“He said that his soul left him and made its way with many others and they came to a sacred spot where there were two openings in the ground next to each other, and two others opposite them in the sky above. Between them sat judges who, when they had passed sentence, ordered the just to make their way to the opening on the right leading up through the sky, and they fixed placards on the front of their bodies indicating their judgments, while the unjust were sent to the left-hand downward path and they also had indications of all they had done attached to their backs. But when he himself came forward, they said that he must become the messenger to mankind of what was happening there, and they ordered him to listen to and observe everything in that place.
“In this way, then, he said he saw the souls, when judgment had been passed, leaving by one of the openings in the sky and one in the ground, while by the other two, out of the one coming up from the ground, were souls covered in filth and dust, and down from the other one from the sky came others purified. — Plato, Republic, 614c, translated by Jones and Preddy
What state gives you the credit of having been a good lawgiver and having benefited it? Italy and Sicily would claim Charondas, we would claim Solon. Who would claim you?’ Will he be able to answer?”
“I don’t think so,” said Glaucon. “Nothing is said on the matter even by the Homeridae themselves.”
“There again, what war is on record as being well fought in Homer’s time under his leadership or on his advice?”
“None.”
“Or again, as would be expected of the deeds of a wise man, are there many ingenious inventions and clever contrivances in crafts or any other activities that are mentioned, as they are with the Milesian Thales and the Scythian Anacharsis?”
“Nothing of that sort at all.”
“And yet again, if not in public life, in private life is Homer himself said to have been a leading educator in his own lifetime for some who delighted in his company and passed on a kind of Homeric way of life to their successors, as Pythagoras himself was particularly loved for this, and even today his successors seem to be distinguished among the rest for a way of life they call Pythagorean?” — Republic, 599e, translated by Jones and Preddy
it is logically consistent to designate the actual as eternal, having been separated from the concepts of time and movement. — Metaphysician Undercover
“Actuality “means the presence of the thing, not in the sense which we mean by “potentially.” We say that a thing is present potentially as Hermes is present in the wood, or the half-line in the whole, from potentiality. because it can be separated from it: and as we call even a man who is not studying “a scholar” if he is capable of studying. That which is present in the opposite sense to this is present actually. What we mean can be plainly seen in the particular cases by induction; we need not seek a definition for every term, but must comprehend the analogy: that as that which is actually building is to that which is capable of building, so is that which is awake to that which is asleep; and that which is seeing to that which has the eyes shut, but has the power of sight; and that which is differentiated out of matter to the matter; and the finished article to the raw material. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. — ibid. 1048a30, emphasis mine
So he says that we understand the difference between these senses of "actual" by the way that they each relate to "potential". — Metaphysician Undercover
1825. Now actuality (769).
Second, he establishes the truth about actuality. First, he shows what actuality is; and second (1828), how it is used in different senses in the case of different things (“However, things”).
In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows what actuality is. He says that a thing is actual when it exists but not in the way in which it exists when it is potential. (a) For we say that the image of Mercury is in the wood potentially and not actually before the wood is carved; but once it has been carved the image of Mercury is then said to be in the wood actually. (b) And in the same way we say that any part of a continuous whole is in that whole, because any part (for example, the middle one) is present potentially inasmuch as it is possible for it to be separated from the whole by dividing the whole; but after the whole has been divided, that part will now be present actually. (c) The same thing is true of one who has a science and is not speculating, for he is capable of speculating even though he is not actually doing so; but to be speculating or contemplating is to be in a state of actuality.
1826. What we mean (770).
Here he answers an implied question; for someone could ask him to explain what actuality is by giving its definition. And he answers by saying that it is possible to show what we mean (i.e., by actuality) in the case of singular things by proceeding inductively from examples, “and we should not look for the boundaries of everything,” i.e., the definition. For simple notions cannot be defined, since an infinite regress in definitions is impossible. But actuality is one of those first simple notions. Hence it cannot be defined.
1827. And he says that we can see what actuality is by means of the proportion existing between two things. For example, we may take the proportion of one who is building to one capable of building; and of one who is awake to one asleep; and of one who sees to one whose eyes are closed although he has the power of sight; and “of that which is separated out of matter,” i.e., what is formed by means of the operation of art or of nature, and thus is separated out of unformed matter, to what is not separated out of unformed matter. And similarly we may take the proportion of what has been prepared to what has not been prepared, or of what has been worked on to what has not been worked on. But in each of these opposed pairs one member will be actual and the other potential.
