I am loath to admit 2 minds in one brain. Admitting two separate minds in one body gets out of hand very quickly. — Bitter Crank

I can understand the resistance, but that seems like the only sensible option IMO. Most of the crazy situations you'd expect come from such a scenario would come when both parts of the brain are incapable of communicating with each other. So for most normal people (without split brains), you don't have to worry about fighting with yourself.

Interestingly, people can live without the right hemisphere of their brain. On a few occasions, the hemisphere has been removed because of disease. I'm pretty sure nobody who had this done counted it as an improvement, but they didn't drop dead from it, either. I suppose they could live without a right hemisphere (not in addition to losing the right hemisphere, but as an alternative -- though I have met people who appear to be without any brains whatsoever). If the left hemisphere was removed, they wouldn't be able to tell us much about what it was like.

The two hemispheres are not duplicates of each other, but are rather complimentary. Different specialties are allocated to opposite hemispheres -- such as language being in the left hemisphere, while rhythm is a specialty of the right brain. The left brain thinks more in a sequential, linear fashion, while the right brain is given to more of a gestalt, a-linear style. On the other hand, each hemisphere processes left/right body sensory information (sight, hearing, touch, proprioception, smell, taste, etc.). — Bitter Crank

I believe there are also cases where people have lived without their left hemisphere as well. Most people who would go through such an operation won't function to the same degree as normal people, for obvious reasons, but I find it fascinating that they can function at all in any capacity. Some may still even exhibit signs of above average intelligence, and in one purported case, one subject had managed to go to graduate school despite the lack of one hemisphere. It's interesting stuff.

My takeaway from it is that the individual hemispheres, though they may coordinate with each other, are capable of operating independently when need be, which I take to be a sign of their autonomy. The corpus callosum seems to serve mainly as a communication channel for the two of them rather than a mental glue that makes them one.

There is an interesting book by a brain anatomist, Stroke of Genius by Jill Bolte Taylor. She suffered a severe stroke; the book is about her recovery and about brain function and anatomy. Easy read, very interesting. Search YouTube for Jill Bolte Taylor and you can watch her TED talk -- summarizes everything in the book. — Bitter Crank

Thanks, I'll check it out.

If the halves of the brain were never connected by the cerebral commissure, then two "persons" might develop (from birth forward). I don't know whether this has ever happened and been observed. — Bitter Crank

Apparently in some cases, the infant brains will create new connections between the two hemispheres as they develop, but I'm not sure what will happen in cases where that does not happen. I wonder if something akin to a conjoined twin scenario could occur as a result of being born with a completely separated brain.

Severing the cerebral commissure in someone who has already developed an intellect and personality (using both hemispheres of the brain) results not in two persons, but two now uncoordinated hemispheres. I (quite literally) can not imagine what that would be like. — Bitter Crank

If by "persons" you are referring to conscious minds, then I would say otherwise (or rather I would say that brains in general would possess two "persons" or minds whether split or not). Like you I would not be able to imagine what it is like to have a single mind in the split brain cases above, which I would take to count against that scenario's possibility.

Making this post partly as a bump for discussion, but really I just want to point to a nice short video I've just found that illustrates my point:



For those of you who are worried about the text and all that, then hopefully this will help set things up.

If consciousness isn't the product of the brain then why can we get knocked unconscious? — Panzerfaust

Do we? When we sleep or get "knocked unconscious" are we really not conscious anymore, or are we still conscious but just not as actively aware of the world as we usually are when awake? Maybe I'm just being nitpicky, but I've asked this question in another thread and I'd thought I'd bring it up here.

Aside from that, if consciousness is really considered a phenomenon independent of the brain, then I don't see why you should cease to be conscious at all when your brain stops functioning. One could argue for instance that any immaterial "soul" would reach the afterlife once your body falls over, or get reincarnated to another body and continue having experiences. Not necessarily advocating for those myself, but I'm just saying that one need not agree with you that knocking out the brain means knocking out consciousness, especially if they believe consciousness to be a separate process from the brain.

