But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state — ucarr

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states. — noAxioms

Regarding,"the lack of a state"qualifying as a predicate, such a predicate applies to a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

Only a cognitive entity of the mind-scape can be a whole apple and not just one of its states. Such wholeness beyond the scope of a particular temporal state is an abstraction. You cannot access a mind-independent, physically real thing not within a particular temporal state.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

In this example, Pegasus exists as a cognitive entity of the mind-scape.

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field — ucarr

I made no mention of any existence within a language field. Your comment used words that implied usage of 'existing' within the domain of time, as opposed to your usual domain of perception, and I was noting that. I need to do this since you've been very inconsistent and unclear with your usage of the word. There are no axioms being leveraged. — noAxioms

I'm building my arguments from E1 & E2. The pillars of my argument are: a) the quintet: mass_energy_force-motion_space_time; b) the symmetries and their conservation laws. My main premise says, mind-independent things and cognitive things have two parts: a) local part: a mind-independent material thing measurable in its dimensions and also in its location; b) non-local part: the quintet that funds the physics of the temporary forms of emergent physical things and the cognitive things of sentience.

All modes of existence, whether mind-independent or cognitive, exist within time. The dimension of time applies to both modes. My saying your "analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field," does not establish an either/or binary governing the two modes.

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

Yes, language alters E2 existence, but not the other kinds, and this topic is about the other kinds. — noAxioms

Observer entanglement raises doubt about cognition having no impact upon E1, E3, E4, E5, E6.

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence. — ucarr

You say that your example is not limited to mind-dependent reality, yet your example is one of perception. Pick an example that is not based on mind or perception. — noAxioms

I don't argue with the claim all of our human perceptions of existence are mind-dependent. My "inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence." stands as my argument inference from observed behaviors of other persons gives us reliable information about their cognitive states as objective reality. No reasonable person disputes one person's ability to predict another person's behavior on the basis of inference from past observed behavior.

A moon meteor strike event exists relative to an Earth state a couple seconds later because Earth measures the moon. Now consider a supernova explosion in a galaxy 3 GLY distant. That supernova event exists relative to today's Earth event because Earth measured it 100 years ago say. (Notice that at all times I am referencing events, not objects)

Our moon does not exist (at all) relative to that supernova event since that distant event has not measured any event of our moon. So same moon existing relative to one thing but not relative to the other. That's how a relational definition of existence works. It works backwards, with ontology being caused not by past events but by future ones as the future measurements get entangled with that which gets measured. There is no mind dependence whatsoever in that, but it requires causal relations between what would otherwise not be meaningful events. — noAxioms

Before I give a response, I need you to define the sense in which "measured" is being used in your two paragraphs above.

I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind. — ucarr

Yes, that is the primary evidence for E4 sort of existence. Unlike E2, the car would still be there if you were not, but it's existence is still epistemologically based. You posit the mind-independent existence of the car from your mind dependent perception of it. Our tiny corner of the universe exists, but probably not other universes because we don't see those. There's incredible resistance to theories that only explain things by requiring the 'existence' of far more than what was presumed before. It started when Earth was all that existed, coupled with the domes of light show that circled overhead. The discovery of other galaxies was met with significant resistance, and you can see those. Imagine the pushback when the boundary got pushed back to nonexistence. So yes, your car example is evidence for E4, but E4 is still very anthropocentric. — noAxioms

Yes, E4 is very anthropocentric, and likewise your conversation here notwithstanding your stipulation for the exclusion of E2. Fundamental to this conversation, as well as to all of the rest of the entire universe of human cognition, lies mind dependence by knowledge.

Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence. — noAxioms

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality. — ucarr

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. — noAxioms

Not sure. You seem to perceive a drawing instead of a flying horse. I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse, and not the existence or predicates of either a drawing (which has E4 existence) or the concept of Pegasus (E2 existence). Neither of the latter has wings, but the former does. EPP says that last statement is meaningless. — noAxioms

When you say, "I am asking about the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..."as I understand you, you refer to a flying horse defined by physics. E2 "I know about it," refers to cognitive things of the mind-scape. E4 "Is part of the objective state of this universe," as I understand it, refers to a flying horse defined by physics as rendered through a cognitive thing of the mind-scape.

Let's suppose imaginary-impossibles inhabit an imaginary plane. Having two parts: a) real-imaginary; b) imaginary-imaginary. When you ask about “…the existence (and the predicates) of the flying horse..." you’re asking about a) the real-imaginary part. EPP, as I understand it, does not deny the existence of Pegasus part a) the real-imaginary part. Pegasus defined by physical dimensions exists as an “as if” physical horse with wings in terms of part b) the imaginary-imaginary part. This “as if” version of a mind-independent, physically real horse differs from a non “as-if” mind-independent, physically real horse because it is not directly observable, whereas the other is directly observable.

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the [referent of] predicate of the sign? — ucarr

I am absolutely separating the two, and no, it does not mean that I cannot infer the predicates of the sign, such as its mass or location. I was just noting that being red wasn't one of those predicates. That is a deception of language. We say that 'the sign is red', and we hear that so many times that you believe it, instead of realizing that it would be far more correct to say 'the sign appears red'. Knowing the difference is a good step towards knowing the mind independent thing itself, but it's got a long way to go from there. — noAxioms

From our consensus-based social reality, we know the stop sign is red because we infer from the similar behavior of others reacting to it their mental content in reaction to it. This means the mind-independent physics we call "stop sign" lies in the causal history of the socially verified public reaction to it. Why should we, the perceiving society, think the causal history of the referent might be, WRT language, an intentional deception or an unintentional distortion of the mind-independent state of the stop sign? This type of supposition presents itself as likely being a capricious frolic of a wayward mind.

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

I never said it exists. Read the quote. — noAxioms

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

I read the text in bold as saying, "the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify." (So, 'has wings' makes a claim about an existing thing, Pegasus. We know that in this context, Pegasus exists because we know logically you can't make a declaration about indescribable non-existence. Saying non-existence 'has wings' makes no sense. It's like multiplying 'has wings' by zero with a total non-existence result.). Next you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." Your first sentence posits an object. Your second sentence denies its existence. The two sentences describe a paradox.

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1. — ucarr

OK, E1. Yet all your descriptions are of E2. Pegasus doesn't exist because you do not see it. A T-Rex doesn't exist because you see it, but it isn't simultaneous with you. That's not objective existence. That's existence relative to you, or E2.

Just saying that your posts in no way reflect using 'exists' in an E1 way, so it was a surprise to see that statement. E1,5 & maybe 6 are mind independent, but your posts imply that they exist due to your perception of them.

There is no empirical test for E1 existence since it isn't defined in an empirical manner, so it is really hard to justify the existence of something if E1 is what you mean by 'existence'. It needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. — noAxioms

You say E1 needs a rational justification, not an empirical one. I can point to a rational justification of E1 in the form of Noether's Theorem. It makes the prediction that WRT mass, “If a system has a continuous symmetry property, then there are corresponding quantities of mass whose values are conserved in time. – Wikipedia”

Since we know that mass is conserved, we also know the temporary forms of massive objects emerge from the fund of the total mass of the universe. Empirical observations that confirm the generalizations of Noether’s Theorem allow us to generalize to E1 by means of the theorem.

I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. — ucarr

Maybe. Many think that numbers don't exist except as a concept (E2). No platonic existence, yet there are 8 planets orbiting the sun, a relation between a presumably nonexistent number and a presumably existent set of planets. — noAxioms

If numbers exist as a concept, then they exist. Zero does not equal non-existence because it's an unsigned number that's a placeholder and, as such, it can add great positive value to other numbers. For example,

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence

in base 10, the difference between 1 and 10 is a factor of ten, a big difference of value.

In a similar manner, zero as a factor erases value including presence altogether. Any number, no matter how great, when multiplied by zero, evaluates to zero. Non-existence, an infinite series of negations, does something similar. It negates anything in its presence, even itself. Attributes, like the things they predicate, are negated in the presence of non-existence. Predication implies existence because it implies the sentient being making predication possible.

I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence — ucarr

No, presumably only the concepts have existence, especially per Meinong. — noAxioms

Everything in the sentence has existence as a concept.

The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." — ucarr

Wrong, because I explicitly stated that EPP was not one of my premises, and the implication you mention directly requires EPP, else it is a non-sequitur. — noAxioms

Is EPP your language denoting Sartre’s “Existence Precedes Essence”?

Your job is to demonstrate that "Pegausus has wings" leads to a contradiction, but without begging EPP. — noAxioms

Anyone can show non-existent winged Pegasus is a contradiction by establishing the definition of attribute:

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 a quality or feature regarded as a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something: flexibility and mobility are the key attributes of our army. – The Apple Dictionary

I think it likely the cited definition of “attribute” assumes EPP based on its use of the preposition “of.”

preposition | əv | 1 expressing the relationship between a part and a whole: the sleeve of his coat | in the back of the car | the days of the week | a series of programs | a piece of cake | a lot of money. – The Apple Dictionary

noun | ˈatrəˌbyo͞ot | 1 … a characteristic or inherent part of someone or something…

Someone might wish to argue “attribute” and “existence” are contemporaries. I argue against this by citing the symmetries and their conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. This tells us that material things with attributes are changes of form of eternal matter. At least twice you’ve made claims that suggest eternal matter prior to its temporary forms:

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

Yes, I realize that it is a contradiction if that principle [EPP] is presumed, but I don't presume principles unless there's a logical reason to do so. Believing an unjustified principle is essentially rationalizing your beliefs, as opposed to holding rational beliefs. People are very good at the former and just terrible at the latter, perhaps for the best. We're evolved to do that, so to do otherwise is against our nature. — noAxioms

The duality copula strategy argues that an impossible object, such as a round square, has a non-physical existence. It doesn't claim it lacks all manner of existence. Does Meinong use the duality copula strategy? It's quite distinct from what you argue below:

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

Things that exist/don't exist simultaneously are paradoxical. — ucarr

Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox. — ucarr

Two things here.
1) I was trying to unpack your symbolic notation, which is indeed paradoxical, but it doesn't reflect anything I said. — noAxioms

No. You did say, "the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist." See your own quote below.

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

You can talk about things - which can be physical, or abstract - that exist but lack the property of existence, but this talk describes a paradox. You've been talking this way throughout this conversation. My sentential logic translation of your words quoted above makes clear the element of paradox in your explanation of Meinong's rejection of EPP. I suspect you embrace Meinong's rejection of EPP.

2) You mention 'simultaneiously', which seriously narrows down the sort of existence you're talking about. Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction. — noAxioms

You say, "Simultaneity is a coordinate concept, hence is purely a mental abstraction." I'm unsure about the purity of the truth content of your claim. If I'm in Cincinnati, I know I'm simultaneously in Ohio. Although a human-level mind is required to know this, a chimp in Cincinnati is also simultaneously in Ohio, and this is an existential truth independent of whether or not the Chimp knows it.

So we're once again talking about E2 existence, and we all agreed that Pegasus has exists as a human concept. — noAxioms

You and Meinong, when talking about predication sans existence, navigate the mind-scape of abstractions including paradox. At the level of practical English, and everyday conversation, if I say, "Yesterday, I looked at the red..." In response, you would probably say, "You looked at the red what?" My statement is either an incomplete thought with a adjective dangling, or it is a complete thought about a noun expressed by the word "red." An example of the latter is "red" used to designate a radical leftist.

These two predications, assuming existing things, make declarations about them. The scope of predication always includes existing things. Our declarations fall into two categories: a) claims about the behavior of an existing thing; b) claims about the state of being of an existing thing. We can wax fanciful and make claims about non-existing things - such as a winged Pegasus of the mind non-existent - but such talk inhabits the realm of paradox.

But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state — ucarr

Doesn't the lack of a state qualify as a predicate? The word 'state' implies a temporal existence, like talking about the state of an apple one day vs a different state on another day, this standing opposed to just 'the apple', the whole apple and not just one of its states. So maybe talk about modifiers or predicates and not about states.

For instance, the state of Pegasus is 'flying', and later the state changes to 'landed'. That's a change of state of a presumably nonexistent thing (very presumably because nobody has defined 'exists' when asserting that Pegasus doesn't). — noAxioms

You make analytic declarations of the existence of a thing within the language field and then argue for such axiomatically determined existence therein. If “existence” and “predicate” are only words, then, of course, you can axiomatically determine their existence.

If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective. — ucarr

Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence.. — ucarr

Two things wrong with this. I can talk about the homeless. The noun is not in the sentence. It's implied, but your wording doesn't allow that.

Regarding your example sentence, in your prepositional phrase, "about the homeless." the modifying adjective "the" attaches to the noun "homeless." If you remove "homeless" from the sentence, the sentence disappears and becomes an incomplete thought with the article dangling.

Secondly, 'existing thing' is simply not a grammatical requirement, allowing reference to a winged horse. Be careful about using language rules as a substitute for logic. — noAxioms

When an adjective attaches to a noun as its modifier, the state of the noun changes in your perception because the adjective gives you additional information about that state of existence.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence. If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement. — ucarr

OK, so we're talking E2 despite the topic not being about mind dependent reality. — noAxioms

I don't think my example is limited to mind-dependent reality. The inference about the other person seeing the color red as I see it is based upon evidence.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent. — ucarr

But I don't care what somebody else's mind sees. I care about what exists. Of course, if by 'exists' you mean that you have in some way perceived it, then it exists in that way by definition. — noAxioms

Knowing what someone else's mind sees by evidence supporting inference to my mind seeing the same thing is how we know what exists beyond mind-dependent perception. If I see a car run a red light and enter an intersection, and then one car in the oncoming traffic swerves one way to avoid the intruding car, and another car in the oncoming traffic swerves another way, then I know both swerving drivers saw the same intruding car. I know my perception of the intruding car is not confined to my mind.

