The second line establishes "probability distribution" "which produces the illusion of continuity..." — ucarr

That line explicitly states "we have something... which produces the illusion of continuity". Why would you conclude that "something" refers to the probability distribution, when I've already stated that the illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not to the probability prediction? What is stated is that there is something there, which produces the illusion of continuity, and it also supports the assumption of necessity. I make no claims as to what that "something" is, but it is obviously not the probability distribution itself, because I've already explained how it is not that Your interpretation makes no sense. It's like you are intentionally making an obvious misinterpretation for the sake of claiming that I contradict myself — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's look at your second unedited quote:

The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

In your unedited quote, the relation of probability (probability distribution) is present, rather than a relation of necessity...

So, it (probability distribution) $=$ illusion of continuity.

Let's look at your first unedited quote:

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, it (probability distribution) $≠$ illusion of continuity.

Relativity tells us that no given frame of reference for time is locked into one of the three tenses of time. The exception is the empirical present that populates every local frame of reference. Therefore, your talk of future preceding past, and all of the complexity it suggests, dissolves away when we remember there is no universal time. — ucarr

I told you why relativity is unacceptable. So reference to it really does little here. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I believe is demonstrated, is that if we model a single dimensional line, "an arrow of time", the present cannot be adequately positioned on that line, because the different types of objects moving relative to each other (massive vs massless), would require a different position on the line. We could simply make the area called "the present" wider, but the way that relativity theory deals with massless objects would require that the whole line would need to be "the present" at one boundary, and the other boundary would assumingly be a point. This allows for an infinitely wide present.

Clearly this is not an acceptable representation. So, if instead, we model a number of parallel lines, each representing a different type of object, from the most massive to the most massless, then each could have its own point of "the present" which would distinguish that type of objects future from its past. Then the multitude of lines, marking the flow of time for each different type of object, would be placed in relation to each other, revealing how "the past" for some types of objects is still the future for other types, in relation to the overall flow of time. This allows for the breadth of the present, the second dimension of time, where the past and the future actually overlap because of the multitude of different types of object in the vast field of reality, each having a specific "present" at a different time, making the general "present" wide.. — Metaphysician Undercover

All of this is theoretical physics. It won't modify relativity without experimental verification. Does it exist?

I've been waiting for you to demonstrate some particular details of the workings of non-physics. — ucarr

I told you, freewill. You... are somewhat interested in freewill, probably because it actually is a self-evident truth... Still... you refuse to accept it as a premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

Freewill expresses as desires and anticipations. These are thoughts of the mind linked to the neuronal activity of the brain. Even if we suppose thoughts are non-physical, supposing they're free is a big assumption. Neuroscience shows us that different parts of the brain control different types of thinking. When a part is damaged, or destroyed, the associated type of thinking changes, or stops. Sometimes the brain can adjust to offset loss of function due to injury. Certainly this partial correction is not non-physical. This shows that exercise of will has parameters. Take the impairment of speech due to stroke. I haven't seen where free will restores it to pristine condition.

However, to address your complaint, I did discuss details concerning how the material world is created anew at each passing moment, and I described the type of model of time which is required for this. You told me mathematics and diagrams would help. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not the case that the time proposed is bi-directional. What I propose is that physical things come into existence (are recreated) at each moment of passing time. Once it is created at the present it cannot be changed, but until that moment it is not determined. The second dimension of the present allows that some types of objects move into the past (receive material existence) prior to others, at the present. This means that the present is multidimensional because some types of objects are already in the past (fixed), while other types are just beginning to materialize. Empirical evidence indicates that massive objects are created and move into the past first, that is why they have inertia, obey basic determinist laws, and it is more difficult for freely willed acts to change them. Massless things are created last, having their moment of the present later, and this provides free will the greater capacity to use them for change.

So consider the premise that anything, any state of being, which comes into existence at the present. must be predetermined (principle of sufficient reason) by something. Now imagine a number of parallel horizontal lines, as arrows of time, in the same direction, arrows pointing left. At the top of the page is the most massive type of object, and at the bottom is the least massive type. At the top line, the present is to the right, so that the entire line is in the past. At the bottom line, the present is to the left, so the entire line is in the future. "The present" refers to when each type of object gains its physical existence. Notice that at any moment, massive objects already have physical existence before massless objects do. This allows that a slight change to a massive object, through a freely will act, is capable of producing a large effect on massless objects. This effect we observe as our capacity to change things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this a description of physical things, both massive and massless, coming into existence at each moment of passing time? After being created, these two types have a relationship to the present that determines when they can be changed? The free will of the thinking mind is the sufficient cause acting as the agent of creation of the two types of things? What are some important details of the physics of the continuous recreation of all things? How is passing time fueling this continuous recreation? How is it that passing time is non-physical? How does non-physical passing time become the dynamism of physical things changing? Is this transformation the continuous recreation of all things? Does your mind freely will the changes that are the events that populate your life? Does this mean nothing happens in your life that you don’t freely will into the
changes that are the events that populate your life?

Show me how your dimensionally extended present overcomes the limitation of Heisenberg Uncertainty. — ucarr

If you can't do that, then your inability is evidence Heisenberg Uncertainty is not a measurement problem; it's an existential limitation on possible measurement.

By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction. Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not. — ucarr

Maximum certainty of one is equivalent with maximum uncertainty of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does this exemplify discontinuity?

For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity?

If non-physics can only observe nature through the lens of physics, then it too cannot obtain any info beyond this limitation. — ucarr

Another false premise. You keep insisting that the only way to the nonphysical is through observation of the physical, and I insist that this is false. Yet you keep insisting on it. We can derive information from ways other than observation. This is how a person comes to accept freewill as self-evident, through knowing one's inner self, and this is not a matter of observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

(As a side note, I dispute your premise self-examination "...is not a matter of observation." Knowledge is always acquired by observation, whether through the senses, or through the mind. A priori knowledge is based upon the mind's observations of logical truth.)

But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act... Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your description above paints the picture of a thinker who uses physics to observe the natural world, and who then bolsters his observations with logic, and the two combined empower him to understand the natural world. This is a picture of you using your abstract mind emergent from your senses.

The future is present to us through feelings like desire and anticipation, it is not present to us as "abstract ideas". We have contact with the nonphysical through these emotions. This gaves rise to the abstract concept of "freewill", which is how we relate to our contact with the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

If we're sitting side-by-side on a bench in the park, and you start indulging your desires for the future: vehicle, home, large income and I, hearing tell of this from you, also start indulging my desires for the future with me in possession of similar things, do you believe the two of us have entered the future mind, brain and body?

The future-as-past is only relative in relation to our frame of reference as non-local to the incidence of the stimulus. In it's own frame of reference, it's the present. If you deny this, then you're saying a thing is future to itself, or past to itself, a strange and probably paradoxical configuration for the existing self. — ucarr

For a long time you've been telling me the future jumps to the past, skipping the present. Next the present and the past overlap and, somehow, the dimensional present includes the past.

If all our observations are of things of the past, with the time lag being significant rather than negligible - with the latter being the case in the empirical present - then we can't know our true selves because our observations are always separated from our present selves. This undermines and perhaps even destroys the free will you're always touting. — ucarr

This is addressed above. — Metaphysician Undercover

I know you've said our exercise of free will shapes a future that becomes the past overlapped with the present with our desires realized. This allows our present to move toward our desires realized in the future now become past. So, given the overlap of two different temporal tenses, I occupy two different times simultaneously. Maybe this is superposition that has me in two different temporal locations at once. Well, if I'm my own observer and resolve myself into a definite temporal location, then I've used free will to create myself according to desire, but since my observation sees only my past, then my present self remains a mystery. Under your plan, free will creates a version of me I observe as me-as-my-past-self. I still don't know myself now. The upshot: In spite of all of this complexity, I still need a dimensionless present I approach as an infinite series that narrows the time lag down to a differential so minute I can know my virtual self.

Regarding danger, if it's out of date info, how is it that we avoid impending harm? — ucarr

Desire and anticipation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Non sequitur because these two would be looking toward the future, not toward the past, so they'd be looking at what they imagine, whereas they need to be looking at what is actually about to happen.

...the future is present to the mind as desire, anticipation, and such emotions which influence us in relation to the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the future is present to the mind, then it's present in the mind in the present as the present. No amount of word-gaming will change this simple truth.

The so-called "empirical present" is a 'present" which is purely past, as you admit. So you assume, when you say "understanding is in the empirical present", without any justification, that "understanding" is in the past. But this is clearly wrong because true "understanding" must involve the future just as much as the past, because the future is just as much a part of our reality as the past is. — Metaphysician Undercover

The empirical past, as we experience it, resides within the local frame of reference of our now. It's only the past relative to the stimuli of our perceptions which have a different local frame of reference.

The local frame of reference of our now is the only experience of a temporal tense that has an absolute value for us mind, brain and body. The other two tenses: past and future, only have relative value for us as concepts within our minds. You can only experience past and future in your mind. You never experience them mind, brain and body. This is even true when we assume the possibility of time travel. When you time travel, and arrive in another time mind, brain and body, that time is now your empirical present. If we were sitting together in a room having this conversation, and I challenged you to travel mind, brain and body to either past or future absent a time machine, you could not do it. You would remain sitting next to me in the room, no matter how many word games you played.

Let's look at this again with another example: You're standing on the platform of a train station. An express train that doesn't stop at your station whizzes by with passengers aboard. You catch a glimpse of each other.

We know from relativity the passengers are in one local frame of reference; you are in another. Since their velocity, relative to you, is greater, their time, relative to you, passes more slowly. Conversely, your time, at the lower velocity, relative to them, passes more quickly. Relativity of time therefore tells us that in their glimpse of you, they're looking at the future; in your glimpse of them, you're looking at the past.

Since the two local frames of reference are different, Relativity tells us the passengers, within their own frame of reference, inhabit the empirical present; within your own frame of reference, you too inhabit the empirical present.

We only inhabit mind, brain and body the empirical present. Past and future are only experienced as concepts of the mind. Time measured in millennia had passed before the abstract mind attained to the relativity of time and its ramifications. This because the mind must climb a learning curve before it understands the empirical present and its relationship to past and future. We're not naturally aware of relativistic effects because we only experience them mentally.

Now we're in position to see why representing the empirical present as a point with zero extension is useful. — ucarr

Sure representing the present in this way is "useful", that's what I've argued from the beginning. — Metaphysician Undercover

The QM approach to the literal now, as represented by an infinite series irrational, suggests something curious: the empirical now lies embedded within QM uncertainty. It looks similar to the hedging of superposition, but in effect at Newtonian scale.

The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. — Metaphysician Undercover

...in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So [we] are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

I read your statement as showing past and future hold equal status of importance. An infant has wants that lie in its future, but has scant ability to satisfy those wants due to a deficiency of learning and the ability it sponsors. Moreover, future desires, as you say, are informed by what we've learned in the past. The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground. — ucarr

I don't see an argument, just more false premises. An infant cries to fulfil its wants. Your claim that an infant has no capacity to fulfil its desires is unfounded and unsound. — Metaphysician Undercover

You misquote me (see my bold text above and compare it to your bold text immediately below): scant ability $≠$ no ability. So, again, as our past deepens, it enriches our intentions for the future.

Furthermore, that the past cannot be altered is a contestable premise. Who's past are we referring to? Relativity raises this question. Somewhat as I argued before in a thought experiment, let me pitch another one which has me imagining myself leaving from you standing beside me, and traveling to the past, perhaps via a wormhole. Once there, it becomes my present. So my past, unalterable, now my present, alterable, becomes the new situation. The complexity of relativity demands we incorporate these twists and turns into our understanding. — ucarr

Something with no physical evidence, time travel, and the capacity to change the past, cannot be offered as physics. Therefore I take it merely as a desire which you have. It serves as more evidence of the reality of my perspective, that in reality, desires are given priority over physical evidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Those who are ignorant of the past are doomed to repeat it." When we intentionally make the present
different from the past, we can say we've learned how to contain it, which is changing it in the sense of erasing an influence (repetition) that otherwise would exist.

Since a QM vector can be accurately measured for both magnitude and direction, all of the info is available. The complication is that both measurements cannot be measured to high resolution simultaneously. The question becomes, "What is the role of simultaneity of high resolution measurements within QM vectors?" — ucarr

This is evidence that "the present" as a point with zero dimension, though it is useful in many situations, reaches the limitations of its usefulness at QM. — Metaphysician Undercover

Show me how your dimensionally extended present overcomes the limitation of Heisenberg Uncertainty.

Let's read them one after the other.

The illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution... $→$ The probability distribution is not in relation to the illusion of continuity.

