like overstretching and pivoting to China ), Trump’s advisors/sidekicks (like Miran, Musk and Bannon), and geopolitical analysts (like Mearsheimer). Trump’s strategy looks to me as an effort to maintain the American supremacy in accordance with the MAGA motto while adapting to the emergence of a multi-polar environment infested by powerful and ambitious authoritarian regimes.
Finally, “chaos” is about uprooting what has been taken for granted by allies and enemies about the US, right? How can such “chaos” serve Trump’s MAGA agenda to you? Maybe some order is still preferable to no order, right? What order is the preferable order to the US? What US preferable order may more likely lead allies and enemies fearing chaos to converge upon, right now , and without falling into the previous toxic dynamics?
Look, I may be wrong, and frankly I wish it to be if that's for the best, but maybe it’s better to take into account the worst scenario consistent with the available evidence. See where believing that Russia wouldn’t eventually invade Ukraine led us.

Europe is not one subject. It can be conveniently fragmented by pushing domestic nationalism. And Europeans, especially the anti-American and pro-Russian nationalists are happy to fragment Europe. Now those very same anti-American and pro-Russian nationalists will get what they wished for. They are going to love it.

There is a dichotomy here, nationalism pulls together for the fight in a war. If the libertarians want to create division in Europe to weaken the EU. Forcing them to step up to defend a European country is not the way to do it. Indeed, the opposite will happen. It will probably end in an integrated European army. I’m reminded of what Sweden and Finland did following Putin’s invasion. Strengthening NATO. They (Sweden) are prepairing for war conducting exercises with Canadian forces. Looks as though the opposite of what Putin wanted is going to happen. — Punshhh

If you think that “integrated European army” is the likely result of Trump’s pressure and an integrated European army is precondition for the European strategic emancipation on world stage, then paradoxically Europeans should welcome Trump’s pressure. However Europe is not just Finland and Sweden, nor is their alliance going to compromise Trump’s agenda. And nationalism can be used also to break European cohesion, as it has been so far. Besides what European may need is not just an integrated army, but also an integrated military-industrial complex, and also a nuclear arsenal. Maybe the latter is even quicker to achieve.

But this doesn't make sense. Fine if you want to downside your military, if you want to go back to the US, be the proverbial isolationist, why then attack your allies? Why go so blatantly and so clearly on the side that is and has been hostile to you? Why vote in favour of Russia and North Korea when even China abstained from the vote in the UN? Why repeat Kremlin talking points? And why then this bizarre ideas about Trump Gaza? Why the attempt to annex Greenland and Panama? The US behavior under Trump is not something what you describe above.

Above all, is Elon cutting dramatically the American military to be half of it's size? Of course not.

And the US people and the politicians? I don't think that they have converged to this idea at all. If they would, then you could post me ample amount of speeches and commentary that this would be the case. — ssu

Here some clarifications:
First, I was talking specifically about the issue of “overstretching”. Imperial overstretch can be broadly understood as the overextension geographically, economically, or militarily that inevitably leads to the exhaustion of vital domestic resources, decline, and fall (https://niallferguson.substack.com/p/debt-has-always-been-the-ruin-of). This risk was abundantly under the radar of American analysts, prior to Obama administration (https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/07/15/the-danger-of-imperial-overstretch/)
And it became even more pressing under Obama and the pivot to Asia:
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/25/04/2017/obama-and-%E2%80%9Cunder-reachover-reach%E2%80%9D-dilemma-american-grand-strategy
Secondly, I wasn’t talking about isolationism. I think Trump is aiming at revising American Imperialism where the US keeps a sphere of influence but more affordable/sustainable (also militarily). And this will take place at the expense of international liberal order. The international liberal was supported by the US during the globalisation but it ended up benefiting, mostly: EU, Russia, and China. Maybe it came natural to many to think that the end of American-led world order automatically meant the end of American imperialism. But if one understands the extent to which the American-led world order was a BURDEN on the US, one can understand why its end doesn’t necessarily compromise US hegemonic ambitions. On the contrary, it can unleash them. Indeed, once the US breaks free from multilateral agreements (that could be vetoed), the costs of policing the world, and spinning the liberal-democratic propaganda, American foreign policies have an “unprecedented” wider spectrum of options (I’ve already talked about this one month ago [1]) also for decreasing their costs. This comes at the price however of accepting greater risks and more fluid alliances, hedged only to the extent the US maintains its military/technological/financial supremacy.
Thirdly, the wide support for Trump’s second mandate in the name of “Make American Great again” evidently show that Trump’s agenda and propaganda were effective to gain popular consensus over internal and external challenges. And things were set in motion already in his first mandate. Notice however that Biden, in between the two Trump’s mandate, kept following the foreign policy trends set by Trump in his first mandate:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/22/biden-us-policy-trump-legacy-foreign-policy-aukus/
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/strategic-change-us-foreign-policy?lang=en
“U.S. Foreign Policy on the Verge of a New Path” https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8807368/
Ukraine also provides a case to understand left-leaning attitude toward the risk of overstretching: despite the rhetoric, Biden’s support for Ukraine was pretty much self-restrained (while the support for Israel wasn’t as much) for reasons that do not seem explainable exclusively in terms of military aid capacity or fear of escalation e.g. to a nuclear conflict.
My understanding is that this approach was inspired by the need of containing Russia (and Russia’s influence in Europe) without overdoing, namely, without diverging efforts from the pivot to China, or even letting China profit from Russia’s weakness to increase its regional influence. Indeed, ”China, not Russia, poses the greatest long-term threat to American interests" (https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/03/ukraine-wants-security-guarantees-does-that-mean-america-must-go-to-war/). Biden had also to take into account the raise of domestic concerns from overcommitting  to foreign conflicts (see https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/11/25/wide-partisan-divisions-remain-in-americans-views-of-the-war-in-ukraine/ where only  “18% say the U.S. is not providing enough support” to Ukraine).
Not to mention the far left which spins anti-imperialist propaganda and keeps invoking restraint and retrenchment: https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/11/15/chomsky-foreign-policy-book-review-american-idealism/


[1] https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/963479

As I wrote a while back, the problem the West must face is that if rising anti-Western regimes do not evolve into more Western-style liberal democracies, the West may feel compelled to adopt the characteristics of these anti-Western, militarized authoritarian regimes in order to balance the asymmetry. Meanwhile, nationalist and religious motivations, as well as propaganda, are likely to take precedence over universal human rights motivations and/or propaganda. Imperial ambitions may also become more openly territorial, which AT BEST could lead to a form of agreed-upon, stable (?) spheres of influence. In this scenario, minority groups and non-hegemonic states will likely face oppression, exploitation, or will be used to serve the interests of the dominant powers one way or another through local populist bootlickers.