Perhaps what you're trying to get at is the fact that the contents of our conscious experience is tied to the processes of the brain. This is one thing that pretty much everyone can agree upon. Hit me in the head, and I may not lose consciousness, but my experience does change. I can pinch you in the arm and that would send a neurological signal to your brain that would correlate with a painful experience. Does that demonstrate that consciousness itself must be a byproduct of the brain? To me, not really, since that would be the equivalent of saying that my television running is a byproduct of a remote television station operating because it receives signals from the latter to create an image on the screen. Sure the television is a receiver for the station, but it does not depend solely on it for its operation.

You can see how this can be scaled up by adding more atoms and particles to the system: they each have some finite number of states, and so do their combinations, even allowing for interactions. The number of degrees of freedom rises dramatically as you expand outwards, but the principle remains the same. — SophistiCat

Do those combinations also include how they are arranged together in space? If space were continuous, then there would seem to be an infinite number of possible ways I can put them together. I can imagine two atoms being separated by 1 nm, 2 nm or any 1/n nm, for example. I am not sure if it's physically possible but I can imagine it in my head. Or does that not matter?

I'm thinking it just means that our language can be confusing. We're not accustomed to tense-less chat. — jorndoe

I am not sure what you mean by "tenseless chat". Under the block universe, every time "is" real. What does the "is" mean here? Does it mean that it was or will be, that they ceased to exist or will come to exist? Certainly not, since that means they don't exist. Or perhaps it means just what we normally mean by the term, that they all currently exist in the present tense.

So, the block universe = what was, what is, and what may yet come to be. — jorndoe

I think a better way to say it is that the block universe = Every event in the universe's history. This would include things like the Big Bang, the earth at 2017, and the Martian Outposts in 2100. We speak purely in terms of the particular contents instead of using confusing descriptions like "the things that were" or "what will be", which have a particular meaning to them. To me, under the block universe, every one of these events just "is" in the present tense. The events that we normally take to have existed or will exist actually currently exist somewhere in our universe, though of course not in the same 3D timeslice as our own.

I think the lesson from relativity is that time as a dimension functions a lot like space. That is not to say that time is exactly like space, but that time as a dimension designates locations just like space does. Napoleon didn't cease to exist, he just exists "over there" somewhere in the block universe the same way I say that the planet Pluto exists "over there" somewhere in space.

What I'm saying is that the meaning of the concept of the predicate is included in the concept of the subject. For example, "All bachelors are unmarried," or "All bodies are extended in space," which are instances of the meaning of the predicate being a function of the meaning of the subject. You can't have one without the other. — Sam26

Yeah, that was how I read your "Change is analytic to time". That was what I'm saying essentially, but it seemed like you were inclined to disagree for some reason which is why I asked.

Is there a difference between saying that change cannot be isolated from time and time cannot be isolated from change? It seems they express the same thing, that we cannot have one without the other, no?

Ya, it seems that time, at least to me, is logically impossible without change. — Sam26

I think it goes deeper than that. Our concept of time is basically derived from our understanding of change. The fact is, if we did not perceive change in the world then we wouldn't have come up with this notion of a flow of time. Similarly, I don't think we can make sense of space either in a world without any physical objects. So to try, like Shoemaker does, to separate time from change and isolate one from the other sounds wrongheaded.

On eternalism, or the block universe, there “is” still time (— by the way, notice the present tense “is” here — it’s misleading due to our language). — jorndoe

What does the "is" mean then, if not that it exists in the present tense? Either something is, was, or will exist so in what other way is the block universe said to "exist"?

Claiming that the past exists now is incoherent. — jorndoe

Yep, that is certainly logically impossible, but that may just be the wrong way to say it. What if we instead say that the "Big Bang exists now" or "Napoleon exists now"? Instead of saying that these events and objects exist "in the past" and that the past currently exists, we just cut out the middleman. IMO, there is no conceptual incoherency in saying that.

But there must also be a kind of connectedness between these mini 4D entities that enables accumulation and integration of memories that enable our experience of personal identity that evolves in time. — litewave

Yes. They are all different versions of the same entity that exists over its entire lifetime, different clones of the same person.