The prediction is not one of necessity, but one of probability. We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity...

Right, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity. It is not in relation to the prediction, which is a prediction of probability. When a prediction of probability is falsely assumed to be a prediction of necessity, as in the case of a cause/effect prediction (the falsity demonstrated by Hume), this false "assumption of necessity" is consistent with the idea of continuity (which is an illusion of sense observation). There is a relation between the two "the assumption of necessity", and "the illusion of continuity", by means of which each one supports the other logically. So it is a sort of biconditional relationship of a vicious circle of falsity. Necessity (logical) implies continuity, and continuity (observational) implies necessity. The fact that the whole thing is based in probability rather than necessity, such that the whole vicious circle is actually irrelevant, is dropped right out of the picture.

Please explain how you apprehend contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

The probability distribution is not in relation to the illusion of continuity.

The prediction is... in relation to the probability distribution... We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity...

The first line negates "probability distribution" in relation to "the illusion of continuity."

The second line establishes "probability distribution" "which produces the illusion of continuity..."

QM uncertainty is a discontinuity, the discontinuity of information, — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you take this QM-Uncertainty caused discontinuity and put it into a thought experiment that shows when and where the discontinuity occurs and what effect it has on the trajectory of a photon?

You need to go into this level of physical detail in order to contradict: $5.39x10^-44s$.

This is a description of the trajectory of a photon traveling across the distance of one Planck length.

By inserting your info into this situation, you need to show how QM-Uncertainty destroys the claim the photon persisted intact across the Planck length.

By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction. Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not. — ucarr

Maximum certainty of one is equivalent with maximum uncertainty of the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does this exemplify discontinuity?

For clarity, consider the example of a seesaw: When Child A is up, Child B is down, and vice versa. Where's the discontinuity?

If a particle goes from having a location (rest) to having momentum (motion), what happens in between? What constitutes this change? This is the problem of acceleration. If something goes from being at rest, zero velocity, to being in motion, having some velocity, then there must be a duration of time when the rate of acceleration is infinite — Metaphysician Undercover

Zeno's paradox has been solved: there's a way to cross an infinite number of intervals so that they sum to a finite number. Acceleration is not involved.

I've already noted how all of your observations of physics are rooted within physics. You're trying to see something from within an environment that has no connection to what you're trying to see. Therefore, all you see is the environment of your observations. It follows from this that what it cannot explain is populated by parts of itself as yet not understood. — ucarr

This makes no sense. How are my "observations of physics" rooted in physics, when I am educated in philosophy, not physics? You only interpret them as rooted in physics because you cannot apprehend any other possibility due to the influence of your physicalist bias. I don't deny my dualist bias, but I deny that my "observations of physics" are rooted in physics, because my observational perspective is derived from an education in philosophy. This puts my observational perspective outside of physics. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "independence" is due to the incompatibility between freewill and common interpretations of Newton's laws. But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. So giving details is rather pointless, because what you would request is proof that there is such an act. Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

If your training in philosophy provided means to back your immaterial claims with evidence, no doubt you would use it. As you say, however, "...your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. I've bolded your above statement admitting you only have physics as your source of evidence.

Again, the problem is the limitations of observability. Yet you are restricting your knowledge of the world to "the observable world". That is the influence of your physicalist bias — Metaphysician Undercover

My scope of the observable includes abstract ideas. What does your scope of the observable include beyond physical things and abstract ideas? Bear in mind, abstract ideas include the contents of the imagination (free will), where I locate your non-physical world.

You are only demonstrating that you are failing in your effort to understand. All observations are of things past. We have never, and simply cannot, observe the future. Since "the present" as what constitutes the reality of "what is", consists of both past and present, there is therefore a large aspect of the reality of "what is", which has never been observed, and simply cannot be observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

The future-as-past is only relative in relation to our frame of reference as non-local to the incidence of the stimulus. In it's own frame of reference, it's the present. If you deny this, then you're saying a thing is future to itself, or past to itself, a strange and probably paradoxical configuration for the existing self.

If all our observations are of things of the past, with the time lag being significant rather than negligible - with the latter being the case in the empirical present - then we can't know our true selves because our observations are always separated from our present selves. This undermines and perhaps even destroys the free will you're always touting.

Regarding danger, if it's out of date info, how is it that we avoid impending harm? If the info is time-lagged by only a few nano-seconds, and is thus negligible, then practically speaking, we're inhabiting the empirical present, which is a real present.

Your attitude appears to be "if we just wait a Planck length or two, the future will become the past, and then it becomes observable, and measurable, so what's the difference?" The difference is that if we wait for it to become past, before acting on it, then we can never get what we want. In this case, what is wanted is a more complete understanding of reality. Therefore your proposal of "semi-independent reality" ought to be rejected as not having the capacity to be productive in relation to the goal of getting a more complete understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

Relativity tells us that no given frame of reference for time is locked into one of the three tenses of time. The exception is the empirical present that populates every local frame of reference. Therefore, your talk of future preceding past, and all of the complexity it suggests, dissolves away when we remember there is no universal time.

I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, you are left with nothing but physics to explain what you believe. — ucarr

Only from your perspective of physicalist bias, am I left with nothing but physics to explain what I believe. This is a restriction which your attitude imposes on me. You will only accept an explanation in physical terms. Therefore I have no choice but to demonstrate the deficiencies of physics, to get across the need for something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've been waiting for you to demonstrate some particular details of the workings of non-physics. All you ever do is imagine non-physical activity that might be possible, with this act of imagination being totally dependent upon your observations of particular details of physics. Neither I nor any other physicalist impose this restriction upon you. You seem to be bound up in this restriction because, apparently, you are unable to liberate yourself from it by means of your non-physicality.

From the perspective of some mysticisms for example, within which the givenness of Newton's first law is rejected, and the assumption that the entire world is created anew at each moment of passing time is adopted, the constraints of "physics" are left behind, and we may speak freely in terms of willful creation. But such a discussion can only be meaningful if those physicalist assumptions are first rejected. That is why the reality of free will must be adopted as the primary, and self-evident, premise. — Metaphysician Undercover

You imagine yourself as one with all of existence. Furthermore, you imagine yourself the creator of all existence through exercise of free will. This empowers you to discard Newton, which you do. Now living beyond physics, you experience reality in terms of your free will and its creations.

If the design of the world limits the vector info of a particle, then that's all the info there is. — ucarr

We discussed this already as well. The restriction is due to the limitations of "observability", and imposed by the need to observe in the science of physics. Therefore "that's all the info there is" is not implied at all. The lack of information available for the representation, is attributable to the restrictions of the scientific method of physics. The information we have is restricted due to the limitations of observability. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since a QM vector can be accurately measured for both magnitude and direction, all of the info is available. The complication is that both measurements cannot be measured to high resolution simultaneously. The question becomes, "What is the role of simultaneity of high resolution measurements within QM vectors?"

Let's suppose simultaneity herein lies beyond the reach of physics. If non-physics can only observe nature through the lens of physics, then it too cannot obtain any info beyond this limitation. Therefore, it cannot be used to establish the existence of a non-physical realm unless physics can see it also. The problem is that if physics can see it, it's physical not non-physical. This tells us that "non-physics" can only see what physics sees, and thus it too must be physics after all. Therefore, it cannot be used to establish a flaw in the methodology of physics since it cannot measure anything without using that same methodology. Finally, non-physics, being dependent on physics to observe nature, can only conjecture without knowing if its existence extends beyond the realm of the imagination.

For simplicity, let us say that our thoughts are experienced by us in the empirical present. Right now I’m expecting you to respond to what I’m writing with your refutation statement. Why isn’t it simply true that I’m having my thoughts about the future right now in my empirical present? — ucarr

We already discussed this. The "now" of the present cannot be an extensionless point in time, for the reasons we discussed. Therefore it must be a duration. "Empirical present" is unacceptable because it implies that the entire duration of the present is in the past. We need to acknowledge that since "the present" refers to a duration, it consists of both past and future. To say that the present consists only of past is self-contradicting. — Metaphysician Undercover

The future is present in the now as an abstract thought. The mind understands that plans toward a goal are about the future, but this understanding is in the empirical present. Adding further difficulty to our understanding is the fact time is local and therefore relative. So the incidence of a stimulus impacts our perceptual system and, shortly thereafter, it renders a representation of the stimulus. It's now natural to think, therefore, by this example, the future precedes the past. However, at the moment of the stimulus, in its own frame of reference, its incidence is in the now, not in the future. This takes us back to our understanding that the future of the empirical present is an abstraction of the mind. We know this because, as we just observed, the incidence of the stimulus is in its own now, so it's the future only relative to a non-local frame of reference. In our own local frame of reference, the incidence of the stimulus is a past event, with us further in the past moving forward towards it. Even so, we're not moving towards the past, but instead moving forward within our own ongoing empirical present.

Now we're in position to see why representing the empirical present as a point with zero extension is useful. This point is the limit of an infinite series, i.e., it's the limit of the ongoing now. You know you never wake up into the past, and you never wake up into the future. You only wake up into the empirical present. Relativity, because of its complexity, demands we understand we're always moving through the infinite series of the empirical present towards a dimensionless eternity as now.

The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. — Metaphysician Undercover

...in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So [we] are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground. — ucarr

Directly above, I supply two of your comments. For my reaction to them, I repost your edited post of them. It's incomplete. Here's my entire quote:

I read your statement as showing past and future hold equal status of importance. An infant has wants that lie in its future, but has scant ability to satisfy those wants due to a deficiency of learning and the ability it sponsors. Moreover, future desires, as you say, are informed by what we've learned in the past. The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground.
— ucarr

I see no reason for your so-called "common sense conclusion". The past cannot be altered, but the future holds the possibility of getting what you want. I don't understand why you would not prioritize the possibility of getting what you want, over that which is impossible to change. — Metaphysician Undercover

Instead of skipping over my argument in bold above, why don't you respond to it?

Furthermore, that the past cannot be altered is a contestable premise. Who's past are we referring to? Relativity raises this question. Somewhat as I argued before in a thought experiment, let me pitch another one which has me imagining myself leaving from you standing beside me, and traveling to the past, perhaps via a wormhole. Once there, it becomes my present. So your past, unalterable, now my present, alterable, becomes the new situation. The complexity of relativity demands we incorporate these twists and turns into our understanding.

MU wants to argue probability means the individual trajectories are incoherent and thus their beginning state and ending state are discontinuous — ucarr

...I argue that in the case of quantum "particles", the lack of information is due to a real, ontological, gap of existence of the physical "particle". This is an ontological discontinuity of the physical "particle" between t1 and t2. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the gap in the existence of a particle - from one point in its trajectory to another point - is ontologically real, then, as I've said, that's your claim the trajectories of particles are incoherent. This conjectured discontinuity has nothing to do with not knowing before measurement, which possible trajectory will be the actual trajectory. Moreover, the measurement of the trajectory within the LHC will not show a discontinuity due to QM uncertainty. Instead, it will show discontinuity if the particle decays, or if something massive intervenes into its trajectory. Such discontinuity is something sought after by the design of the experiment. Physicists want to see particles interacting.

If a particle has momentum (movement), it cannot have a location ( a position), and if it has a position it cannot have movement (momentum). — Metaphysician Undercover

By definition a vector has both magnitude and direction. Vectors are not either/or, and neither is the Heisenberg calculation. One of the calculations is highly resolved, the other is not.

But this invites a fully valid philosophical question. If a particle goes from having a location (rest) to having momentum (motion), what happens in between? What constitutes this change? This is the problem of acceleration. If something goes from being at rest, zero velocity, to being in motion, having some velocity, then there must be a duration of time when the rate of acceleration is infinite. So a philosopher might ask, what is happening, what type of change is this, when a thing's rate of acceleration is infinite. — Metaphysician Undercover

Something at rest has rest momentum as well motion momentum. Infinite acceleration violates relativity: there is no acceleration all the way to light speed.

The evidence of the nonphysical is the existence of activities which are contrary to, or cannot be grasped by physics. This includes free will acts. So the assumption of the nonphysical is not grounded in physics, it's grounded in the fact that physics cannot explain everything which is observable. And, my argument concerning time shows that it is highly probable that there are activities which physics will never be able to explain. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already noted how all of your observations of physics are rooted within physics. You're trying to see something from within an environment that has no connection to what you're trying to see. Therefore, all you see is the environment of your observations. It follows from this that what it cannot explain is populated by parts of itself as yet not understood.