Trump seems to be reasoning along these lines:

* If Russia can make territorial claims over Ukraine and China can do the same with Taiwan, then the U.S. could claim territories like Greenland, Panama, or even Canada.
* If Russia commits genocide or ethnic cleansing in Ukraine, and China does the same against the Uyghurs, then Israel can act similarly in Palestine.
* If Russia and China can leverage economic pressure or political division to exploit Europe against the U.S., the U.S. can retaliate in the same way against Russia and China.
* If Russia and China reject green agreements, the U.S. can do the same.
* If China exploits Russia to counterbalance the U.S., the U.S. can attempt to exploit Russia against China.
* If Russia and China promote nationalism or religious extremism to advance their geopolitical agendas, the U.S. can follow the same path.
* If Russia and China adopt protectionist policies against the GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft), the U.S. can similarly oppose China’s technologies and Russia’s attempts to exploit them against the West the US.

And so on.

the US must avoid to overstretch, must contain China, both European countries and Russia must be more instrumental to the US strategic interests than the other way around, and at this point the US has greater leverage over European countries and Russia. — neomac

What leverage the US has over Russia? Trump has surrendered the position that everybody know how you deal with Russia, from a position of strength. It has thrown away it's own cards and become an subservient to Russia in pushing the agenda what Russia wants. Before the negotiations have even started, it has accepted the major Russian points that Putin has made. So idiot Vance tells that these arguments that Putin has made are "reality". Well, that Ukraine would be fighting a war still after 3 years of the conventional attack wasn't "reality" for anyone except the will of the Ukrainian people. — ssu

To me the war in Ukraine wasn’t primarily about evidently pressing security concerns for Russia (I don’t think they were non-existent but they worked more as convenient pretexts), but about:
1. Russia imperialist ambitions and power projection: reshaping the world order in which Russia could see it self as top-rank superpower beside the US like during Stalin, Soviet Union, Cold War, and related sphere of influence. Feelings there shared not only by Putin but by its political and economic entourage, part of Russian intelligentsia, and Russian people.
2. Grabbing the opportunity provided by a series of favourable conditions: EU unreadiness and fear of escalation, conflicts between EU and the US (anti-NATO and anti-American feelings), US domestic instabilities and US pivoting to Asia. And the pressure of unfavourable conditions: Russia’s incumbent demographic decline and pro-Western ideological corruption of Russian youth especially in the capital (democracy, human rights, freedom etc.)

So the leverage Trump has is to finally satisfy Russia’s aspirations, and to save Russia from China’s fatal hug, in the moment where Russia is more vulnerable since the beginning of the conflict wrt the US and China. Besides what if Trump helps Putin economically recover e.g. by removing sanctions?
I don’t think public declarations alone help us understand the full picture and I can’t discount the possible existence of reserved diplomatic channels where Putin and Trump may have found some basic agreement already by the end of last year. What however strikes me the most is the idea that Trump is taking by far the initiative to reset the relationship with Russia, without much evident concessions from Putin other than political flattery. Anyways, taking into account Trump’s aggressive diplomacy and even extortion (see Miran’s plan), my speculation is that Trump is de facto provoking and humiliating the Europeans to trigger some reaction that can be conveniently exploited against Russia one way or the other. If Europeans will prove to be so determined to counter Russia’s expansionism even by military means, if necessary, Trump can play the role of the good cop offering a partnership to spare Russia’s predicament from getting worse. In exchange, Trump expects Russia to detach from its current allies (China, Iran, North Korea), and avoid to interfere in the Middle East (also in favour of Israel). The cooperation with Russia and Israel will help further isolate China from Europe. If Europeans give up on Ukraine and start to go in different directions, Europe as a common project will likely end , then there will be those which will turn into US bootlickers and those which will turn into Russian bootlickers. The difference is just that if the US bootlickers will be happier than the Russian bootlickers, resentment toward Russia will grow once again and Russia will need to repress, so the burden of overstretching will be put once again on Russia’s shoulders without US antagonising Russia.
In both cases, Trump can sell weapons to Europeans to counter Russia but only for business sake (like Turkey with Ukraine), not because he cares about Russia taking Ukraine or other pieces of Europe to re-establish its sphere of influence. So much so that Europeans are compelled not only buy but also buy as much as possible prior to any conflict with Russia to avoid that the US will stop selling weapons to favour Russia. In both cases, there will be some “bucket-passing” (“when a great power finds itself in a defensive posture trying to prevent rivals from gaining power at its expense, it can choose to engage in balancing or intervene by favoring buck-passing—transferring the responsibility to act onto other states while remaining on the sidelines, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offensive_realism#Theoretical_flaws).
Notice that this speculative scenario is somehow reversing globalization: Europe and Russia will be put one against the other to empower the US and help the US contain US rivals (primarily China, but also Russia and Iran).
It’s a “Weimar moment” for the international order: US resentment + economic weakness (debt) + weakness international institutions and soft power are leading to a more assertive/aggressive and authoritarian US.

Because just look how actually thoughtful and visionary someone like Marco Rubio was before Putin invaded in 2022. (Notably you can see a person who is now a the secretary of defense in his former position in the video). Rubio understood that Russia would attack Ukraine and Rubio had been a very pro-Ukrainian hawk. Here, before the 2022 invasion, he was saying that Ukraine has to be armed. Here's a blast from the past: — ssu

Once one takes into account the full picture one can see better how propaganda is instrumental for longer political trajectories (after putting aside the part in which the propaganda of one side is just trying to put the blame on the opposite side): Russia WAS and IS a threat to Europe and Trump wants to keep it that way (even better if Russia feels threatened by Europe). It’s just that neither Biden-style nor EU-style approach (as shown by European politicians hesitant toward Russia or infiltrated by Russia) could handle the Russian threat the way Trump can to support MAGA. Russia poses a different threat to the US now (before it was too close to Europe, then too close to China), so Trump needs to contain the Russian threat independently from the European contribution to such containment, by offering Russia the US partnership to re-balance.

He might genuinely be so stupid as he comes through his rhetoric and actions, which will just end up in the dismantlement of American power in a very rapid way. Note that Europeans have already seen where this is going. Friedrich Merz said that Europe has to be independent of the US and isn't sure if NATO will be around for the next NATO summit in the summer.