These chunks of experiences may actually overlap, but since we cannot experience time intervals under the scale of tens of milliseconds the transitions between experiences may feel fuzzy and continuous. — litewave

That could be the case, but then that would sound a bit too extravagant and excessive. Instead of having multiple 4D entities that uniquely experiences and represents a portion of a person's life, every moment is represented by a multiple (perhaps infinite) entities that each have very slight differences in regions they occupy. Personally, I think that sounds even more strange.

Our experiences are obviously associated with spatiotemporally extended objects like brains but the experiences themselves seem to be indivisible and unanalyzable. They seem to have an intrinsic, unstructured, monadic identity as well as a relational identity that is constituted by the relations of the intrinsic identity to other intrinsic identities. This metaphysical view is also known as Russellian monism. — litewave

Not entirely familiar with that view, so I'll have to look into that. I do think that this particular issue is related to the debate between what people call Extensionalism and Retentionalism. There are those (the extensionalists) who have argued that the specious present requires our minds to be actually extended and those (the retentionalists) who claim that it doesn't. This partially extended view seems to involve some form of the former view. I, however, happen to find the latter more preferable since it seems to reduce our specious present into something purely psychological instead of metaphysical.

If it states that there is an ontological present, then it is not any form of eternalism that I'll agree with. — noAxioms

Okay, then you disagree with the article. I don't really have much else to say then :-} .
I can only conclude that your version of eternalism is, like libertarian free will, irrational and ill defined.

They are existing in an ontological sense, but not a temporal sense. — noAxioms

And so they currently exist which I have quoted you as saying.

I don't like to reference the present when speaking of ontological sense since it has no ontological existence. But the temporal present can still be referenced and that is what the Stanford post is doing. Such mixing of senses only serves to confuse. — noAxioms

Look, the Stanford author was clearly outlining a sense of "now" that is ontological, which for some reason you want to deny. If you disagree with him in any way, then just say it. If you're more interested in muddling things, then I don't see how this discussion can go forward.

Good example of mixing senses, leading to confusion. Everything exists (ontological, italics) right now (temporal, bold). Eternalism does not give temporal existence to Socrates, nor give any ontological status to 'right now'. — noAxioms

This is a good example of misrepresenting what I said. Did I bring in anything temporal? I was speaking strictly and purely from an ontological standpoint, and all uses of the word "now" and its synonyms are in the ontological sense.

I cannot agree to a statement with mixed senses like that. Be explicit. Every event (there is no 'every time' since something like '1945' is ambiguous outside the context of Earth) currently (temporal sense) exists (ontological sense). — noAxioms

Like I said, everything is strictly ontological, so you can't dodge the problem like before.

.

Right. It appears that one's identity is a series of experiences along the time dimension that are connected in an intimate way by laws of nature but each experience excludes the others. Earlier experiences may affect later experiences as memories built in the structure of your brain but at each moment there is an experience that excludes both earlier and later experiences. This exclusion seems to be due to the fact that consciousness exists only on certain time scales, which is about tens of milliseconds. There is no experience on shorter or longer time intervals. And so you cannot have an experience that spans an hour or your whole life. At this moment you have an experience that spans say 50 milliseconds. Over the next 50 milliseconds you have a different experience and not the one that you have over the previous 50 milliseconds. And you have no experience that spans 100 milliseconds. — litewave

Interesting. It could be that we do not either exist as complete 4D entities extended throughout our entire lives, nor instantaneous entities in the block universe, but are actually somewhere in between, mini 4D entities who exist for only a mere few milliseconds, but certainly more than an instant. However, that does raise a number of problematic questions, such as how arbitrary processes within our brain during our lives can determine how we are extended through time. In a sense, such a process seems to be meta-temporal, where events within time can affect the way time is divided, which is somewhat strange to me. In addition, even if our brains are at every moment, processing events of an extended interval of time, this process (at least to my mind) is continuous. Our brains seemingly just process information in discrete chunks of 50 milliseconds, but our experiences are constantly flowing in and out (presumably staying within our brain for that particular interval of time), so which parts of our lives these our mini 4D entities do occupy and experience is unclear which raises the question of why our lives were "cut" up in a particular manner.

Personally, I think that the fact that our brains process information at a certain time scale has no ontological implications. It just means that at every moment we are aware of events occurring within a period of time but that does not mean that our conscious mind need be extended.