If there's no way to transcend one's own mind, and yet all members of society are confined to their own minds likewise, and therefore I can infer what's confined to the mind of another is the same as what's confined to my mind by what my mind sees as the behavior of others, then that's a functional simulation of objective reality, and the conjectured real, unreachable objective reality is trivial. Given this, the epistemological reach for the conjectured real, objective reality is just academic fuss.

Pegasus (and not just the drawing) exists, but that's a mind-dependent existence. — noAxioms

Since you expect me to understand what the word "Pegasus" signs for, you must believe my mind-dependent perception of Pegasus is the same as yours. Our two perceptions together make Pegasus a social reality.

Yes, the fact that two people see and agree on a common referent (the drawing in your example) is solid evidence that it is mind independent. It is more than just a concept. Any view that isn't idealism is based on that, but it isn't in any way proof. — noAxioms

I now suspect your apparent quest for epistemic certainty is the idealism lurking within this conversation.

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others? — ucarr

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

My example showed the color of the stop sign to be a predicate of perception, not a predicate of the sign. — noAxioms

You separate predicate of perception from predicate of the sign. Since you're claiming our confinement to our mind's perceptions, aren't you unable to know the predicate of the sign? Isn't it generally understood what's perceived in our minds is a functional substitute for whatever is out there causing it?

How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge? — ucarr

By concluding its mind independence independently of concluding its existence, which remains an defined assertion anyway. — noAxioms

So, the ontic status of mind independence independent of existence is what you're examining?

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction. — ucarr

No it isn't. You need to understand this. Had I wanted to reference the language referent, I would have said 'Sherlock Holmes' and not Sherlock Holmes. With the latter usage, I am not in any way talking about the language referent.
I was asked of what Meinong probably denies the existence, and he doesn't deny the existence of the language referent 'Sherlock Holmes'. It appears in countless places, including this post. — noAxioms

You think Sherlock Holmes non-existent but receptive to predication?

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? — noAxioms

The measurement defined the wave function, not the other way around. So it seems that the effect (the measurement) causes the existence of the cause, at least under the E5 definition. — noAxioms

E5 "state X exists to state Y iff X is part of the causal history of Y"

Since IFF denotes a bi-conditional relationship between the wave function and its measurement, then the two are different expressions of the same thing. Notice the possessive pronoun attaching measurement to wave function. There is no precedence in the case of equality.

If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? — ucarr

Your seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical wave function collapse. Try an example that isn't so classical — noAxioms

That my seeing the ball in the store is an epistemic change, not a physical change, is my point. The soccer ball is not an effect caused by me.

Yes, current theory gives space properties. It's just that velocity isn't one of those properties despite so many trying to give it that property. — noAxioms

Loop quantum gravity posits space as a construction from elementary units (of space) assembled. By this definition, space is a divisible thing. Space as a four-manifold of Relativity warps around celestial bodies including the earth. Things fall to earth due to its curved space.

When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. — ucarr

I would say that there is the same space in a full room. I don't consider the space to be only the empty portion. So no, i would not say the space in the room does anything by my presence since there's no more or less of it than before I entered. The room has the same dimensions and thus occupies the same space, full or empty. It is that coordinate space that is expanding, not 'volume of emptiness'. — noAxioms

So-called emptiness ≠ emptiness.

When you throw a football, or anything else with a horizontal trajectory velocity, its trajectory traces a parabola. This is a predication about how space physically accommodates material objects.

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? — ucarr

It has a temporal dimension. — noAxioms

Spacetime means space and time are connected. Gravity and acceleration cause elapsing time to slow down relativistically. The universe has an age. It is changing its age and its degree of expansion.

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. — ucarr

That actually seems to say that existence is things that don't exist. Your verbal description says it means that existence is things that either exist or don't exist. Neither makes sense to me. — noAxioms

Things that either exist or don't exist simultaneously. This is a description of paradox. The idea is simple, "Talking about attributes implies the existence of a thing that possesses the attributes describing its nature." If this is reality, then saying,

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

is an example of winged _______________. You say, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." That means there's something to modify, something that exists. Next you say, The object simply lacks the property of existence." Since you say something exists that lacks the property of existence, you describe a paradox.

Most of my definitions E1,2,3,4,6 seem to define existence as membership in some domain, with the domain being different with each of them. — noAxioms

I think existence is fundamental to the entirety of all types of reality (subjective/objective). For this reason, I've been focusing on the definition closest to what I believe: E1.

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else. — noAxioms

Going by that, a winged horse exists because there's a noun to attach 'winged' to. Existence by language usage, which I suppose falls under E2. — noAxioms

Within the scope of predication, I don't object to what you say here. I think the scope of existence is greater than language since I think earth, for example, existed before there was a language naming it.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier

If by 'exists' here, you mean 'is a predicate of' relation, sure. — noAxioms

I acknowledge this truth within the scope of language. I don't think you can make predications of relations between existing things and non-existence. Non-existence precludes relations. Humans can talk meaningfully about relations between existing things and non-existence, as Meinong does.

This type of talk, however, depends upon the indirection of complexity. I can talk meaningfully about a circular triangle, "It's an imaginary geometric entity that violates the definitions of circle and triangle by combining them." The reader can understand this sentence. So, everything in this example has existence, and the different parts have relations connecting them. Because the sentence has the indirection of complexity, humans cannot observe the imaginary object directly. They can observe the local part, the language part, directly. They cannot observe the non-local part, the imaginary part, directly. In this example there is the real-imaginary thing, the language establishing the predication of a circular triangle. This we can observe directly as language. The non-local part, the imaginary-imaginary thing, the actual circular triangle that is the referent for the language signing for it, we cannot observe directly.

you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist.

I do? Depends on definitions.
I am taking an open mind and not telling anybody how things are. Such is the nature of exploration. — noAxioms

I think here you have a good policy.

If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. — ucarr

I don't think a modifier changes any state. It already is the state. Maybe I don't understand you here. Give an example of a state that changes due to it having a predicate. — noAxioms

Here you say something interesting because, by my reading of you, you involve modification with state change. Let's imagine that a soccer ball inhabiting objective reality without being observed has a proto-color undefined. The soccer ball is in motion. At some point, it enters a field of visible red light. In this zone, observers see that the soccer ball is red. It moves on to a field of visible green light and observers see that now the soccer ball is green. In both instances of the soccer ball being observed first red and then green, we perceive that modification plays the role of a function that creates a bi-furcation of before/after for the soccer ball. In our example it's clear the two visible light fields are existing things that embody their colors as real things, but WRT the soccer ball, they can't act as modifiers until a pre-existing thing enters the field of their presence and undergoes the modification of their functions.

Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. — ucarr

OK, you're qualifying a perception as a 'thing', which is probably consistent with an assertion that red exists, at least by most definitions of 'exists'. — noAxioms

I don't think it makes sense to say a thing is in a state of being red, except under idealism where 'things' are just ideals and a red ideal is logically consistent. I don't think a stop sign is red, it just appears that way to some of us. — noAxioms

I think it makes sense to say a thing is red such that there's an intersection between the thing and redness such that the two overlap. Within the region of the overlap, it's as if the two are one, as the language indicates.

The color read exists — noAxioms

I need more clarification of what 'measure' means. If you mean a mental act of perception, then your definition is E2: Measurement is something done by a mind, making it a mind dependent definition of existence.
If on the other hand 'measure' X means a relation where in some way a measurer gets affected by something measured (like a rock measuring water by getting wet from it, or a thermostat measuring heat by turning off current to a relay, then we're close to an E5 definition which is based on measurement and causality relation between measurer and measured.[/quote]

I think the two senses of measure described above overlap. Measurement is mind dependent and measurement is entanglement.

Your example of 'red' makes me suspect the former (E2) since I don't know how a perception can be measured. I cannot for instance in any way measure somebody else's conscious perception, hence a mind-dependent definition typically leading to solipsism. — noAxioms

You can measure another person's perceptions by inference. If two people independently look at a red square printed on paper, and then are asked to point to what color they saw while looking at a printed spectrum of colors that includes red, both pointing to red lets each know indirectly what the other perceives.

So Pegasus exists under E2 because you measure it. You can for instance count its wings. The thought of Pegasus is what makes it exist. Unfortunately, that is not realism (a mind-independent reality), which is what this topic is trying to discuss. EPP holds pretty much by definition under E2. — noAxioms

Again, I can know pretty accurately what your mind sees looking at a drawing of Pegasus by the inference to red described above. If I know what your mind sees by knowing it is the same as what my mind sees, then I know the drawing of Pegasus is mind-independent.

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon. — ucarr

Now that's a physical thing: a wavelength. But that description says nothing about how it appears to various observers. — noAxioms

Ditto for redness, a perception of a specific wavelength range by some observers, but not most of them. — noAxioms

Again, by the same argument above. How do you suppose societies persist if each individual is locked inside of a private reality not able to be communicated to others?

To illustrate: A stop sign will appear green to you if you approach it fast enough. The perception is not a property of the thing, it is a property of perceiving. The stop sign is not different, but it sure looks different. — noAxioms

With respect to the question of mind-independence, your example contradicts the point you're intending to have it make. You're intending to show to me how a property of perceiving refutes mind-independent reality, but your argument hinges upon me agreeing with you about what a third party perceives. How could we do that, and how could your argument be sound without the assumption of a mind-independent reality pertaining to perception that we both acknowledge?

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes? — ucarr

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton. — noAxioms

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood. — ucarr

No. 'Sherlock Holmes' exists as that. Sherlock Holmes is not that. The former is a proper noun with 14 letters and only the latter lives on Baker St. Had I wanted to refer to the proper noun, just like had I wished to refer to the mental concept, I would have explicitly said so. — noAxioms

I'm saying Sherlock Holmes is a language referent that has only other language referents whereas Issac Newton is a language referent that has other language referents and physical referents as well. I don't understand from your words here why you're refuting my distinction.

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming? — ucarr

You make it sound like the machine choices are being made by humans, sort of like a car being driven. Sure, the machine didn't write its own code, but neither did you. Sure, the machine was created in part by human activity, but so were you.

None of that detracts from the fact that it is doing its own measurement of whatever it needs to, and reacting accordingly by its choice, not being remote controlled (like so many humans claim to be). I called the measurement 'perception' since I lack a better word. I hessitated to use the word 'sentient' since the word has heavy human connotations. Nothing else is sentient since nothing non-human has human feelings. If there was a word the robot might use to describe what it feels, you would in turn not have that. But I rarely see robots use human language to communicate with each other. It's just not natural for them. — noAxioms

I didn't create my own dna, but I know it created me. Are you ascribing the same self-knowledge to AI?
Are you saying that when AI performs rational functions, it knows its doing so? Since you think AI has feelings, apparently you do think AI is self-aware. Is that correct? Don't confuse the impressive accomplishments of AI's iterative machine learning with self-awareness.

...measurement (not mind-specific) defines presence and therefore precedes it. This is pretty consistent with quantum mechanics where measurement is what collapses a wave function and makes some system state in the past exist where it didn't exist before the measurement. — noAxioms

Since the wave function is measured and thus it is the object of a verb acting upon it (measurement), how can the verb be prior to it? If I search about for a soccer ball for sale and then, after a while, I see
one on display in a store window, how am I prior to the soccer ball? Presumably, the soccer ball existed even before I had a notion to seek after it.

f your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space? — ucarr

Space isn't material either, at least not by any typical definition of 'material'. — noAxioms

If space isn't material, then how is it I can walk into a room? When I walk into a room, the space in the room is doing something. It's accommodating me spatially. By this reasoning, so-called emptiness is filled by space. Isn't that how we talk about space? On the other hand, non-existence, infinite negation, can't even do the infinite negation I describe it doing. Non-existence, then, is the limit of negation. The accommodation of the presence of existing things by space is one of the most fundamental actions within physics.

The universe doesn't exist in time, so it doesn't change. It is all events, all of spacetime and contents of said spacetime. — noAxioms

How is it that the universe accommodates the endless changes of physics while itself remaining static? I wonder if you hold with background independence?

In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}. — ucarr

E{B} says E (Winged) changes B (Horse) into Winged Horse. 0{B} says 0 (non-existence) changes B (Horse) into { }, the null set, which is the empty set, or non-existence. This is the crux of my argument supporting EPP. Non-existence, like zero, negates infinitely all that would seek to be in its presence.

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction? — ucarr

It is assigning predication to something that doesn't exist, where EPP says existence is necessarily prior to predication.
Actually, it says that existence is conceptually prior to predication, which makes it possibly not about realism at all. Pegasus can be conceived to have wings only if one first conceives of Pegasus. It has nothing to do with if Pegasus actually is real or not. Maybe that is all the principle is about, and not about realism.
But in that case, Meinong is spouting nonsense with his examples. Sherlock Holmes has a pipe, which requires Sherlock to be conceived before we conceive of him with the pipe. Need a better example. A jabberwockey lives on Baker street. That's a predicate even if I have no concept of what a Jabberwockey is. — noAxioms

All of this, speaking in terms of logical consistency, revolves around definition, grammar and syntax. Object by definition ≠ non-existence. Adjective, by grammar ≠ modify a word for an existing thing if no such word is in the sentence. If an adjective adjacent to a noun, attaches to the noun as its modifier, then their juxtaposition tells us that if and only if adjective modifies noun does noun objectify adjective.

