Hawt damn. Looks like it was worth all the posts after all :D

OK, yes, same question. Nevermind to my above.

Right.

But is there anything more to it than the difference in the shapes of the letters?

Oh, yes. Very much. The topics are related but I'm trying to remain on target with @NotAristotle here.

Cool. We agree there.

So when we start using things like "P" to represent any proposition whatsoever this relies upon substitution. Without a notion of substitution we'd not be able to make sense of variables.


Or, what's probably a better way of stating this, informal substitution is subject to more criteria than formal substitution is. Informally substitution is usually reserved for mathematics and statements of that form -- which is what formal logic is very much like.

But since A -> ~A uses symbols it's more appropriate to call this a formal construction of material implication, which we can write the truth-tables out for and easily conclude it's valid, but unsound, as said.

You can of course say that there is no difference and that "informal logic" and formal logic are infinitely separated, but I think that is to put the cart before the horse. Something which has nothing to do with human reasoning is not logic, and so I would say that if someone is talking about something which is wholly separate from human reasoning then they are not talking about logic (and besides that, they are not paying any attention to the historical development and motivations behind formal logics). — Leontiskos

I think there's a difference and I've committed to indications for the difference -- in the recent posts substitution has been the criteria I've been using.

I don't think that makes them entirely separable.

You are talking in terms of the first premise of a modus ponens, and that is what the material conditional is in many logics. If there is a difference between modus ponens and disjunctive syllogism, then there is a difference between A→B and ¬A∨B. — Leontiskos

The difference is the shape of the little squiggly marks.

Right.

So I'm asking -- what else is there? What does the full meaning say?

I'm sympathetic to informal logic taking priority over formalization, though it gets difficult because of the inherent ambiguity in informal logic. When I say "If I touch the stove then my hand will burn" I'm not talking in terms of material implication or disjunction at all, but a causal relationship between action and event.

But cashing out that causal relationship into the formalization is not in any way easy. Which is why we usually rely upon the informal.

But once we start introducing symbols and substitution I tend to believe we're not really talking about this imprecise, though more frequently utilized, informal reasoning.

1. Right, I mean P entails Q. The logical equivalence (not-P or Q) is an implication of the conditional, not having the same meaning as the conditional. — NotAristotle

What on earth would the meaning of P -> Q be such that it differs from not-P or Q? It's not like P -> Q is in any way a natural language sentence. We're already relying upon substitution (with the variables P and Q) so what prevents us for substituting "not-P or Q" for "P-> Q" when they are logically equivalent?

I'm tempted now to say that the "trap" that science (or "physics") must avoid falling into is not philosophy but sophistry, and that it's better to see science also as a type of ongoing reasoned discussion (or "logic"). (Talking about the lab and the field, as I did, might be just an intuition pump, suggesting that scientists need only share the knowledge they acquired using their special techniques, rather than seeing science as a type of discussion.)

Which means science is only in the same position as philosophy. — Srap Tasmaner

I think it's reasonable to say that science and philosophy are in a similar position with respect to whatever a "highest" discourse is.

I think of them as different, but independent. The appeal to science is a move one can make in philosophy as much as one can make an appeal to coherency and beauty in science -- clearly philosophical words. But neither is "higher" than the other.

Though I'd also say the same about science as I did about philosophy -- there's a practical part that's important to consider (at a minimum, if philosophy is literature, then it seems we should read and discuss hte literature to say we are doing philosophy -- just as an example, I do believe there's more to it than this)

Yeah I'm not sure there. I can say I really enjoyed it though. Made me think about logic in totally new and different ways.

* For argumentation, I suggest studying both informal and formal logic. Informal for practical guidance; formal for appreciation of rigor. I don't have particular texts in informal logic to recommend. — TonesInDeepFreeze

I really like this book for informal logic:

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/arguments-about-arguments/27835C37D9CEDFA6BE9EFD11CA2DA5A3

Cool.

I see the difference flipped about. I'm tempted to say we're doing philosophy and thereby blah blah blah, but that seems kind of cheap too -- around the merry-go-round type comment.

I'm not sure what you mean here. If you mean that metaphysical attitudes can influence how folk think about ecological, economic and political issues then i agree. — Janus

I suppose I'm speaking in favor of philosophy so I really do mean it the other way about: that philosophy doesn't influence but is the beginning of those thoughts, and so metaphysics and all the rest cannot be dismissed as a game else all the rest is a game.