It does indeed say that, with the note that Socrates is not currently present. So there's a difference, and they are apparently allowing the use of an implied reference to a present. — noAxioms

But they are all currently existing. Again, I must emphasize that part of your post. You keep saying that that they aren't. Unless you want to backtrack on that.

So in my posts, I consider references to the present ('right now', 'currently', etc.) to be temporal references, not ontological ones. There is no ontological now, nor a time that is ontologically the current one. — noAxioms

Perhaps you meant to say that there is no temporal now? If you're saying that there is no sense of an ontological now, then you're contradicting what you just quoted. Everything exists right now under eternalism, in the ontological sense. This sense of now is just the sense of now that we have when we speak in the present tense.

But if you agree that every time in the universe's history currently exists in the ontological sense, then we can move on to the bigger problem in the OP, which is how, if all times of our life currently exist, and that we are currently a 4D object that extends throughout our life, can be reconciled to our current experience of only one of those times.

Are you saying that relativity does not order my parents' birth before my own? The ordering is ambiguous or nonexistent? — noAxioms

I would ask if you're disagreeing with the relativity of simultaneity. If you are then you'll have more help reading up the literature on it. If not, then I have no idea what your disagreement is on about.

Eternalism is not an assertion that all times 'currently exist'. — noAxioms

Sorry, but this is just false:

One version of Non-presentism is Eternalism, which says that objects from both the past and the future exist just as much as present objects. According to Eternalism, non-present objects like Socrates and future Martian outposts exist right now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things. — Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Time (My emphasis)

Maybe you should read up on more on the view before talking about it.

No, events are still ordered if within each others' light cones. My parents were born before me, in any relativistic reference frame. — noAxioms

There is a reason why they call it "Relativity". It's because of the fact of the relativity of simultaneity. Look it up if you disagree.

Eternalism is not an assertion about simultaneity or preferred frames or the lack of them. — noAxioms

Yeah, that was my point. Eternalism doesn't say anything about simultaneity. It has probably been around before relativity was a thing but the lack of any absolute notion of simultaneity has been used to argue for the view.

No, I say he exists. There is no current time. — noAxioms

I'm sorry, but there are only three ways I could read your "exists". Either you're saying that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist" or you're saying that he is currently existing. You somehow deny all of them, and want a fourth option, this "tenseless" form of exist, but I have no idea what that is.

It's like libertarian free will. Metaphysical libertarians want something that isn't random but also somehow not causally determined. What else is there? I dunno but apparently it isn't any of the well defined options out there.

Eliminativism most likely (denial of subjective experience/ appearance vs the reality), I think that's what can be interpreted the "stubbornly persistent illusion" quote. — JupiterJess

That sounds a bit too extreme to me. It seems like eternalists are willing to grant that experiences do occur, but that they are illusory in the sense that what they imply isn't real. For instance, I mentioned the problem with the experience of the passage of time in my OP, where the common position is to accept our subjective experience, but at the same time explain it away via psychological reasons.

Anyway, the B-theory of time is the modern Parimendes and so the classicial criticisms apply. Such as how it is possible to be persuaded by the result of argument if change is not possible. In order to accept B-theory, you have to accept minds can change in some way and the change must be in some way the result of the argument.

Not familiar with Parmenides, so I'll have to look into that. My main concern however is with the problems with the view from a phenomenological standpoint, so if you have any comments on that then I'd be interested to hear them.

There is no present, no present objects, since no reference has been specified. So you can say that Napoleon presently exists at Earth, 1815, which is a redundant way of saying Napoleon exists at Earth, 1815. But there is no 'the present', and 'currently' is meaningless without a temporal reference point. Whose present? Currently with what? Begging references to these things is going to make you declare the position irrational. — noAxioms

I think you're confusing a preferred time with things currently existing. The argument from relativity states that there is nothing to determine that one set of simultaneous events should be preferred to any other, leading to the conclusion that none are. There are no privileged frames; this is known as the relativity of simultaneity.

It is like saying that any one place in space is privileged. Our location is not any more special than any other in the universe. For instance, some may say that our planet is at the centre, but that is not true at all, or at least not justifiable. However, that does not prevent us from saying that all locations presently exist or are currently existing.