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence; D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." — ucarr

I don't know what " Let C = {D | D ∉ C} " means. — noAxioms

Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. C = Existence; D = Object (that gets modified). Existence (C) is expressed as Let C = {D | D ∉ C}. The two brackets enclose the set of Existence. First there's D = Object. This is followed by the vertical line |. This is a partition indicating the set of Existence has two sections. In the first section containing only D we have a representation saying D is a part of existence. On the other side of the partition, in the second section, we have D ∉ C, which means D is not a part of existence. This is a sentence logic (SL) statement representing your sentence verbal statement:

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

By definition, an adjective attaches to a noun in its role as modifier of the noun. If, as you say, "The object simply lacks the property of existence." then the adjective also doesn't exist since its defined as a modifier of the object and is not defined as anything else.

Since you take the position that, "Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify." you imply that the adjective exists as a modifier and it modifies an object that doesn't exist. Since the adjective, defined as a modifier of an object, exists, then its object exists. If the adjective also modifies an object that doesn't exist, you imply that the object simultaneously does and doesn't exist. The contradiction of something simultaneously existing and not existing is expressed in sentence logic as: Let C (existence) = {D | D ∉ C}.

You think a modifier can modify an object that exists, and you also think a modifier can modify an object that doesn't exist. I think a modifier can only modify an object that exists. If a modifier could modify something that doesn't exist, that would mean it could change the state of something that doesn't exist. But if something doesn't exist, then it has no state, and thus its state can't be changed, and thus it can't have a modifier that changes its state.

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? — ucarr

Depends on definitions. — noAxioms

How can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify? — ucarr

Didn't say there wasn't anything to modify. I said that the thing modified doesn't necessarily exist. Pegasus has been our example. Given denial of EPP, and a definition of 'exists' which excludes Pegasus, the predicate 'has wings' has an object (Pegasus) to modify. The object simply lacks the property of existence. — noAxioms

I think there's a logical issue embedded in your language: A = ¬EPP; B = Pegasus; C = Existence;
D = Object; E = Winged (modifier) → Let C = {D | D ∉ C}, then D ∈ C ⟺ D ∉ C. This logic sequence says you're having it both ways when you say, "An object modified lacks existence." In so saying, you say that E{B} = 0{B}. If E, a modifier, can modify E[B} so that it evaluates to 0{B}, then you show how E changes the initial state of B to a final state of B = to 0{B}. This statement says that B = Object, when modified by E, becomes 0{B}. The translation for this says, "B = Object, when modified by E becomes { }. This means that E modifies B = Object such that it becomes B equals an expression of the null set, the set of nothing. So modifier E changes Object B into non-existence. Only non-existence can practice infinite negation so that there is never any existence that can get started. Non-existence admits no presence of existence. They cannot intersect. This tells us that E{B} ≠ { } because something existing, such as E, cannot modify non-existence because E itself cannot exist within the presence of non-existence. Only zero can evaluate to zero, a non-modification. This tells us that modification only applies to existing things acting upon other existing things, and thus there are no attributes modifying things that don't exist.

If we posit EPP, then a contradiction is reached when asserting that Pegasus has wings, as you seem to be doing. — noAxioms

What is the chain of reasoning from EPP to "Pegasus has wings," being a contradiction?

Pi = the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter.

My mind tells me one of the main revelations of pi is the picture of the straight line of the diameter surrounded by the encircling circumference. This juxtaposition shows concisely that the rectilinearity (straight-lining) of science is only partially commensurable with the curvilinearity (curving) of nature.

The straight lines infinitesimal of the analysis of calculus can only approximate nature's reality.

Science is nature-adjacent rather than natural.

As technology diminishes and displaces nature, humanity rejiggers itself out of mysterious existence into self-reflection. The trick of AI and SAI is baking in a component of mystery and a component of error. Mystery and error support otherness, a component essential to forestalling the cognitive suffocation of an enclosing self-reflection.

Intentional mystery and error preserve the irrationality pictured by pi.

We must pull on and push against the idea our natural world is full mystery and error because some prior race of sentients understood the essential importance of forestalling cognitive suffocation. Having original sin in the mix is better than the damnation of perfection.

Against utopia!

Adjective yes, and for argument sake, noun, yes. Does that thing playing that role need to 'exist' to have that adjective apply to it? Depends on definition of 'exist' (nobody ever specifies it no matter how many times I ask), and it depends on if EPP applies to the kind of existence being used. — noAxioms

Does the noun need to exist for the sake of the adjective function? Since an adjective is defined as a modifier (of a noun), how can it modify if there's nothing for it to modify? Consider a parallel question, "How can red exist if there's no thing that's red?" Even redness, as a noun, is a thing red. Clearly, if redness doesn't exist (the state of being red), then red doesn't exist.

As for the general definition of the infinitive: to exist, I say it's the ability to be measured, and thus the ability to exhibit its presence as a measurable thing. Therefore, all existing things have a measurable presence. Let's consider something believed to exist, but not measurable. The math concept of infinity is an example. An infinite series can be parsed into segments unlimited. Now we see that the abstract concept of infinity can be measured indefinitely, so it's not completely measurable rather than unmeasurable.

The color read exists

Only as a concept/experience, hardly as a 'thing' in itself... — noAxioms

The color red and the taste of sweetness exist as effects of a) a segment of EM wavelengths of the visible light spectrum; b) an organic chemical compound including oxygen, hydrogen and carbon.

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I think he referenced Sherlock Holmes and his attribute of having an address. This of course presumes he is using some definition of 'exists' that precludes Sherlock Holmes but does not preclude say Isaac Newton. — noAxioms

Sherlock Holmes exists as a proper noun with adjectival attributes in the same manner that other proper nouns exist with adjectival attributes as, for example, Isaac Newton. They both exist in language. Neither exists in flesh and blood.

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from.

Does a unicorn being horny make it exist then? If so, what definition of 'exists'? If not, how is that consistent with EPP?
17 is prime, so 17 exists? Same questions. — noAxioms

My answer here is the same as directly above: unicorns and prime numbers exist within language, and language is a real thing, so they are real linguistically. As we say in common speech, a real person differs from a fictional person in that the former exists in both flesh and blood and language whereas the latter exists only in language.

A machine can perceive stuff without what most would call a 'mind', but I suppose it would not qualify as a sentient thing. — noAxioms

You know about machines that base their behavior upon their own judgment rather than mechanically and non-self-consciously responding to human-created programming?

If it's impossible to measure something not present

Dark matter is not perceived, but we measure it nonetheless by its effects on other more directly perceived things. — noAxioms

In your example with dark matter, presence precedes indirect measurement.

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named.

...there's not much utility to a definition that doesn't exclude anything. — noAxioms

This explains our conversation; it's hard to define and rationalize totality.

if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A'). — ucarr

Think of a fraction in math. If the numerator and the denominator are the same, then, as you know, the value of the fraction evaluates to one. In the first statement in parentheses, it's merely saying noAxioms is noAxioms, a circularity we don't waste our time on. The second statement, an equation, translates to A/A. Then we can treat A as a variable that let's us add a coefficient, such as 2. So 2A/2A = 1A = A. The third statement is a logical deduction from knowing that if a fraction has a value other than 1, then the numerator and the denominator are not equal.

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them. — ucarr

Distance is not a journey. That word implies that a separation isn't meaningful unless something travels (which drags in time and all sorts of irrelevancies). — noAxioms

I think the implication you describe is a true implication. If D(istance) = A, and A > 0, then any length beyond a dimensionless point is meaningful in terms of the definition of distance. We know this because the dimensionless point (0 distance) is the negation of length which, in our context here, equals distance. Our conclusion, then, says both thinking about and experiencing distance becomes meaningful as a journey either of the mind or of the body.

Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact. — ucarr

The time for a rock to hit the ground depends on a relation with the immaterial gravitational constant. That seems to be an example of material things interacting with something not material.
Greed (not a material thing) drives much of the actions of people (material things).
A shadow (not a material thing) has a length, and often relates to a material object. — noAxioms

Math → emergent from brain; Greed → emergent from brain; Shadow → emergent from massive object. The bi-conditional IFF connects them necessarily to physics.

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding? — ucarr

Space expands over time... — noAxioms

If your statement, "...the universe is not itself material," includes space, then how do you explain the expansion of space?

The distinction between a thing existing and the exact same thing not existing is that the latter thing isn't in this universe, it's in a different one. It exists in that one, but not this one. All very symmetrical. — noAxioms

Your statement raises logical issues: a) if something doesn't exist, it doesn't exist anywhere; b) if two things exist outside of (A≡A) but rather as (A) = (A) then that reduces to (A), and thus they're not in separate universes; they're in one universe. Also, if (A) = (A) can't be reduced to (A), then they're not identical; they're similar as (A) ≈ (A').

Here again, the unicorn exists by E4 (it's out there somewhere in this universe) and perhaps under E2 (because our imagination is arguably perception of it). The horse and the unicorn share the same ontology. — noAxioms

I don't believe you live your life according to the integrity of your claims here.

Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist? — ucarr

I never claimed that. I said distance would not exist given a definition that only material things exist, and the fact that while distance might be a relation between material things, it is not itself material. Anyway, I would never use that definition, so I don't claim anything about the existence of distance. — noAxioms

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

Do material things relate to each other immaterially? If distance is a relation between material things, say, Location A and Location B, then the relation of distance between the two locations is the journey across the distance separating them. That journey, being as it is a relation that costs time and energy to traverse, expresses itself as a physical relation between the two locations. Moreover, this concept of distance as an abstract thought has a referent of two locations separated by time and energy. No referent no thought/no brain no thought and thus abstract thought is also physical. Yes, abstract thought is emergent, but it can't exist without its material ground, and thus it belongs to the world of physics.

Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic? — ucarr

In a world like this one but without humans in it at all, a planet orbits one light-hour from its star. Of course I had to use human concepts (including one of our standard units) to say that, but the distance is between objects that have no anthropocentric existence.

2nd example: In a very different universe of conway's game of life, a Lightweight spaceship is of length (distance) 5 at all times. There is no people in that universe since it has but 2 spatial dimensions, but an observer is possible. — noAxioms

In my view, your two examples demonstrate the impossibility of humans talking about mind-independent situations. Sans observers, the orbits of planets around suns cannot be characterized as such, nor can they be characterized by us in any way. There's nothing we perceive that doesn't become anthropocentric.

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially? — ucarr

No. The question seems to be a category error, treating the universe as an object that 'does things'. — noAxioms

Since, as you say above, "...the universe may arguably contain material things... the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe..." Given your description of an inter-relationship between material things and immaterial container, I expect you to be able to say how material and immaterial interact. If you can't do that, then you must consider whether our universe is a case of material inter-relating with material. Also, can you explain how an immaterial universe is expanding?

If "...treating the universe as an object that 'does things (like expand)'." is a category error, then does it follow that pairing immaterial universe with material things is also a category error?

How do immaterial things relate to material things?

Well, light was one of my examples, arguably not a material thing since it is massless. My material eyes react to light, so that's a relation. — noAxioms

Photons possess energy, force and momentum, material properties.

Another example is the fine-structure constant (α) which relates to me since material of any sort cannot form with most other values of it. Universe with different values of it might just be fading radiation. — noAxioms

I read this as alpha equal to an unchanging value. The value I take to be a measurement of something material, given my belief you can't measure immaterial things directly, but only indirectly in relation to material measurements.

If you only know about immaterial things through the reactions of your body, then how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes? — ucarr

I don't claim immaterial causes, nor do I claim material causes. Distance causes a rock to take longer to fall, so immaterial cause can have effect on material. — noAxioms

I don't see how these two sentences are consistent.

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?

No. I said it wasn't travel at all. The thing is question is everywhere present on that worldline. It is one 4D object, not a 3D object that changes location. — noAxioms

A world-line is a four-dimensional manifold with three spatial dimensions and one temporal dimension.

We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B.

If we're talking spacetime, points in spacetime are called events. If we're not talking spacetime, then there is no meaningful interval between the points. — noAxioms

In math, an interval is a set of numbers that includes all real numbers between two endpoints. Intervals are important in many areas of math, including algebra, calculus, and statistics.

There are 3 types of interval notation: open interval, closed interval, and half-open interval. The interval with no infinity symbol is called a bounded interval. The interval containing the infinity symbol is called an unbounded interval.

Intervals in Math

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. — ucarr

You got it backwards. Given EPP, a thing with defining attributes necessarily exists since existence is prior to those attributes. So the answer would be 'no' given EPP since nothing is added. Meinong denies EPP, and therefore existence is not necessary for a thing to have attributes. So Meinong would say 'yes' (as do you), existence is optional and thus in addition to those attributes. — noAxioms

Thanks for the correction.

Attributes exist as characteristics that don't characterize anything? They embody the role of an adjective, but they don't attach to any existing thing playing the role of a noun or pronoun? The color read exists, but it doesn't colorize anything, not even empty space?

What's Meinong's example of a non-existent thing that has attributes?

I differ from Meinong in that I affirm EPP and therefore think existence is what attributes emerge from. In line with my thinking, existence is the reality of faces uncountable.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. — ucarr

So you deny mind-independent existence then? This topic was explicitly about the meaning of mind-independent existence (commonly known as 'realism'). If you don't deny it, then why the definition based on perception? — noAxioms

I don't deny mind-independence outright in accordance with a hard-edged yes/no binary. I allow my still developing thinking upon the subject to include a gray space that accommodates thoroughgoing nuancing. The question is especially difficult from the standpoint of perspective, given that no sentient can perceive anything without its mind. Speculation about mind-independent reality cannot even be supported by inference because that too is mind dependent.