I'm not sure how to convince, but I do think there are stakes in philosophy -- even in the esoteric topics. The ecological, economic and political issues fold into the metaphysics, from my perspective.

But, by the way I view things, that makes you a player in the metaphysic while you express it in terms of the ecology, economic, or political.

Or no?

That's probably why I call it a curse -- I enjoy the reflection and the wondering, and I know it annoys others and so try not to do it when it does so.

It can, but usually it just irritates others :D

And, again, on the other hand...

From an anthropological view there is the case of people attending church on special occasions, celebrating the Christian holidays with its imagery and meaning, follow the scriptures as an ethical guide because of the deep truths contained in the text, and for all that don't believe the text is literal.

I'd be inclined to call people who observe the various rights and rituals of any religion by that name, anthropologically, because it's hard to make a distinction between the two "from the outside" -- it appears to be an internal debate of some kind.

lol you're right. My accent coming through in the writing.

More to the question of the OP: I think that the belief in the resurrection is pretty important. At least it's on this basis that I argue that Mormans, for all their idiosyncrasies, are still basically Christian: They really do believe Christ died on the cross for our sins and that we can be saved by baptism by immersion and following the rules, while acknowledging we'll fall short because we are not the Christ and so will need forgiveness (grace).

They do it different, but at least for the Mormans who really believe in the theology it's hard for me to separate them from Christianity because of the belief that Christ was risen from the dead and he conquers death and sin, as @Leontiskos said.

But, also, while I have my two cents I'd prefer to leave this adjudication to thems who want to be Christian.

Well, I suppose it's sort of like asking: "can I be a 'Marxist' while rejecting dialectical materialism and the workers' ownership of the means of production, and while embracing neoliberal economic policies, voting for Donald Trump, and idolizing Reagan and Thatcher?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

Definitely maybe. I've sort of thought of the neo-cons as Marxists who gave up on class struggle -- where there's nothing primitive about primitive accumulation.

But it'd be an odd duck who committed to such notions rather than cynically used them.

When it comes to financial crises, governments stepped in. They gave gamblers giant amounts of other people's money. Was that a good thing? — Clearbury

You're ignoring what I said to point out a bad thing governments did. I'm fully on board with governments being bad. They suck.

I'm not fully on board with companies providing state services -- sounds like another state.

Generally speaking: The minarchists constantly reinvent the state, but at an even higher price. And, given that the state still exists, are not anarchists.

The more the government is pulled-back, the more apparent it will become that it is unnecessary and actually counter-productive: that it facilitates the very things we - the people - think it's needed to prevent. — Clearbury

If it's a gradual process then I think the 2008 financial crises is a hard event for you to reckon with. The 2008 financial crises occurred because of a gradual pulling-back of the government on financial regulation.

That's usually how this goes, in my experience.

And, regardless, you've ignored the point I've made about firms enforcing rights -- even if we "gradually" get there your reliance upon private property and contracts makes it such that the state will be reinvented. How else do you enforce contracts other than threatening jailtime?

Interestingly, a literature of literature sounds more promising, or at least a literature about literature. — J

The state's power rests in the hands of individuals and in the misguided idea that we 'need' it. To overcome that, people need to see that the government is a) unjust by its nature and b) does an appalling job at everything. — Clearbury

Let's suppose we're all in agreement here.

What then?

Whatever malevolent forces you think are at play in private companies are amplified - not reduced - at the level of the state.

The logic is very simple. If it's bad on a small scale, it's worse at a large scale. Note, there's no starry-eyed idealism at work here. There's just common sense and a keen sense of justice. It's not healthy or right to concentrate power in one individual or some tiny group.

You don't solve the problem of mafias by having one mega mafia. That's like solving the fact you've got a cold by giving yourself cancer.

Incidentally, you know how mafias really survive? State corruption. The most successful mafia in the world is THE MAFIA. And how are they so successful? (They're the most successful organisation in Italy accounting for 7% of GDP) Corrupt government officials. — Clearbury

I don't think that private companies and the state are easily separable. I'm more or less saying that as soon as you abolish the state someone will re-invent the state. That's sort of the whole revolutionary thing.