Napoleon exists, and he also exists in 1815, but does not exist in 1915 since the two times are not simultaneous. Paris exists, and Paris exists in France, but Paris does not exist in Japan since the two locations are not the same place. But that doesn't mean Paris doesn't exist just because the speaker is in Japan. It simply doesn't exist at that speaker's 'here' any more than Napoleon exists at your 'present'. — noAxioms

My emphasis on the word "exists". You seem to be using "exist" in the present tense. You don't say that Napoleon "did exist" or "will exist", you are saying that he currently exists.

I think you should understand that under eternalism, time as a dimension functions very much like space. One could even say that it is the fourth dimension of space. The notion of past and future are replaced with earlier and later, which designate coordinates in our universe just as spatial ones. Just as we say that Pluto exists over there, so too do we say that Napoleon exists in 1815.

What do you mean by "relative terms"? And what inconsistency are you talking about? I don't understand.

I was asking if you have an idea of what all moments being equally "real" or all "existing" could possibly mean if not that they exist in the present tense. If you cannot do so for whatever reason, then I can only conclude that your disagreement is irrational and that you don't know what you're talking about.

No, not simultaneously. — noAxioms

According to eternalism, every moment is real in the same sense as the present is real. I don't see how else I can make sense of all moments being real or equally real other than to treat them all as I do present objects, which is to say, that they currently exist, unless you have another idea of what it means to say that they are all "real".

If "possible" means logically possible (or non-contradictory) alone, then no, not everything logically possible is bound to be the case. An analogy:

1. in an infinitude of numbers, there are every kinds of numbers
2. there are infinite whole positive numbers {1, 2, 3, ...}
3. therefore there are negative numbers among them (from 1)
4. contradiction, 1 is wrong (however intuitive it may seem)

Same argument for the negative whole numbers {..., -3, -2, -1} and 1, the even numbers {0, 2, 4, 6, ...} and π, etc. — jorndoe

I don't think that counterexample works. You defined a set that is composed solely of positive numbers. By definition, that excludes the possibility of any negative numbers. And the same goes for your other examples as well. 1 being in the set of negative numbers isn't a logical possibility due to 1 not being negative and by the same logic neither is π in the set of even numbers.

I think the unintuitiveness of the quantitative behaviour of infinity is something isolated to the folk-mathematics idea of it. Infinity isn't just well understood in mathematics, it's essential. — fdrake

Sure, I'm not disagreeing with the fact that we do understand infinity. My point was really about how our finite understanding of probability doesn't transfer over to cases of the infinite, which seems to be the lesson we should take for infinity in general.

There are possible events which have probability 0 too. Stuff that could happen but will not. Like throwing a dart onto the number line and hitting a fraction (or a real world equivalent if reality is continuous). — fdrake

That is an interesting point that you've brought up. As you and others have mentioned, probability doesn't seem to make sense when we bring in the infinities. Although we would normally take events with probability 0 to represent impossibilities, that isn't necessarily the case here. In a way, I guess that isn't all that surprising, given that alot of our maths don't make sense when dealing with infinities.

Don't know how to explain it better. The simulation is of a real thing. The simulation is not the thing, and thus at no point are we in a simulation, be we simulated or not. So my stance is that we cannot be a simulation. If a simulation is run and it is not perfect (does not simulate what was intended), then the simulation is just of something else with different physics, but the simulated thing is still not a simulation. — noAxioms

And my point is that it doesn't matter. Sure, a simulation of Paris is not the same as Paris. That is why it's called a simulation. But that doesn't affect the fact that we do not know if the Paris we know is one or the other. Apart from that, I must admit I don't see your point.

And again, I must stress that you move away from talk about the self. The simulation argument deals more with the world we are in rather than ourselves and I feel like ignoring that would lead to more confusion than not.