How does a mind-enclosed sentient describe mind-independent reality with any authority? I take recourse to Kant's noumenal realm for guidance. My mind instinctively goes to a conception characterized by unlimited, undiminished stimuli that resembles a computer screen displaying raw data unformatted by a software program. Therefore, when a tree falls in the forest sans observer, it doesn't make a sound. Instead, it makes a proto-sound, which is the totality of all possible sounds unformatted by an observer. This seems to support the notion from QM that the observer's identity is entangled with the environment it perceives. Working backwards from here, we go to a scenario wherein no observer is present within an unlimited, undiminished reality that examples hyper-presence, viz., presence unmeasurable. Reverse direction again and I'm backwards engineering from mind-independent reality to mind-dependent reality that fraternizes with solipsism. We cannot do any organized perceiving without injecting ourselves into the perceived reality per our perceptual boundaries.

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. Presence and its detectability are the results of an existing thing being a system with capacity for different states being emergent from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable. — ucarr

If perception defines existence, then measurability seems to define presence, not the other way around. — noAxioms

Since perceive means to become aware of something; to realize or come to understand something, it's reactive rather than proactive. If it's impossible to measure something not present, and if, therefore, presence precedes measurement, then measurability and measurement are reactive rather than proactive.

If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library. The book has its own attributes, and the library that houses it probably has no material effect on its particulars, even so, most readers who borrow library books think it useful to know the book's library. — ucarr

This seems to suggest existence as being part of a domain (the universe perhaps) and not at all based on perception. This seems to utterly contradict your definition above. OK, so perhaps you are using E4 as a definition. X exists if X is a member of some domain, which is our material universe perhaps. That's a common enough definition, and it is a relational one, not a property. A thing doesn't just 'exist', it exists IN something, it is a member OF something. — noAxioms

I'm proceeding with the belief existence is the most inclusive context than can be named. So life is a part of existence; existence contextualizes life as an encompassing container in parallel with a library encompassing a book.

If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist? — ucarr

Depends on the definition of 'exists'. That's always going to be my answer if I don't know the definition. Your first statement says if it is material, it exists. OK, but that doesn't mean that if it exists, it must be material. So it does not imply an assertion of existence only of material things, leaving me with no clear definition from you of what you think 'exists' means. — noAxioms

For what I know now, I think existing things have presence. Presence is a detectable part of the world that relates to its perceiver. Presence and its detectability are the results of an existing thing being a system with capacity for different states being emergent from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. Moreover, existing things that have presence are in some way measurable.

Whether or not non-material things exist is a deep topic with many believers who have important things to teach us all. I'm not going to make a conclusive statement of judgment about what I think is the correct answer to the question because I think I can answer your question, "What meaningful difference is made by having this property (existence) vs the same thing not having it?" without making such an announcement within this conversation. Instead, I'll make a short argument for using physics in my attempt to answer your question. Our minds, our language and most of our empirical experience trade in the currency of physics, viz., the quintet WRT what we experience as the world around us. If material things, as I believe, emerge from the quintet, with its forces conserved, then it makes sense to me to argue that a material thing being said to exist parallels saying a book belongs to a collection of books populating a library. The book has its own attributes, and the library that houses it probably has no material effect on its particulars, even so, most readers who borrow library books think it useful to know the book's library.

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations?

No. I don't deny the meaningfulness of the word, even if there's no context here to narrow it down to a specific definition of the word. — noAxioms

Are you walking back your claim distance does not exist?

Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?

Depends on the definition of 'exists', but you seem to be leaning heavily upon an anthropocentric definition, in which case, no, I don't deny their existence given such a relational definition. — noAxioms

Can you share an example of "distance" not anthropomorphic?

All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material."

1) While the universe may arguably contain material things, the universe is not itself material. Material things have for instance location, duration, mass, etc. none of which are properties of the universe.. — noAxioms

Can you elaborate details describing how the universe performs the action of containing material things immaterially?

2) Not everything is material, even if everything arguably relates to material in some way. For instance, light is not material nor is magnetism or the cosmological constant. All these things are parts of the universe. — noAxioms

How do immaterial things relate to material things? The purpose of this question is to get from you a description how immaterial things connect to your body. If you only know about immaterial things through the reactions of your body, then how do you know these reactions have immaterial causes and not material causes?

Since you believe light is not material, how do you understand light bending around a gravitational field, and how do you understand laser light generating heat?

If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime... — ucarr

One does not travel in spacetime. One travels in space, and one traces a worldline in spacetime. 'Travel' implies that the thing is no longer at point A once point B is reached, and this is not true of a worldline in spacetime. — noAxioms

Are you saying that regarding the tracing of a world line in spacetime, one is traveling instantaneously?

I really don't know what 'framed between different states" means. — noAxioms

We know there can be a distance between Point A and Point B; we know there can be an interval between Point A and Point B. This is a description of distance and interval being framed between two different states.

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named. — ucarr

I will further qualify my answer to say that if we say or determine that the number 1 is real and not just in the sense that it represents a real concept in a mind, but it is real as a number and exists separate from mind, then I agree. But the problem arises to this question or point. It's being argued in other threads and in this thread by other posters essentially. If existence encompasses everything that is materially real and everything that can be thought of or imagined then it is the largest all encompassing context. If existence is reserved for only things that exist materially then it is not. — philosch

If I'm reading you correctly, then I understand you to be saying a concept of the number two within the mind is not material, whereas one stone beside another stone is a material display of the number two. I'm saying both are real and both are material. The concept of the number two within the mind has no less material reality than the number two expressed by two stones side-by-side. The concept of the number two is perhaps more complicated than two stones side-by-side, but it is material. The argument for this claim says, “No brain, no mind.” The mind, like the brain, is emergent. Both emerge from the quintet: mass, energy, force_motion, space, and time. As we know, no mind works without consuming energy. Mind is the material dynamism of the everyday world internalized. Consider: You went to a racetrack in the afternoon. That night, while asleep, you dreamt of horses rounding the track and entering into the final stretch. You heard the thundering of the hooves through the dirt. All of this mental activity is the motion of the world internalized within your brain_mind. No brain, no memory, so it’s physical.

People have attempted arguments for the existence of god in this manner. They prove that the concept of God exist and mistakenly thought that through clever semantics, they have proved the existence of god in a material sense and they have not. As we all know, there is no rational proof that a material being that is "god" can be or has been made. So it is very important to try and categorize or definitions and concepts. It's the Harry Potter example all over again. Harry Potter does exist in a context. He doesn't exist in the set or real, literal material things. He exists in the context of a fictional, mind generated character. Those are different contexts, one being more "real" if you will allow me that term. This relationship between these contexts and realness and other definitions causes much confusion in these forums in many threads and topics. — philosch

Have you ever watched a good movie and experienced a stirring emotional ride through the journey of the story? Maybe it was an adventure tale. When the hero carefully inches out onto the string bridge suspended over a deep valley where a rushing river crashes over boulders far below, with close shots of the frayed strings of the bridge unraveling, and the girl in distress screaming in fear, afraid he won’t reach her in time, you may have felt an ache in the pit of your stomach. If the movie is truly a classic, you might’ve reached a point where you forgot you were in a theater watching a movie. It was as if you were living in the world of the story.

The ache in the pit of your stomach was real, and so was the pounding of your heart. For these reasons, we go to the movies. The mind and its experiences are physically real. No brain, no mind.

E1 - "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality" — noAxioms

Material things vis-á-vis existence describes a part/whole relationship. Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things. — ucarr

This is one of my premises.

~E1- Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality. My premise above is an elaboration of this definition. Distance examples existence in two modes: a) distance as an interval of spacetime is a material reality; b) distance as an abstract thought is a cognitive reality.

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

If a thing is material it exists. Do you deny that material things exist?

Do you deny distance is meaningful to you in real situations? Consider: You're planning a trip to another city. The distance from your home to the other city has no meaning for you in terms of the cost of gas, the amount of time for travel, and the best route to take? Do you deny that things that make a difference to your money, your time, and your attention exist?

E4 - "Is part of this universe" or "is part of this world" — noAxioms

This is leveraging E4, not E1. All the examples are relative to our universe. Your prior definition was that it was 'material'.

Your meaning here is unclear. All I can say is, "Yes, the universe is material and therefore things existing within it are also material." Regarding my reading of E1 - quoted above - "member of all" tells me existence as "member of all" participates as a presence in "all that is part of objective reality." Unless you entertain some arcane notion, such as, "Objective reality is inaccessible to consciousness." then I see the definition as simple and clear.

BTW, distance is a coordinate difference in spatial coordinates, not a spacetime interval. Distance is frame dependent, and an interval is not. Irrelevant to the topic, I know.

If you travel from Point A in spacetime to Point B in spacetime, there is an empirically detectable change of state regarding your position, whether or not you know math.

Regarding frame dependence WRT distance and interval, can you show logically that distance and interval are not both framed between different states?

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. — ucarr

You start by presuming your conclusion directly? It is not going to in any way justify how we know what exists or not if you presume the list right up front rather than conclude it by some logic and/or evidence. — noAxioms

The implications are more interesting. Existence itself becomes a property, or gets redefined to something other than the typical presumption of 'being a member of <objective> reality'. What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it? — noAxioms

I'm examining your question presented in bold immediately above. I don't agree that Meinong, by arguing against EPP and thereby setting up, "...allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent
things..." establishes existence as a property. Existence is not a property because it is not emergent. This is one of the important implications of "Eternal universe uncaused." It possess two fundamental properties that it attaches to material things: symmetries and their conservation laws. These two fundamentals support all properties emergent from uncaused existence.

Arvin Ash_Symmetry Fundamental

I have three premises: a) Axiomatic eternal universe uncaused is my starting point; b) Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things; c) Existence adds the context of symmetry and conservation to an emergent thing that has properties.

My conclusion says, "Every existing thing has two parts: a) the local part individualized with defining properties; b) the non-local part which is its ground of symmetry and conservation from which it emerges."

Here's a very basic example of the error you are making;

A = B
B = C
Therefore A = C.

This is logically valid in all cases.

It's sometimes true and most of the time false as a truth claim.

For the above argument to be true, A has to actually be equal to B and B has to actually be equal to C .

This is true in all cases. If A is related to B but not exactly equal to B then the conclusion is false even though the logic is valid. If B is related to C but not identical, then the conclusion is false. — philosch

The logic is valid. The conclusion is still false. The reason is that the premise's are false. There's nothing more to it then that. Your interchanging of the meanings of words has lead you down this fallacious path. — philosch

I acknowledge what you have written above is the truth and moreover, your technique of examination is both sound and correctly applied to my reasoning.

If A = Existence; B = Life, and therefore A = C is the claim being made, then, as you say, the conclusion is logically sound but factually incorrect because, again as you say, Existence ≠ Life.

This is where we differ. You evaluate my argument to the conclusion that A = B. I do not believe Existence and Life are one and the same. It follows, therefore, that I do not intend to conclude Existence equals Life. It may be the case, however, that my statements logically evaluate to this conclusion. If that is the case, then my error lies somewhere in how I evaluate to my intended conclusion.

My goal in this conversation is to examine the question, "Does saying, "a thing with defining attributes exists" add anything to that collection of attributes? My position, contrary to Meinong's position, answers, "yes" to the question. Saying a thing exists places it within a context; the obverse of this is claiming a thing exists outside of an encircling context. I don't expect anyone to make this claim. Moreover, I claim that existence is the most inclusive context that can be named.

Let me try to show you that I do not intentionally evaluate to A = B. Consider: {0,1}. This is a set that examples a bounded infinity. The bounded infinity enclosed within this set is the infinite series of numbers lying between 0 and 1. 0 and 1 are the limits of the infinite series of numbers lying between them. The series goes on forever in both directions without arrival at either of the limits.

Here's the distinction between Existence and Life: Existence equals the scope of numbers from 0 to 1. Life equals the scope of the infinite series of numbers lying between 0 and 1. The scope of Existence is greater than the scope of life even though the latter is infinite.

I know not all existing things are living things.

You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. The general fund of existence: mass, matter, energy, space, and time have total reach WRT all existing things. — ucarr

I get what you mean by your example (bounded infinity) and I was mistaken. — philosch

Now we're looking at an opportunity to have a good exchange of ideas.

Logically speaking, if your parents cease to exist, you cease to exist. That’s the logical truth of a child being contingent upon their parent. — ucarr

In my quote above, the critically important words are "Logically speaking..." and "...the logical truth..."

As you say, a logically valid argument doesn't always correspond with what's true in life. I was trying to say the same thing with my statement:

Empirical experience is different from pure logic because when a parent leaves human form, they do not cease to exist. — ucarr

Whether its true or not -- I know my idea is way out there and feels wrong -- my statement has me recognizing, like you, that evaluating logical symbols on paper lies a great distance from the flesh and blood frailty of real human lives.

Now, if we focus on the other critical words "bounded infinity," we arrive at another clearing of the fog shrouding my message. Math tells us something important through the concept of bounded infinity. The difference between both life and existence and non-life and non-existence is always infinity. This is why you see me seemingly conflating existence and life.

The child born remembers nothing of the journey to earth from the quintet that funds the general existence of the world. We can make a near approach to our beginning of life, but we never arrive. You can’t ease your way from non-life into life. No, it’s instantaneously alive for the screaming newborn just pulled from the womb. Likewise, you can’t ease your way from life into non-life.

You ask how do I know these things? I only know them by inference from my statements.

At the beginning, and at the end, there is the forever approach to the bounded infinity that nurtures life. What does this mean? The meaning is simple. Life can only be life if it is everlasting with neither beginning nor end. The beginning and the ending of our lives and our semi-verse can be represented by a bi-directional number irrational in both directions.

It's the passage from and return to "forever" that makes us alive. Existence imbues individualized things possessing defining attributes with the fundamentally unexplainable uncontainability of existence that knows itself, life.