Likely it will be around in the end of June, but the Hague is a great place for Trump to leave NATO. — ssu

We will see. I just believe that Trump’s moves however outrageous to our political habits are more logic than they appear. He’s certainly playing a risky game. And things can go awfully wrong in so many ways. But even if Trump won’t achieve his goals, that doesn’t mean Europeans are going to achieve theirs. As I wrote two years ago: “Outside the EU (or some other form of federation) Europeans might go back to compete one another not only economically but also for security. And outside the US sphere of influence, we might compete not only with Russia, and China and other regional or global competitors, but also with the US. Good luck with that.”

I totally understand that the US is playing a risky game because they might still very much need allies to preserve their superpower status. But in the current predicament they clearly privilege those which are proven to be helpful and faithful to the US’s struggle for supremacy, then it’s matter of European people’s taste: Netanyahu, Starmer, or Salvini? — neomac

Yeah,

Why don't you start with the allies that have contributed soldiers that have participated in the wars you have fought? Wouldn't they be the ones that are important? Or you want those allies that won't do anything, but praise your President? Guess then your most helpful and faithful allies are Bibi and Victor Orban, which the former naturally hasn't ever contributed forces to your wars, but you contribute troops to even today. And why doesn't Trump ask the billions back from Bibi then?

In fact, just in Afghanistan, Denmark suffered the second most casualties compared to the population, which is quite small.

Number of foreign soldiers killed in Afghanistan
Country Deaths Population (2010) Deaths per million
1.USA 2,461* 309 million 7.96
2. Denmark 43 5.5 million 7.82
3.Georgia 32 4.4 million 7.27
4.UK 457 63 million 7.25
5.Estonia 9 1.3 million 6.92
6.Canada 159* 34 million 4.68
7.New Zealand 10 4.4 million 2.27
8.Norway 10 4.9 million 2.04
9.Australia 41 22 million 1.86
10.Latvia 4 2.2 million 1.82

So how is Trump valuing Denmark as an ally and the commitment the small country has made? He wants to buy or annex parts of it, and hasn't refrained from even using military force. In that Trump shows his real face.

Don't ever think that this is normal or belittle the past administrations that they too would be as "transactional" as Trump. For the MAGA crowd, those are the "Deep State". This really isn't normal behavior anymore. — ssu

The problem is that Trump is questioning his predecessors’ strategies based on liberal internationalism and Western alliance, so he doesn’t feel committed to liberal internationalism, nor responsible for its legacy or supporters. I doubt what we are going to see a backlash against Trump from Europe soon, since the closest threat to Europe is now Russia.
But I do wonder what European pro-Russian supporters, even in this thread, would think if Trump materially enables Russia to completely defeat Ukraine. After all it’s always Trump who said he would encourage Russia to ‘do whatever the hell they want’ to any NATO country that doesn’t pay enough.

The Trump administration has fxcked up big time. By cutting USAID they have fallen at the first hurdle. The biggest threat from China over the last few decades has been their aid and investment strategies around the third world(amongst others). Now the influence the U.S. had in these arenas has been handed to China on a plate. While Russia is following China’s example in the African continent and we have the rise of BRICS. — Punshhh

USAID was part of the US soft-power arsenal (something similar holds for China). But America soft-power narrative has been exploited by anti-Americans outside and, most importantly, inside Europe, to further discredit the US foreign policies, or, if you prefer, American imperialism (China wasn’t discredited as much). So if you want USAID now you have to beg for it and stop shitting over US foreign policies or, if you prefer, American imperialism. Besides there are means for the US to mess-up with Chinese investments around the world, by fomenting conflicts or by bending political will with threats (https://www.csis.org/analysis/italy-withdraws-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative) or by extending territorial control (see the story of Panama and Greenland).
I totally understand that the US is playing a risky game because they might still very much need allies to preserve their superpower status. But in the current predicament they clearly privilege those which are proven to be helpful and faithful to the US’s struggle for supremacy, then it’s matter of European people’s taste: Netanyahu, Starmer, or Salvini?

Secondly they have misunderstood the motives in Europe. The failure of the TTIP negotiations wasn’t a failure on the part of the EU, it was them not falling over and becoming an economic vassal block via U.S. litigation which would be imported along with the goods. A colonisation through the economic back door.
Also the deleterious effects the U.S. experienced as a result of globalisation were also felt by European countries. It affected all Western countries and is the primary reason why the EU is struggling economically at this time. — Punshhh

European motives, no matter how legitimate, risk very much to fail when they fly over power relations. And lions want and take the biggest share, no matter how hungry the others are. Maybe Europeans could have played it smarter instead of playing it harder? For sure, they had time. Now time is over.

They will fall at the next hurdle if they alienate Europe and find they have no friends anymore. How sad, although, they will have Putin’s shoulder to cry on I suppose. — Punshhh

Europe is not one subject. It can be conveniently fragmented by pushing domestic nationalism. And Europeans, especially the anti-American and pro-Russian nationalists are happy to fragment Europe. Now those very same anti-American and pro-Russian nationalists will get what they wished for. They are going to love it.

Why the US doesn't see this a hostile intent is beyond me. But I guess too much of "culture war" and too much of the idea that the "Deep State" in the US is the real enemy blurs people from seeing those who really have hostile intent. — ssu

I think that in the US most people and politicians (left or right leaning, it doesn’t matter) have finally converged on the idea that the US can’t afford anymore to overstretch: overwhelming debt for military expenditure, dispersing resources around the world in geopolitical arena without significant return of their political, military, economic investment while enemies and allies grow fatter and hostile toward the US. So now the US is betting on the fact that neither Europeans nor Russia can really profit much from the US downsizing their presence in Europe to threaten the US strategic interests (also in Europe) in the foreseeable future, at least by comparison with China. Russia and Europe look now too weak to challenge Trumps’ game, and their weakness can be played against one another.

If American nationalists wish to keep the US as the strongest superpower, which they most likely do, then Russia can be very much instrumental to contain China (and Iran to make Israel happy!). This likely includes the idea of keeping China and Europe separated. The idea of using Russia to counter China as the biggest competitor to the US supremacy is e.g. what Mearsheimer kept suggesting roughly since the beginning of this conflict. — neomac

And this is so the real insanity, which just show the extreme hubris and utter ignorance and delusions of these "American nationalists".

Perhaps they in their fantasies think of an "Kissinger moment" when Nixon went to China and the Americans enjoyed that "they" had breached the Communist states. Well, that breach happened because Mao was Stalinist and Soviet Union moved away from Stalinism with the two countries even having a border war.