Further, it seems your programme must reinvent the state because military and police details will be contractable through private firms, themselves needing firms to enforce their contracts. How would they do that unless they send people to prison?

In which case:

I think all forms of government are unjust. Governments claim a monopoly on certain uses of violence and threats. I take that to be definitive. Government policies are backed by the threat of prison. — Clearbury

Your own definition of government would apply.

Private security companies would be a much better job - and do do a much better job - than the state. Try and steal something in a supermarket and see who stops you first - a private security guard or the police. — Clearbury

How would the private security companies operate given your notions of government here?:

I think all forms of government are unjust. Governments claim a monopoly on certain uses of violence and threats. I take that to be definitive. Government policies are backed by the threat of prison. — Clearbury

How would the private security companies' policies be backed? Would they not imprison people?

Privatizing the police and army would be the last step.... — Clearbury

The reliance upon privatization sort of undermines this as an anarchist project -- private property requires rights to be enforced. Once you "privatize" the army the warlords move in and take what is theirs and enforce what they want thereby reinventing the state.

This is what I think of as one of the fundamental philosophical problems for anarchy: the problem of warlords is such that no matter what path to abolishing the state that you take the "bad" kind of anarchy will arise. It's not like gangs and cartels are going to vanish when all the citizens decide to stop supporting the government. And when the army can be bought then we're pretty much back to having warlords fighting over resources because they can pay troops to enforce their will.

The warlord in this scenario may be named "Chrysler", but it's not fundamentally different -- and it basically just recreates the state, but now there aren't many civic institutions to direct the necessity of violence.

But since privatizing the army does not remove coercion this plan will simply reinvent the state in the process of trying to dismantle it, and for the worse.

Hmm. I'm struggling to understand this. Tribal markings arise in the wider system of tribes; cell markings arise in the wider system of multi cellular organisms; makers marks arise in the larger system of the marketplace. — unenlightened

True.

It could just be a professional hazard of the cobbler seeing the world as a big shoe. The system of signs can be seen as an assemblage, too.

An attempt to make a distinction though: A maker's mark and a tribal marking, so it seems to me at least, indicates an actor with intent. This is our company's mark. This is your position in the tribe. Act accordingly! (indicating a "you" to whom the command is addressed -- a sort of responsibility)

Intent is much less obvious at the level of the multicellular organism, though -- the self made of millions of cells interacting in various capacities continues even as the cells that once were a healthy part of the organism become other from the organism from degradation or infection. There isn't an intent so much as a mechanism composing parts connected to parts and the distinctions are each of them a miniature sorites paradox resolved by what's of interest.

When the two organisms became 1 it made me think: here there's no intent, and it's really only the functions and capacities within an environment which is marking the difference between self/other (as the two others become one self due to environmental pressures).

Going back to an earlier thread, marking is the act of making a distinction. — unenlightened

There's something about life that feels different from the relays -- the whole "entering into itself" thing at the end that feels a bit mysterious feels analogous to the question of differentiating species, or even differentiating life from not-life. They are clearly differentiable when they are, and not when they are not (the virus providing a good mid-point between the two -- certainly life, but almost mechanical in its piggybacking on life). But rather than the logical system of marks it's a slapdash and messy process that looks designed at times, but clearly isn't. It's us who find the patterns in life because we like to see the patterns -- we want to know how this whole messy thing began.

But unlike the system of logic there's an entire environment which surrounds and even composes the multicellular organism, and the self -- though we hold it responsible -- is this assemblage of parts feeding into a great multiplicity of functions far beyond intent.

If mating patterns -- that natural chemistry people want -- is the result of compatible immune systems then the self will intend what the functions demand. Or, intent is a post hoc explanation of the assemblage.

EDIT: Though, as always, after I write something and give myself some time to rethink I see little bumps in the thinking I dislike: the tribal markings were supposed to function the same and here I started to think how intent would make them different, and now I'm thinking "intent" need not come in at all in any assemblage. Heh -- the curse of wondering is exactly this back-and-forth...

The functioning seems to me to be more like a makers mark, or a password, or a signature - in other words it is exactly a biological name/label and arbitrary at that if I read wiki aright.

And now I'm thinking "tribal markings" as the social equivalent. — unenlightened

"Tribal markings", insofar that we understand them in a wider cultural context as fulfilling a multitude of functions, I think is pretty close.