Example: You can't dig up earth without creating a pile of earth and a hole that shake hands symmetrically. — ucarr

This is not an example of a definition. If I didn't know the meaning of the word 'symmetrical', I would not know how to use the word after reading that. — noAxioms

This is my definition of symmetry, i.e., transformation without net change.
— ucarr

That wording sounds more like a definition, even if it's not one that is in any dictionary. But that one is not worded as a premise. — noAxioms

Material things vis-á-vis existence describes a part/whole relationship. Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things. — ucarr

This is one of my premises.

This is not E1 at all. It seems to suggest that a thing exists if it is material. A unicorn exists, but distance does not. — noAxioms

~E1- Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality. My premise above is an elaboration of this definition. Distance examples existence in two modes: a) distance as an interval of spacetime is a material reality; b) distance as an abstract thought is a cognitive reality.

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. — ucarr

You start by presuming your conclusion directly? It is not going to in any way justify how we know what exists or not if you presume the list right up front rather than conclude it by some logic and/or evidence. — noAxioms

I have three premises: a) Axiomatic eternal universe uncaused is my starting point; b) Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things; c) Existence adds the context of symmetry and conservation to an emergent thing that has properties.

My conclusion says, "Every existing thing has two parts: a) the local part individualized with defining properties; b) the non-local part which is its ground of symmetry and conservation from which it emerges."

Empirical Experience Vs Pure Logic

Your partition between the two modes: a) pure logic; b) empirical experience presents artificial. The same pure logic – your stock in trade – applies in both situations. Logically speaking, if your parents cease to exist, you cease to exist. That’s the logical truth of a child being contingent upon their parent. Do you see that this is more evidence that we are neither born nor eventually become dead. With pure logic symbols on paper, we say that if B is contingent upon A, then destruction of A logically demands destruction of B.

Empirical experience is different from pure logic because when a parent leaves human form, they do not cease to exist. Instead, the parent changes form from individualized person to general stock in the quintet (mass, matter, motion, space, and time) funding general existence. Human individuals are emergent from this fund.

Since the parent A does not cease to exist, the contingent child B also does not cease to exist, even after the parent A changes form from individualized human back to the general stock of the quintet.

The fallacy obscuring the bounded infinity of human existence eternal is that we are born and eventually become dead. No. We emerge from the eternal change of form into the individualization of personhood for an interval of time, then we change form back into the general stock of existence eternal.

You have an understanding that puts "subjective" brackets around knowledge. Why do you not put these same brackets around your birth and your death? By your own words, you cannot know the "(absolute) objective reality" of their presence. — ucarr

Well now that is true. I stand by the fact you cannot know anything for absolute. I have held dear friends as they took their last breath and all I can say with absolute certainty is they are no longer present in my subjective reality. Something has dramatically been lost or changed state. We collectively call that transformation death. It is real in so far as anything else I can know is real. No amount of conjecture changes that level of real experience. The rest is the poetry of our collective reality, never to be fully grasped or understood, as I've stated, we cannot escape the limitations of our context. (Not withstanding any altered states of consciousness of which just deepens the conjecture and mystery that we are.) But these statements do not invalidate the practical aspects of reality, birth and death and so forth. — philosch

:up:

That B never knows C is not due to non-existence, but rather due to the bounded infinity of individualized life. — ucarr

Na, I don't buy anything you say here. Bounded infinity doesn't make any sense at all, it's not infinity if it is bounded....again by definition. — philosch

If you're willing to enter "bounded infinity" into the Google Search Engine, you can start learning about it. Take for example: {0,1} This bounded infinity accommodates an unlimited number of values between 0 and 1, the boundaries of the infinite series.

Individualized life? Again just some words strung together in poetic fashion. Writing and speaking do not specifically enjoin you to alter the common words of language to suit your own sensibilities unless you are writing or speaking poetically, in which case anything goes. Philosophical and scientific writing and argumentation and debate demand the coherence of accepted meanings to allow for meaningful information exchange. — philosch

When Einstein's associate Minkowski coined the word "spacetime," he gave the world a easy label for The Theory of Relativity. Do you approve of the word?

I'm going to assert; "No light bulb ever knows darkness". Um, I can play around with this statement but ultimately it's of little use. It becomes nothing but an exercise in semantic gymnastics. It is poetically useful and that's it. I believe that is what is driving your writing. — philosch

Do you read poetry?

Again this may be poetic but it's not true rationally. Normal, logical, philosophical discussion and argument demand a consensus, a shared or agreed upon set of definitions. I was not "alive" 400 years ago. If you want to change the definition of what "always" means or what "alive" means then feel free, that's all you've been doing in your arguments......mixing, fuzzing and altering definitions in a poetic way to make grandiose un-provable assertions which is not philosophy. — philosch

You've stayed in this conversation in order to teach me things?

Your understanding of the conservation of information is un-informed. The notion that your individuality is preserved is a gross misunderstanding of that law. It's quantum information that is theoretically preserved in that law, not macro scale emergent properties such as consciousness and memory. You may pose some other theory about the preservation of consciousness after death but the conservation of information that has been proposed as a physical law does NOT do it. — philosch

Do you think the sub-atomics of atoms in humans are categorically different from the sub-atomics of atoms in stars?

"when death becomes an objective reality for you it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you" is of the form; When A (death) becomes B(an objective reality) of (-) C (you), A won't become a B - C because C no longer exists. That is not quite correct. B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. So A becomes the B-C for an instant and then C and B-C or now non-existent. So what, it's trivial. — philosch

The crux of your argument is the equation of B: objective reality with C: human cognition rendered through language. If, as you've been arguing:

If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. — philosch

then you're in no position to make your supporting claim for your argument:

B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. — philosch

A, in the context of a given C is by definition the "end" of that C and anything dependent on that C. — philosch

You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. The general fund of existence: mass, matter, energy, space, and time have total reach WRT all existing things.

I didn't over generalize anything. I specifically stated if the existence of a thing is dependent on the existence of something else and the first thing ceases to exist, then by the rules of logic so des the existence of the dependent thing. In this context of the argument you setup, the dependence is absolute. — philosch

This argument is predicated upon B (Objective Reality) = C (You). You say, as I quote you above, objective reality is inaccessible to perception. Your "If/then" correlative conjunction makes your conclusion analytically true by definition. In our present context, however, we're examining empirical experience as it applies to A, B, and C.

Your "If/then" correlative conjunction makes your conclusion analytically true by definition. In our present context, however, we're examining empirical experience as it applies to A, B, and C. We’re not examining exercise of pure reason wherein observation of material events is unnecessary.

The language field of pure reason can practice your logic inside a shuttered room. Our debate, in contrast, has its focus on what we see and understand about ourselves while active in the social world. I apply your cognition boundaries of language to the social world while you apply it to the formalisms of abstract logic. In consequence of this, you bring an apples argument to an oranges claim, and I bring an oranges argument to an apples claim.

You might counter that logic is the same everywhere, and I can then counter with my math logic pertaining to bounded infinities.

When death becomes an objective reality for you, it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. — ucarr

The dependence of a child's life on it's parent's life is a non sequitur as existence and being alive are not the same thing as I previously argued and a child's existence is not absolutely dependent on the parents continued existence. It's a different argument altogether. — philosch

I doubt you don't fully believe your cognition has its entire grounding in socially-supported definitions of words. The report of your senses, sans words, tells you when an independently real corpse lowers into the ground. As you say, "...existence and being alive are not the same thing..." This equation you ascribe to my words, but I don't agree they state or imply that. The existence of your corpse will be a remnant that is not you, and thus we know you will not see your own corpse. I've been saying this from the start, so you can reason from my words that I've never equated existence with life.

Both arguments focus on contingent things. Both arguments focus on a Venn diagram of common ground connecting two distinct things. This common ground - in the instance of a child, genetic inheritance - continues to shape the path forward of the contingent thing. The conclusion to equivalence is your evaluation, not mine. Ignoring that, the sanctity of life goes forward for the life-in-the-child of the foreseeing parent, and also for the remembering child looking back to its family roots.

You had to have added the following second premise; A = B and C = end of A

You now get:
P1 - A has no beginning or end
P2 - A = B
Conclusion : B has no end (C)

The second premise makes the logic valid but that just render's the conclusion as a partial restatement of the first premise using different labels and it is trivial. However without the second premise the logic is invalid so the conclusion is false. A does not equal B without altering standard, accepted meanings. — philosch

Instead, I get:
A=Existence
B=Life
C=Death
A → ((∞B)∧C)

As far as what we know empirically, we only experience life without beginning or end. We see others born and dead, and we correctly believe these two states apply to us, but we never experience either.

Existence is defined as the quality of being real. Life or living things exist, but so do things that are not alive. Now you might get cute and start question whether or not a rock is alive or real but that's just playing with generally accepted meanings. Also by definition, life is a distinct quality of organic matter and the organic "things" that possess that quality, clearly lose that quality upon death, so "a" life has an end. Take a human being as something that exists. It's aliveness had a beginning and it has an end. The body still exists after the quality of life has ended, as long as standard definitions are being adhered to. Your above quote is in error. — philosch

Consider: a bounded set can include the cardinality of the entire set of real numbers. This is a bounded infinity. Your life is a bounded infinity. It has no beginning and no ending. The life in you was never non-life. The seed and the egg must be alive, or no baby. All of your forebears were alive unto their passing of their living seed forward towards your life never begun and never ended. Life infinite is what existence infinite imparts to your contingent individualizing attributes marking your individuality. Understand your life, young-to-old, is a navigation of the parameters of a bounded infinity of total life. There is no entrance into life from non-life, and no return of life to non-life.

This is the essence of my objection to your arguments. Words matter and the rules of logic matter. If we start letting the accepted meanings of words become malleable or squishy then we get malleable or squishy philosophy. — philosch

The view forward is sharp with hailstones and lusty wind. About face without scanning the looking glass backwards.

As far as being a solipsist, I am not. The assertion that the only thing we can be certain exists is our own consciousness has not been proven. I don't support that position even theoretically. IMO, everything you perceive through your senses is real by definition, including your consciousness meaning everything your perceive exists. I simply stated in so many words that you can only experience a subjective reality, your perspective or context limits you from experiencing (absolute) objective reality. I'm not stating whether objective reality exists or not, only that you cannot experience it if it does, because your conscious experience is filtered through your senses. I can say unequivocally that a rock exists but I cannot "know" the object state of the rock's reality, I can only know the subjective reality of the rock that I experience. — philosch

You have an understanding that puts "subjective" brackets around knowledge. Why do you not put these same brackets around your birth and your death? By your own words, you cannot know the "(absolute) objective reality" of their presence. What do you know about them? You know what you experience empirically which, by your discreteness, seals you off from "(absolute) objective reality" of their presence. Through your senses, you never saw yourself non-living before birth. You can imagine it now by definition of words in abstraction. You will not see yourself non-living after death; you might see your death approaching, but you will be alive while doing so.

Death is the ending of life which is what you are really calling existence. — philosch

There is neither beginning nor ending of existence. For this reason, no life ever knows death. Why do we not fully know either the world or ourselves; eternity cannot be analyzed whole. — ucarr

The above quote is wrong (logically invalid) if you stick with the generally accepted meanings of words. You are by syllogism, inferring that "existence" and "life" are interchangeable and that "death" and "non-existence" are also interchangeable, and they are not synonymous. Your first premise, "there is no beginning nor ending of existence" is actually interesting and worthy of the philosophical debate. I'm not sure what my position is on that premise but it's certainly interesting. Your conclusion is "for this reason, no life ever knows death", simply does not follow from the first premise unless you hold "being alive" as equal to "existing". They are not the same thing without bending the rules of language. Your above argument or assertion is of the form... — philosch

Sticking with the accepted meaning of words is one of the things writing and talking is specifically allowed to refuse to do. The reason we of our generation don't sound much like those of Shakespeare's generation is the fact that language is a practice alive with continual variation and invention. Life demands continuous adjustment, and language, more often than, not obliges.

Life and existence are distinct but not disjunct. Consider the Venn diagram linking two different domains by their common ground. I don't expect anyone to claim a living being non-existent. I don't expect anyone to claim a bottle of beer and the man drinking it interchangeable. No, life and existence are not interchangeable, and I'm not suggesting they are. You, philosch, have always been alive, and you've never been dead. How is that not eternity, bounded yes, but eternity nonetheless? The quintet of mass, matter, energy, space, and time, the fundamentals that fund your existence, index you to eternity, the only thing that can create life. It has your back, and will never let you go. Just as you warn me not to make the mistake of confusing myself with it, I warn you not to make the mistake of divesting yourself from it.

It's not necessary to equate life with existence. Rather, it's useful to perceive that life will not persist outside of existence. Life, by its nature, bends the rules as life will not be understood. Rules applied to life populate morals, but life transcends morals. Does life transcend logic? Life transcends present logic. In the presence of living things, there's always an unseen window of nascent possibility nuancing present logic towards a better tomorrow. Synkismetricity (synchronicity+kismet).

Premise 1. "A" has no beginning and no end
Conclusion: From premise 1 (for that reason) "B" never knows "C".

Where;
A = existence
B = Life or being alive (either definition works)
C = Death or the end of A, (either definition works)

It's not valid logic period. The conclusion clearly does not follow from the premise. — philosch

I oppose your interpretation which posits: ¬A=C. The quintet indexes you to the source eternal and therefore ¬A≠C. Our lives emerge from existence general into individuality for a period of time, then return to it. Information is never destroyed, so existence general preserves your individuality.

That B never knows C is not due to non-existence, but rather due to the bounded infinity of individualized life. The banishment of death is life inviting you to plight your trust with the uncontainable. What happens when the uncontainable, your consciousness, meets the insuperable, your existence? Nature happens.