What this friending of Russia, in order to "separate China", will do is for the US just loose it's largest and most trustworthy ally. Allies that really have designed their armed forces to be part of NATO. The trust has already been breached by Trump. Trump has through his actions made it totally clear that it won't stand with Europe and Europe has to go it's own way. The "Europe having to pay" for it's share of the common defense is now only a fig leaf that certainly the Europeans will repeat diplomatically. But they do understand that Trump and Vance don't give a shit about Ukraine and don't give shit about the Transatlantic alliance. Far too liberal in their view. Biden and Obama were liked in Europe, so fuck those people. So the real division here done is an effort to break up the Atlanticism. The US is already an untrustworthy ally.

Besides, these "American nationalists" seem to be totally incapable of seeing this from the Russian perspective. Why on Earth would Russia be against China here? What benefit would have to have hostile relations with it's largest trade partner and a country that is shares a very long border? It's China who has helped Russia here, not the US.

Putin will happily lure these suckers into breaking up their own alliances with empty promises.

Here's a great interview from Gabrielus Landsbergis, a former Latvian foreign minister, who clearly tells the situation as it is now. He gives insight just why some countries (like France) is against the using of Russia's frozen assets to help Ukraine. The reason is that China and Saudi Arabia are against this, which itself is understandable as for these countries such a precedent would be bad. Also the Landsbergis compares of just how little the aid to Ukraine has been compared to how costly the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were. The assistance to Ukraine is counted in few hundred billion, those wars in the Global War Against Terror cost is in the trillions both. — ssu

I don’t think that Trump (and his advisors) ignores the risk of Putin not playing along, or that the US may suffer a significant backlash from European allies, which feel betrayed, but I think they feel the need and see greater opportunities for this strategy to succeed now for the reasons I discussed previously: the US must avoid to overstretch, must contain China, both European countries and Russia must be more instrumental to the US strategic interests than the other way around, and at this point the US has greater leverage over European countries and Russia.
Concerning the relation between China and Russia, the problem is multifaceted: to begin with, the Ukrainian case is important also as a precedent for the case of Taiwan, in the sense China are supporting the Ukrainian territorial integrity to then be able to justify the same demand against Taiwan and US interference. But most importantly, China's growing influence, both economically and militarily, has the potential to impact Russia's security and strategic independence in complex ways (from energy business to technology). A the same time areas of competing interests (Central Asia, Far East, Arctic region) are abundant (they also had border conflict in the past). So Russia is very much unlikely that it aspires to become more vulnerable to China. Besides China enjoys greater appeal in terms of soft power and diplomacy to the Rest. And Slavic Russians feel to be more culturally and ethnically close to Europeans than to Asians, which makes it hard to swallow e.g. for Russian ultra-nationalists (e.g. supporting Putin’s aggression against Ukraine) to tolerate Chinese growing and more assertive influence. So from the Russian perspective (especially Putin’s perspective) it could be more tempting to partner with the US than with China. But is Putin really going to trust Trump and play along? The US frustrated Russia’s expectations so many times. And what if Trump’s mandate ends in four or, worse, two years?
Besides, I don’t think that Trump’s interest is to leave Europe. He wants Europe to turn into submissive clients, more responsive or pro-active in complying with the US demands: you want security? Pay or you’ll be on your own (or, worse, we’ll be against you). You want our market open to your products? Pay or you’ll be on your own (or, worse, we’ll be against you). Sort of a racketeering strategy, which is the other face of the wonderful peaceful multi-polar world which European pacifists were so badly wishing for.

I see a lot of Americans putting all the blame on Trump, and then on Putin who must have blackmailed him, trying to exculpate their country from this utterly blatant act of Machiavallianism.

The next president will be able to claim "it was all Trump" and "things are back to normal again", after which the next lamb will be led to the slaughter. — Tzeentch

Well it depends. If Trump's strategy fails, the next US administration may blame it on Trump, but if it succeeds. They will preserve it. Democrats were complaining about Trump's withdrawing from JCPOA agreements, but then they kept it. Democrats were complaining about first Trump's administration's tariff policies turning the US market more protectionist, but then Biden kept this approach. Democrats (Since Obama) started taking seriously the pivot to Asia, Trump is doing the same but more coherently than the Democrats since the Democrats were more committed to globalization which led the US to overstretch. Overstretching would be a problem for the US in any case (not only for the US geopolitical power but also for domestic political stability). Besides the situation looks particularly favorable to the US now, Trump has amassed lots of power within his country and lots of leverage against Russia and the EU. And the more he succeeds in pursuing his goals, the greater is the chance that Americans want to keep Trump in power or whomever he blesses to be his successor.

But wouldn't the US aligning with Russia create a situation where a disgruntled Europe is now more open to Chinese influence? — Echarmion

Sure, Europeans will be compelled to look for new alliances, like China, if the US is turning into its enemy.
However the first 2 related problems that come to mind to me are the following:
1. China is pretty faraway from Europe and all routes for commercial and security support are mostly under the control of Russia and the US, one way or the other.
2. Europe is not really ONE political subject. It’s many, and they are unable to strongly converge on many security and economic issues (local nationalism contributes to keeping divided, without the interference of foreign powers). And the US strategy is to avoid to overstretch but still preserve an affordable/sustainable sphere of influence over the part of Europe that will submit to its demands for business and/or security and shut up (“How can the U.S. get trading and security partners to agree to such a deal? First, there is the stick of tariffs. Second, there is the carrot of the defense umbrella and the risk of losing it.”), because they are unable to do otherwise under the pressure of the Russian threat, economic recessions, islamic immigration, corrupt politicians, climate change, gender equality, you name it.

If you could choose between retaining an alliance with Europe and gaining one with Russia, why would you choose Russia? — Echarmion

My understanding is that on one side, the pivot to Asia, namely the incumbency of competing superpower like China, has been a strategic concern for the US politics for a good decade. So an economically/military weak Russia, subordinate to China (which is also eroding Russian influence on its eastern flank), in desperate need to regain its superpower status (like at the end of the Second World War) can be instrumental to the US in exchange for a strategic partnership. On the other side, Europe has spent 30 years of globalisation enriching themselves and the US enemies (Russia and China) at the expense of the US, instead of taking a greater responsibility in opening its market to the US, and defending the West through soft-power (instead of spinning populist anti-Americanism, complacency toward anti-Western sentiments in the Rest), and also by military means.
It’s really baffling to hear, even in this thread, Europeans complaining about the US as the Great Satan or as the most powerful and dangerous country in the World, and yet at the same thinking that the best strategy for Europe is to poke the US in the eye by being complacent with Russia (which has invaded Europe more than the US has, even prior the existence of the US) and China, and spin anti-American propaganda.
As Russia and China are using populist nationalism against the transatlantic alliance, the US will be using European populist nationalism to turn their countries into a submissive client status, because they are incapable of turning into strong allies (like Israel). They just acted as US parasites, so they will be treated as such.