The other thing I find interesting is how the immune system may be linked to mating patterns -- which makes perfect sense from an evolutionary perspective.

I think rather than a makers mark, password, or signature I'd prefer to think of these various protein complexes in analogue to the markings -- which also can mark all sorts of functions within a community. Mostly because the former suggests a singular hand, an "I" marking something, when in fact there is a wider system in which self/other makes sense (to annihilate or not-annihilate the cell)

Further, there's a deeper link to other life evident in the biochemistry. It gives another physical basis for making the argument that humans are connected to the world about them, rather than a thinking thing directing their body from above.

At least these are the sorts of thoughts I have going on -- I could be missing your point entirely too.

Anyways, the world is indivisible so biology, psychology, sociology, have to create divisions with labels and talk, otherwise everything is mush. 'I am he as you are he as you are me
And we are all together.' — unenlightened

True. Or infinitely divisible and so incomprehensible, which amounts to the same. Everything is mush and so we create divisions in the mush to bring order to the world.

Give me any scientific theory, and I’ll show you how philosophical questions can reveal the metaphysical presuppositions making its assertions intelligible — Joshs

I believe you and I can always show how philosophical questions can reveal metaphysical presuppositions, and that these presuppositions at least help to make phrases intelligible.

What I suspect is that science -- even of the psychological kind -- cannot show how artistic questions reveal metaphysical presuppositions which make its assertions intelligible. And these days I tend to think of scientists as the poets of math, but that's a metaphor I'm still thinking through.

Could the same hold true for literature?

Is there a difference between literature and philosophy, in your opinion?

Philosophers arise out of a contingent culture which shapes the sense of the questions they ask and how they interpret the answers. For me the distinction between philosophy and psychology has only to do with the how richly and comprehensively those presuppositions are articulated. — Joshs

I'm wondering, and suspect you would though I don't know, if you'd accept a similar articulation along the spectrum of literature. As in: "For me the distinction between philosophy and science has only to do with how richly and comprehensively each rendition articulates their presuppositions"

Where I think I'd disagree -- I'm not sure how to differentiate, but I feel that both philosophy and science articulate their presuppositions in a rich and comprehensive manner. This is part of why they look similar.

For me, and probably for you in various ways (and I'm more interested in the various ways than the differences, only expressing a point here): the difference has to do with method more than a description of presuppositions.

It could be a side-trap, though, considering that I'm a fan of Against Method :D -- Just some thoughts.

Some more thoughts that may not be worth it:

Metaphysically -- if self/other is a complex of physical proteins performing a function then it seems we'd at least overcome the hurdle of nominalism which uses reductionism: Here is a physical explanation of self/other which relies upon an assemblage rather than a cogito -- so the "I think" cannot be a pure, self-seeing clarity unless it is somehow not associated, at all, with the body which makes it up.

The person who believes the self to be a soul will want more, but the physicalist will see that even in the practical realm of immunology self/other is not some singular divide

Oh sorry. I don't know how much of the details are philosophically important per se, it just reminded me of the organism in your video because what the organism is changes over time -- it's not a crisp and neat divide as even the cells that once composed the organism become metabolically defunct and yet continue to tell the killer cells that they are a part of the organism by having the protein on the outside of the cell-wall which tells the killer cells "Do not Eat"

At least, in one version of cancer. I'm not sure how far the metaphors can be pushed here -- "needs further research" :D

Also the idea that the self-other can be reduced to hinging on the functioning of a protein network seems reductionist, but there could be some interesting implications for the mind-body problem depending upon what we learn and how we'd want to interpret what we learn.

But really I just thought it was friggen' cool. :D

Is it not absurd, though?

Yeh. No matter what I say the keys are locked in the car I locked.

I think to accomplish something like that you'd have to stipulate Wittgenstein, almost. Not quite, because you can argue this or that about him, but if you bring in Davidson as a point of comparison it seems that Wittgenstein is harder to interpret -- or at least has more interpretations to decide from -- than Davidson.

o yeah no worries. You said as much in your review.

It definitely sounds up my ally. I just haven't gotten around to reading the pdf yet is all.

Aahhhh!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_leukocyte_antigen

I was privileged enough to learn about that for work, at one point.

I found the idea of a protein complex as the basis for self/other fascinating, and still do.

I didn't know about the organism you linked about though. Very exciting stuff.