Do you believe a definition cannot be used as a premise? If not, why not? — ucarr

A definition takes the form "I am using the word 'X' to mean such and such in some context". A premise takes the form "X is being presumed here to be the case". — noAxioms

I suppose with some careful wording, a statement can be used as either. The closest example I could think of was the fallacy of using a definition as a premise (actually as a conclusion), resulting in Anselm's ontological argument.
Give me an example of a definition being used as a premise. — noAxioms

In your two descriptions, respectively, of "definition" and of "premise," you example something taking a form by force of an axiomatic assumption without evaluation to a reasoned conclusion. This is an argument they are non-identical yet interchangeable. Example: You can't dig up earth without creating a pile of earth and a hole that shake hands symmetrically. This is my definition of symmetry, i.e., transformation without net change. It's also my premise for reasoning to the conclusion that matter is neither created nor destroyed. In the case of digging up the earth, the net change is re-arrangement of matter at zero change due to the material pile and the material space it created being summed to zero.

Consider: I will use E1 to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to a conclusion negating the possibility of predication standing independent from existence. — ucarr

That would be great. Nobody else has tried. You're saying that if definition E1 is used (I think Meinong is using it), then EPP must be the case, something Meinong denies. — noAxioms

Material things vis-á-vis existence describes a part/whole relationship. Existence indexes physics in that it supervenes as context into all material things, both concrete and abstract. Existence as supervenient context establishes all real things in relationship to each other. I don't expect anyone to claim they can name something both real and non-existent.

You can't name an attribute of a thing without simultaneously indexing it within the quintet: mass, matter, energy, space, and time.

Insuperability serves as an index of the eternal reach of existence.

Existence is eternal and nothing is prior to an eternal thing. An emergent property is a derivative, so the fund of that property, the quintet, exists prior to it. The fund of a potential thing is that thing's necessary prior condition.

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. — ucarr

By 'eternal', do you mean unbounded time (everlasting), or do you mean that time is part of the universe (eternalism)? Either way, it is uncaused. If it's caused, we're not including the entire universe, just part of it. — noAxioms

Time is part of existence, as is the universe. Existence is the largest largest container; it is insuperable to all that lies within it. The insuperability is so extreme that occupants of existence can't fathom non-existence beyond positing it as a limit of existence.

Eternal universe existence uncaused is my starting point. I equate it with existence. I equate connect existence with objectifiable reality (public, repeatable, measurable). There is an oscillation between "to experience (subject)" and "to measure (object)."

The measurement problem of QM might be related to subject/object entanglement, and it might example a bi-conditional relationship between subject/object such that a complex grayscale region of the two inter-mingled perplexes simple, binary notions of subject/object. This relates to the insuperability of existence from the standpoint of observation_measurement not being possible without inter-subjective_inter-objective entanglement.

It isn't objective if it is confined to being public, repeatable, measureable. That's an empirical definition (E2). It exists relative to an observer. Putting the word 'objective' into a subjective description does not make it objective. — noAxioms

The subject/object duet is not divisible. Where there is subject there is object. If we examine subjectivity without objectivity, what do we have? The answer is solipsism.* If we have objectivity without subjectivity, what do we have? The answer is Kant's noumena. In separation, the two modes become lighthouses of eternal isolation. Be of good cheer, no existing thing is truly isolated.

*Even with the assumption of solipsism, we still can't avoid the self as both subject and object of itself.

The alternative to the subject/object duet is neither, but that entails non-existence. There is no non-existence. Given the indivisibility of the subject/object duet, we see the problem of the search for an origin story in cosmology. There is the insoluble problem of point-or-view. If you're trapped within a container - existence is an insuperable context-as-ecology-of-physics - you can't observe it as a whole because that demands you be greater than yourself. This, in turn, tells us that every sentient being comprises the entirety of existence by means of consciousness. What happens when consciousness, the uncontainable agent meets existence, the inescapable container?

I read E1 as, "Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality." — ucarr

But then you go and describe a subjective reality. As far as I can tell, there is no test for something objectively existing or not objectively existing. Any test would be a relational test, a subjective one. — noAxioms

In this statement, you bolster my claim: the subject/object duet is not divisible. Moreover, you sign on to the index function of the quintet, the scaffold of existence.

Saying you can only talk about death as a living person is also obvious and trivial. Of course it's true because a dead person can't talk about anything. You we never dead is true but you were non-existent as a living conscious being before you were conceived and you will be non-existent as a conscious living being after you die because of the definition of "exist" and "death". You might say that your atoms existed in different forms before your being existed and that would be true and the atoms that make up your body may continue to exist after you die but they are not a conscious living human being by definition. Now you can try to alter or impart other meanings onto words or shift contexts mid statement, but that violates the rules of language. I call this semantic gymnastics which arm chair philosophers do all the time to try and prove some profound truth they think they have discovered. — philosch

All of this supports the interpretation that language and the thought supporting it are emergent properties, not the fundamentals of the dynamism of physics. Absent mass, matter, energy, space, and time, no thought and no language to make assertions about the presumed priority of thought and language vis-á-vis physics.

Supervenience shows that emergent properties are downwardly causal, but not to the extent that thought and language conjure the physics from which they emerge. Were that the case, thought and utterance of the type depicted within Genesis would have precluded science. Few to no deathbed scenarios if thought and utterance could abolish the degeneration of the body.

"when death becomes an objective reality for you it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you" is of the form; When A (death) becomes B(an objective reality) of (-) C (you), A won't become a B - C because C no longer exists. That is not quite correct. B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. So A becomes the B-C for an instant and then C and B-C or now non-existent. So what, it's trivial. — philosch

The crux of your argument is the equation of B: objective reality with C: human cognition rendered through language. If, as you've been arguing:

If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. — philosch

then you're in no position to make your supporting claim for your argument:

B in this argument, is dependent on C by definition. Remove C and of course B ceases as well. — philosch

A, in the context of a given C is by definition the "end" of that C and anything dependent on that C. — philosch

You over generalize; children's lives are contingent upon their parents, whether dead or alive. This gets at my main theme: no existing thing is alone. This especially true of children who, without their ancestors, would scarcely know themselves. The general fund of existence: mass, matter, energy, space, and time have total reach WRT all existing things.

Death is the ending of life which is what you are really calling existence. — philosch

There is neither beginning nor ending of existence. For this reason, no life ever knows death. Why do we not fully know either the world or ourselves; eternity cannot be analyzed whole.

When you say "our" immersion within existence is weirdly infinite, this depends on the "our" that you are talking about.If you are referring to our conscious living state then you are wrong by definition.
— philosch

If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. Our personal reality is completely bounded by our own subjective experience. — philosch

How is it that your two above quotes are not contradictory?

If you are referring to our conscious living state then you are wrong by definition. — philosch

Supervenience and subvenience, I think, mirror-image each other as a symmetry essential to emergence. Given this, "No mind, no logical thinking/No brain, no mind," stand as evidence, facts and measurable truths.

The aforementioned context is the hard, un-analyzable fact of existence. If you ask, "Why do I exist?" the only answer is, "You exist because you do exist." This sounds like non-sensical circularity; it's because existence can only be examined by a thinking sentient, and there can only be thinking if the thinking sentient exists.

You, as a thinking person, have never not existed. Even your thinking about not existing is entirely confined to existing. You can only talk about death as a living person. You've never been dead and you never will be dead. When death becomes an objective reality for you, it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. Our immersion within existence is weirdly infinite in this way — ucarr

I partly agree and disagree. I think you are playing semantic gymnastics. Saying you exist because you exist is definitely just circular reasoning (Self referential). You actually exist because we as beings, capable of language, have defined a word "exist" to mean what ever it's definition is. There is no absolute meaning. There's only the meaning of the word in the context of our human language and shared experience. I could have just as easily said there is no objective reality, only subjective reality, or I could have said everything is relative, or nothing can be understood outside of it's relationship to other things which we have also defined. Those statements are all getting at the same thing. If there is an objective reality we can never perceive or realize it because we are completely bounded by our own senses including our consciousness. Our personal reality is completely bounded by our own subjective experience. It's locked in that context and cannot escape it. That's what my original statement was getting at. — philosch

Are you viewing my quotes through a Wittgenstein-inspired lens of analytic philosophy?

Language is a voice emergent from the effects of expression constrained by the parameters enforced by the signification rules of grammar. If you believe the referents for the signs you express as language are just more signs of that same language, then you are: a) practicing the gymnastics of higher-order signification, an engulfing, upward spiral, all of it derivative; b) fraternization with solipsism.

... everything we think, say, experience and even philosophize about is bounded by context. — philosch

You are not your context. This is a way of saying you did not generate yourself through you own language acts. If you're total existence is distinct from your language capacity, then you are not trapped within that language capacity. You are, however, trapped within the totality of your existence.

Let's try to examine the difference between the derivative language context and the insuperable existence context.

Russell's Paradox helps us see that existence is authentically insuperable: The unrestricted axiom of comprehension in set theory states that to every condition there corresponds a set of things meeting the condition: (∃y) (y={x : Fx}). The axiom needs restriction, since Russell's paradox shows that in this form it will lead to contradiction.

Without comprehension restriction we get: Let R = (x | {x⊂x}), then R∈R ⟺R∉R. This tells us that a set cannot be a proper subset of itself. If we translate this rule into conversational speech, we get, "My statements are equal to their referents." This translates to, "My statements, being equal to their sources, are proper subsets of themselves." Your language capacity can't be equal to its sources in your experience of phenomena because that expresses phenomenal experience mapped to grammatical signs one-to-one. When you see two vehicles collide at an intersection, then later that day recount the event in words to your brother at the dinner table, your words do not equal the phenomena observed by you earlier. They sign for it. If the signs equal the phenomena, then one thing simultaneously possesses two different values. That’s the upshot of your subjective (cognitive_linguistic) reality equals your objective (dynamics of physics) reality. You might say, in push back, at the scene of the collision, I was immersed in language. Here we see why total existence cannot be analyzed. The totality which general existence embodies cannot be subsumed by anything outside itself for observation, measurement and analysis because that leads to Russell’s Paradox. In the case of totality, there can be nothing beyond it because that would mean a thing being greater than itself, a paradox. This limit expresses the insoluble POV problem lying at the heart of cosmology.

E1 was the definition (it's not a premise or any kind of assertion) that was problematic with EPP since EPP was difficult to justify. — noAxioms

Do you believe a definition cannot be used as a premise? If not, why not? Consider: I will use E1 to develop a chain of reasoning that evaluates to a conclusion negating the possibility of predication standing independent from existence.

This is the upshot of what I'm declaring to you.

Perhaps you can attempt to do that, but I really have a hard time parsing your posts. Try to be clear. Nowhere in your post do I see EPP justified given an E1 definition, mostly because you never reference E1 at all. — noAxioms

Eternal universe uncaused is my starting point. I equate it with existence. I equate existence with objectifiable reality (public, repeatable, measurable). There is an oscillation between "to experience (subject)" and "to measure (object)."

Eternal universe is the “bank account” that funds the reality chiefly characterized by mass, matter, energy, space, and time. So, the currency of phenomena and the science that observes and measures it is the aforementioned quintet. The “bank account,” being conserved, proceeds by way of a zero-sum structure. All transactions of the physics of reality balance to zero.

I think E1 is a distillation of my two above paragraphs. I read E1 as, "Existence is a part of all parts of objective reality." I see it as being distinct from E4, which I read as, "Existence is a part of objective reality."

All of the apparently distinct physical things of the phenomenal world are temporarily emergent from the "bank account" that funds the quintet of essentials part and parcel of the dynamism of material things emerging into and subsuming out of the physics of reality.

The zero sum structure -- powered by the symmetries and their laws of conservation -- of emergence and subsumption of the dynamism of physics is what I refer to when I say a physical_material thing has two parts: a) local part; b) non-local part. Example: the red apple: a) the local part is the piece of fruit in the bowl on your breakfast table; b) the non-local part is the "bank account" funding the quintet of essentials out of which the piece of fruit on your table is emergent.

If eternal universe lies at the heart of objective reality, and if it functions as the "bank account" funding an alternately emergent/subsumed change of forms eternal, then nothing can precede it, it being without a beginning.

Existence references the item to the totality. It’s a cataloguing reference to the totality that honors the conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. Existing things all come from the same fund of mass_energy and thus are inter-connected all of the time. — ucarr

I made little sense of most of the post, but this seems to reference the E4 definition (is a member of our universe), a relation. — noAxioms

I'm defending the EPP. My defense stands upon E1 as its premise: "Is a member of all that is part of objective reality"

I catch my clue about the relationship between any material thing and general existence as an all-inclusive category like Star Trek's The Borg: "You will be assimilated resistance is futile."

Do you know how you can't get the last drop of ketchup out of the bottle, or how your birthday party balloons deflate and fall to the ground? Things cooperate with our intentions most of the way, but not all of the way.

Everyone and everything pays involuntary allegiance to the great cosmic trade-off. The impermanence of things is summed up by the conservation laws. If something is gained on one side, something of equal measure is lost on its mirror-image side. Everything in existence has been shifted around from some prior, reciprocal existence. When a guy digs a shovel into the dirt, he's got no choice about simultaneously creating a pile of shifted dirt and a corresponding hole of matching dimensions.

When we say matter is neither created nor destroyed, we're simultaneously saying existence is neither created nor destroyed.

... everything we think, say, experience and even philosophize about is bounded by context. — philosch

The aforementioned context is the hard, un-analyzable fact of existence. If you ask, "Why do I exist?" the only answer is, "You exist because you do exist." This sounds like non-sensical circularity; it's because existence can only be examined by a thinking sentient, and there can only be thinking if the thinking sentient exists.

You, as a thinking person, have never not existed. Even your thinking about not existing is entirely confined to existing. You can only talk about death as a living person. You've never been dead and you never will be dead. When death becomes an objective reality for you, it won't become an objective reality for you because there won't be any you. Our immersion within existence is weirdly infinite in this way.

