I agree.
Taylor treats the 'ideal' city as a kind of governance in the way being discussed in Book 8. The focus there is that particular kinds of people predominate in particular kinds of Cities. In those accounts, there are many discussions of the roles of men and women and children. The metric of the 'city of words' is used to measure what changes in the field.

One thing that strikes me about the myth of Er is that the reassignment of souls requires a level of election by the self where a man could become a woman, a human an animal, and vice versa. An equality of all possible fates.

Likewise, or 'back at you' as an American might say.

I have been reading Republic Book 10 for the sake of the Fooloso4 thread and came across a positively Dantean passage that does not belong being quoted over there (at least so far). This is a near death experience that Er reports:

“He said that his soul left him and made its way with many others and they came to a sacred spot where there were two openings in the ground next to each other, and two others opposite them in the sky above. Between them sat judges who, when they had passed sentence, ordered the just to make their way to the opening on the right leading up through the sky, and they fixed placards on the front of their bodies indicating their judgments, while the unjust were sent to the left-hand downward path and they also had indications of all they had done attached to their backs. But when he himself came forward, they said that he must become the messenger to mankind of what was happening there, and they ordered him to listen to and observe everything in that place.

“In this way, then, he said he saw the souls, when judgment had been passed, leaving by one of the openings in the sky and one in the ground, while by the other two, out of the one coming up from the ground, were souls covered in filth and dust, and down from the other one from the sky came others purified. — Plato, Republic, 614c, translated by Jones and Preddy

In Dante, of course, there is no return. The location of the placards on the front or back sends a chill down my spine.

Book 10 concentrates on different ways a soul might get what is their due, in this life or afterwards. Plato placing tradition in continuum with previous challenges puts the immediate discussion in a broader context. The traditions Socrates is found questioning in many of the Dialogues involve a collision with a code of silence of sorts.

For example, when Socrates challenges Antyus in Meno, the talk about learning virtue is seen by Antyus as an assault upon his honor. There is a vivid Homeric logic to what might happen next.

Euthyphro provides another point of contrast but without the threat of violence pointed to in Meno and Republic Book 1.

I find the specificity of Socrates' letter to Homer interesting. Here is the continuation after your quote:

What state gives you the credit of having been a good lawgiver and having benefited it? Italy and Sicily would claim Charondas, we would claim Solon. Who would claim you?’ Will he be able to answer?”

“I don’t think so,” said Glaucon. “Nothing is said on the matter even by the Homeridae themselves.”

“There again, what war is on record as being well fought in Homer’s time under his leadership or on his advice?”

“None.”

“Or again, as would be expected of the deeds of a wise man, are there many ingenious inventions and clever contrivances in crafts or any other activities that are mentioned, as they are with the Milesian Thales and the Scythian Anacharsis?”

“Nothing of that sort at all.”

“And yet again, if not in public life, in private life is Homer himself said to have been a leading educator in his own lifetime for some who delighted in his company and passed on a kind of Homeric way of life to their successors, as Pythagoras himself was particularly loved for this, and even today his successors seem to be distinguished among the rest for a way of life they call Pythagorean?” — Republic, 599e, translated by Jones and Preddy

This places Plato's effort in a continuum which is rarely expressed so directly in the Dialogues. It also points to a negative space where people can assemble. A way of life that does not talk about itself. That points back to the question of what Simonides meant to say in Book 1

There is plenty for the reader of today. I was mostly thinking how sure Dante sounded when claiming to know what the coming judgement of some of his contemporaries was going to be. This life and the afterlife are woven together.

I will think about what Mandelstam is saying and try to dip into the Cantos again. It has been a while.

The effort you have put into placing me outside of the conversation does not address the distinctions that Aquinas also understood.

it is logically consistent to designate the actual as eternal, having been separated from the concepts of time and movement. — Metaphysician Undercover

The passage in question is not claiming that result.

Your introduction of how well the eggs can be understood through time prompted me to think about how different a book the Inferno by Dante was for the generations closest to it.

The double standard involved with discussing cruelty is there. As a matter of public discourse, the language of complete vindication is different than what the U.S. should do as a polity.

Your choice to not choose between possible administrations ignores the extreme rhetoric from the Trump side that has been going on for years. As citizens, these differences appear in outcomes in our communities. Don't gnash your teeth in self-imposed silence.

Since you are compelled to undermine my reputation as a scholar, I will give the matter one last go:

The original translation I quoted from CDC Reeve agrees with HG Apostle, and Hugh Tredennick, who I quoted above from the Loeb Edition. Tredennick is also the translator of the English version at Perseus where I got the Greek text from.