Sure, Putin was a convenient figurehead to use for the right wing populists and their nativist, anti-EU and frequently Anti-American agenda.

But that was and is mostly political manoeuvring to appeal to voter blocks. It's hard for me to see why a Europe that was actually ruled by nationalist governments would be friendly to Russia. There is no constructive overlap of interests. The overlap is purely destructive: against the EU and NATO. — Echarmion

Precisely, for Russia the destruction of EU and NATO must be very much functional to weaken the grip of the US in Europe, which is the superpower against which Russia tries to define its hegemonic status.
Besides European nationalisms constrain one another, so it may be in the interest of superpowers (like Russia, but at this point also the US) to keep Europe divided. Dividing Europe may be convenient to avoid the emergence of a European superpower, but also to turn small nations into clients (or worse puppets) otherwise to thwart their exploitation by rival superpowers. In the case of Russia, nationalist Orban is serving Russia. And you shouldn’t discount the largest Russian minority in Europe which is hosted by East Germany and may have very much contributed to rise of AfD, the far right political movement (https://theconversation.com/how-russians-have-helped-fuel-the-rise-of-germanys-far-right-105551). Musk was trying to steal AfD from Putin and it seems he failed, at least for now.
European nationalists serve to keep Europe fragmented and turn them into US bootlickers or Russia bootlickers. Salvini is the prototype of far-right populist which Trump and Putin wish to have in all European countries in which political elites try to resist the US/Russia’s interference or refuse to complain with their demands.

Similarly with US politics, I can see right wing populists using Putin as a sign of their opposition to the status quo. But now that they're actually in power, there seems little reason to care for Russia one way or another. — Echarmion

If American nationalists wish to keep the US as the strongest superpower, which they most likely do, then Russia can be very much instrumental to contain China (and Iran to make Israel happy!). This likely includes the idea of keeping China and Europe separated. The idea of using Russia to counter China as the biggest competitor to the US supremacy is e.g. what Mearsheimer kept suggesting roughly since the beginning of this conflict.
On the other side it is unlikely that Russia is happy to turn into some dumb sidekick of China. Russia current economic, military and political weakness can be exploited by Trump to turn Russia into US’s sidekick (this move reminds me of Nixon's opening to Mao’s China against the Soviet Union). And to make this proposal of partnership credible to Russia, Trump needs to blame everything on Biden, Zelensky and European allies, make them pay for Russia’s aggression of Ukraine and make a good deal of concessions to Putin.

Do not worry, Trump is bringing peace in Gaza as in Ukraine. And you support peace right?

https://twitter.com/yashar/status/1894613903302176846

When will it get through to you that what you're seeing now is the true face of the United States? — Tzeentch

you mean this?

What if Mearsheimer is part of the Blob?

His views on the Ukraine conflict:
- May deflect blame from other policy failures
- Justify continued engagement with a weaker Russia to contain a stronger China and maintain hegemonic supremacy
- Limiting the scope of public debate on foreign policy, while providing controlled opposition that gives the appearance of diverse viewpoints within foreign policy discourse.

What's confusing me is that I don't see what either the tech-bros like Musk or the nativists like Bannon (I'm not really sure where Vance falls on this) are getting out of this. — Echarmion

Tech-bros are getting EU laws/tax against American Big Tech down and prevent the formation of European big-tech competitors (keep an eye on AI and how AI will be integrated within military industry or how American crypto currencies will be injected into the European system). Bannon with his fascist-leaning mindset and propaganda aspires to be the guru of European far right movements (see Salvini in Italy who is waving between becoming a Putin's bitch and Trump's bitch, or both), so he helps steal the European far-right movements/propaganda from Russia. All three are helping each other.

It’s good that Trump wants peace. — Mikie

It's called peace by prostitution. If you are a European prepare your lubricant coz you are gonna be next... ah but you are not European but from the US? Tell us your dirtiest desires, master.

Whatever Trump agrees on with Putin about a new world order, it should be maintained under and possibly after Trump presidency (as long as it lasts) and after Putin. What might possibly ensure this?
Whatever Trump is ready to concede to Putin concerning this world order, implies that Putin must be ready to concede the same to Trump: e.g., if I'll break Western alliance to contain Russia, then Russia must break with its alliance (China, Iran, North Korea). If Russia occupies pieces of Ukraine or widens further its boarders, then the US (including Israel) can do the same. If Russia wants to sell oil to Europe, then the US will take Ukrainian resources (like rare earth).

(Don't mind the fact that is breaking international law and setting examples to others e.g. China with Taiwan)

More on Mearsheimer's infallible predictions:

US President-elect Donald Trump won’t end the Ukraine war because he has appointed “a bunch of hawks” who suffer from “Russophobia in the extreme”, international relations scholar John Mearsheimer has claimed.

Mearsheimer argued the West and Ukraine must — but won’t — accept two conditions for Russian President Vladimir Putin to enter negotiations. First, “that Ukraine will never be in Nato”. Second, “that Crimea and the four Oblasts that the Russians have now annexed are permanently lost”. He continued: “I find it hard to imagine the US, even Trump, accepting those two conditions.”

https://unherd.com/newsroom/john-mearsheimer-trump-is-appointing-russophobic-hawks/

So what is it you expect from me? Convince you somehow? To try and 'win the argument’?

If you're not even willing to believe I'm being honest about my credentials, then what possible point would there be to carry on conversation? — Tzeentch

To me the point of this conversation with you has nothing to do with believing your honesty over your credentials or whatever else, of course. As I said, I find it rather irrelevant, even if you were honest: indeed, I find irrelevant any argument from authority if that’s meant to replace arguments de re.
If I do not understand the criteria for sexing chickens, and ask you clarifications, it would be pointless to tell me: “see these two chickens? Well, the right one is male and the left one is a female and the criteria are that I’ve academic credentials on sexing chickens, I’ve sexed chickens for 30 years in tens of farms and I’m honest”. Even if you were 100% right, 100% honest, 100% convinced, 100% believed by all the people in the universe, past, present, future (ME INCLUDED!), yet you didn’t offer any criteria for me to understand how to sex chickens.
I think the purpose of a conversation in a philosophy forum is not just to exchange opinions about things one takes to be evident but also to investigate and question grounds to believe things. That’s why I’ve joined this philosophy forum and this thread. Is this why you too joined this philosophy forum and this thread? If not, for what other purpose are you here?