Nobody and nothing is alone because our existence is predicated upon an emergence that is configured such that every existing thing, as a fundamental of it existing, emerges as half-symmetry of a pairing across the line of mirror-imaging with the reciprocal partner.

You've never not been known to exist because the cost of your existence has always been a depletion reciprocating your addition.

What does existence-in-general add to the red apple? A notification of orientation to the void the red apple can never transcend, "You will be assimilated resistance is futile." The red apple is the local part; the void is the non-local part. The void seems not to be paired with the red apple because that's the nature of a void. Why death? Because life costs something. What does life cost? It costs the expenditure of energy allowing you to swim above the waves of the void, for a while. Eventually, however, we must be ourselves. We are the void.

Premise – Metaphysics is An Incomplete Project

... everything we think, say, experience and even philosophize about is bounded by context. — philosch

Meinong, when he says certain things (a circular triangle) have no regular existence, but nonetheless have some kind of existence, speaks toward the indirection of complexity.

The indirection of complexity, as with the imaginary numbers of the complex number plane, shows us that some real things must be approached in terms of a multi-part complex.

Their existence is no less real than an imaginary number is a real complex number.

The implications are more interesting. Existence itself becomes a property, or gets redefined to something other than the typical presumption of 'being a member of <objective> reality'. What meaningful difference is made by having this property vs the same thing not having it? — noAxioms

Existence references the item to the totality. It’s a cataloguing reference to the totality that honors the conservation laws. Matter is neither created nor destroyed. Existing things all come from the same fund of mass_energy and thus are inter-connected all of the time.

Existence as a property of things makes them complex in the sense of imaginary numbers being complex. Existing things have two parts: a) the local part (collections of attributes); b) the non-local part (inter-connection to all things). The suggestion of QM is that at that scale the non-local part of things becomes detectable.

Existence as a predication, given its non-local part, plays as an acknowledgement of the insuperability of context for presence. Present things are all connected. When I say a red apple exists, I say a red apple is a roadmap to all other existing things. The apple is the Gestault of its generalizable attributes such as red and apple, and existence is the general container, i.e., the inter-connectivity of all Gestaults. Existence of a thing is its approach to the container of containers.

Existence as a catalog reference for a thing and its ecology is useful to the physicist in general and the cosmologist in particular.

So existence is context generalized to insuperability. It is the limit of presence. It is why there is not nothing. The question answers itself by the brute fact of its existence.

The insuperability of context forestalls analysis. Questions of being are insoluble problems of perspective.

The serial solutions to questions of being reside within the hierarchy of upwardly evolving dimensions. The third spatial dimension of depth looks at an infinite series of aerial planes and understands them categorically as algebraic manifolds. The cubic POV affords an overview of aerial manifolds.

What does an infinite series of cubes become categorically? We don’t know the experience of hyper-cubic space. What does its overview of all cubic spaces afford?

If we generalize the hierarchy of upwardly evolving dimensions to an infinite series, then we ask ourselves what is the Gestault of evolution toward infinite presence? Is it scalable presence across upwardly evolving complexity of dimensional extension? Existence as generalized and scalable context upwardly multi-dimensional perplexes vector measurement of location. Might the measurement problem of QM be evidence of strategic cosmic incompleteness? Can we express it locally as perpetual trans-hyper presence?

A big question asks, “What’s the relationship between existence as context insuperable and consciousness as awareness uncontainable?” When the inescapable container engulfs the uncontainable agent, what happens? happens. This is our universe (semi-verse really) as a bi-directional irrational expansion.

The POV problem of Why Existence? that forestalls analysis tells us that metaphysics is necessarily is an incomplete project.

Time and space persist in independence, each holding its own properties? — ucarr

I can imagine non-spatial continuity, but i cannot see how space can exist without the property of continuity (or "absolute" time). If it were possible for space to exist without continuity, it wouldn't be a universe, or at least not our universe. — punos

...there is no room for movement within a 0-dimensional point — punos

I wonder if a 0-dimensional point, as in the singularity, hints at what space without time might be like. I think I’ve seen some debate whether time exists at the singularity. As for space at the singularity, since there is the Big Bang, can we assume there was space within the Big Bang? Explosion implies space, doesn’t it?

As for non-spatial temporal continuity, do you think absolute time motionless? Also, am I wrong in conjecturing that absolute zero temperature equals no motion and thus it's prohibited by the motion of absolute time, and thus absolute time does always move in space since it keeps material things always moving. Moreover, this shows us that motion of time is never uncoupled from mass-energy-motion-space, and thus mass-energy-motion-space-time is a never-broken quintet?

Might absolute time and relative time be two aspects of one temporal phenomenon?

It is the basis of continuity in space and is instantaneous in its action — punos

Loop quantum gravity pictures space broken down into discontinuous, granular pieces that combine to form space. Does this not suggest space and time inseparable?

Although the transmission of a state to the next point is instantaneous, from successive instances emerges a finite rate of propagation we call the "speed of light". — punos

I'm trying to remember if you told me time is a form of energy. If you did, does it have both a particle form and a waveform?

According to my model, the kind of energy that constitutes mass originates from the logic of continuity. — punos

Is continuity an attribute of time, or vice-versa, or do they form a co-equal pair? If time is the continuum of change, how can it be measured; wouldn't that be like trying to stop never-stopping motion? Are perceived phenomena really incorporeal samples of ineffable continuous change?

My question relates to another question of mine, Does causation have a temporal component? Let's imagine that Plant A releases Pollen A. Joe is not allergic to Pollen A, so Pollen A WRT Joe is not a cause of hay fever, an effect. Bill is allergic to Pollen A, so Pollen A is a cause of hay fever WRT Bill. Since Pollen A has two incompatible identities simultaneously, it seems to me causation is atemporal. — ucarr

What is "0th order time"?
0th order time is what one might call "absolute time," "primordial time," or "non-relativistic time." It is the basis of continuity in space and is instantaneous in its action. It is timeless in the sense that it never began and never will end. It represents the first degree of freedom within a single 0-dimensional point. This point is a single element of time and space, and is an abstract process or function self-contained in an elemental point space. Without this 0th order time, there can be no existence because it is the ground of existence itself. — punos

Can eternity move? If no beginning and no end means an irrational-number-like middle, then that suggests to me the stop-motion of eternity.

What is "1st order time"?
1st order time is an emergent kind of time characterized by intervals in quantized multi-point space. This interval nature emerges from the instantaneous transmission from one space point to another. Each space point contains within it the temporal characteristics of 0th order time. Although the transmission of a state to the next point is instantaneous, from successive instances emerges a finite rate of propagation we call the "speed of light". This is the maximum speed at which a state signal can travel along a path of multiple spatial state points. Quantized space has the effect of quantizing time in multi-point space, and thus quantizes energy. — punos

Might the instantaneous transmissions from state to state be evidence of paired states (similar to particle pairs)? Might cause and effect be evidence of paired states at Newtonian scale?

Might our "pure reason and logic together with what we already know" also be distorted by the insuperable relative time subject to the distortions of the speed of light, gravity, and our nervous systems? — ucarr

Sure, maybe, but can you give an example of such a case of distortion? — punos

There's a ASI cyborg on a space station outside of both earth's and mars' gravitational fields. She's collecting data on the orbit of mars in prep for a mars landing. She develops hyper-drive data processing only after being off-planet for a while. She sees that some anomalies are developing in the mars orbit due to an eruption on the planet's surface releasing tons of electromagnetic compounds. She's making a long term projection about the deviation from orbit not presently detectable by anyone but her and her hyper-drive data processing. She sends this data to monitoring humans on earth. She sees that they're not getting her info re: the orbital anomaly and knows the mars landing will be far afield from the chosen landing site. Since she's due to stay in orbit until after the mars landing, she knows there's nothing she can do about the impending botched navigation to the landing site.

Atomic clocks could reveal the time lag of the slower change of time on earth compared to the change of time in the space station. Since the orbital anomaly wasn't foreseen, there are no atomic clocks available. Sometime later, it was discovered that the cyborg, being limited to transmitting her hyper-drive data at hyper-speed, could only send her data stream within a time frame shorter than the time lag between the space station and the monitoring station on earth.

The earth monitors couldn't get the mars orbital adjustment data because the time interval, in micro-seconds, was too short start to finish to be received across the duration of the time lag between the cyborg's present tense on the space station and the monitoring stations present tense on earth.

In the bold letters we see you saying an uncaused thing has no reason (cause) for being but itself. When you say an uncaused thing has no reason for being but itself, you're saying it's uncaused and self-caused, a contradiction. — ucarr

Ok, I don't often get angry, but your repeated twisting of my words to fit what you want them to say is starting to make me mad. Here's what I said: "That's what uncaused means Ucarr. It means "not caused". There is no reason or explanation for its being besides the fact that it is." I did not say "self-caused". That in no way implies "self-caused". — Philosophim

I don't twist your words; I quote your words. See the bold, underlined key word below:

If we understand the full abstract scope, then the solution becomes clear. First, in terms of composition, if we're talking about composition that caused the universe, this would requires something outside of the universe. But because we've encompassed 'the entire universe' there is nothing outside of the universe which could cause it. In terms of composition, the universes cause would simply be what it is, and nothing more. — Philosophim

A ninth grader easily understands your words in bold to mean: self-caused.

Can I have an honest conversation with you? You have some good points at times, but then you pull stuff like this and it just makes me feel like I'm wasting my time with you. Its been days of this back and forth now. Read more carefully and stop trying to add in things I don't say. — Philosophim

I await your response to my defense.

No, eternal universe means eternal mass, energy, motion, space and time that change forms while conserved. — ucarr

And what caused this exactly? — Philosophim

As we've agreed: eternal, uncaused universe.

no, uncaused origin of universe because universe can't power up without pre-existing forces fueling that power up. — ucarr

So then power has always existed without prior cause? :) Ucarr...you've already admitted you believe in uncaused existence, lets stop this. — Philosophim

You're getting confused about your own concepts. Origin of universe - by your understanding, not by mine - is not eternal universe. Eternal universe eliminates the possibility of non-existence. By you saying uncaused universe not eternal, there's non-existence replaced by uncaused universe. Nothing is what uncaused universe replaces, so how does uncaused universe draw from the pre-existing, conserved forces that fuel uncaused universe's power up? Matter is neither created nor destroyed. If uncaused universe replaces non-existence, then matter and energy would have to be created instead of being eternal. The conservation laws forbid that.

You keep being unable to explain how an uncaused universe powers up without pre-existing forces fueling that power up. Even if an uncaused universe can power up without pre-existing forces, that's self-causation, not uncaused. — ucarr

"Uncaused". Meaning its not caused by anything. Meaning it requires no pre-existing forces. If I gave you a pre-existing force, that would be causation. But its not causation. There's no prior cause. And no, that's not self-causation because it would require it to exist prior to it existing. — Philosophim

Re-acquaint yourself with the conservation laws, or read Ellman's Theory of Nothing.

An uncaused universe eternal includes symmetries coupled with their conserved forces powering the dynamism of material things. — ucarr

This is nonsense. Break this down into points and a conclusion please. — Philosophim

Open a book of Intro Physics and do the work yourself.

There's no obvious reason why set theory should be generally excluded from debates. — ucarr

Besides the fact I told you its not a set theory argument? Or the fact I told you you're introducing language and concepts I don't use as if I was? Set theory isn't excluded, you don't get to introduce things like "scope of existence" which I don't use as if i do. Present your argument instead of being sneaky and trying to get me to say what you want me to say. I really respect your style of argumentation except when you try to pull crap like that. Stop it. Just post your arguments. — Philosophim

Present your argument that:

I am saying that existence encapsulates everything that is. — Philosophim

cannot be construed as the description of a set containing things.

Logic does not ever have to be consistent with what we experience if we have not experienced it yet. — Philosophim

Are you trying to say, "Logic need not be consistent with what we don't know empirically"? Both empirical observation and a priori conceptualization need to express correct reasoning. — ucarr

No, I'm saying that we have no way of empirically verifying or countering the proposal here, so all we're left with is logic. — Philosophim

Then, as I said, a priori conceptualization needs to express correct reasoning.

Logic does not ever have to be consistent with what we experience if we have not experienced it yet. — Philosophim

This is a roundabout statement that makes a faulty approach to saying - I'm mostly guessing here - logic does not ever have to be consistent with what we don't know empirically. In order to make the intention of this statement even more clear, we can make another change. Logic does not ever have to be consistent with what we know through correct thinking by reason alone. This is false. Logic must always be sound, whether based on observation, or based on abstract reasoning.

Are you claiming your OP solves the problem of infinite regress thought by some to be connected to origin of universe? — ucarr

Yes. This is now a possibility. Not necessary, but logically possible. — Philosophim

Uncaused universe is the logical possibility?

Here's my abstract: a) a thing is caused (including self-causation, "...once a thing exists, it now has causation from it.") or b) a thing is uncaused. — ucarr

There is no self-causation because that would require something to exist before it existed. — Philosophim

Then why did you write in your OP what I've emphasized in bold letters below?

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If we understand the full abstract scope, then the solution becomes clear. First, in terms of composition, if we're talking about composition that caused the universe, this would requires something outside of the universe. But because we've encompassed 'the entire universe' there is nothing outside of the universe which could cause it. In terms of composition, the universes cause would simply be what it is, and nothing more. — Philosophim

This means that the members in a chain of causation of contingent things could've been uncaused instead, and thus outside the chain of causation, or it suggests chains of causation are conditional, or perhaps they're illusory. Now we're looking at a set called "universe" that might be a collection of universes with all of them uncaused. The equal pairing of caused_uncaused has many ramifications. — ucarr

In theory, correct. We'll need new principles and outlooks with this in mind. I can safely sum it up to be, "Causality is the rule unless causality is completely ruled out." On this notion I would love to hear your thoughts as I think this is worth exploring. — Philosophim

The problem of your uncaused universe is that it can't power up in the absence of necessary prior conditions for its existence. — ucarr

Just like an eternally existing universe... — Philosophim

No, an eternal universe never powered up. — ucarr

Then what caused the power to be? That's the point. Its the same question for a finitely regressive universe. — Philosophim

The mass_energy_motion_space_time of material dynamism, being a part of eternal universe, is likewise eternal. The symmetries and their conservation laws support this: matter and energy are never created nor destroyed.