In the text preceding Theta 6, different senses of how potentiality was present in a motion or a being was discussed. Theta 6 begins by addressing the difference between how actuality and potentiality can be said to be present:

“Actuality “means the presence of the thing, not in the sense which we mean by “potentially.” We say that a thing is present potentially as Hermes is present in the wood, or the half-line in the whole, from potentiality. because it can be separated from it: and as we call even a man who is not studying “a scholar” if he is capable of studying. That which is present in the opposite sense to this is present actually. What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular cases by induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but must comprehend the analogy: that as that which is actually building is to that which is capable of building, so is that which is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is seeing to that which has the eyes shut, but has the power of sight; and that which is differentiated out of matter to the matter; and the finished article to the raw material. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. — ibid. 1048a30, emphasis mine

The antithesis is what will have to be applied analogically. The precise terms of actuality and potentiality are supplied in the text as ratios. That statement is not saying:

So he says that we understand the difference between these senses of "actual" by the way that they each relate to "potential". — Metaphysician Undercover

The passage does relate how specific senses of actuality relate to specific potential activities but it uses the clearly stated antithesis between actuality and potentiality to do so.

Edit to Add for Aquinas Fans:

1825. Now actuality (769).

Second, he establishes the truth about actuality. First, he shows what actuality is; and second (1828), how it is used in different senses in the case of different things (“However, things”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows what actuality is. He says that a thing is actual when it exists but not in the way in which it exists when it is potential. (a) For we say that the image of Mercury is in the wood potentially and not actually before the wood is carved; but once it has been carved the image of Mercury is then said to be in the wood actually. (b) And in the same way we say that any part of a continuous whole is in that whole, because any part (for example, the middle one) is present potentially inasmuch as it is possible for it to be separated from the whole by dividing the whole; but after the whole has been divided, that part will now be present actually. (c) The same thing is true of one who has a science and is not speculating, for he is capable of speculating even though he is not actually doing so; but to be speculating or contemplating is to be in a state of actuality.

1826. What we mean (770).

Here he answers an implied question; for someone could ask him to explain what actuality is by giving its definition. And he answers by saying that it is possible to show what we mean (i.e., by actuality) in the case of singular things by proceeding inductively from examples, “and we should not look for the boundaries of everything,” i.e., the definition. For simple notions cannot be defined, since an infinite regress in definitions is impossible. But actuality is one of those first simple notions. Hence it cannot be defined.

1827. And he says that we can see what actuality is by means of the proportion existing between two things. For example, we may take the proportion of one who is building to one capable of building; and of one who is awake to one asleep; and of one who sees to one whose eyes are closed although he has the power of sight; and “of that which is separated out of matter,” i.e., what is formed by means of the operation of art or of nature, and thus is separated out of unformed matter, to what is not separated out of unformed matter. And similarly we may take the proportion of what has been prepared to what has not been prepared, or of what has been worked on to what has not been worked on. But in each of these opposed pairs one member will be actual and the other potential.

And thus by proceeding from particular cases we can come to an understanding in a proportional way of what actuality and potency are. — Aquinas, Commentaries on Metaphysics, LESSON 5 Actuality and Its Various Meanings ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1048a 25-1048b 36

Now, that will be my last word. I leave your Church of the Only Aristotle. It is nice outside.

The negative feedback from both sources tortured Edgar Allen Poe while inspiring him at the same time.

We will have to agree to disagree. In any case, I will say no more here.

You have the same resources I have on the site. Use them if you are genuinely curious about past interchanges.

I could do that sort of thing, given what you have said in the past.
Your lack of interest in supporting any of that stuff for the sake of forcing me to repeat it is not the mark of a gentleman.

That is not what I said. You have said the state is an illusion..

Your often repeated idea of the "state" is that it is a shared misconception rather that an existing thing. You are now asking that illusion to perform better.

How do these problems fit into your libertarian vibe that nothing can be done by the state?

It won't mean much to the Trump pooper scooper but here is an update:

FEMA deploys to rough terrain after Helene as it faces criticism, fights misinformation.

Your link failed.

With the "not wanting to spare anybody from thinking", there is introduced an element which my teachers of Wittgenstein emphasized. The benefit from the way out is only helpful for those who sincerely have the problems, If we can stand outside of the circle and express superiority over the poor fucks who suffer that sort of thing, then that would be a kind of psychology.

The Trump team plays both sides of that:

Trump FEMA Claim Debunked: Agency Not Running Out Of Money Because Of Migrants.