And thus by proceeding from particular cases we can come to an understanding in a proportional way of what actuality and potency are. — Aquinas, Commentaries on Metaphysics, LESSON 5 Actuality and Its Various Meanings ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1048a 25-1048b 36
False. It was taken up as a slogan by a rather detrimental portion of the male populace of the USA for a short period. — AmadeusD
καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν — Theta 1048a35
But things are not all said to exist actually in the same sense, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B, so is C in or to D; for the relation is either that of motion to potentiality, or that of substance to some particular matter. — Translated by Hugh Tredennick, Loeb Edition
Of nothing that exists is there nature, but only mixture and separation of what has been mixed; nature is but a name given to these by men. — ibid. 1015a1
Hence as regards those things which exist or are produced by nature, although that from which they naturally are produced or exist is already present, we say that they have not their nature yet unless they have their form and shape. That which comprises both of these exists by nature; e.g. animals and their parts. And nature is both the primary matter (and this in two senses: either primary in relation to the thing, or primary in general; e.g., in bronze articles the primary matter in relation to those articles is bronze, but in general it is perhaps water—that is if all things which can be melted are water) and the form or essence, i.e. the end of the process of generation. Indeed from this sense of “nature,” by an extension of meaning, every essence in general is called “nature,” because the nature of anything is a kind of essence.
From what has been said, then, the primary and proper sense of “nature” is the essence of those things which contain in themselves as such a source of motion; for the matter is called “nature” because it is capable of receiving the nature, and the processes of generation and growth are called “nature” because they are motions derived from it. And nature in this sense is the source of motion in natural objects, which is somehow inherent in them, either potentially or actually. — ibid 1015a6, emphasis mine
The paragraph states that it is the meaning of "actual", that we learn by analogy, not the meaning of "potential". — Metaphysician Undercover
“Yet these people have more to say on the subject of reputation. For when they throw in good reputation in the eyes of the gods, they describe a whole host of goods that, they declare, are given by the gods to holy people, just as noble Hesiod, and 363B Homer too, declare in one case that for the just people the gods make oak trees
Bear acorns in their topmost branches with swarms of bees below.
“And he says,
Their woolly sheep are weighed down with fleeces.[4]
“And there are many other good things connected to these. In the other case, Homer says something similar:
… as of some king who, as a blameless man and god-fearing,
and ruling as lord over many powerful people,
363C upholds the way of good government, and the black earth yields him
barley and wheat, his trees are heavy with fruit, his sheep flocks
continue to bear young, the sea gives him fish…[5] — Plato, Republic, 363A, translated by Horan
I don't understand what you are saying here. Parmenides is Eleatic. And then you say "Pretty darn Parmenidean", as if you are confirming that Parmenides was sophistic. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is much said about "potential", and "potency" in Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially Bk.9, and most is not said by analogy. — Metaphysician Undercover
What we wish to say is clear from the particular cases by induction, |1048a35| and we must not look for a definition of everything, but be able to comprehend the analogy, namely, that as what is building is in relation to what is capable of building, and what is awake is in relation to what is asleep, |1048b1| and what is seeing is in relation to what has its eyes closed but has sight, and what has been shaped out of the matter is in relation to the matter, and what has been finished off is to the unfinished. Of the difference exemplified in this analogy let the activity be marked off by the first part, the potentiality by the second. |1048b5| But things are said to actively be, not all in the same way, but by analogy—as this is in this or to this, so that is in that or to that. For some are as movement in relation to a capacity [or a potential], and the others as substance to some sort of matter. — Aristotle, Metaphysic, Theta 6, 1048a34, translated by CDC Reeve
What I'm wrestling with are two senses of 'form'. There's the Aristotelian sense of morphe which informs matter. That is the classical view, which to all intents became absorbed into Christian theism. As such it's a kind of no-go for a lot of people, if it suggests anything like intelligent design or the 'divine intellect'. — Wayfarer
Ζ.13 therefore produces a fundamental tension in Aristotle’s metaphysics that has fragmented his interpreters. Some maintain that Aristotle’s theory is ultimately inconsistent, on the grounds that it is committed to all three of the following propositions:
(i) Substance is form.
(ii) Form is universal.
(iii) No universal is a substance. — SEP Aristotle's Metaphysics
It's also part of the One, though apparently the part where Plotinus explains this is squirrelly. — frank
(That question is anticipated in the Parmenides, when Socrates asks if there are forms for hair, dirt and mud.) — Wayfarer
I don't think the Greeks shared the conception of self-organization that is associated with modern biological theory. — Wayfarer