Your interpretation of my quote is wrong. I'm not denying the existence of time apart from our experience of it. I'm denying we know anything about the reality of its supposed causation of things changing. — ucarr

I still don't understand what you mean by this, can you go into more detail? What does "its supposed causation of things changing" mean? — Philosophim

Some of the theorists at TPF (punos, Metaphysician Undercover) posit the existence of absolute time in addition to relative time. Absolute time is the ultimate fundamental in their cosmology, I think. Absolute time, they say, causes things to change with it being independent of physics. By their lights, absolute time is a type of energy, and it's the engine that drives causation.

You think that uncaused eternal universe implies the possibility of other types of uncaused universes, including one that has an origin. — ucarr

Its not implied, its a logical assertion. Do you understand why? I've attempted to explain multiple times, so try explaining back to me in your words this time. — Philosophim

As we both have said repeatedly, you think total existence uncaused means it might be anything.

My objection to an uncaused origin of the universe hinges on the role played by the conservation laws — ucarr

And I have told you repeatedly, "You cannot rely on causal laws as a denial for something uncaused." Its irrelevant. Let me give you an analogy. I'm noting A -> B -> C. You're saying, "Because B -> C, you can't have just A". That's not a viable argument. — Philosophim

The conservation laws are bi-conditional with symmetry.

Given the context created by my abstract above, with your argument here inserted into it, your argument for uncaused real things suggests "uncaused" destroys the necessity of "caused". — ucarr

How? I've already noted once something exists, how it exists is what we base our causal rules from. — Philosophim

Since you've divided causation into two categories housing things: a) caused; b) uncaused, and since one thing can swing back and forth between the categories according to conditions, "caused" is optional, not necessary.

... I'm demonstrating that all causality leads to a logical end point where something is uncaused... if something uncaused is possible, then we know there can't be any limitations as to what specifically must have existed. Thus a universe that incepted uncaused vs always existed uncaused have the same underlying reasons for their existence if they did exist. — Philosophim

Regarding the sentence in bold above, how do we understand it to be saying anything different from what theism says about an unlimited God? — ucarr

Because an unlimited God is only one of infinite possibilities. Theism asserts a God exists without evidence, and at best can attempt logical arguments that imply its necessity. My argument notes that yes, an 'unlimited' God is one of many possibilities, but it is not necessary. The only way to prove that a God exists is to do so with evidence, like any proposed necessary theory of specific universal origin. A card is drawn, but we must prove it is a Jack and not a King. — Philosophim

If unlimited God is evidence of, as you say, if something uncaused is possible, then we know there can't be any limitations as to what specifically must have existed. then saying God's unnecessary is also renders unnecessary:

... I'm demonstrating that all causality leads to a logical end point where something is uncaused... if something uncaused is possible, then we know there can't be any limitations as to what specifically must have existed. Thus a universe that incepted uncaused vs always existed uncaused have the same underlying reasons for their existence if they did exist. — Philosophim

How is your theory an example of:

The nature of something being uncaused by anything outside of itself is a new venue of exploration for Ontology. — ucarr

The fact that something can incept uncaused at anytime is an amazing idea to be pulled into ontology. The fact that we can safely consider a God as a viable possible origin is incredible. The fact that it allows us to think of our universe and existence on a completely different level as we can confirm for a fact that there is no necessity or grand plan in anything we do. — Philosophim

You haven't responded to my counter-argument.

I've also previously stated that your argument here examples you merely referring to the contents of your mind when attempting to establish your knowledge of what happens independent of your mind. A valid argument can't be based upon what you think. Instead, somehow you will have to show that you know things independently from what you think. — ucarr

That would be the OP. Where in the OP is my argument wrong? I expect better criticism at this point Ucarr. — Philosophim

Your digression to your OP is irrelevant. Your consciousness never transcends your mind. You've not seen directly the origin of the universe. You have only your abstract thoughts for "viewing" the origin of the universe. If if you did see it directly, you'd still be confined to the boundaries of your mind. Your answer to Kant's question about the tree in the forest is debatable.

Here's my argument - expressed in your own words - proving uncaused origin of universe is impossible: — ucarr

...uncaused existences are once again, not caused by anything and are not tied to non-existence — Philosophim

Since uncaused existences are not caused by anything, in the case of the uncaused universe, which "encapsulates everything that is." there is only non-existence replaced by existence. Now we have the question, What was before uncaused universe? The answer is nothing, in the sense of non-existence. Logically, this can only mean one thing: uncaused universe has always existed, and thus eternal universe is always paired with uncaused universe. This logical certainty excludes origin of universe.

Approaching my same argument from the transitive property law: Statement 1: uncaused existences are once again, not caused by anything and are not tied to non-existence = Statement 2: eternal universe uncaused. If Statement 1 = 2+3, and Statement 2 = 5, then Statement 1 = Statement 2.

Furthermore, let me emphasize how, within your statement defining universe origin, you say uncaused universe not tied to non-existence. In so saying, you refute the possibility of a "before" in relation to uncaused universe. Something uncaused with no "before" is obviously uncaused and eternal. — ucarr

You already agreed with me that an infinitely existing universe is uncaused. I think you mean a finite origin vs infinitely always existing origin. — Philosophim

Our issue here is the viability of an uncaused origin of the universe. Since you do not respond to nor even mention my somewhat lengthy argument against the viability of an uncaused origin of the universe, I conclude you have no viable counter-argument. From experience with debating you, I know you would not hesitate to defend one of the two major prongs of your theory (uncaused origin of the universe) if you had a viable defense.

f you're going to use a semantic "Because there was no time, once time started it always existed," argument, that's fine. My point still stands. Nothing, then something. You just agreed with me. An actual eternal universe wouldn't even have the idea of nothing prior to it. In otherwords, "always something". It also still does not negate the fact that if something uncaused happened, there are no limitations in to how or why it could happen. Meaning things that are uncaused are still possible to happen even with other existences elsewhere. — Philosophim

No. I'm using what you've written many times over:

...uncaused existences are once again, not caused by anything and are not tied to non-existence — Philosophim

As you say, uncaused origin of universe is not tied to non-existence. It doesn't come from anything. Since the uncaused universe "encapsulates all that is," it is all that exists and has always been so. This means uncaused universe is eternal.

Nothing, then something. You just agreed with me. — Philosophim

No. As you say, “uncaused existences are…not tied to non-existence.” You’ve been saying I keep putting uncaused universe into a causal relationship with non-existence. No. As you say, “uncaused existences are…not tied to non-existence.”

Furthermore, let me emphasize how, within your statement defining universe origin, you say uncaused universe not tied to non-existence. In so saying, you refute the possibility of a "before" in relation to uncaused universe. — ucarr

I'm glad you're finally seeing what I've been noting this entire time. But we can actually say 'before', especially when we consider that uncaused things can happen even with other existences elsewhere in the universe. — Philosophim

No. We cannot say "before" in the case of uncaused origin of universe that "encapsulates everything that is." Non-existence replaced by uncaused universe. No "before" because uncaused universe not tied to non-existence.

Alright! We've finally come to an agreement on the base idea that an uncaused existence is logically necessary, so at this point the only part left is for you to address my second point. "An uncaused existence has no reason for its being, therefore there is nothing to shape or constrain what could be. Therefore there is no limit as to what could form uncaused at any time or place". — Philosophim

No. I've argued - with pivotal use of your own words - that uncaused origin of universe that "encapsulates everything that is." is impossible because it's equal to eternal uncaused universe. You haven't responded to my argument.

On the basis of these quotes, I don't see anything explicit or implicit that suggests your use of "scope" means anything other than "extent." Can you clarify? — ucarr

Ucarr, we both know you're trying to make this a set issue right? Stop insulting my intelligence and goodwill. Read the OP and use scope in relation to causality. I'm going to ignore any further questions on this unless I see some good faith effort on your part to cite the OP. — Philosophim

I've posted three of your quotes on "scope of causation." Why isn't that evidence of me acting in good faith? Why am I prohibited from using set theory in my arguments? We have no agreement not to use set theory. There's no obvious reason why set theory should be generally excluded from debates. I seems to me you're the one with a bias against set theory. I can't read your mind and know your biases. Even if I could, why should I respect your bias against set theory? If you want such respect, you must explain why you seek to prohibit set theory. After consideration of your explanation, I may or may not comply with your request. These exact stipulations apply to me in relation to you. I have no more right to dictate terms to you about how you prosecute your side of the debate than vice versa.

Here's a fourth quote from you on the subject:

... I'm demonstrating that all causality leads to a logical end point where something is uncaused... — Philosophim

You appear to think that, in general, the entire scope or extent of causality includes uncaused first cause followed by contingent things.

If this doesn't imply scope of causation equals extent of causality, then I think you should clarify. Don't I always attempt to clarify when asked to do so?

Switzerland maintains design on countries at war by maintaining no design on countries at war. This design by no design is called neutrality. — ucarr

Switzerland maintains design on countries at war by maintaining no design on countries at war. This design by no design is called neutrality. — ucarr

What? This doesn't even make sense gramaticaly. If a country decides to stay neutral by design, then the people who made the neutrality approach designed it. A design has a designer period. Just accept basic premises that no one has an issue with Ucarr. — Philosophim

The point is that a design needs a designer. You cannot have a design without a designer. — Philosophim

I've already said the designer is the one who designs by no-design. Designing by no-design is designing by a designer.

The uncaused universe, which therefore is not self-caused, nevertheless features the causation that didn't cause itself -- it looks as if, by this reasoning, a thing is not always defined by what it is -- and it also features humans who design things within an undesigned universe. Considering these non sequiturs from non-existence replaced by uncaused existence featuring the causation that didn't cause the universe that makes it possible followed by designing humans who study the undesigned powers driving their designing, you, who make these arguments, would be amenable to logical possibility, which you argue is the uncaused only answer to the full scope of the causal chain, being a designer. — ucarr

You're the one championing no restrictions on what could be within an uncaused universe. Going from there, I describe a string of contradictions and non-sequiturs arising from your uncaused, no-restrictions universe.

First, this is a massive run on sentence I can hardly understand. Second, read my replies to your first two posts and see if what you wrote still stands. — Philosophim

Why don't you repost your quotes for my convenience. I always do that for you.

Your maneuvering around the circularity of identity is an extreme version of fine tuning a theory to explain why its parameters have precisely the rules they return: unexplainable (beyond "It is what it is." ) — ucarr

Your attempt to not address the actual argument is a clear sign that the argument is pretty tight isn't it? If its so simple to refute, why haven't you done it yet Ucarr? I fail to see this circularity you keep claiming. You already believe in an uncaused eternal universe, so you're in the exact same boat I am. — Philosophim

You fail to see the circularity I keep claiming? Here it is:

No. There is no couplet of expression. There is no, 'thing that makes the change of state." There is nothing, then something. "But what about the inbetween?" There is no inbetween. "But what about..." No. "But how..." No. That's what uncaused means Ucarr. It means "not caused". There is no reason or explanation for its being besides the fact that it is. — Philosophim

In the bold letters we see you saying an uncaused thing has no reason (cause) for being but itself. When you say an uncaused thing has no reason for being but itself, you're saying it's uncaused and self-caused, a contradiction. Next, you defend your contradiction by saying "It just is." This is the circularity of identity being examined for reason to exist: "It exists for the reason that it is in existence."

These parameters of unexplainable have no known mechanism for explaining why a dynamic material universe with respect to mass, energy, motion, space and time is unexplainable regarding why these resources are not necessary pre-conditions for the existence of the dynamic material universe. — ucarr

Exactly like an eternally existing universe. You've already agreed uncaused existences logically are. Now you have to indicate why it must necessarily have always existed vs finitely existed. — Philosophim

No, eternal universe means eternal mass, energy, motion, space and time that change forms while conserved. No, unexplainably always existed, not necessarily always existed. No, uncaused origin of universe because uncaused origin equals self-causation, a contradiction; no, uncaused origin of universe because universe can't power up without pre-existing forces fueling that power up.

My repeated attempts are to get you from thinking in terms of causality and into 'uncausality'. You keep implying something comes before an uncaused existence. It doesn't. You keep thinking things exist in non-existence prior to existence. They don't. You keep thinking there is something that compels or explains an existence that incepts despite it being uncaused. It doesn't. If you can't understand these basic premises at this point, then this discussion is likely beyond you. — Philosophim

You keep being unable to explain how an uncaused universe powers up without pre-existing forces fueling that power up. Even if an uncaused universe can power up without pre-existing forces, that's self-causation, not uncaused.

I acknowledge uncaused existence with the stipulation that it always be paired with eternal existence. This is the crux of our disagreement. We agree on uncaused eternal universe. We disagree on uncaused non-eternal universe. — ucarr

Fantastic! Lets lose all the silly parts then. Just focus on this part. I've mentioned above a few reasons why your idea of an eternal universe has the same 'problems' you've noted for a finite universe. Your part next should be to demonstrate why an uncaused existence must necessarily be eternal vs have finite existence. I look forward to this! — Philosophim

An uncaused universe eternal includes symmetries coupled with their conserved forces powering the dynamism of material things.