In the report:

Congress determines how much money goes to FEMA’s disaster fund, and the fund faces issues after lawmakers declined to allocate additional funding for FEMA’s efforts in the stopgap funding bill it passed last month, only extending FEMA’s existing funding level and allowing it to draw from $20 billion in funds more quickly.

It was the MAGA minions, of course, who pushed for that.

False. It was taken up as a slogan by a rather detrimental portion of the male populace of the USA for a short period. — AmadeusD

I had no idea. I must be using the wrong locker rooms.

Your reading overlooks the role of analogy as a response to what cannot be defined. The Greek of 1048a35 is:

καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν — Theta 1048a35

The ἀλλὰ sharply separates the 'seeking the boundaries of all things' from 'being able to see through analogy'. The separation is reiterated at 1048b10:

But things are not all said to exist actually in the same sense, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B, so is C in or to D; for the relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter. — Translated by Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Edition

Not being able to define actuality and potentiality more precisely echoes Aristotle wanting to move past Empedocles in Delta:

Of nothing that exists is there nature, but only mixture and separation of what has been mixed; nature is but a name given to these by men. — ibid. 1015a1

Hence as regards those things which exist or are produced by nature, although that from which they naturally are produced or exist is already present, we say that they have not their nature yet unless they have their form and shape. That which comprises both of these exists by nature; e.g. animals and their parts. And nature is both the primary matter (and this in two senses: either primary in relation to the thing, or primary in general; e.g., in bronze articles the primary matter in relation to those articles is bronze, but in general it is perhaps water—that is if all things which can be melted are water) and the form or essence, i.e. the end of the process of generation. Indeed from this sense of “nature,” by an extension of meaning, every essence in general is called “nature,” because the nature of anything is a kind of essence.

From what has been said, then, the primary and proper sense of “nature” is the essence of those things which contain in themselves as such a source of motion; for the matter is called “nature” because it is capable of receiving the nature, and the processes of generation and growth are called “nature” because they are motions derived from it. And nature in this sense is the source of motion in natural objects, which is somehow inherent in them, either potentially or actually. — ibid 1015a6, emphasis mine

Aristotle yokes together these two senses of natural being without reducing them further. Notice that it is the same pair of terms which get used analogically in Theta 6.

Revealing comment.

So, you add it to the ledger of your disaffection.
Trump said that while thinking he was alone with his interlocutor. It was never a slogan.

Do you include "grabbing by the pussy" in that category?

Are you past that? Do you condone Trump's behavior in that regard?

Your brand of libertarian ethos does not engage with such questions on a personal level. Are you living the Trump life?

That portion of the story plays a part in the Republic.

The paragraph states that it is the meaning of "actual", that we learn by analogy, not the meaning of "potential". — Metaphysician Undercover

It does not say that. It includes both terms in relation to each other. It goes out of its way to make that clear.

In Book 2, the trio begins sorting the poets into different baskets. Adeimantus says:

“Fathers, when speaking to their sons and offering them advice, and indeed anyone 363A who cares for anyone, speak to them presumably about the need to be just, by praising not justice itself but the good reputation derived from it, saying that by seeming to be just, from the reputation alone, they may secure positions of authority, and marriages, and whatever else Glaucon listed just now, all from having a reputation for being just.

“Yet these people have more to say on the subject of reputation. For when they throw in good reputation in the eyes of the gods, they describe a whole host of goods that, they declare, are given by the gods to holy people, just as noble Hesiod, and 363B Homer too, declare in one case that for the just people the gods make oak trees

Bear acorns in their topmost branches with swarms of bees below.

“And he says,

Their woolly sheep are weighed down with fleeces.[4]

“And there are many other good things connected to these. In the other case, Homer says something similar:

… as of some king who, as a blameless man and god-fearing,

and ruling as lord over many powerful people,

363C upholds the way of good government, and the black earth yields him

barley and wheat, his trees are heavy with fruit, his sheep flocks

continue to bear young, the sea gives him fish…[5] — Plato, Republic, 363A, translated by Horan

It is odd that Adeimantus puts such an emphasis upon reputation when it seems the virtuous are receiving actual benefits from the gods themselves, not just looking cool to other people. This oddity is continued in the talk immediately following of succeeding generations getting a benefit from virtuous living.

In any case, Simonides probably belongs in the first basket rather than the ones about to be introduced in the dialogue. The Thrasymachus thing is more obviously presented in the subsequent baskets. So, what to make of Socrates pulling this particular beard?

