I wonder how the "isomorphism" relates to ideas about representation. The following statements establish a connection but also a distance:

2.1511 Thus the picture is linked with reality; it reaches up to it.

2.15121 Only the outermost points of the dividing lines touch the object to be measured.

2.1514 The representing relation consists of the co-ordinations of the elements of the picture and the things.

2.1515 These co-ordinations are as it were the feelers of its elements with which the picture touches reality.

Pardon me for perhaps confusing the discussion but some element of Sartre putting forth a less restrained vision of change is part of his embrace of Marx's view of the ideal and the real as invention rather than as discovery.

Camus was an opponent to this view as a close contemporary.

Nice. Thanks.

The wager is a double edged sword. It cuts against the authority of any given time because nothing like that can answer the personal desire for salvation. If one continues along that line, there is no way to cover the bet. The point of the bet is that we do not own what is needed to secure a loan for that purpose.

We are free to recognize that or not. But only in that game of cards.

Sartre, whom I find rather impenetrable, especially Being and Nothingness. So, I’ve still a long way to go to understand it better; it does attract me. — Rob J Kennedy

I find Transcendence of the Ego by Sartre to be the clearest expression of the idea as a point of departure.

The view of it as a change of paradigm suffers from what many other attempts do. The effort to defeat classification leads to new classifications.

Your question does not include what speaks to you on the matter.

I may as well honk at the moon.

He was kind of interesting until he became abusive. I get enough of that at work.

Pardon my misunderstanding. How do you see the "illusion of free will" in relation to the deliberation involved in acting toward achieving ends in Spinoza's view?

I don't think he was advocating a kind of quietism. In the passage I quoted above, there is the emphasis on the wise being more influential than the ignorant:

It is clear from this how potent a wise person is and how much more effective he is than an ignorant person who is driven by lust ​alone. For apart from the fact that an ignorant person is agitated in many ways by external causes and never has true contentment ​of spirit, he also lives, we might say, ignorant ​of himself and of God and of things, and as soon as he ceases to be acted on, at the same time he also ceases to be. — ibid. part 5 proposition 42

In the passages where he criticizes the anthropomorphizing of God, he points to the natural activity of men seeking their own ends as the point of contrast. How our deliberations change things for us is not how the causality by God works.

When Spinoza puts forth his vision of determinism, he always adds that when it seems like our actions are free causes, that is because we do not know the causes well enough. The more effective we become is in the direction of greater knowledge rather than a capacity that can be identified as will in the Augustinian choice between sin and Grace.

He then abandoned transcendental views by the time of the Investigations, which though his best-known work, and while having good stuff in it, is also in some respects, a step down form the Tractatus. — Manuel

I like the bold language of the earlier work too. But I did not notice the moment of abandonment you refer to.

Is there a particular bit of text that brings this thought home to you?

Your reluctance makes sense. The discourse following the statement goes in many different directions.

As far as I know, Wittgenstein does not abandon the point of view.

I was thinking more about Vashane denigrating people as a component of the argument.
I get a lot of the other kind of denigration at work.

If you are referring to our previous disagreements about Aristotle, I did not end up with judgement but a lack of understanding. I don't get it.

I wonder about the limits of direct personal insults. I recognize that I have not expressed the ideal of eschewing such behavior. In fact, I am part of the problem.

Some kind of consistent rule regarding the matter would be good.

I think of it more as a group of people who yearn to hear what they want to hear versus the different options that are put on offer.

The many peasant revolts that died with the people who participated was an argument before proposing the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Is there an example of Fabian tolerance which has a better result? Are not all these questions of what is helpful to be measured against contrasting views?

Tractarian solipsism does not lead to skepticism in the modern sense of doubt about the existence of the world or the possibility of language — Fooloso4

I think the matter is put more forcefully than that:

Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. — ibid. 5.64

That may have a shared purpose with other expressions of doubt. But it is also cojoining what many have struggled to keep apart.

The book begins by declaring it is not an inventory. The act of naming is what is being investigated.

You have made your point of view clear. Your descriptions of other points of views are arrogant.

I was referring to your efforts. But the example provided is interesting.

With that metric, you can sort all things with little effort..

I figured something like that was underway.

In that case, why assume a point of view above the arguments, where your judgements regarding others are given special regard?

Who made you the one who corrects?

If something is far enough beneath you, why bother with it?

If the matter is as inconsequential as you suggest, your insult is equally stupid.

You are using the claim for the purpose of your argument.

Are moderators observing this conversation?

The decision did not reverse the various statements of fact regarding what qualifies as an insurrection. It limited the rights of States to act upon such findings.

So how is believing that there is no society working out for you? — baker

Framing it that way reminds me of Margaret Thatcher's saying, "society does not exist, only people and their families do." How does one separate such a bold claim of bourgeois supremacy over the functions of the state from the pre-linguistic space where the Sovereign Individual runs its cattle unfettered by the demands others? After all, they use many of the same words.

The word "right" is interesting because it expresses a direct or straight quality as an adjective: "Right on time", for instance. When the term is used as "rights of individuals", the use is all about the boundary between the prerogatives of a common interest and what an individual can preserve against such interests.