If we examine a particle with multiple possible trajectories across a distance, Planck scale or otherwise, we know that one of the trajectories will cover a distance traveled by the particle. The calculation of the probability of the particle taking a particular trajectory has nothing to do with the continuity of each of the calculated possible trajectories. During its journey, a particle might change, or be destroyed, but not without an intervening force causing it. — ucarr

This is utterly misleading. We cannot say that the supposed "particle" takes any "particular trajectory". Therefore we cannot say that it has "a trajectory", "a journey", or even that it exists in the meantime. There is a very clear lack of continuity of the supposed "particle", in this time period, Therefore we cannot talk about changes to the particle in this duration. — Metaphysician Undercover

The particle is not supposed. The particle is a photon. It has been established that a photon takes $5.39x10^-44s$ over the duration of one Planck length. You should notice something. Whenever you challenge me on a fact about physics, if I'm right about the fact, I can usually give you specific details establishing the fact. So far, you've only given me conjectures about what might be facts pertaining to the non-physical world, and your conjectures are usually short on details. In fact, most of your details are physics which you use to support your conjectures.

It now seems likely that, in general, non-physics cannot get started without using the measurements and methodologies of physics. This suggests to me non-physics is an emergent property of physics, i.e., it is abstract thought.

The "independence" is due to the incompatibility between freewill and common interpretations of Newton's laws. But your physicalist approach will simply deny the reality of such an immaterial act, because it is not possible to observe such an act. So giving details is rather pointless, because what you would request is proof that there is such an act. Therefore I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you can neither observe nor measure a thing, how do you know it exists? If you conceive a logical conjecture about something that might exist, can you count on finding it within the world? If it's physical yes. If it's non-physical no. If the non-physical world is independent, then it runs parallel to the physical world. What's the one example that seems to permit a connection between the non-physical and the physical? Abstract thought is the answer. The seeming transformation from non-physical to physical is not really a translation between parallel realms. Abstract thought emerges from the brain as it were as a timeless compression of multiple individual patterns grouped thematically into a conceptually timeless generalization. Of course this timeless generalization can be applied to individual patterns in the real world.

Since abstract thought is physical within the brain, then logic, also a product of the brain, also is physical. This tells us why you say,

I am left with nothing but logic, and the deficiencies of physics (as evidence), to prove my point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, you are left with nothing but physics to explain what you believe.

I attempt to show, in MU's own words, the contradiction I believe him to have made. — ucarr

If I could see contradiction in my own words, I would not have said them. You need to explain to me in your words, why you think what I have said is contradictory....Now you just take snippets of what I said, without any context, and wrongly claim that these snippets constitute contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you didn't see them in your own words, so you said them. I saw them in your own words, and here they are,

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read as: The illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution which does not make a prediction of necessity.

The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read as: The prediction is not one of necessity, but one of probability. We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity; it provides a relation of probability rather than a relation of necessity; it is not a true continuity.

Let's read them one after the other.

The illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution... $→$ The probability distribution is not in relation to the illusion of continuity.

The prediction is not one of necessity, but one of probability. We have something in that duration of time which produces the illusion of continuity...

Firstly, your language here is clear. Had it been your original language, I would'nt've called out a contradiction. — ucarr

OK, so my language was unclear, and you thought there was contradiction where there was not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now my language is unclear. What I should've said is, "Your original language, in my opinion, expresses a contradiction."

Can a particle traverse one Planck length? Yes. — ucarr

No it does not. That is the issue, with the uncertainty of the particle's location. We cannot say that the particle traverses that length because it's location in that extremely short duration of time when it is assumed to be moving, cannot be known. That is why physicists say that it takes every possible path from A to B. There is a discontinuity of information, such that we cannot really say that a particle even exists during this time. That's why its better to defer to the non-physical at this point, the circumstances are such that the principles of physics do not apply. — Metaphysician Undercover

My counter-narrative to your above narrative stresses the non-equivalence of uncertainty and discontinuity. QM doesn't know precisely, but does know probabilistically, what path a particle occupies at a given moment of time. This uncertainty of knowledge has no impact whatsoever on the continuity of whatever path the particle actually takes. You make a leap of logic from uncertainty about which path the particle takes in a given moment to concluding the particle doesn't exist. That's an invalid conclusion from the evidence because, were it true, we'd be unable to verify the existence of the particle, whether it travels one Planck time or one millennium.

I know you want to set up a thought experiment that features a particle disappearing out of existence. This then allows you to usher in your non-physical info exchange as a conjectured example of non-physical causation that's useful. So far, your thought experiment is founded upon an invalid conclusion about the relationship between uncertainty and discontinuity. We know from the imaging of the LHC that particle paths do not suffer the type of QM discontinuity that would have them disappearing. Particles can decay, but that entails the emergence of constituent particles. If they did simply disappear, we couldn't design experiments to measure reactions from particle collisions. The first law of thermodynamics tells us that no mass is lost from the world overall.

...everything observed through sensation is in the past by the time it is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

So your answer is, "No, we directly experience neither the future nor the present. Only the past is observed directly." — ucarr

The empirical present consists of observations of the past, as you explain here, but the non-empirical present consists of desires and anticipations of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

.

For simplicity, let us say that our thoughts are experienced by us in the empirical present. Right now I’m expecting you to respond to what I’m writing with your refutation statement. Why isn’t it simply true that I’m having my thoughts about the future right now in my empirical present?

The question of which of these two, the past or the future, has a greater effect on us, and therefore ought to be handed priority is a matter to be debated. — Metaphysician Undercover

...in general we apply our experience of the past toward getting what we want. So [we] are guided by what we want and desire, therefore the future has a greater effect on us than the past. — Metaphysician Undercover

I read your statement as showing past and future hold equal status of importance. An infant has wants that lie in its future, but has scant ability to satisfy those wants due to a deficiency of learning and the ability it sponsors. Moreover, future desires, as you say, are informed by what we've learned in the past. The only common sense conclusion I see is one that puts both side-by-side on level ground.

Multiplicity of possibilities isn't always born of incomplete info. Heisenberg's uncertainty equation knows both axes for the trajectory vector of a particle: position and momentum. However, due to an existential limitation on measurement within QM, only one or the other axis can be known to a useful degree of accuracy. — ucarr

You may insist that this "uncertainty" is the result of an "existential limitation on measurement", and that is what I called the limitations of observability, but this is not a complete explanation. It does not explain how these limitations cause the knowledge which ought to consist only of certainties, to get contaminated with uncertainties. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the design of the world limits the vector info of a particle, then that's all the info there is. So it's not an uncertainty. It's a design limitation. We might imagine there's more to be known, but our act of imagination doesn't dictate reality.

I explained to you already how this uncertainty is due to a lack of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world. — Metaphysician Undercover

As the case with you lecturing me about "time passing with nothing happening," sometimes we have to make peace with a hard fact. This is - at least for the time being - a fundamental truth that can't be further broken down by analysis, nor can it be expanded by either interpolation or extrapolation.

The uncertainty of the uncertainty principle is due to this lack of correspondence, which is an epistemic problem. This failure of correspondence between the mathematical principles and the reality of the observable physical world, allows that the unknown, (which could be excluded from physics, and left as the non-physical part of reality which physics cannot explain), gets incorporated into the expression, the representation of the physical world, as the uncertainty of that representation. — Metaphysician Undercover

If something is part of the observable world, even if that something is an abstract idea, then it can be measured for possible use. This is what semi-independent reality, apparently non-physical, should be amenable to. That’s abstract thought, isn’t it? I'm not seeing where you're able to show non-physical things in possession of causal powers whose effects can be measured for their usefulness. The top-down causation of mind doesn't count because mind is tied to brain. Also, so far, I’m not buying your arguments for concluding free will depends upon non-physical things.

Semi-independent reality posits abstract thought as quasi-non-physical.

Why must the reality of abstraction be independent of physical reality? What does it lose when it loses its independence?

You think things unexplainable in science inhabit a realm beyond its reach. If this realm is non-physical, then you need non-physical methodology to access and make use of these things. This is where you get stuck. You can’t name any non-physical methodologies. Mind is tied to brain, so it’s not what you’re looking for. This is the puzzle. Every attempt to find the non-physical terminates in physics. This is why we say mind is emergent from brain, but never becomes independent thereof.

There’s talk of granular sub-units of space being fundamental reality: moments in time occurring. Since these sub-units of space are separated, the question arises, “What lies between them?” Let’s suppose it’s time that lies between them. Does this not bring us right back to spacetime physics?

Why do you think a distribution of differential probabilities is not interrelated? One of the points of the distribution is to compare levels of probability. — ucarr

Once again asking the wrong question. This has nothing to do with what was disputed. THe dispute has to do with your erroneous claim of contradiction. It was erroneous. I do not need to clothe the Emperor. — AmadeusD

My question above is directly related to your argument supporting your denial of my charge of contradiction. I repost it below:

You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity: — AmadeusD

...a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. — AmadeusD

A clarifying example that helps the reader to understand my question, which I already posted to you yesterday, is reposted below.

Consider: Two basketball players. Each player tries to hit the same jump shot from the same free throw line. A statistical analyst watches each player shoot the same shot twenty-five times. He calculates a probability distribution based on the twenty-five shots taken by each player. His conclusion says Player A has a fifty per cent chance of making shot #26, and Player B has a twenty-five per cent chance of making shot #26. Now we see Player A's chance of making the shot is twice that of Player B's chance of making the shot, according to the probability distribution.

Why do you think this probability distribution is not a relation of probability? — ucarr

You're ignoring my clarification. Why should I not think you're hiding behind your claim my question is irrelevant? Why should I not think you're hiding behind it because you cannot think of a sound refutation?

...they must prove their absence from the scene of the crime over and above the prosecution's proof they were present at the scene of the crime. — ucarr

This is a clear example of you misunderstanding the basic tenets I pointed out. No, They do not need to 'prove their absence'. If the prosecution has no evidence they were there, the prosecution has no case. — AmadeusD

You'll notice I've bolded the part of my statement that says an active defense is needed when the prosecution does have proof - I should've said "evidence" - since it might be interpreted as damning. Moreover, as you've needlessly pointed out, it's assumed that a case that goes to trial includes potent evidence against the defendant. Technically speaking, however, you're right, it's still true that the defendant need not speak nor engage council for a defense.

You can be confident this is correct because a prosecutor won't initiate a case lacking solid evidence proving the guilt of the defendant — ucarr

False. Cases are often thrown out because of this, or at least don't make it to trial. — AmadeusD

It's my understanding that the District Attorney is interested in viable cases, considering that his/her record impacts the outcome of the next election.

Without being able to plausibly meet the burden of proof, the prosecution would be thwarted by simple denial. — ucarr

Are you under the impression that all cases come with overwhelming evidence? Or that evidence of presence could somehow be rebutted once produced at trial? — AmadeusD

As I've been saying for some time now, both the prosecution and the defense need to exercise skillful judgment regarding the viability of a case. Even though it's a separate issue from the burden of proof being on the prosecution, the two issues are closely related within a complex relationship.

Don't be misled by the fact the prosecution must prove its case against the defendant, and not the other way around. Both the prosecution and the defense [are liable to] make claims of fact they must prove [in their own interest]. — ucarr

You note how defendants oftentimes refuse to testify. Usually this is because their defense attorney is presenting cogent rebuttals to the accusations. I don't suppose you're trying to suggest the defense has an advantage over the prosecution. Therefore, I think it reasonable to say, regarding any possible difference for the two sides going in, it's akin to the white pieces moving first in the game of chess.

No one but a purist thinks a mute defense is sound. — ucarr

As I said above, and you seem to have missed, Judges regularly instruct juries to make nothing of the defense producing no evidence or not testifying. This is not uncommon. This literally happens weekly, possibly daily, across various courts. Lawyers often instruct their clients not to testify... — AmadeusD

Yes, I see now that a mute witness and a mute defense are two different things. The presence of the defense attorney sets them widely apart.

Regarding how all of this relates to your naysaying my claim of contradiction by MU, am I to suppose that in a debate, you'd make a denial without supporting it, and then stand mute while your opponent advances a cogent argument against it? — ucarr

This is just as disingenuous as the previous part of your reply which was just so. — AmadeusD

No. If you've made that of what i've said, that is a misinterpretation. One that seems, I am sorry to say, purposeful. You made a claim. I denied it. That's the end of that, unless you want to provide support for your claim. You failed to provide any support for your claim (on my view, to be sure). I am free to walk away denying it. That's how it works. I am not required to answer to a claim which has not been supported. That is also how courts work, to the point that what's called "summary judgment" has been invented to cover this common circumstance. — AmadeusD

In this case, there is no judge. In my view, you failed to support your assertion. Therefore it was dismissed. Hitchens Razor.