I don't understand what you are saying here. Parmenides is Eleatic. And then you say "Pretty darn Parmenidean", as if you are confirming that Parmenides was sophistic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was referring to Aristotle's comments in Sophistical Refutations. The formulation of Plato in that case references statements influenced by Parmenides' language. Aristotle charges the Eleatics of being 'eristic' more often than Plato does. It does not always mean something is 'sophistical.' I think it is safe to say that Aristotle does not hold Parmenides in the same high esteem expressed by Socrates in Theaetetus.

There is much said about "potential", and "potency" in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially Bk.9, and most is not said by analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover

What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, |1048a35| and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, |1048b1| and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second. |1048b5| But things are said to actively be, not all in the same way, but by analogy—as this is in this or to this, so that is in that or to that. For some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential], and the others as substance to some sort of matter. — Aristotle, Metaphysic, Theta 6, 1048a34, translated by CDC Reeve

There is more in Book Lamda drawing the same distinction, but I remember that you have excluded that from your canon.

I disagree with your depiction of the Eleatics as sophists. Plato wrote the Sophist having a student of Parmenides overturning a critical tenet of his teacher. Aristotle (almost reluctantly) confirms Plato's descriptions of sophistry as a way to "say what is not." Pretty darn Parmenidean.

What strikes me about Aristotle's Physics is how his rejection of the Eleatics makes no reference to Plato's objections to them in the Sophist (or Plato's Parmenides). That makes it likely there is some portion of the work he likes well enough to make his own.

Your version of 'being' and 'becoming' gives a place for "potential" to hang out in between times of actuality. That does not fit well with Aristotle speaking of potential as something we can only apply by analogy. We need experience to use the idea. In a parallel fashion, I read the tension created in Metaphysics Zeta 13 to point to the complexity of causes beyond being able to recognize "kinds" (genos).

So, is that to say my version of the story is an error?

As a production of written text, the results point to a detachment from speech. The compilation of generic explanations was long vapid filler including seemingly reasonable speech before a player piano did the work for one.

I am not here, this isn't happening

What I'm wrestling with are two senses of 'form'. There's the Aristotelian sense of morphe which informs matter. That is the classical view, which to all intents became absorbed into Christian theism. As such it's a kind of no-go for a lot of people, if it suggests anything like intelligent design or the 'divine intellect'. — Wayfarer

For Aristotle, moving away from the idea of 'participating' in forms involves the particular individual coming into being as an event of ousia that the universal or genos cannot provide a sufficient explanation for. The issue is at the center of the disruptive quality of Metaphysics Zeta 13. Here is an SEP article that puts it in a nutshell:

Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:

(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics

The authors of the article make some reasonable arguments to resolve the issue. I tend to look at it as an ongoing issue of how to understand the role of all the causes needed for particular creatures to come into being. Since the forms don't have their own real estate outside the convergence of causes, a new concept of the soul is needed.

There is a parallel consideration taking place in Plato's Sophist, where the sharp division between Being and Becoming is brought into question. It is interesting that Aristotle's Physics (nature) spends so much time and effort into pressing a thumb into the eye of the Eleatics.

The different role of matter in Plato and Aristotle is difficult to fully draw out but the expression "morphe which informs matter" is a product of later Platonism where matter is the empty husk that Soul attempts but fails to completely fill. Aristotle rejects that view in De Anima when he dispenses with the Pythagoreans' concept of soul.

It's also part of the One, though apparently the part where Plotinus explains this is squirrelly. — frank

Does this source quote from a specific text from Plotinus?

(That question is anticipated in the Parmenides, when Socrates asks if there are forms for hair, dirt and mud.) — Wayfarer

This is an issue where Aristotle's argument about the inseparability of form and matter comes into play. The call for a comprehensive causality means not being able to choose who shows up for the party.

I am lucky enough to live in the house I remade for myself. So, both made and found. The 'made' is also a matter of finding in regard to what I could afford. I regret some of those choices but I cannot cohabit the place of the one who made them.

As a worker in the trades, I have diligently attempted to carry out designs and fell short to varying degrees. People still live in those places, living with my work. When I visit extremely designed spaces, I see the shadows of my life in peculiar details another investigator might miss.

I have encountered those who have a different relationship to their work than I have developed. I will not opine upon that. I am pretty sure it is different.

I don't think the Greeks shared the conception of self-organization that is associated with modern biological theory. — Wayfarer

Aristotle considered the matter through developing different ideas about seeds. That some bits of material were ready to become something else is in direct opposition to the Pythagorean idea of forms impressing themselves into matter like a seal pressed into wax.