It indeed cannot be exact, and yes, it works fine that way. I suppose our universe could be simulated down to the quantum level, but not on any simulating equipment that I can envision. It seems unnecessary unless there is a quantum amplifier (like the one that kills Schrodinger's cat) that needs to be simulated. Biology seems not to have them, nor does electronics for the most part. History cannot be reproduced, but a functional world of sorts can be simulated. It would work. A transistor for instance has very simulatable macroscopic behavior, and I've actually worked with transistor simulations which are cheaper to test than real chips. But transistors rely on quantum effects to function. They wouldn't work without that. Doesn't matter: The simulation does not simulate at the quantum level. It simply simulates it as a macroscopic switch with this and that delay, threshold, and EM noise. The neuro-chemical nature of brain cells seem to have similar macroscopic function. The simulation need not be more detailed than that. — noAxioms

Didn't know you were implying quantum phenomena here by the use of "macroscopic". I must first start off by saying that my knowledge of physics is only basic (some Pop Sci. Books and a rough knowledge of the history), but I do not see how quantum phenomena cannot in principle be simulated. Indeed, aren't some physicists already simulating quantum phenomenon in their research? I can imagine it is impractical sure but not impossible. In addition, we should not imagine that the world running a simulation of our physics needs to run on the same rules. That was the point of what I said earlier. The ancestor world can run on an entirely different set of laws, one that makes the simulation of the quantum more practically feasible. However, the simulation would still run on the same fundamental principles of computation that we have for our own computers.

And that is the key point in all this. In order to demonstrate that something cannot in principle be simulated, it must not be able to run on a computer. Computers, as far as I can tell, are digital, they run on binary, they use an algorithm and are finite.

You mentioned infinity, which is something that our ideal computer cannot simulate,due to its limitations. Other examples of phenomena which cannot be simulated are continuity and true randomness. Unless the intelligent race is somehow able to tap into the infinity and create the ultimate computer, then we can safely assume that their simulations are limited (thus excluding the infinitely small and the infinitely big). And the same goes for true randomness, as computers are necessarily deterministic. However, the problem with these possibilities, when I was thinking about them, was that it was impossible for us to know whether or not they were true. Unless we are able to go to the ends of the universe, then we cannot determine if there really is an end to space or not. Same for continuity and randomness. Unfortunately, I don't see how quantum mechanics fits the bill in all this. All in all, I remain unconvinced that you have shown or solved anything.

My assumption is no dualism, not necessarily true, but hardly a wild assumption. I consider BIV to be dualism, essentially a mind being fed lies about its true nature. — noAxioms

I believe there are a couple of assumptions that you've made that I've pointed out below. I am not sure what you mean by dualism though, if you consider BIV to require it. As far as I can tell BIV works perfectly fine with most positions about the mind.

I'm not undermining the argument. I'm listing additional possibilities than the three listed. — noAxioms

Your possibility tries to undermine the simulation scenario just as much as the first two possibilities do. That's just how it is.

This statement presumes that the simulation is the simulated. — noAxioms

Okay, then we are not sure if we are talking about something simulated when we are talking about the world we live in. Whichever way you word it, the fact is that we still have no clue.

The simulation runs on macroscopic rules, and suddenly the simulated guy starts doing non-macroscopic experiments in his simulated lab and the simulation cannot handle that. He'd be able to tell. So the simulation has to be good enough to mimic even that, and at that point I have a hard time agreeing that it is possible even in principle. — noAxioms

The simulation's macroscopic rules don't necessarily have to be the same as the rules in the world of the simulation. And even if the simulation world's rule do mimic the macroscopic rules, there is no requirement that it has to be an exact representation. Though either way, if we are living in the simulation we will not be able to determine what those macroscopic rules are so from our POV we can't compare them to our own world's rules.

Likewise, the simulation needs to be confined somehow, limiting resources. An infinite universe cannot be fully simulated even macroscopically. The simulated guy would possibly notice that he is in the center of a finite place, just like we were centuries ago. So I have a hard time with the assertion that the simulation could be so good that we can't know we're in one. — noAxioms

The true universe (the world that isn't simulated) does not necessarily have to be infinite either. If we find out that our universe is finite that does not mean we live in a simulation, that could just mean that the true universe is finite. But of course we aren't able to know either way, so that doesn't help in deciding the issue.

And even if that isn't the case (and that the true universe must be infinite), there is nothing in principle that says that we should be able to determine ourselves if the universe is finite and thus simulated. Assuming we are in a finite simulation, if the creators of that simulation really wanted to play the role of Descartes's Demon, then they can probably do something to prevent us from being able to tell.