↪neomac
Out of courtesy I did read your entire post, but I will not be getting into a repetition of moves where we write entire essays about what has already been said. — Tzeentch

Out of courtesy I’m thanking you for your courtesy. However, I doubt the that your problem is repeating moves, as you claim, since you keep repeating moves [1] (including the claim that you have already said this and that so no need repeating [2]). Even in this last post of yours.
You can give synthetic answers to my questions (I consider all of them equally pressing, then it’s up to you), at least we can verify where you said that already as you claim.
Besides, the fact that you keep repeating claims may also point to the fact that you think to win arguments by repeating the same response to challenges against what you keep repeating. Unfortunately, I’m sure you agree that “you don't win arguments by repetition”. Maybe try something else instead of repeating.

[1]
“That's something I've repeatedly argued in this thread: NATO, the US in particular, was purposefully seeking conflict in Ukraine from 2008 onward”.

[2]
“I’ve probably written about a book's worth and can't be arsed to repeat it all”

I'll only answer those questions where I think my position may require clarification.


Could you provide criteria that would make such difference so much morally grey in one case over the other? — neomac


In the case of the Israel-Palestine conflict:
- +/-70 years of thorough documentation
- Mountains of reports by human rights organisations, including those within Israel itself
- Mountains of UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions
- Near-unanimous global condemnation
- Condemnation within Israel itself
- Admissions by Israeli politicians
- Having studied the conflict in-depth as part of my academic education, and having visited the region as part of a research tour.

— Tzeentch

In what way this is a clarification of “It is perfectly clear to me what has gone on over the past 70 years, and the world as represented in the UN General Assembly agrees almost unanimously, just like virtually every human rights organisation imaginable, including Israeli human rights organisations” when my explicit challenge to you was: “I find more interesting to discuss explicit moral criteria, hopefully not “ad hoc”, than just provide moral opinions. And I will charitably assume that your criteria are not something like: if after 70 years there is unanimous agreement by all human rights organisation imaginable (excluding Russian human rights organisations, since apparently there aren’t much left there unlike in Israel, even under Netanyahu) on the Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, one is entitled to morally condemn Russia’s aggression of Ukraine” ?
I do not question that you may be more convinced in one case than the other, but I’ll repeat that the criteria you are repeating seem rather arbitrary.
A part from the fact that if a conflict lasts 70 years of course one may have evidence and complaints spanning over 70 years to support the “genocide” accusation, while if a conflict lasts 3 years of course one may have 3 years of evidence and complaints to support the “genocide” accusation. But most importantly, really are you waiting for 70 years of evidence to make moral assessments about wars? 3 years are not enough? BTW moral rules like “do not kill”, “do not lie”, “do not steal”, “do not break promises”, sound rather intuitive, so do you seriously not have amassed enough evidence in 3 years that Russia is committing more violations of moral rules against Ukraine than the other way around in this conflict or its genesis? Or you want to say that Russia’s aggression of Ukraine was a morally “proportional” response to the Ukrainian desire to join NATO while Israel’s response against the massacre of its civilians by Hamas wasn’t? No temporal constraints are part of the legal definition of "genocide".
How fair is it to recall certain criticisms from within Israel vs lack of similar criticisms from Russia given the fact public opinion in Israel is much more free than in Russia?
Concerning your appeals to your expertise or experience (not the first time you are doing it), how is not that convenient, besides being unverifiable to us? Appeal to your authority is as good as an attack ad hominem against your interlocutors. Actually its complement.
Finally, a part from the fact that the accusation of “genocide” is legally different from the accusation of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity, you can read more about appeal to near-unanimous human rights organizations and UN Assembly condemnations against Russia here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegations_of_genocide_of_Ukrainians_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
So much so that there are ICC arrest warrants for Putin as much as for Netanyahu (and also for Hamas representatives but not against Zelensky).
Concerning the UN Security Council resolution the trick is that it requires the permission of Russia, which is the perpetrator of the alleged “genocide”. Besides the accusation of committing “genocide” against Israel by the Security Council concerns specifically the massacre of Sabra and Shatila, not the current conflict:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_Nations_resolutions_concerning_Israel#United_Nations_Security_Council_resolutions
And the problem is not only in the criteria which you mention, but also on criteria which you do not mention now, while being so important to you in other posts. I'm referring to your claim: “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests”. You made this claim to justify/explain (until you do clarify better how you distinguish them, I’ll put both) Russian aggression of Ukraine, but not the Israeli aggression on Hamas. Why? Is it “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests” a moral criterium for moral condemnation/justification or not?

Concerning genocidal intentions and war crimes, can you articulate a bit more your moral views on that? — neomac


War crimes are an unfortunate reality of war. They happen in every war, and criminals ought to be punished.

Things take on a different guise when war crimes are carried out intentionally on a large scale, at a governmental level. — Tzeentch

That sounds to me a plausible criterium when accusing governments of committing genocides because it stems from the legal definition of “genocide” which includes the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”. The problem is to understand what evidences are needed to prove such an intent in one conflict over the other. There are evidences coming from human rights organizations and UN resolutions, one can check historical patterns, one can check political decisions and declarations. I think one can find lots of compelling evidence in both cases.

I don't believe Russia has genocidal intentions in Ukraine. Ukrainians are returning to Russian-occupied territories every day. — Tzeentch

If the criterium of assessing “genocidal intentions“ is Ukrainian ability to go back to occupied territories, then the same holds for Palestinians, see here : https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/27/middleeast/palestinians-return-north-gaza-intl-hnk/index.html

Anti-Western authoritarian government will do their propaganda, but if people see that things are better in the West than they are under the authoritarian government, they will draw their own conclusions. — ssu

"more than half (52%) of Gen Z thinks that "the UK would be a better place if there was a strong leader in power who doesn't have to worry about parliament and elections" and a third (33%) believe that "it would be better if the army led the country"
https://assets-corporate.channel4.com/_flysystem/s3/2025-01/Gen%20Z%20Trends%20Truth%20and%20Trust_0.pdf

But what happens if none of them can fix it now, in one week, in months, in years, ever? You learn to live with it (hoping that one day it gets fixed) or you try to change the service (and hope the problem won’t replicate). — neomac

You simply have a defective product. It's your loss.

as if you were hinting at some solution, it looks rather empty to me. — neomac

Look, what I'm saying that if you want a functioning democracy, a prosperous country, then a lot of things have to be right.

…

First of all, you cannot think that a country is a democracy without all the necessary institutions and by just having elections.