The thesis of the OP borrows from that latter use to deny the existence of what gave context for it.

Are you suggesting that the idea of a form of life is an elaboration of the earlier position? — Jamal

The article on Logical Atomism linked by Banno taught me enough about Wittgenstein's changing view of the former work to be unable to call the later work an elaboration. I don't want to (or could) shrink the analytic discussion that developed after Tractatus into a digestible snack.

But the questions cited in Philosophical Investigations reflect the unwillingness to accept a "nexus of causality" as a given through logic. That is expressed in the Tractatus.

The distinction between the 'saying' and what is 'shown' remains a feature throughout.

The sense of the following is reiterated in Philosophical Investigations:

Man possesses the capacity of constructing languages, in which every sense can be expressed, without having an idea how and what each word means just as one speaks without knowing how the single sounds are produced.
Colloquial language is a part of the human organism and is not less complicated than it.
From it it is humanly impossible to gather immediately the logic of language. Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognized.
The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enormously complicated. — ibid. 4.002

The discussion immediately following PI 324 and 325 concerns the relationship between thought and language.

On the basis of these ideas, I question Cometti's statement that the boundaries of "my world" have been transposed into the boundaries encountered in participating in a 'form of life'. The later work retains many of the conditions of the former. The formation of language through human activity has not replaced the vanishing point of a person's horizon:

This remark provides a key to the question, to what extent solipsism is a truth. In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself. That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which only I understand) mean the limits of my world. — 5.62

If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are laws of nature.
But of course, that cannot be said: it makes itself manifest.

This distinction is made in the context of limits to establishing possibility apriori but is also a moment in Wittgenstein's ongoing argument against Russell attempts to establish universal rules about logic that can be recognized independently of their use. The theme of "saying" being necessarily connected to "showing" is expressed in:

The application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are.
What lies in the application logic cannot anticipate.
It is clear that logic may not collide with its application.
But logic must have contact with its application.
Therefore logic and its application may not overlap one another. — ibid. 5.557

The discomfort Russell expressed with this result would probably have been shared by Kant. In regard to your OP, I think there is a continuity here between the Tractatus and the later Wittgenstein:

324. Would it be correct to say that it is a matter of induction, and that I am as certain that I shall be able to continue the series, as I am that this book will drop on the ground when I let it go; and that I should be no less astonished if I suddenly and for no obvious reason got stuck in working out the series, than I should be if the book remained hanging in the air instead of falling?—To that I will reply that we don't need any grounds for this certainty either. What could justify the certainty better than success?

325. "The certainty that I shall be able to go on after I have had this experience—seen the formula, for instance,—is simply based on induction." What does this mean?—"The certainty that the fire will burn me is based on induction." Does that mean that I argue to myself: "Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too?" Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground? Whether the earlier experience is the cause of the certainty depends on the system of hypotheses, of natural laws, in which we are considering the phenomenon of certainty.

Is our confidence justified?—What people accept as a justification— is shewn by how they think and live. — Philosophical Investigations, 324

With the older and newer expressions placed side by side, Cometti can be seen to be missing the mark when stating:

In the later Wittgenstein the notion of "forms of life" takes the place of the Tractarian doctrine of the boundary between what can and cannot be said, which determines in turn the "limits of my world". My world takes on the limits of my form of life. — Jean-Pierre Cometti, 'Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and the question of expression'

Wittgenstein is observing the same limits of 5.557 in both works. The use of "form of life" is not a replacement of a previous schema.

How do you suppose that this passage says anything whatsoever about what cannot be said? How could "recognizing our condition" produce any conclusions about "what cannot be said"? — Metaphysician Undercover

That passage is the result of what cannot be said. It was arrived at by all the previous steps in the argument. Recognizing our condition is how we approach first principles. You are using that approach when you accuse Wittgenstein of excluding a premise to treat it as a discovered conclusion at the end.

Those are limits of what can be "pictured" in Wittgenstein's schema. The problem is that it is very obvious that language provides us with a whole lot more creativity than just a basic capacity to draw some simple pictures. Therefore this provides us with no information concerning what can or cannot be said. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is a complete misunderstanding of the argument. No text even remotely makes the statement that language is being depicted as a basic capacity to draw some simple pictures.

There is another completely distinct category of empirical reality which concerns the activities of objects. And a "picture" does not ever capture the activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The development of the structure of representation has been built up since the description of thought in the second proposition. The role of "objects" in the argument is not referring to a world including a totality of things as you describe. This ties back to the beginning at 1.1 "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." The argument here is not dealing with what a picture can capture. Nothing in the text suggest that is the case. I am getting the impression that the argument has no existence for you because you have written it off as a fallacy from the beginning.

Hume stated this position, the foundation of induction is psychological rather than logical. But Hume's efforts to prove this (inductive) principle logically only serve to demonstrate the falsity of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein is not trying to prove Hume's principle. Wittgenstein's statement is:

"There are natural laws.
But that can clearly not be said: it shows itself."

This goes to express the recognition that the limits of explanation are not the limit of what can be experienced through the use of a method. To that end, the argument is a deeper acceptance of transcendence than what Kant expressed.