These are all standard concepts. Your position is counter to them. Therefore, I am confident in leaving it here. — AmadeusD

In the long sequence below, I present MUs statement, provide my argument for deeming it contradictory, and then you make your denial of my argument. Since you quote me when I charge MU with being contradictory, the evidence suggests you've read my argument. Are you attempting to lie your way out of acknowledging you've read my argument?

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I read your above quote, I get: The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.

Compare, side-by-side, my two readings, which boil down your words to the gist of their meaning:

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD

Haven't you been making an astute defense of the right to deny and then remain silent? The evidence is before us: you weighed in on a debate with a simple denial, and then defended your subsequent silence:

It's clear from your words [Metaphysician Undercover] that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD

Denial is a full response in court. The claim must be proved, not the denial. That is, in fact, how all debates go. — AmadeusD

You did provide a supporting argument:

You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity: — AmadeusD

...a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. — AmadeusD

But I had to request it, and your tone in providing it suggested to me you felt you were doing me a favor.

In a court of law, as you know, when one side says the other has made a contradictory statement, and then the side accused of making a contradictory statement says, "I did not make a contradictory statement." the judge then requires the side making the denial to prove their denial. — ucarr

Don't be mislead by the fact the prosecution must prove its case against the defendant, and not the other way around. Both the prosecution and the defense make claims of fact they must prove. So if a claim of innocence is based upon the defendant not being at the scene of the crime, in order to persuade a jury in their favor, they must prove their absence from the scene of the crime over and above the prosecution's proof they were present at the scene of the crime. Simple denial won't do. You can be confident this is correct because a prosecutor won't initiate a case lacking solid evidence proving the guilt of the defendant. Without being able to plausibly meet the burden of proof, the prosecution would be thwarted by simple denial.

If the defense could win their cases with simple denial, who would ever need a defense attorney?

Absolutely not. BUt if this is how you feel things go, then I am not surprised. Denial is a full response in court. The claim must be proved, not the denial. That is, in fact, how all debates go. In court, particularly important. Judges remind juries constantly that a defendant not providing any testimony or evidence does not indicate anything whatsoever. The entire point is that the prosecution prove their case, either on probability, or beyond reasonable doubt. At no stage, ever, does a judge require proof of denial. You're talking about disputed facts. — AmadeusD

Your purist argument is true, but I don't believe one person in ten thousand would enter a courtroom as a mute defendant without a defense attorney. Moreover, with indigent defendants, the court assigns a public defender free of charge. No one but a purist thinks a mute defense is sound.

Regarding how all of this relates to your naysaying my claim of contradiction by MU, am I to suppose that in a debate, you'd make a denial without supporting it, and then stand mute while your opponent advances a cogent argument against it?

Why do you think this probability distribution is not a relation of probability? — ucarr

You're not asking close to the correct question to address the issue. The distribution and the relation are separate properties/elements. — AmadeusD

Why do you think a distribution of differential probabilities is not interrelated? One of the points of the distribution is to compare levels of probability.

Why do you think a distribution of plotted trajectories has anything to do with the internal consistency and coherence of each trajectory? MU wants to argue probability means the individual trajectories are incoherent and thus their beginning state and ending state are discontinuous. If he can establish this dis-continuity, then he can insert by conjecture possible non-physical agents of change and causation independent of physics.

MU wants to ride piggyback atop the dynamism of physics, then, at the critical moment of his conjectured dis-continuity of the trajectory of the particle, insert his immaterial agents, i.e., immaterial information doing an immaterial info exchange at the last lap of the trajectory, thus proving both the independence and causal power of immaterial info.

So far he doesn't answer the question why none of his independent, immaterial things can't do anything observable without the grounding of physics.

You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. But for clarity: — AmadeusD

a probability distribution is not a relation of probability. — AmadeusD

Consider: Two basketball players. Each player tries to hit the same jump shot from the same free throw line. A statistical analyst watches each player shoot the same shot twenty-five times. He calculates a probability distribution based on the twenty-five shots taken by each player. His conclusion says Player A has a fifty per cent chance of making shot #26, and Player B has a twenty-five per cent chance of making shot #26. Now we see Player A's chance of making the shot is twice that of Player B's chance of making the shot, according to the probability distribution.

Why do you think this probability distribution is not a relation of probability?

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD

Your claim is a refutation of my claim. It makes a declaration about the truth content of my claim, finding it to be zero.

Why do you think your refutation of my claim's truth content is not another claim that needs to be supported by a logical argument?

In a court of law, as you know, when one side says the other has made a contradictory statement, and then the side accused of making a contradictory statement says, "I did not make a contradictory statement." the judge then requires the side making the denial to prove their denial. In summary, we see that a claim of making a contradictory statement has been leveled against the other side, and then the other side denies it. The judge, hearing the denial, knows the denial is another claim, and thus demands the denier present an argument supporting the denial.

It does seem, unfortunately, that you misunderstand basic tenets of exchange, reason and relation. It is making things difficult. We ran into this last year, and it seems MU is getting it now. Perhaps reflect on some of these criticisms with an open mind. It seems your entire mode is to simply push-back even when things you say aren't relevant. — AmadeusD

Consider: As you see at the top of this post, I reposted MUs statements I find contradictory. I've edited out the extraneous details to clarify the parts of his statements I'm addressing.

This is evidence I present to support my claim of contradiction; I attempt to show, in MU's own words, the contradiction I believe him to have made. The point I'm making now isn't concerned with the correctness of my interpretation of MU's statements. I'm attempting to show I follow proper procedure when I participate in rational discourse. When I push-back on someone's claim because I believe it false, I always provide either evidence - as in this case - or a logical argument, or both.

...everything observed through sensation is in the past by the time it is observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

So your answer is, "No, we directly experience neither the future nor the present. Only the past is observed directly."

Since sensory processing by the brain at light speed is time-lagged only nanoseconds behind sensory stimulus, and thus it is negligible, you, like me, always wake up in the empirical present, it being noted you call it the past.

If this is true, as I judge it, based upon your words, then I see your temporal direction, like mine, is a passage through a never-ending, nanoseconds time-lagged sequence of pasts.

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover

Correct, the illusion of continuity is in relation to the assumption of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is when the prediction of probability is taken as a prediction of necessity, which creates the illusion of continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, we have a prediction based on probability, and this does not on its own lead to a conclusion of continuity, because "probability" implies a lack of information required to complete the continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Multiplicity of possibilities isn't always born of incomplete info. Heisenberg's uncertainty equation knows both axes for the trajectory vector of a particle: position and momentum. However, due to an existential limitation on measurement within QM, only one or the other axis can be known to a useful degree of accuracy.

So, we have a prediction based on probability, and this does not on its own lead to a conclusion of continuity, because "probability" implies a lack of information required to complete the continuity. However, when we assume the cause/effect relation to be one of necessity, and we assume therefore that the prediction is one of necessity rather than one of probability, this creates the illusion of continuity.

Therefore, the illusion of continuity is not in relation to the probability distribution itself, it is related to the assumption (belief) that the prediction which is based in probability is a prediction of necessity.

Where is the contradiction here? — Metaphysician Undercover

Firstly, your language here is clear. Had it been your original language, I would'nt've called out a contradiction.

Secondly, we know particles cover distances across durations of time. This is the issue you raised in your Planck time thought experiment: Can a particle traverse one Planck length? Yes.

Next you posited a theoretical half Planck length. Claiming no physics can occur at sub-Planck length, you speculated about info exchange at sub-Planck length independent of physics. You concluded immaterial info can do something causal independent of physics.

If we examine a particle with multiple possible trajectories across a distance, Planck scale or otherwise,
we know that one of the trajectories will cover a distance traveled by the particle. The calculation of the probability of the particle taking a particular trajectory has nothing to do with the continuity of each of the calculated possible trajectories. During its journey, a particle might change, or be destroyed, but not without an intervening force causing it.

Inside the LHC two protons collide and the Higgs particle emerges. Researchers had predicted the emergence of the Higgs particle on the basis of one Higgs particle emergence for every 30 billion proton-to-proton collisions. Since the researchers, using statistical analysis, detected the Higgs particle, we see no continuity issue attached to a probability calculation of the Higgs particle emergence.

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

I really don't see how you apprehend contradiction here. The prediction is based in a relation of probability, not in a relation of necessity. However, when this relation (the cause effect relation) is taken to be a relation of necessity, the illusion of continuity is created. — Metaphysician Undercover

This isn't what you wrote originally:

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover

The illusion of continuity $≠$... the probability distribution...

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The prediction $=$ prediction of probability $=$ therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity...

You've made the claim. I don't require a supporting argument. — AmadeusD

You've also made a claim. In rational discourse, propositions need the support of logical arguments. Why do you think you're exempt from this requirement?

probability distribution — Metaphysician Undercover

is not — AmadeusD

of probability — Metaphysician Undercover

a relation of probability — Metaphysician Undercover

Why are the calculated probabilities of possible values of a variable not part of a relation of probability of possible outcomes?

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution... — Metaphysician Undercover

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other. — ucarr

Third party here - no, they don't. — AmadeusD

This is your declaration. Where is your supporting argument?

I hope what I said above helps you to see how this is not a proper representation of the continuity I am talking about. The continuity I referred to is epistemic, it is a continuity of information. — Metaphysician Undercover

There's no clear distinction here. Logic and knowledge are both epistemic.

So the problem here is that you have two incompatible premises which you try to unite. You say "logical relationships are atemporal". And you also have "real life is temporal". Because of this incompatibility the "logic" you are talking about cannot be applied to "real life". But then you attempt to apply this type of "atemporal" logic to "temporal" real life, through the concept of causation, and you produce a seriously flawed example. The obvious problem is that causation refers to "real life" temporal events, so the application of atemporal logic is faulty. Therefore modal logic has been developed for this purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not uniting logic and events; I'm stressing their distinction: one atemporal, the other temporal. If your house is on fire, and it's logically true dousing it with water will extinguish the fire, but you're unable to get to water and the house burns down, this calamity blocking the link between real burning house and real water to save it has zero impact on the logical truth connecting water with extinguishing fire.

Furthermore, this stresses that causation is a logical concept of the abstract mind, and thus it too is atemporal. If it's true A causes B, then A in the role of cause and B in the role of effect are contemporaries. If B is not an effect of A simultaneous with A being a cause of B, then A is just A, it's not an effect. This is why we understand causation is an abstract thought, not an event.

...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're repeating your mistake of confusing: a) the Planck length is currently the shortest time interval science can measure with; b) the Planck length is the shortest time interval in which physics can happen.

Statement b), which your argument assumes, is false. — ucarr

As I've explained, this is not relevant. The fact is that physics is restricted by the limitations of observation. The use of "Planck time" is just an example of such a restriction. So it doesn't matter if Planck time is replaced by some other temporal length, as the shortest time period, there will always be a shortest time period due to the limitations of observational capacity. And physical theories are verified through observation, so this is a restriction to "physics". — Metaphysician Undercover

If what I wrote is now irrelevant, it's because you've shifted from denying physics below Planck scale to asserting physics has measurement limitations, an assertion nobody disputes. The difference between what you say now and what you said directly below is obvious.

...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

The further principle which I've tried to impress on you, is that this restriction necessitates an "informational gap". There will always be a shorter period of time, shorter than what observational capacity allows for, and physics will not be able to tell us what happens during this time period due to that restriction. Therefore something nonphysical could happen during this time period which could have a causal influence.[/quote]

Since your "observations" of immaterialism are restricted by the observational limitations of physics, your suppositions about immaterial info and causation are really just speculations made possible by the work of physicists. Your dependency on physics doesn't make a strong case for believing immaterialism has logical and existential priority over materialism.

Consider entropy for example. As time passes entropy increases, and this is a violation of the law of conservation of energy within a system. Energy is lost to the system, and its loss cannot be accounted for. So in principle the law of entropy indicates a violation to the conservation law. Now, even during the shortest period of time, some energy must be lost, and we can ask what is the cause of this loss. Clearly, the activities of "physics" do not account for the increase in entropy, so the cause of it is nonphysical. "Entropy", commonly represented as "uncertainty" signifies the informational gap which I referred to, where something nonphysical has causal influence during the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

The first law of thermo-dynamics says the total energy of a system remains constant, even if it is converted from work into heat energy.

Entropy is the loss of a system's available energy to do work. There is no violation of the first law.

You acknowledge that, "As time passes entropy increases..." This statement has you acknowledging passing time and increase of entropy are moving in the same direction. Since increase of entropy is experienced by humans as getting old and dying, how do you deny our getting born infantile, and then growing through childhood, adolescence, first adulthood, and middle age all come before old age, given your contention the future, which for the child is old age, comes before the past, which for the old person, is childhood?