…

Because you have to start with the reality that you have. Like for example the US. What it desperately needs is for it's citizens to think that the government works for them, and not the oligarchs. The only way for people to change their views is for the government really seen to work for them. — ssu

Not sure if these claims are meant to be objections to my arguments, because they sound pretty in line with what I’ve already said.

But the authoritarian looks at democracies being weak with all the woke nonsense. Yet in fact it's the authoritarians who are in the fundamentally weak, because they actually fear their people. — ssu

Russian is authoritarian, China is authoritarian, the US is moving from democracy to authoritarianism.
Russia, China and the US seem to be stronger than democracies like France, Italie, UK and Germany.
In some sense, in authoritarian regimes political leaders won their fear of people, more than political leaders in democratic regimes.
Besides, after compering authoritarian regimes, one can notice that the popular support for Putin doesn’t seem as weak the popular support for the Iranian leader in Iran.

The only way for people to change their views is for the government really seen to work for them. — ssu

if people see that things are better in the West than they are under the authoritarian government, they will draw their own conclusions. — ssu

Precisely, but the problem is that in authoritarian regimes, “people” exclusively refers to the relative majority that vocally supports or silently tolerates the regime, also in a period of crisis where protracted collective sacrifices are required, the rest is forced into political irrelevance and suppression. While, in democracy, “people” doesn’t exclusively refer to the relative majority that vocally supports or silently tolerates the regime, but includes also people and political movements that criticise the regime. So in a period of crisis where protracted collective sacrifices are required, there are always margins for disputes and blame gaming.

There are 2 issues that I brought up repeatedly in this thread and yet, to my surprise, nobody looks/looked interested in discussing them as vocally as I was: the problematic link between democracy and security, and the problematic link between morality and security.
The first one is worth digging into because it can contribute to explain the authoritarian turn of Trump's administration, his antagonism against EU and Trump’s philo-Putinism.
The second one is worth digging into because it can contribute to better assess analogies and differences between the Ukrainian-Russian conflict vs the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The strategic stakes of the war between Russia and Ukraine were mostly about a new world order in which powerful authoritarian countries can impose their rule over the others through direct negotiations between supreme leaders (independently from the qualms of international law), including Western democratic countries no matter how justified their moral outrage is.

The Ukraine conflict is not comparable to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Ukraine is much more morally grey.

In the case of Israel-Palestine, it is not morally grey at all. It is perfectly clear to me what has gone on over the past 70 years, and the world as represented in the UN General Assembly agrees almost unanimously, just like virtually every human rights organisation imaginable, including Israeli human rights organisations. — Tzeentch

In a philosophy forum, I find more interesting to discuss explicit moral criteria, hopefully not “ad hoc”, than just provide moral opinions. And I will charitably assume that your criteria are not something like: if after 70 years there is unanimous agreement by all human rights organisation imaginable (excluding Russian human rights organisations, since apparently there aren’t much left there unlike in Israel, even under Netanyahu) on the Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, one is entitled to morally condemn Russia’s aggression of Ukraine.
Concerning criteria relying on the advise of international law and humanitarian organizations, the allegations that Russia is committing genocide and war crimes in Ukraine do not look so much less severe than the Israeli case to me, see here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegations_of_genocide_of_Ukrainians_in_the_Russo-Ukrainian_War
What actually sounds even morally worse in the Russian case than in the Israeli case (assumed the notion of “genocide” equally applies to both) is that in his article ”On the historical unity of Russian and Ukrainians“ Putin has claimed “Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people” . (https://www.prlib.ru/en/article-vladimir-putin-historical-unity-russians-and-ukrainians). So Putin’s war against Ukrainians is not only genocidal, but also fratricidal. Nothing of the sort can be said of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Finally, also the moral outrage of the perceived "provocations" look more problematic for Russia than for Israel: indeed, what's evidently morally outrageous in the idea of having Ukraine joining NATO some day in the future compared to the massacre of Israeli civilians in Israel by Hamas?
Concerning history, the struggle of Ukrainians to gain independence from Russia is going on for centuries (the last one is just the 4th war of independence). So the claim that the Ukrainians badly want to be independent from Russia and Russians do not let them doesn’t sound so far fetched. Not to mention the case of the “Holodomor” which looks to me way more atrocious than the “Nakba”. Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term "genocide" in 1944, explicitly applied the concept of ”genocide” to the Soviet oppression of Ukrainians, including the Holodomor. He considered the destruction of the Ukrainian nation as a "classic example of Soviet genocide" and "the longest and most extensive experiment in Russification”.
Concerning political principles, as I said elsewhere, Russia’s war against Ukraine looks pretty hegemonic in nature. Indeed, Russia not only has a state which Ukraine acknowledges and hasn’t invaded or attacked (at least prior to this conflict), but it has the largest state on earth, and abundant land for hosting way more ethnic Russians than currently exist compared to Israel (the population density in Israel is roughly 50 times higher than in Russia). Besides Russia has previously formally acknowledged Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the other side, Israel’s war against Hamas doesn’t look hegemonic in nature. Israel so far is just trying to establish its own nation state and keep it safe from Palestinians’ and other neighbouring middle-eastern countries’ aggressions, and it has never acknowledged the existence of Palestinian state. Besides, in accordance to the premises I made explicit in my previous comment, if one holds the right to people self-determination, it’s much more easy to condemn Russian hegemonic ambitions as violating Ukrainian people’s self-determination, than to condemn either nations between Israelis and Palestinians which are fighting for their right to self-determination over exactly the same land.
So what is it making so “much more” morally grey one case over the other to you doesn’t look evident to me at all. Could you provide criteria that would make such difference so much morally grey in one case over the other?

Second, when geopolitical actors meddle in ways that are misleading and exploitative, I have no qualms with making moral statements about that.