What appears to happen in the Tractatus is that Wittgenstein discovers the reality that the primary premise is false, that a large part of the world consists of what is other than fact. But instead of recognizing that language has naturally developed to speak of this other part of the world in ways other than truth-apt propositions, he makes the faulty conclusion that we cannot speak about this part of the world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your use of "fact" and its place (or absence of place) in the world has nothing to do with Wittgenstein's argument. What cannot be said is found through recognizing our condition:

6.4312 The temporal immortality of the soul of man, that is to say, its eternal survival also after death, is not only in no way guaranteed, but this assumption in the first place will not do for us what we always tried to make it do. Is a riddle solved by the fact that I survive for ever? Is this eternal life not as enigmatic as our present one? The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.
(It is not problems of natural science which have to be solved.) — ibid.

The dimensions of this condition are found through the structure of our representations. The argument of what can be said or not is the description of that structure. That is where the limits of what can and what cannot be done are laid out. The method is the linking of these "cannots."

2.16 In order to be a picture a fact must have something in common with what it pictures.
2.161 In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all.
2.17 What the picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it after its manner rightly or falsely is its form of representation.
2.171 The picture can represent every reality whose form it has.
The spatial picture, everything spatial, the coloured, everything coloured, etc.
2.172 The picture, however, cannot represent its form of representation; it shows it forth.
2.173 The picture represents its object from without (its standpoint is its form of representation), therefore the picture represents its object rightly or falsely.
2.174 But the picture cannot place itself outside of its form of representation.

2.223 In order to discover whether the picture is true or false we must compare it with reality.
2.224 It cannot be discovered from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225 There is no picture which is apriori true.
3 The logical picture of the facts is the thought.

3.22 In the proposition the name represents the object.
3.221 Objects I can only name. Signs represent them. I can only speak
of them. I cannot assert them. A proposition can only say how a thing is, not what it is.
3.262 What does not get expressed in the sign is shown by its application. What the signs conceal, their application declares.

4.0312 The possibility of propositions is based upon the principle of the representation of objects by signs. My fundamental thought is that the logical constants do not represent. That the logic of the facts cannot be represented. — ibid.

With these limits established, the arguments can observe differences between logic and the world we talk about:

5.556 There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of the elementary propositions. Only that which we ourselves construct can we foresee.

5.5561 Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects. The boundary appears again in the totality of elementary propositions.
The hierarchies are and must be independent of reality. — ibid.

From this point, what cannot be explained is distinguished from the explanations given through natural science referred to in 6.4312:

6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might run: There are natural laws.
But that can clearly not be said: it shows itself.

6.363 The process of induction is the process of assuming the simplest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience.

6.3631 This process, however, has no logical foundation but only a psychological one. It is clear that there are no grounds for believing that the simplest course of events will really happen. — ibid.

But the idea that language consists of truth-apt propositions was derived from the faulty premise, that the world consists of facts. — Metaphysician Undercover

That assertion does not appear in the text.

Aristotle proposed that we allow a violation of the law of excluded middle to accommodate becoming. Others have proposed that becoming violates the law of non-contradiction. In any case, this aspect of "the world" cannot be understood as consisting of facts. But this does not mean that we cannot speak about, or even understand this aspect. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does that idea connect with what Wittgenstein says? Do any particular passages bring that issue into the conversation for you?

They made a film out of it?! That would be like making a movie out of Metamorphosis.

I read Saramago's Blindness many years ago. Scared the crap out of me.

I recommend reading the introduction written by Bertrand Russell to get a sense of the "world" as a boundary rather than as a "thing."

I don't agree with Russell's framing of many issues, but he does reflect the distance from the "totality of facts" given in the descriptions:

More interesting than such questions of comparative detail is Mr Wittgenstein's attitude towards the mystical. His attitude upon this grows naturally out of his doctrine in pure logic, according to which the logical proposition is a picture (true or false) of the fact, and has in common with the fact a certain structure. It is this common structure which makes it capable of being a picture of the fact, but the structure cannot itself be put into words, since it is a structure of words, as well as of the facts to which they refer. Everything, therefore, which is involved in the very idea of the expressiveness of language must remain incapable of being expressed in language, and is, therefore, inexpressible in a perfectly precise sense. This inexpressible contains, according to Mr Wittgenstein, the whole of logic and philosophy. — ibid. page 18

OK, should there be a shadow to the right of the station? — BC

Given the angle of the other shadows, yes, there should be a bit of darkness to the right. There is no shadow of the fence either but that could be written off as the platform being too high. If one looks at the angle taken from the height of objects to the shadow cast, the cowboy's angle is greater than the others. And what is with the lantern casting a more washed-out shadow than the others?

I think there is an Escher thing underway along with the Hopper vibe.

For Aristotle, the hierarchical ordering of the different kinds of beings is based on the extent to which form predominates over matter in each. — Eric D Perl Thinking Being - Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition

Aristotle certainly put the active principle above the elements being acted upon. I am not aware of any passage that expresses a ratio of the sort Perl is putting forth.

What if one does not know the facts well enough to speak about them?

For those of us watching at home, are you referring to:

The world is the totality of facts, not of things. — Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1.1