We can only say that the immaterial cannot do anything observable without converting that activity into material activity — Metaphysician Undercover

To me this looks like an acknowledgement, by implication, that immaterialism, i.e., abstract thought, is an emergent property of physic.

So it's not probability itself, which creates the illusion of continuity, it is the practise of treating what is probable as what is necessary, which creates that illusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not what you say in your original quotes.

And the point is that it is an illusion, not real. The first quote indicates what are the consequences of treating the probable as necessary, and the second quote states the consequences of treating the probable as it truly is, probable. So in the first it is the assumption of necessity which is related to continuity, and in the second, it is stated that what is often assumed to be necessary (determinism), is really just probable, therefore the continuity associated with this assumed necessity is an illusion. The necessity is false.[/quote]

As I read you, you're charging QM physics with trying to pass off probability as necessity. The prominence of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle contradicts this wholesale mis-characterization of QM physics.

As the Schrördinger equation calculates the multiplicity of possible trajectories of a particle, there is no continuity issue for the individual possible trajectories, and therefore there is no continuity issue with the set of these possible trajectories.

Probability and continuity run on separate tracks here.

Regarding probability: There's a probability cloud of possible locations of the particle

Regarding continuity: Whether it's the same particle at the start and end of its journey across an interval of time is not necessarily in question. It's possible two different states express: a) two different positions of the same particle; b) the decay of, say, a proton, into a neutron.

Without focusing observational attention on A it cannot be said that all A causes Z. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've never denied causal chains can be broken.

Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so $P↔︎Q$. This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal.

We can readily see that this is seriously flawed. Just because "vinyl-dipped" produces the necessity of "non-rust", we cannot conclude that all non-rusted pipes are vinyl dipped. This is how the assumption of bi-conditionality may mislead. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your analysis is irrelevant because my statement never claims its logic establishes: we can conditionally conclude that all non-rusted pipes are vinyl dipped.

P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so $P↔︎Q$.

Vinyl-dipped iron pipes imply non-rusted iron pipes, but non-rusted iron pipes don't imply vinyl-dipped iron pipes. The two statements are not commutative. One does not allow us to assume the other.

By inserting the bi-conditional: non-rusted iron pipes imply vinyl-dipped iron pipes if and only if vinyl-dipped iron pipes imply non-rusted iron pipes, the two statements are equalized by definition, and thus they become commutative.

With P and Q equalized bi-conditionally, one allows us to assume the other.

The statement: "vinyl-dipped iron pipes imply non-rusted iron pipes," is an analytic truth, but it is not the way the world is. This shows us that sound logic does not always faithfully represent the world.

This distinction remains useful to my purpose because I want to show how the soundness of logic
is not necessarily refuted by contrary events. See below.

...I establish that: a) causal relations exemplify bi-conditional logic; b) temporal sequences of events can be regarded as being causal, but interruptions in their continuity says nothing contradictory about the bi-conditional logic of causation. — ucarr

Since future and past are distinct dimensions of time, and they overlap at the present, the present must be two dimensional. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does a person experience future and past empirically?

Considering your two above quotes, as I understand you, in the first quote you absolve probability from responsibility for producing the illusion of continuity. In your second quote, you indict probability for producing the illusion of continuity. — ucarr

You misunderstand the second quote then. Notice in the first quote, the assumption of necessity goes hand in hand with the illusion of continuity. These two are related. In the second quote I am saying that the assumption of necessity is false, what is really the case is that predictions are based on probability rather than necessity. This supports the first quote, saying that continuity is an illusion, and implying that the assumption of necessity is a false assumption. — Metaphysician Undercover

Directly below are your two quotes.

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I read your above quote, I get: The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...

The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I read your above quote, I get: The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.

Compare, side-by-side, my two readings, which boil down your words to the gist of their meaning:

The illusion of continuity is... not in relation to the probability distribution...

The prediction is a prediction of probability; therefore, we have... the illusion of continuity... since it provides a relation of probability... rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity.

It's clear from your words that your two statements contradict each other.

To me, consciousness is the ability of the mind, the ability to experience. The mind however has another ability, namely the ability to cause as well. So, to summarize, the mind is an entity with the ability to experience and cause. — MoK

I think ability to experience = enduring, personal point of view featuring impressions and judgments about them.

I think ability to cause = formulating a plan followed by execution of a logical sequence of steps to achieve the plan's goal.

What do you think?

Do you believe time is immaterial?

Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?

Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?

Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?

Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?

With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?

Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things? — ucarr

Pretty much "yes" to everything here, but some of the questions aren't really clear enough to answer with confidence. — Metaphysician Undercover

This question and response shows our work so far has been good: a) You've done a good job of communicating your system of beliefs to me; b) I've done a good job of listening and learning about your understanding of metaphysics.

Here's the most important confirmation:

• Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?

• Pretty much "yes" to everything here...

Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Edit: I say that passing time is broken down into components, dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do these dimensions include line, area and cube?

I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction. — ucarr

I don't see the contradiction. I think you must be misunderstanding. There is an illusion of continuity between state A and state B so continuity is assumed based on that illusion. But there is not a real continuity as there is a gap between T1 and T2 which physics cannot explain. Instead of explaining the gap, continuity is assumed. — Metaphysician Undercover

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Considering your two above quotes, as I understand you, in the first quote you absolve probability from responsibility for producing the illusion of continuity. In your second quote, you indict probability for producing the illusion of continuity.

I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. $P↔︎Q$ is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic. — ucarr

The succession of temporal events, by definition, stands as a temporal phenomenon. Everybody knows, "Life is what happens to you /While you're busy making other plans..." - John Lennon — ucarr

Sorry, I don't see your point. Determinism assumes a necessary, and bi-conditional, relation between cause and effect, as described by Newton's first law of motion. A force will change the motion of a body. If the motion of a body changes, it has been acted on by a force. How is that not bi-conditional? — Metaphysician Undercover

With my two above quotes, I establish that: a) causal relations exemplify bi-conditional logic; b) temporal sequences of events can be regarded as being causal, but interruptions in their continuity says nothing contradictory about the bi-conditional logic of causation.

Suppose we establish that: iron pipes, when dipped in liquid vinyl, don't rust. Logically, we can represent this relationship as: P=Non-rust state and Q=Vinyl-dipped iron pipe, so $P↔︎Q$.
This is a logical relationship with the terms established: iron pipes don't rust when they're dipped in vinyl. This logical relationship inhabits the abstract mind, and it is atemporal.

In the real world, we have an iron pipe scheduled for vinyl dipping by a certain date. It's part of an outdoor support structure for the roof covering a veranda. On that date, the shipment of liquid vinyl to be used for the dipping fails to arrive due to bad weather interrupting and delaying shipping of the liquid vinyl. So, on that date, it rains and the iron pipe rusts.

From this event we don't declare that the bi-conditional logic is faulty because the pipe is rusty. Real life is temporal, and thus causal relationships are subject to interruptions. Logical relationships are atemporal, and the change of circumstances of life interrupting real and causal chains of events have no bearing upon the truth content of atemporal, logical relationships.

...in that time period, between T1 and T2, between when the photon is at PX and PY respectively, a physical force cannot act on that photon, because the time period is too short for a physical event to occur. Therefore if anything acts on that photon in this time, it must be nonphysical. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're repeating your mistake of confusing: a) the Planck length is currently the shortest time interval science can measure with; b) the Planck length is the shortest time interval in which physics can happen.

Statement b), which your argument assumes, is false.

Don't you see that it is impossible for that photon to be acted on by another photon, in that time period? The photon moving from PX to PY is the shortest possible period of time in which a physical event can take place. The photon being acted upon by another photon is another physical event. It is impossible that the photon can be acted upon in this time, because the event of moving from X to Y has already taken all that time, so there is no time to add another physical event within that duration.

The rest of your paragraph seems to just demonstrate that you still have not understood this. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have lined through your above statements because they repeat an argument based upon a false premise. Again, the singularity assumes the persistence of physics all the way down to the infinitely small interval of time. Were this not the case, the Big Bang couldn't happen.

It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role. — ucarr

Sure, but what is evidence but observational data? The math has to be applied to something. — Metaphysician Undercover

For example, at Cern the math is applied to the spectral imaging of particle behavior.

Describe some details of non-physical activity. — ucarr

What are you asking for, a physical description of the nonphysical? Haha, nice try. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your question reveals your belief the immaterial realm cannot be active, cannot do anything without converting into the material realm.

Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification — ucarr

Why do you say this, that I think like that? That is obviously not what I've been saying. — Metaphysician Undercover

Here's what you've been saying.

What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover

You're falsely claiming the math interpretation of the ATLAS and CMS detection of particles at Cern is not empirical verification of physical phenomena. Can you present a math interpretation that contradicts the Cern math interpretation?

Note - From now on, lets post everything in this thread.

What is at issue, is that the photon does not, rigorously speaking, "cover the distance". What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified, observed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is this your argument for adding immaterial causation into the mix?

So, by adhering to determinist causation, it is assumed that there is temporal continuity of the photon between T1 and T2, and by Newton's first law, nothing can have an effect on it in the meantime, because that is outside the limits of physical possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read Newton again. His first law says, "...an object will not change its motion unless a force acts on it."

...some physicists say that the photon must take every possible path between X and Y. Therefore, we cannot even conclude, from observable evidence, that the photon exists in the meantime. — Metaphysician Undercover

Overall, this is an argument that supports my position: "...an object will not change its motion unless a force acts on it." So, as I said, the photon covers the Planck length. If its path is altered by another photon, then, from start to finish, we're looking at the physical activity you're trying to deny. Likewise, this applies to a photon having several possible paths. You admit a probability distribution is not afflicted with the identity problem you have brought up. You talk of possibility pairing with realization. So QM probability confirms rather than denies physics. Your conclusion of "no physical change," as based upon lack of empirical verification, stands invalid. Read up on the work conducted at Cern. All of this QM activity refutes your denial of physics at the Planck length.

The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.” — ucarr

The issue is that "physics" is limited by the scientific method, which relies on empirical observation for verification. Therefore the science of physics is restricted by the natural limitations of observability. Remember, we agreed that what is "observed" is always in the past. However, we also agreed that there is some part of the future, which coexists with the past, at the present. This aspect of "the present" which is really "the future", in the same way that what is observed at the present is really "the past", is an unobservable part of the present. This is what can be called the nonphysical, due to its inability to be observed. And the nature of free will demonstrates to us that the nonphysical is active and causal at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not precisely correct to say science is limited to empirical observation for verification. Math interpretation of evidence plays an important role.

I continue to claim humans experience the empirical present, with abstract thoughts about the relative past and relative future.

Being unobservable to the senses is not proof something is non-physical; the EM waves feeding your tv are unobservable.

Describe some details of non-physical activity. Your example of info transfer was presented without details exposing the transferral process.

What happens between T! and T2 is not a "physical change" because it cannot be empirically verified... — Metaphysician Undercover

Since you think the spectral imaging of particles at Cern examples a lack of empirical verification, I think you should learn more about the scientific method before attempting to criticize it.

In the model of time I described, it is necessary to assume real points in time, real moments when the world materializes as time passes. These moments ought to be observable, and from these real moments, the principles for relating the non-physical activity can be established. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you believe time is immaterial?

Do you believe the passing of time causes the material world to exist?

Do you believe physics rides piggyback on passing time, the reality clock?

Do you believe the principles connecting immaterial cause with physics populate metaphysics?

Do you believe passing time is the fundamental reality, that it cannot be broken down into components?

With respect to passing time, the ultimate fundamental, logic, math and science cannot discover constituent inner workings?

Passing time, aside from itself, remains unresponsive to all other things?

Probability stands as a necessary condition for a distribution of options, instead of for a single option. — ucarr

How is this an illusion of continuity? — ucarr

The illusion of continuity is related to the assumption of necessity, not in relation to the probability distribution, which does not make a prediction of necessity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The issue is the lack of continuity between state A (quark), and state B (anti-quark). Without continuity we lose the principle of identity. At t-1 is state A, at t-2 is state B, and there is time between these two. In this time between, we cannot say whether there is state A, state B, neither, nor both. However, there must be something which links the two, because if we consider a succession of states prior to state A, state B can be successfully predicted. The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have bolded the part of your statement that appears to contradict your other statement above it. I need an explanation of your apparent self-contradiction.