Russia is clearly a wolf and widely perceived as a calculating geopolitical actor. The US on the other hand is a wolf in sheep's clothing, and therefore much more dangerous because people are ignorant to its true nature. — Tzeentch

Well, given the case of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, I thought your moral assessment depends not only on honesty and exploitative intentions , but also genocidal intentions and war crimes.
Concerning honesty and exploitative intentions, since Russia is a “wolf”, what would you consider as misleading and exploitative by Russia in the current conflict with Ukraine? Do you have concrete examples in mind to provide? Maybe the fact that Russia acknowledged Ukrainian territorial sovereignty on many occasions (including the one Mearsheimer wrote an article about in “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent”)?
Concerning genocidal intentions and war crimes, can you articulate a bit more your moral views on that? Indeed, since you accused others of cognitive dissonance, let me point out that I also see a risk of cognitive dissonance on your part too. Honestly I don’t remember much of your moral statements against what Russia is doing in Ukraine. And the problem is not much that you seem way more focused on the moral status of the US and its European “vassals” than on Russia because, as you claim, the US is much more dangerous than Russia. The problem is that you even look “favourable” to Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, given this comment [1]: “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests” (https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/968536). Now, if this argument is not apologetics for Russia’s genocide in Ukraine (territorial annexations included), then also arguing that Israel is reacting against the Palestinian aggression (territorial annexations included) is not apologetics for Israel’s genocide in Palestine as “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests”. If it is apologetics in one case, than it is also in the other.
Given your views, it must be convenient for you to argue that Russia is not seriously committing a genocide in Ukraine or war crimes (because you are morally against genocide or war crimes, right?), at least until you provide more explicit and non-ad-hoc criteria. The alternative would be that committing genocide and war crimes are morally justified if “it is good for countries to draw a line in the sand in the face of a blatant disregard for their security interests”. Which is it?

Considering the US is objectively the most powerful, and most dangerous, nation on earth, at the very least the idea of deliberate strategy should be exhausted before assuming incompetence. Currently, it remains conspicuously absent from the discussion. — Tzeentch

The principal threat is not an 'angry' US - the US is thousands of miles away across an ocean - but European 'Trans-Atlanticists' prostituting Europe to the American agenda. — Tzeentch

These two comments remind me a bit of the joke “It's Schrödinger's war machine.”
Instead of indulging into sarcastic retaliations, let me highlight the following dilemma.
Either the US is objectively the most powerful and most dangerous compared to Russia, then recalling the geographic distance shouldn’t be enough to dismiss the security threat coming from the US, nor suggest that’s batter to provoke and keep provoking/antagonising the US (so yes one must be definitely be worried about a “angry” US).
Or the US is NOT objectively the most powerful, and most dangerous compared to Russia, then recalling the geographic distance shouldn’t be enough to dismiss the security threat coming from Russia, nor suggest that’s batter to provoke and keep provoking/antagonising Russia (so yes one must be definitely be worried about a “angry” Russia).
Which is it to you?

The Ukraine war neither suggests they have the intention nor the capacity to threaten Europe. — Tzeentch

Are you saying that it’s thanks to the war between Russia and Ukraine that we know that Russia has not “the capacity to threaten Europe”? How so?
Besides, if Russia has not the capacity to threaten Europe, then the fear of an “angry” Russia seems less compelling, do you agree?
These statements in addition to the previous ones do not make it more clear how you assess the Russian threat to Europe. More on this below.

I support Ukrainian independence. What I do not support is incompetent nations like the EU, or exploitative nations like the US leading it down the prim rose path by feeding it fake promises of security. — Tzeentch

How do you know that populist movements or national leaders are less incompetent than EU leaders?
Do you mean that Russia is not an exploitative for making fake promises of security to Ukraine like the Budapest memorandum?

About European 'emancipation' I have little to say. Europe is a lost cause. It will take decades for it to undo the damage of post-Cold War soft power US colonialism. But for the US to leave is obviously a prerequisite for things to get better. — Tzeentch

The problem of the European emancipation must also go with some important acknowledgement from you:
did the US oppress Germany, France, the Ntehterlans or Spain as Russia is oppressing Ukraine?
Obviously, I can get that a nation wants to become independent from foreign interference which is perceived as oppressive. But the US hasn’t been oppressive toward EU countries as Russia is toward Ukraine, or Israel toward Palestine. Actually the EU prospered in peace for several decades. Do you agree?
Besides what do you mean by “for the US to leave”? One can say that Soviet Union has left Hungary, still Hungary has been supporting Russia over EU and the US as a European vassal may support the US. That is to say, that even assuming that the US military bases leave Europe, that doesn’t imply that the US “the most powerful and dangerous” country has not economic and military interests in Europe that will still constrain Europe margins for strategic emancipation (things may get even trickier if "Europe" refers to individual European countries instead of groups of European countries like the EU).

I don't believe in the narrative that the Russians are coming for Berlin. — Tzeentch

Europe's population is roughly four times that of Russia. It's GDP is roughly ten times that of Russia.
Even if Europe organises its defense inefficiently on a country-by-country basis there ought to be no Russian threat. — Tzeentch

First, Russia has military resources to threaten Germany and a nuclear arsenal (indeed Russia has not spared itself from making nuclear threats when its strategic interests are at stake), Germany has an insufficient military capacity wrt Russia, Russia has historically invaded Germany and taken a good piece of it, so Russia doesn’t need to come for Berlin anytime soon to be a security threat to Berlin.
Second, as I pointed out in another post: aggregating GDP (or population) of EU countries doesn't make much sense if one overlooks the deep divisions over security issues among European countries. Besides Berlin is just one European capital, there are other Eastern European capitals for which Russian conventional military aggression could be a serious problem.
Third, most importantly, Russia’s threats to Europe are not limited to conventional warfare. Hybrid warfare must the taken into account and hybrid warfare can be enough to induce concessions to Russia’s demands. So if European countries want to emancipate themselves from being vassals of foreign powers like the US, then the same must hold against Russia. Besides a source of security concerns comes also from Russian minorities populating many European countries (including Germany). They are a good resource for pretexts to rise tensions, covert operations (like sabotaging) and political trafficking.

The only reason Europe is vulnerable is because American interests have infiltrated its every institution like a Trojan horse, disallowing it from making sensible decisions. — Tzeentch

What about a “victorious” Russian interests in Europe? Did Russians infiltrate European institutions and far right populist movements like a Trojan horse? What if the US will leave and Russia wants to ensure that the US doesn’t come back again and for that it will do its best to fill the void of power left by the US? It shouldn’t sound so far-fetched that outside NATO/EU e.g. Hungary might be interested in hosting Russian military bases. Or that European countries which need Russian oil/gas/wheat could be blackmailed in various ways including buying Russian weapon systems to feed the Russian military-industrial complex and its power projection like in the middle east, Mediterranean sea, North Africa and Baltic sea (around Europe).
So while Russia is arguably far more oppressive and aggressive over nations under its sphere of influence than the US is toward European countries, it seems you worry more about a vassal status of the EU toward the US, and as if there was no risk that European countries would turn into vassals of Russia once the US has completely gone. Unfortunately, I wouldn’t even exclude a worse scenario one in which an “angry” US and a “victorious” Russia will turn European states into more submissive vassals (for the US, Italy is a good candidate, as much as Hungary is for Russia).