As for determining if the universe is infinite and therefore not a simulation, I am not sure what kind of experiment could be done to even determine such a fact anyways (though I am open to hearing proposals), so it seems like we're lost there too.

Never said you assumed BIVs. I merely used the case of BIVs to demonstrate what I think is a wild assumption with your approach. As far as I see it, the only way for your argument to undermine the simulation argument to work is for you to somehow point out some feature or element about the nature of our understanding of the world (or our experience of it) that cannot in principle be replicated by a computer program. If it can be, then we cannot ascertain whether or not we are looking at a simulation when talking about the world we live in.

Of course, this sort of discovery seems as likely as the discovery that there is a feature of our experience that is impossible to replicate, whether by a BIV, or demon, or a vivid dream scenario. Now you may not be alone in thinking this. I believe this is the sort of suggestion made in the "Answering the Skeptic" thread, but as for my own take on it I find it to be a bit too extraordinary for my own liking.

Your example deals with a conscious person, but again, I must point out that the simulation argument (as well as the BIV argument) is more about the world we find ourselves in rather than who we are.

The problem is, once we start applying your reasoning to things in general, then it seems to amount to us saying that the experiences that we have of an external world cannot be replicated by a simulation or otherwise. That'd be extraordinary indeed, if we can somehow prove definitively that we cannot be brains in vats or living in a vivid dream world. Unfortunately, I think it's more likely that that isn't the case, hence the persistence of skepticism.

I think the simulation argument is less about us and more about the world we live in.

Your argument was that since there's always an underlying fulfillment of personal desire by carrying out a seemingly selfless act, all acts must be inherently selfish. I disagreed, arguing that fulfillment of desire (i.e. doing what you want) does not make an act selfish. In order to determine whether something is selfless, you simply look to the specific act and see if it primarily is directed at helping others. — Hanover

No, I never emphasized any "underlying fulfillment of personal desire" at all. I am confused as to how you came to that interpretation, given that in the very line you have quoted, I was strictly referring to the avoidance of guilt one could achieve by performing a selfless deed:

On the other hand, it seems like in all of these cases, there was something to gain from performing such actions. If somebody didn't donate to a charity then they would be guilt-ridden by not doing anything. — Alec

(My Emphasis)

Simply put, you're making false assumptions about what I am saying, which explains our disagreement.

I am sorry but I am not sure what your concern is here.

My point to @Hanover was that I could want something but not have any deeper reason for wanting it. Any actions resulting from that want is geared towards that goal. A goal may be a reason but that does not mean that the goal itself is determined by a deeper reason which was what I had tried to emphasize. If you disagree that it cannot be, then I am open to hearing it.

My point is that goals don't need underlying reasons.

My understanding of the word "intent" is that it refers to an action with a goal, while your jumping on one foot apparently doesn't have one. Isn't there a difference between "voluntary" and "intentional?" — T Clark

Sure there is. The jumping on one foot is it's own goal, because you wanted to jump on one foot.

You distinguished between two sentences:

#1: I simply want to save someone from a burning house vs.
#2: I want to save someone from a burning house in order to protect myself from the guilt of not doing so.

The problem is that #1 is an incomplete sentence. There is some reason you want to save someone because, tautologically, every intentional act has a corresponding intent. In order to find an act without an underlying intent, you must look for accidental or random events, not the sort we're at all interested in here.

So, to your question, when does #1 occur, asking very specifically as you have when do you intentionally save someone from a burning house for no reason, I'd say never, but that's based upon a logical problem in trying to explain how one can act intentionally for no reason. That just doesn't make sense. If you acted intentionally, you had a reason, and that reason formed the basis of your intent. — Hanover

I disagree that intentional acts must always have underlying reasons to them. If I were to have the sudden urge to jump on one foot and someone asks me why I did it, I would say "I don't know, I just wanted to do so". It's an intentional act clearly, but it was made on impulse.