The break in continuity is between past and future. So when we say that because the last ten minutes have occurred in a certain, determined way, the next minute will necessarily be in a determinable way, based on what already happened. That is the assumed necessity of the cause/effect relationship which supports determinism, such that we say that if X occurs, Y necessarily will occur, when Y is understood to be the necessary effect of X. That necessity implies a continuity between past and future, such that nothing could interfere, or come between X (past) and Y (future), at the present, to make something other than Y occur. Do you see how the assumed necessity of the relation between cause and effect is based in a presumed continuity, the premise of continuity supports the believed necessity of that relation? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have bolded what I take to be your attack on the validity of what you call "past_future determinism." You're mixing apples with oranges. Logical relations are atemporal. $P↔︎Q$ is a bi-conditional logical relation between P and Q. It says the two are bi-conditional - each is a necessary condition for the existence of the other - if and only if the two terms are equal. This is identity logic.

The succession of temporal events, by definition, stands as a temporal phenomenon. Everybody knows, "Life is what happens to you /While you're busy making other plans..." - John Lennon

The presence of State A, and the presence of State B are included in the time duration defined as T1-T2. This is stipulated, or otherwise determined from empirical evidence, to be the shortest period of time during which a physical change can occur. Therefore no physical event can occur between T1 and T2, whether this event takes a quarter of that time, a half of that time, three quarters, or .999... percent of that time.

Firstly, I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.

Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded two of your statements that contradict each other. Given this contradiction, your argument is nonsense.

So, in your example, If T-1 marks the presence of a quark, and T-2 marks the presence of a quark, anti-quark pair, it is impossible that a collision of two quarks occurred in between, because this is a physical event, and it has already been determined that this period of time is too short for the occurrence of a physical event. — Metaphysician Undercover

Firstly, again I've lined through your statement because I believe it generally invalid, as I've explained in my previous post.

Secondly, for curiosity, I've bolded part of your statement because, as I understand you, you're saying all of the time is consumed in the transformation from T1 to T2. This transformation cannot happen without a catalyst; in this case its the collision of the two quarks.

Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.

For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2. — ucarr

How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time? — Metaphysician Undercover

How could two quarks collide in the time between T1 and T2 because the change form quark to quark, anti-quark pair, already takes up all that time, and nothing physical can happen in a shorter time?

Do you see what I mean? The physical change observed is the change from State A to state B. Nothing physical can happen in a shorter time. Therefore it is impossible that anything physical happened between the state of quark, and the state of quark, anti-quark. Therefore it is impossible that another quark collided with the quark during this time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since we're doing a thought experiment, we're stipulating terms. Up front, we can stipulate scientific rigor, or not. If not, then I can stipulate: at T1 two quarks collide such that T2 has a pairing of one quark with one anti-quark.

If yes, then we have to do calculations based on the time for light to travel 1 Planck length in vacuum, which is a time interval of approximately $5.39x10^-44s$. Light being the greatest possible velocity of our world, this is a measure of the longest time possible for a physical event to occur within the boundary of one Planck length.

Since all other physical events are sub-light speed, and thus would have time durations greater than $5.39x10^-44s$, we know that, per scientific rigor, the only example of a physical event occurring within one Planck length is light traveling in vacuum.

So, per scientific rigor, I stipulate at T1 a photon emits, and at T2 the photon covers the distance matching one Planck length. So the change of state of our thought experiment is the change of position of a photon across one Planck length.

The shortest length science can currently measure is one Planck length. This is a very different statement than the statement that says, “On Planck length is the shortest possible length in which physics can occur.”

So, thanks to your demand for scientific rigor, it appears that our contemplation of its requirements has imploded your project to establish a spacetime wherein no physical event can occur yet wherein a supposed non-physical exchange of info is possible.

For clarity, it should be stated that the Planck length is currently the smallest spacetime unit we can measure. Smaller spacetime units, such as those occurring at the time of the Big Bang, are not currently measurable.

The Big Bang theory makes it clear that some scientists believe physics persists all the way down to the singularity, which is infinitely small. So, by this reasoning, there is no pre-singularity point at which physics stops.

In your example, are you establishing the shortest duration of time allowing physical change to occur? — ucarr

In your example, there is a quark at one moment, state A, then an anti quark at the next moment, state B, and you have proposed that nothing can be observed in the time between, hence the shortest duration allowing for physical change. So state B is different from state A, and there is time between these two. We can conclude that the change from state A to state B occurred during this time [one Planck length]. Do you agree with me, that something must have happened during this time, which constitutes, or substantiates "the change" from quark to anti-quark? — Metaphysician Undercover

I have lined through what is unclear to me.

Here's what I agree to: T1 = State A: a quark; T2 = State B: a quark_anti-quark pair. This transformation occurs in one Planck length, the shortest duration allowing physical change.

For example, another quark has collided with the quark of T1, thus producing the quark_anti-quark pair at T2.

Is it true that first you establish the shortest duration of time allowing a physical change from state A to state B, and then, in the following paragraph, you continue talking about this same duration of time until you jump to establishing a non-physical change based on info instead of on physics? — ucarr

There is no "jump", only a sound logical conclusion. We have an observation at t-1, and an observation at t-2. The two states are different. Therefore we can conclude that change occurred during the duration of time which is between t-1 and t-2. "Change" requires that "something happened" which would account for the difference between state A and state B. We have determined that this "something" which happened cannot be a physical change because it would be in a duration of time shorter than the one defined by state A then state B, which has been determined as the shortest possible period of time for physical change. This duration is between state A and state B, therefore shorter, and so it is too short for physical change, therefore it is non-physical activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have made bold the letters where the jump appears to occur. You inexplicably claim we've established that physical change cannot happen. Apparently, you're jumping from the interval between T1 and T2 being one Planck length to being one half of one Planck length.

If you're agreeing physical change can happen in one Planck length, but stipulating physical change cannot happen in one half Planck length, then I'll agree.

We are no [sic] talking about the shorter period of time, between t-1 and t-2, so we must conclude that the change which occurs in this time is non physical. — Metaphysician Undercover

If “no” equals “now,” then okay.

Here's how I see the setup: There is a quark at T1; There is a quark_anti-quark pair at T2. The distance linking T1 to T2 is established as the shortest distance possible between a transformation of a physical system, such as a quark to a quark_anti-quark pair. Let's establish that the distance between the two physical systems measures as one Planck length: $5.39x10^-44s$.

Since it's conjectured space-time itself - the environment that affords parameters for physics - breaks down into sub-units below Planck length, it's impossible to define space-time distances smaller than one Planck length.

Now, let's imagine a theoretical distance between T1' and T2' measuring as 0.5 Planck length. T1' and T2' are theoretically linked by a distance of 0.5 Planck length: $2.70x10^-44s$. As it's established no physical system can transform from one state to another in this distance, any state transformation therein would have to be non-physical.

Now the question arises, "How are non-physical things measured?" Measurement itself implies physicality. What does a non-physical measurement of a non-physical thing entail? Assuming such measurements exist, how are they translated into something practically verifiable and useful?

If “no” equals “now,” then okay.

"Information" is the name which I gave to the non-physical, as I explained at the beginning why information is non-physical. So what happens between t-1 and t-2, by the use of this term, is a change in information. — Metaphysician Undercover

I assume you're talking about what happens over the duration of one half of one Planck length.

The issue is the lack of continuity between state A (quark), and state B (anti-quark). Without continuity we lose the principle of identity. At t-1 is state A, at t-2 is state B, and there is time between these two. In this time between, we cannot say whether there is state A, state B, neither, nor both. However, there must be something which links the two, because if we consider a succession of states prior to state A, state B can be successfully predicted. The prediction however is not one of necessity, but one of probability, as explained by Hume. Therefore, we have something in that duration of time, between t-1 and t-2, which produces the illusion of continuity, but since it provides a relation of probability between state A and state B, rather than a relation of necessity, it is not a true continuity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Consider: In an election, at the national convention, the superdelegates for Party A are composed of some individuals committed to vote for Candidate A, and some not committed to vote for any particular candidate.

Let’s call the uncommitted superdelegates the free will superdelegates. Since we can only know what their vote will be in terms of the probability math that calculates the odds according to the total number of candidates, we conclude their vote is a probability. Each of five total candidates has a twenty per cent chance of being selected by a free will superdelegate.

Probability stands as a necessary condition for a distribution of options, instead of for a single option.

How is this an illusion of continuity?

From the experience of experimental verification, we know that possibilities don't become realities, i.e., don't become realized, until at the time of verification via realization, not before this realization. — ucarr

That is an incorrect description. Possibilities must be a reality prior to being actualized, or else they could not be act on. Therefore they have a place in reality which is other than "actual". — Metaphysician Undercover

I underlined the key sentence in your statement. If a possibility is a reality before being realized, then a possibility is always a reality, so how is it a possibility, i.e., how is it's reality conditional? We transform possibilities into realities via experimental confirmation. After transformation, we know the former possibility will actualize, so possibility becomes abstract reality. As an example, consider: The demolition charges will vertically drop the condemned building. We know that dynamite explodes and we know buildings implode vertically. Before the demolition charges are ignited, we know in abstraction what will happen. As another example, consider: We're looking for the Higgs-Boson particle at Cern prior to its discovery. At this time, the particle is a possibility, not an abstract reality. That changes if and when it's experimentally verified.

Now for the tricky part: Before discovery of the particle, although we cannot know it, the possibility of the particle and its realizationability are contemporary. They are contemporary because the possibility of its discovery can only exist if it can be realized, even before actual realization by experimental verification. There’s no such thing as a possibility not being realizable before its realization. Were that the case, a magic trick would be required to change what’s not realizable into what is realizable prior to realization.

Are you uncoupling space and time? — ucarr

Of course, as I explained, this is necessary for a proper understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I've already addressed all this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you briefly recap your answers to the two questions below?

Can time pass without causing things to change? — ucarr

Since time passes, does its passing imply is physicality? If not, what is non-physical passing? — ucarr

When things change how they're changing, doesn't time follow suit by changing how it's changing?

Example: I'm driving my car at thirty-five miles per hour. I decide to accelerate my speed to forty-five miles per hour. Relativity tells me that by accelerating, I slow down the rate at which times passes for me. Is that an example of me having a causal effect upon time passing?

Let's reconfigure the thought experiment as follows: passing time is making me change. First I name my present day as Friday. Passing time changes me so that I next name my present day as Saturday, and so on. This is an ordinal series which has passing time changing me through a sequence of present days, right? — ucarr

Not quite. The passing of time causes changes. You notice these changes, and name the days according to the way you were taught and understand, "Friday", "Saturday", etc.. To make things easier, imagine that the clock says 1:00, so you say "it is one o'clock". The passing of time causes changes, and you notice that the clock says 2:00, so you say "it's two o'clock". — Metaphysician Undercover

If you're saying time changes me and not I change myself in time, then that difference seems to have zero effect on the changes we're discussing. In both situations, an hour of time passes and the earth changes its position in relation to the sun. The motion of the earth in its orbit around the sun is not uniform; at some points in its orbit, the earth is closer to the sun than at other points. At the closer points the time on earth passes more slowly because, as with the example of my acceleration of my car, time passing changes in reaction to acceleration and gravity. Aren't these examples of physical phenomena having a causal effect on time?

In continuation of this reasoning, when time changes the earth through its orbital by a measure of twenty-four hours, aren't I always in my present? I'm never in my past, or in my future, am I?

Determinism and causation in our context here are much the same, and they are fundamental to humans with intentions regardless of their view of the arrow of time. Whether an individual is suffering from cause and effect thinking or thriving on it is more a psychological question than a physics question, isn't it? — ucarr

You ask me a psychological question, concerning the difference between believing in freewill, and believing in determinism, and how this might affect one's life. I answered accordingly. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't ask you a psychological question. We've established a context within our dialogue. We're examining the role of time in the physics of our world. Our focus has been on the facts of time passing within physics. Our standard of judgment has been whether our claims, respectively, have been verified logically and empirically. You've been claiming the arrow of time, one way, supports free will, and the other way blocks it. We've agreed that members of both groups make plans and realize them.
So, our topics have been physics and philosophy, not psychology.

But determinism and causation are not the same, and this is the central issue of our discussion. Determinism reduces causation to one type of cause, known in philosophy as efficient cause. The concept of freewill allows for the reality of what is known in philosophy as "final cause". This type of causation is completely distinct from "efficient cause". "Final cause" is only intelligible when we allow that the force from the future is causal. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since determination and efficient causation overlap, we conclude the former is a component of the latter. This being the case, we know embrace of determination does not necessarily exclude embracing the other three types of causation. This peaceful coexistence of the two things can operate within the free will advocate. We know this because everyone with intentions acts so as to determine outcomes.

No, I don't think that follows logically. First, any specific possibility must have a temporal extension, what might be called colloquially as "the window of opportunity". Realization must occur within that period of time, so to say that the two are "contemporary" would be misleading. Also possibility is required for the actualization, and it is highly improbable that the actualization would occur at the exact moment that the possibility arises. — Metaphysician Undercover

Furthermore, the moment that the actualization occurs, the possibility is gone, because "possibility" implies more than one option, and when actualization occurs, other options are rendered impossible by the fact of actualization. Therefore it would be contradictory to say that the possibility and the actualization occur at the same time. So we must conclude that the possibility is temporally prior to the actualization. — Metaphysician Undercover

By saying a possibility has a window of opportunity, you're saying: On Thursday, P → A (possibility = P; actualization = A; and Thursday = the window of opportunity, so P implies A during a twenty-four time period). Why do you think P has temporal priority to A? Why do you think the P → A relationship ends when a specific P is actualized as a specific A?

So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they? — ucarr

I think the issue is a bit more complex than this. People give all sorts of reasons for believing in determinism. And, a belief in determinism can produce a defeatist attitude, fatalism etc.. This attitude may be very detrimental to one's life, and prevent a person from getting a happiness which they might otherwise obtain. — Metaphysician Undercover

Determinism and causation in our context here are much the same, and they are fundamental to humans with intentions regardless of their view of the arrow of time. Whether an individual is suffering from cause and effect thinking or thriving on it is more a psychological question than a scientific question, isn't it?

I don't follow your logic. The phrase "possible for me to lift my arm" does not imply actually lifting an arm. So a person could repeat this phrase over and over, without ever lifting the arm, and it could be true. I do not understand the relation you are describing. — Metaphysician Undercover

If possibility is logically connected to realization of possibility, and logical continuity is atemporal, then the reality of the realization of possibility must be contemporary with the reality of the possibility. This doesn't, however, mean that possibility demands it be enacted; it just means the reality of its realizationability is simultaneous with the reality of its possibility. So possibility is not prior to realization, right?

*If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right? — ucarr

Sure, but the possibility to lift the arm is not the same thing as actually lifting the arm. The relation of necessity is only one way. After the arm is lifted, we can say that the possibility to lift the arm was necessarily prior contemporary to with the actual lifting. However, when the possibility is real, and no arm is yet lifted, this does not imply that the arm will ever necessarily be lifted. — Metaphysician Undercover

The key point is that the words do not connect to "the dynamism of the event", as you say. The words connect to the possibility of that dynamism being activated, so this is something which is prior to that event. The words do not connect to the event, but something prior to the event, which could be actualized, and cause that event. — Metaphysician Undercover

From the experience of experimental verification, we know that possibilities don't become realities, i.e., don't become realized, until at the time of verification via realization, not before this realization. Moreover, this verification must continue to occur simultaneous to the possibility; this is known as ongoing experimental verification of a theory that can never be proven, only repeatedly, experimentally verified. This is furthermore known as a verification that is public and repeatable, so possibility is always simultaneous with realization.

Does this suggest passing time is not prior to physics?

Do you agree that any movement in time is from one present to another present? — ucarr

As I said, I do not agree with "movement in time". We move in space, as time passes. Therefore time moves, we do not move in time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you uncoupling space and time?

If we move in space as time passes, is this how we're experiencing time, i.e., as movement through space? If so, how is movement through space, and the time elapsing in sync with that movement, different from things moving in time?

Does this posit time as necessary to our movement through space, i.e., time is necessary to physics?

Does time have physics as either a dimension, or as a multiplex of dimensions?

Since time moves, does its motion imply its physicality? If not, what is non-physical motion?

Can time move without causing things to change?

Can time move without causing things to move?

When I get into my time machine now, in 2025, I intend to time travel backwards 100 years to 1925. Upon arrival there, however, 1925 is now my present, right? If this is true, then it examples my having traveled from one present, 2025, to another present, 1925. When I return to 2025, again that's traveling from one present to another present, right? — ucarr

I'll reply to this with your own words: — Metaphysician Undercover

"If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right?" — ucarr

Talking about time travel is fantasy. Unless you can somehow show that it is real, it provides no evidence toward your claim that we move through time. Are you using fiction as evidence of the truth of what you say? How could that make sense to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

My thought experiment draws its rationale from some interpretations of Relativity and QM that allow time travel. In the realm of science, time travel has not been denounced wholesale.

Let's reconfigure the thought experiment as follows: passing time is making me change. First I name my present day as Friday. Passing time changes me so that I next name my present day as Saturday, and so on. This is an ordinal series which has passing time changing me through a sequence of present days, right?

Both allow for determinist causation. However, the past-to-future direction renders determinist causation as necessary due to the fixedness of the past. The future-to-past direction recognizes that the past is fixed, but since the flow is not from the past, but from the future, and the future consists of possibility, this causation is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

The flow of future-to-past direction has the future tense flowing toward the past tense? — ucarr

I don't understand your use of "tense" here. so I can't answer this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Just ignore "tense." So, it's the future flowing toward the past.

To what subject does the consciousness of the future-to-past direction belong? — ucarr

Ontology, I would say. — Metaphysician Undercover

We're examining a complicated arrangement of relative points of view (POV):

With the past_future POV, decisions of the past are completed and thus choices are excluded. With the future_past POV, decisions are not finalized and thus choices are available.

Does this correctly describe the important difference between the two POVs?

It's true, isn't it, that given: Man A with the past_future POV and Man B with the future_past POV, both make choices that come to pass, right?

If this is right, does it follow that Man A and Man B have an equal chance of realizing their choices? The difference, then, is that Man B has a more correct understanding about how his temporal path from choice to realization is organized in time?

So, the difference between the two POVs comes down to perception and understanding, not down to a literal choice between having free will or not having it, right? If it were true the past_future POV literally prevents a person from ever getting what they choose, no one would commit to that POV, would they?

Regarding "Because possibilities are in the future," If I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I speaking in the present or in the future? — ucarr

You are speaking about the future, because by saying it is "possible" to lift your arm you are referring to something which would occur in the future. Anytime you say that such and such action is possible, you are saying that it may occur in the future. Your act of speaking is in the past though, by the time I hear it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, we're examining a complicated arrangement of relative points of view, and it's one of the devils confronting us in our dialogue. On this note, let me ask,

When I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I connecting* my words to the dynamism of the event of my arm going upwards in the air? If so, does it follow that the words and the dynamism of my arm are synchronous? In other words, when one is true, the other must also be simultaneously true? Does it follow that if they are not synchronous, then my words are not true and thus the possibility does not exist? So, going the other way, when I verbalize a possibility, the words are synchronous with the possible physical event?

*If my words don't accurately signify a possibility, then I'm just indulging my fancy, right?

Regarding "and actualities are in the past," The dictionary defines one of the senses of "actual" as "existing now; current." Is it wrong? — ucarr

No, I would not say that the dictionary is wrong, it represents the way we speak. But I'd characterize "existing now" as an inductive conclusion. If I observe a chair in my room, in front of me for a duration of time, I will conclude "the chair exists now", or "is actual", meaning that I believe the chair will continue to be as it has been observed to be. That is correct by our conventions, and the dictionary indicates this. But it doesn't take into account the fact that the true nature of "now" consists equally of future as it does past. So by the time that I finish speaking that sentence, or by the time you hear it, the chair might cease to exist. That's why i would say that "actual" represents the past part of now, but not the future part. — Metaphysician Undercover

We appear to agree that the present contains past and future parts.

Do you agree that any movement in time is from one present to another present? This is what I think, and I justify my thinking thus: When I get into my time machine now, in 2025, I intend to time travel backwards 100 years to 1925. Upon arrival there, however, 1925 is now my present, right? If this is true, then it examples my having traveled from one present, 2025, to another present, 1925. When I return to 2025, again that's traveling from one present to another present, right?

Do you agree with the following generalization from the above: in our experience of passing time, all we ever do is travel from one present to another present? This true though we say, "Tomorrow I shall do such and such." However, when we're actually doing such and such, it's today. In the reverse direction, I talk about what I did yesterday, but when I was actually doing it, it was today.

Can we say, then, past_present_future or, if you prefer, future_present_past, form a triad that can never be broken into parts?

There's a logical problem in your statement. In the situation of "time without a past," how can the "future" be prior to something that doesn't exist? — ucarr

In the case of all contingent things, the possibility of the thing is prior to the thing's actual existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does logical priority imply causation?

Does causation imply temporal priority?

Can a cause exist before it's paired with its effect? For example: Can Cause A exist if Effect B doesn't simultaneously exist?

"time without a past", i.e. only a future, is necessarily prior to there being a past, if we rule out eternal or infinite time. — Metaphysician Undercover

If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover

As is indicated by the nature of "possibility", when there is only the first, and the first provides the possibility for a second, the second is not necessary. So you're correct to say that if there is only a first it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second. — Metaphysician Undercover

...we're looking back, after the second has come into existence, and realizing that the first was necessarily prior to the second. — Metaphysician Undercover

When there is only the first, and thus it makes no sense to say that the first is prior to the second, because there is no second, does it also follow that it makes no sense to posit the possibility of time without a past and only a future because such a possibility has neither present nor past, but only future. Given this setup, the temporal future tense has no present and thus no presence and therefore cannot exist and therefore cannot look backwards to a past that follows the future?

Given this train of logic, does it follow that the arrow of time, logically speaking, must move from one empirical present to another empirical present, with each empirical present possessing the past and future tenses as mental abstractions relative to the phenomenal_empirical present?

We seem to have a fundamental disagreement concerning "the empirical present". I deny that there is such a thing, because "empirical" requires "observation", or "experience", and anything observed or experienced is past. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does it make sense to always pair both the future tense and the past tense with the present tense because the present tense is necessary for the other two, relative tenses to exist, i.e., to possess presence?

The arrow of time outside of the boundaries of the empirical present is an abstraction. — ucarr

We seem to have a fundamental disagreement concerning "the empirical present". I deny that there is such a thing, because "empirical" requires "observation", or "experience", and anything observed or experienced is past. Therefore I find "empirical present" to be self-contradicting. So I incorporate both, empirical (past), and anticipatory (future) elements into my conception of "present". You refuse to relinquish your idea of an empirical present, and this makes it impossible for you to understand my explanations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Time passing in the future is prior to observing the changes in things time passing causes, which is in the past? This is why you say, "anything observed or experienced is past"?

I can ask why the future-to-past arrow and the past-to-future arrow don't both possess determinist causation? — ucarr

Both allow for determinist causation. However, the past-to-future direction renders determinist causation as necessary due to the fixedness of the past. The future-to-past direction recognizes that the past is fixed, but since the flow is not from the past, but from the future, and the future consists of possibility, this causation is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

The flow of future-to-past direction has the future tense flowing toward the past tense?

Since the flow of future-to-past direction recognizes that the past is fixed, does that tell us it is conscious?

To what subject does the consciousness of the future-to-past direction belong?

Because possibilities are in the future, and actualities are in the past, the flow must be future-to-past to allow that possibilities can get selected and actualized at the present. — Metaphysician Undercover

Regarding "Because possibilities are in the future," If I say, "It's now possible for me to lift my left arm." am I speaking in the present or in the future?

Regarding "and actualities are in the past," The dictionary defines one of the senses of "actual" as "existing now; current." Is it wrong?

...time is not a dimension, it has dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover

Dimensions are a part of time.

How are dimensions connected to time?

Does time have other kinds of parts?

If there is a start to time, then it is necessary to conclude that at the start there is no past. — Metaphysician Undercover

In your example, does time start in the present?

Can I ask, what immaterialist premise gets through to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

Five of Your Key Talking Points

• Spacetime is an immaterial concept

• The independent system of passing time is the immaterial first cause, and it is logically prior to
  dynamism

• The future-to-past arrow of time establishes mind over matter

• Free will resides within the mind-over-matter hierarchy

• If time is immaterial, then time passing with nothing happening stems from immateriality conceived
  as nothing material happening

Now, do you agree that a measurement requires an act of measuring. There is no measurement without that act of measuring. However, the thing to be measured exists as the thing to be measured, regardless of whether it has been measured or not. Because I am discussing the thing to be measured, and an approach toward the means for making accurate measurements, your request for measurements is unwarranted. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is your argument supporting the separation of activity from event? Thinking about doing something is not equal to the actual doing of the something thought about. In order to support your claim non-physical activity is prior - both logically and existentially - to events, you must show that priority, both logically and existentially. Show me, with mathematical inference, how non-physical time passes inside the Cern particle accelerator in such manner as to cause the animation of the material things that populate events. — ucarr

I've told you many times now, it's taken as a logical possibility, not as a proof. However, when we accept this logical possibility as reality, it makes freewill very intelligible. And, you can deny free will if you so choose, but then we'll have nothing more to talk about. — Metaphysician Undercover

With activity, you refer to time imagined in total isolation acting as a transitive verb with events as its object. The transitive action of time is to move events into the past. The objects of time are events. We see a distinction between time as transitive verb and events as objects of time's activity. Time moves and events get moved. The distinction in this particular situation becomes a false generalization when applied to all actions involving time and objects. Its false because the objects moved can act as transitive verbs acting on time. Since time as a dimension has duration, an argument can be made for the actions of moving things acting as movers of time, with time getting moved because its duration increases.