You may say that I wanted to jump on one foot due to wanting to satisfy my desire to jump on one foot, but again, I should point out that such reasoning would lead to a regress. The idea that we wanted to do X to satisfy our desire would lead to an infinite chain of desires and wants. Indeed, that was even a point that @Πετροκότσυφας's linked paper makes on Pg. 8. The point here is that there is nothing wrong, so far as I can tell, with saying that I simply wanted X for its own sake.

Finally, the two sentences I gave were in order to demonstrate a selfless conscious decision, but it seems like you were too focused on the fact that #1 was an intentional act that lacked any reason, which I feel misses the point of what I am saying. If you want an example of an selfless intentional act that has a reason, then it is very simple to provide one. Compare "I want to save someone from a burning house in order to protect myself from the guilt of not doing so" to "I want to save someone from a burning house because it is the right thing to do". If you still think that the latter is somehow impossible then please tell me what is wrong here.

Okay, I just got to reading it. I do agree that the very existence of guilt itself would imply a deeper desire that may not be selfish, which was what your Feinberg paper and @Mr Bee earlier had pointed out. It sounds more likely that those desires are what influenced their action rather than some secondary guilt avoidance. At least, that is where I stand ATM, though I'll be open to hearing other people's opinions if they disagree.

It is also interesting to note that selfless actions comprise more than just the usual cases of helping others. A person may for instance act based upon curiosity and strangely enough even on hatred for another person, especially if such malevolence is self-destructive. These cases too can also be considered "selfless", as they are not in the best interests of the individual.

Thanks for the link. I'll set aside some time for it tonight, so I'll get to you then if I have any thoughts.

That doesn't sound reasonable because then you face a regress. Why do you want to satisfy that desire? Because it will satisfy some other desire in you. And why do you want to satisfy that other desire? Because it will... and so forth. So either the buck stops somewhere or else we have to have an infinite chain of reasons.

Or here's another way of putting it: You're saying that I want to do x because it would satisfy my wanting to do x. That sounds circular.

Any time someone wants something that isn't to their own benefit. Compare I simply want to save someone from a burning house vs. I want to save someone from a burning house in order to protect myself from the guilt of not doing so. The definition itself should be clear enough for imagining what it is like. Or is there something that you find impossibly unclear here?

The problem is not in imagining it, it's whether or not we can give any example of its actual occurrence that I am questioning. I really don't know how I can be more clear on that.

You're creating a tautology here. If I do what I want to, then I'm selfishly doing what I want, even if what I want is to save your life from a burning house. If I didn't want to save you, I wouldn't have. — Hanover

I don't see how I am creating a tautology. A conscious decision to do what you want doesn't necessarily mean that what you want is in accordance with your own self-interest. If the things that you want are to your own benefit (either by acquiring pleasure or avoiding harm) then that means it's selfish and if not then it's selfless. Doing what you want to do is compatible with the latter, but my question is if there are any true cases of such behaviour.

By "self-interest" I mean anything that benefits you or prevents harm on yourself.



Come on. Are all conscious decisions that we make done out of concern for oneself?

There are all kinds of reasons people may provide assistance to other people. Sometimes it is just because they empathize and wish to help. For those who have empathy for others, they understand what I just said, but I am not saying categorically everyone had empathy nor am I saying that people assist only or even primarily for empathy. But I know that sometimes people help others simply because they care. — Rich

I can understand where you're coming from, but it seems like if we ask a soldier why he saved his comrades, he wouldn't disagree that he did so because he couldn't live with himself if he didn't. In other words, the guilt that he would face if he let his friends die is something that makes dying in their place more preferable. And it could be argued that this sort of thinking applies to every person who wishes to help others. The idea that they provided assistance to avoid guilt sounds just as appropriate as saying that they did so because they wished to help.

On a related note, it can also be argued that perhaps the motivations of our seemingly selfless actions can be subconsciously geared towards our self-interest as well, despite our own seemingly conscious selflessness. I am not sure if this would mean that altruism is an illusion, but this is a point I've heard as well from those wishing to argue for psychological egoism.

Doing something for the benefit of others is the definition of selflessness, regardless of whether you happen to benefit yourself. Otherwise, you must define selflessness as those accidentally helpful acts. — Hanover

But my question has to do with whether or not there are actual examples of people doing something solely for the benefit of others and not their own interest. In other words, are all actions done out of concern for oneself?