Don't you think about your travel by car as passing through the interval of time required to arrive at your destination? — ucarr

No, I think of passing through the space between A and B when I travel, and I think that this takes time, i.e. time passes while I traverse this space. — Metaphysician Undercover

Passing through an hour of space and passing through the hour of time elapsed in passing through that space are two aspects of the same experience. We know this because we do both simultaneously. You cannot cite me one example wherein you pass through space without simultaneously passing through time. Being able to do that would mean being able to travel distance in zero time. Flipping this around, we know time doesn't pass without passing through space because that would mean being able to do the temporal expansion of numerical tracking as a dimension with zero dimension.

Time is conventionally conceived as being a dimension. — ucarr

I know, and that's what I am arguing is a faulty conception. You can explain it to me all you want, but unless you justify it, your explanations do nothing for me. — Metaphysician Undercover

How about I let Einstein justify it?

Time dilation caused by gravity or acceleration
Time dilation explains why two working clocks will report different times after different accelerations. For example, time goes slower at the ISS, lagging approximately 0.01 seconds for every 12 Earth months passed. - Wikipedia

Note the above is not a thought experiment. It is scientific verification with real evidence supporting a prediction of Relativity. — ucarr

I don't see how this proves anything. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you don't see how time expanding temporally under influence of gravity or acceleration examples it as a relative, dimension of variable measurements experimentally verified, then it's probably because you don't see what you don't want to see.

If a natural thing resembles an artificial system, it's piss poor logic to conclude that it is a system. — Metaphysician Undercover

A tree has a system of roots that feed into it. A switchboard has a system of cables that feed into it.

I am in no way trying to "establish what is factual". I am discussing logical possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a supposed state of reality is, in fact, real, then a valid argument that such a state is possible is factual. Any supposition not concerned with culminating in verification as being factual is whimsy.

Look, "entropy" is a feature of a system, it accounts for the energy of a system which is no longer useful to that system... — Metaphysician Undercover

With heat death, motion stops, time becomes meaningless. This describes your situation where nothing is happening, not even the passing of time. Time still exists, but I'm guessing it's collapsed to a point of zero dimension. That's a meaningless existence for a dimension.

My model is a model of possibility. You think time is the measurement, so all you are doing is modeling the model. — Metaphysician Undercover

Show me a measurement of any kind with no duration of time attached to it.

So "energy" is the product of measurements and applied mathematics, it is not a real force in the world, like the passing of time is. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm assuming that when a person dies of electrocution, you think it's due to time passing and not the presence of enough electromotive force to cook the person alive like a piece of meat in a hot skillet.

Where there's mass, there's time. This tells me time doesn't pass apart from events populated by animated things. — ucarr

This is an invalid conclusion. Like I explained, "where there's mass, there's time", implies that mass cannot exist without time, but it does not imply that time cannot exist without mass. — Metaphysician Undercover

Read again what I said and you'll see I said time cannot pass apart from mass; I didn't say it cannot exist without mass.

You need to learn how to understand "logical priority". — Metaphysician Undercover

Logical priority exists when one category, being more broadly inclusive that another lesser category, logically contains the lesser category. If A is logically prior to B, then A is a necessary condition of B; A is the ground of B.

Logic works with proofs. How does logic, short of a proof, support a proposition? — ucarr

Clearly you take one way in which logic is used, and assume that this is all that logic does. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you think logical priority can stand on mere possibility absent proof?

You imply my demand that logic prove something in order to have value is short sighted. The laws of physics don't forbid time moving in both directions. It doesn't. This means the logical analysis of the direction of time is incomplete. Hence, it's unsound reasoning to propound a theory that reverses the arrow of time from the one established by consensus. You don't think it does. I believe it does because the direction of time from future to past has the arrow of entropy moving from birth into old age to death in pre-fertilization.

You're not interested in continuing your dialogue with a physicalist; I've benefitted greatly from dialoguing with you, an immaterialist.

From you I've learned time can exist apart from matter and energy.

I don't believe in your central premise: time passes in isolation from matter, energy and space.

We're both dug into our positions across the aisle from each other.

I agree with doing what you've been suggesting you want us to do: go our separate ways (for now), agreeing to disagree.

In claiming free will as a self-evident truth, you're ignoring a perennial debate stretching across millennia. The continuing doubt about the existence of free will renders your following argument undecided WRT free will. — ucarr

Since the determinist perspective, and the freewill perspective produce incompatible models of time, we need to choose on or the other. I am not interested in discussing time with anyone who makes the self-contradicting choice, i.e. choosing that choice is not possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're saying the past_present_future arrow of time is self-contradicting because it cancels the free-will option?

There's a question whether time, or any other dimension, is causal. — ucarr

You continue to misrepresent "time" as a dimension, in the incompatible determinist way. I mean that's acceptable to that model of time, but if you want to understand "time" in this model you need to rid yourself of those incompatible premises. "Time" here is not a dimension of something, it is something with dimensions. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're saying time stands independent of space?

Regarding compatibility between the paradigm of judgment and the work judged, I'm mainly using Relativity as my paradigm, now that I'm clear on your positioning immaterial time at the center of your theory. Surely you're not surprised that examiners of your theory turn to Relativity as their paradigm. I struggle to see how it's legit to brush off Relativity as incompatible and irrelevant. Since you're the one trying to overthrow it, aren't you responsible for meeting it head on with cogent arguments? Waving the flag of incompatibility plays like a dodge.

Since time, per Relativity, is physical, in order for your conclusion to be true, you must overturn Relativity. — ucarr

Overturning relativity is not what is required, only to demonstrate it's deficiencies, like the one mentioned above. Another one which I've been arguing is that it wrongly renders the logical possibility of time without physical events as impossible. When a theory renders a logical possibility as impossible, through stipulation rather than through empirical observation, that theory must be held suspect. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, you hold that time is not physical.

Also, you hold that time passes with no events happening.

Since you fault Relativity for dismissing time-passing-without-events without empirical observation, you plan on supporting your claim of immaterial time with empirical observation.

Since time is a physical dimension... — ucarr

Bad premise! — Metaphysician Undercover

You haven't shown contact between the non-physical and the physical. — ucarr

You haven't dropped your bad premise. Once you drop that premise that time is physical, what you ask for is accomplished. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps time isn't physical, but Relativity's belief in same connects it with our lives, which are, at least in part, physical. Why should I drop my belief in the connection linking physical me with physical time? If It's something unreal - as according to your understanding - shouldn't you show me that immaterial time is somehow connecting with my physical life using cogent logic that overturns my belief. In the boxing ring, the challenger, in order to win, must knock out the champ. This is another kind of boxing ring.

The correction to the cosmological contradiction of a pure origin - there are no pure origins - embodies as the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit of the present. As we move in time, we make an approach to the numerical present - that's the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit - without arrival. This asymptotic progression toward the numerical present is evidence of QM properties being present within the Newtonian scale of physics. This is a way of saying we humans, like the elementary particles, have only a probable location in spacetime. At the Newtonian scale of physics, this seems not to be the case, and that's why Newton himself didn't include it within his physics — ucarr

Again, this is a terrible model. Why exclude "origins"? Having a model which excludes origins as unintelligible renders real origins as unintelligible. That origins appear to be unintelligible is the fault of the model, not because real origins are actually unintelligible. Origins are modeled as unintelligible, so whenever there is an origin it appears to be unintelligible. That's a faulty model. — Metaphysician Undercover

If you've ever tackled the question: "Why is There Not Nothing?" or, stated differently: "Why Existence?" or read up on approaches made by others, then you know why this question, still unsolved, predates Socrates. There is a gnarly cosmological question, specifically invoked by this question: What's the Origin of the Totality of Existence? The question, "What predates the singularity of the Big Bang" is a stumper event the great thinkers still succumb to.

Look, the following makes no sense: — Metaphysician Undercover

As we move in time, we make an approach to the numerical present - that's the theoretical point with zero dimensions as the limit - without arrival. — ucarr

Earlier, you said we are in the "empirical present". Now you say we're moving in time, but never reaching the present. What does this mean, that we are always in the past, yet empirically in the present? Well how do we ever make freewill acts to change things then? The past is already fixed as unchangeable, if we never reach the present we never have the capacity to make a freewill act. — Metaphysician Undercover

We're in the empirical present - how we consciously perceive the world around us, moment to moment - which time lags behind the theoretical numerical present. Speaking in terms of the relative positions, the nearly present, our empirical present, chases closely behind what to us relatively speaking is the near future. This is a way of saying we're some tiny fraction of a second behind the numerical present. Now, to be sure, perception of the numerical present gets gnarly when we home in on its details in high resolution. We can only approach the numerical present as a changing variable traveling the highway of an infinite series. We're always approaching and never arriving at a relative future we're trying to make present here and now. Since these discrepancies at the Newtonian scale are minute, we ignore them. However, if we wish to talk scientifically, we say our position is spacetime is probable, not certain. So, now you see why the present is represented as a theoretical point of zero dimensions.

The infinite series of the calculus and it's limit work very well. They aren't deficiencies. — ucarr

Yes, infinite series' are deficiencies, because as you yourself show, they make origins unintelligible, requiring that there is an infinite series to be traversed between now and then. And, the appearance of infinite time here provides an avoidance of the argument which demonstrates that the future is necessarily prior to the past. Only if time was infinite, could this argument be avoided, and the calculus which works with the infinite series produces that illusion of infinity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, infinite series' are deficiencies, because as you yourself show, they make origins unintelligible, requiring that there is an infinite series to be traversed between now and then. And, the appearance of infinite time here provides an avoidance of the argument which demonstrates that the future is necessarily prior to the past. Only if time was infinite, could this argument be avoided, and the calculus which works with the infinite series produces that illusion of infinity.

Now we have a contradictory scenario, there is supposed to be an origin on the other side of that infinite series, but the infinite series denies the reality of the origin. Then arguments like mine which actually address the origin, can be dismissed, because the infinite series makes a real origin impossible. So all we have is 'waffle-land', deny discussions which take an origin as a premise, because the infinite series doesn't allow the origin to be real, yet also deny that there is an infinite regress by claiming that there is an origin behind the infinite series. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since you're complaining about a never-ending present, maybe you should ask yourself, "Have I ever been bodily present within either the past or the future?" We both know you know the answer is "no." Have you ever awakened from sleep and discovered you're either in the past or in the future? No, you haven't. Even if you could get into a time machine and travel to either one million years past, or one million years future, upon your arrival, wouldn't you be in what for you is the present? Yes, you would. If you find enjoyment in life, and you wish to continue going forward in it, then clearly you have no legitimate reason for complaining about your never-ending experience of being in the present. After all, those not in the present are dead.

This is further evidence we cannot travel to the future; if we could, that would mean we never had a present, and thus we never existed. What prevents this is the fact any time travel is always from the present to another present. Well, that's the infinite present. For clarity, let's look at this from the opposite direction.

If you tried to go from the future backwards of the arrow of time that goes forward, you'd discover you cannot go to the past, because, being of the future and going directly to the past, you'd have no present and thus no presence and thus no existence. Again, going this way, your non-existence is prevented by the fact you can only go from one present to another present.

Now we see why the arrow of time goes in the same direction as the arrow of entropy: past_present_future, with an infinite present, means going in either direction is just a temporal journey from one present to another. Without the arrow of entropy, the past_present_future skein is equal in both directions; temporal travel, either way, is a journey from one present to another present. What gives the arrow of time its unidirectionality is its pairing with the arrow of entropy.

We know we're following the arrow of time only going forward because we know from our life experience we are born young and die older; we understand this as the present going forward to the future. In this sequence, youth, which we look back upon from old age, comes first at birth, old age at death, comes second. We also understand that the reverse of that direction is going from being older to being younger. Since we never see ourselves or anyone else growing younger, we know going forward in time is the only way we're moving in time.