Michael McMahon,

Kant, if he were still alive, might ask the following questions:

Do atoms, electrons, photons and electromagnetism exist independently of the mind or are they pure creations of the mind?

If the former, how do you know?

If we were a species without senses would we be capable of science?

Can things dependent on the senses in the first place (such as science) be properly used to establish the veracity of the senses?

Is it possible to establish what you have called the “present time” other than by agreement?

Can the present time exist independently of the mind? If so, how?

Michael McMahon,

Antirealism may be understood in both the ontological and the epistemic sense.

The belief that nothing material exists outside the mind is the ontological antirealism usually associated with Berkeley.

The belief that physical things do exist outside the mind but are completely unknowable as they really are, constitutes the epistemic antirealism of Immanuel Kant.

The Kantian view includes the following ideas:

(1) When the senses encounter a real thing, the mind creates an impression of it in such a way that the impression does not in any way resemble the real thing. Thus, the impression is said to be “real to us” but not “real in itself.”

(2) Time and space are pure creations of the mind and are not real in themselves.

(3) It is impossible to compare a thing real in itself with any impression gained through the senses. All we can do is compare one such impression with another. Therefore, we are incapable of knowing a truth corresponding to reality. We can only know what is real to us (that is, what humanity experiences as real.)

(4) However, the mind can derive new concepts from a priori concepts rooted in definitions of things. Such new concepts are both “a priorl “and “synthetic” (derivative). Thus, the definition of a circle is a priori but not synthetic. However, pi is both. All of science and metaphysics come within the realm of synthetic a priori judgments. But the latter exist solely in the mind and are not real in themselves.

(5) Thus, sensory experience is “objective” only in the sense that it is taken as real by all mankind and not because it gives us a window to a world independent of our thoughts.

The above little summary hardly does justice to the richness of Kant’s philosophy. One can only hope that it provides at least a basic understanding of his thinking.

NosaA2,

The thing that should be kept in mind is that if we wish to live in a civilized society under a just government, we must abide by the laws. Governments are by their nature coercive. They force people to do things that they might otherwise not be disposed to do. They do this through the laws. But, what is a just law? Indeed, what is justice? No one knows exactly, but a good man knows it when he sees it.

In the US, the Constitution provides certain rights and freedoms that must be observed by the other two branches of government. The president cannot do whatever he wants (although the current president seems to think so). The legislature cannot enact laws that violate the freedoms set forth in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. These prohibitions not only apply to the federal government but also to the individual states through the 14th Amendment.

Although abortion is not mentioned in the constitution, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade held that a woman has a constitutional right to an abortion by reason of a right of privacy somehow rooted in the constitution. This may have been a bit of a stretch. However, the right of a woman to have an abortion has become the established law of the U.S.

Nonetheless, it must be understood, that this rule only applies to fetuses that are not yet viable (able to live outside the mother). The Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade that the abortion of a viable fetus may be prohibited by any state. Yet the Court specifically held that a fetus, viable or otherwise, was not a person for purposes of the 14th Amendment. If the Supreme Court had held that a viable fetus was a person, an abortion of such a fetus would have been forbidden under both federal and state law.
Generally, in the US a fetus is viable after 24 weeks.

In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a 1909 case, the Supreme Court held that the city of Cambridge could impose a fine on residents who refused to take the smallpox vaccination. Jacobson and his son refused to be vaccinated or to pay the fine, claiming that vaccinations were unconstitutional and harmful. The court held that under the particular facts of the case, public safety trumped individual freedom and Jacobson must pay the fine (about $100,00 in today’s money). The court emphasized that the Cambridge law did not allow the forcible vaccination of any person. Also, Jacobson provided no proof that the vaccine would be harmful to himself and his son.

In the rather shocking case of Buck v. Bell (1927) the US Supreme Court upheld a Virginia law that authorized the involuntary sterilization of “feeble minded” persons in state institutions, citing Jacobson. Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes announced the reasoning of the court:

“Society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes… Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”

There have been enormous social and legal changes since 1909, so that no one knows whether or to what extent Jacobson would apply in the current circumstances of the pandemic. The Buck case cannot be the present law in the US or any other civilized nation.

Most people exposed to COVID-19 have thus far remained in isolation voluntarily while consulting with their physicians. But can the state or federal government order that such a person be confined if he refuses to isolate himself voluntarily?

The short answer is yes. In most cases the appropriate state authority would issue an order of confinement under the exercise of its police powers. The appropriate federal authority can in certain cases also issue such an order, but the power to do so rests primarily with the states. If the subject ignores the order, he can be arrested and kept under lock and key.

However, in such cases the subject is entitled to his constitutional rights of due process and equal protection, and the confinement action must not be arbitrary and capricious.

Riley,
I might have added the obvious fact that the generalization I gave as an example was the categorical proposition, “All swans are white” and not the proposition, “Swans are white.” The latter statement is not categorical for it includes white swans but does not exclude swans of any other color. Thus, it is an example of a generalization that is not subject to falsification and spinnable into as many confirmations as there are colors in the discernable palette. As such, it is hardly an example of Popper’s thinking.

Riley,

The essence of the matter is set forth in the Sanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Id.) as follows:

“it is logically impossible to verify a universal proposition by reference to experience (as Hume saw clearly), but a single genuine counter-instance falsifies the corresponding universal law.”

This matter is set forth in considerable detail in my OP as follows:

“We can also employ our reasoning powers to formulate general causal rules that we say can be used to predict future events. This is induction. However, it has long been known that there is a serious problem with induction.

“When we see a repeated conjunction of two events in all of our current experience, we say that the first in time was a necessary condition for the occurrence of the second. We say that the first caused the second.

“However, because it is not possible for us to experience all things, this leaves open the possibility that the future may show that the conjunction was not really one of cause and effect.

“This means that, although we are justified in believing that a conjunction consistently experienced indicates a relationship of cause and effect, we cannot say with certainty that such a relationship exists through all time. In other words, we cannot really know if generalizations are true. Therein, lies the problem.

“The question arises: Is science moving us in the direction of truth? In this connection, the Twentieth Century philosopher, Karl Popper had a remarkable insight. He tells us that if a scientific hypothesis is specifically categorical in its essential features (is sufficiently risky), it leaves itself open to falsification by appropriate experimental data. In such case, the falsity of the proposition would be certain and final.

“If any hypothesis cannot be falsified in this way, it is not science. If it were otherwise, there would be no end to the “confirmations” one may claim to support any hypothesis. This is why so-called confirmation is not the test of science, for one can always imagine some kind of corroboration, leaving us with only opinions pro and con but no certain knowledge.

“Thus, it is only falsification that can claim certain truth, for the falsity of a scientific hypothesis is derived not by induction but by deduction. The force of logic supports it.

“Accordingly, we can never be certain that a scientific hypothesis is true, but we can be certain that it is false. Yet, we are justified in believing that a hypothesis is true if it has strong predictive power and has not, thus far, been falsified.

“However, justification does not equal certainty, for all justified beliefs must be considered provisional. To put it differently, we should leave our minds open regarding the truth or falsity of any scientific theory.

“Popper advises that only falsification moves us in the direction of truth, for knowledge is always a work in progress.”

I suggest you read the above material with a view to comprehending it.

Banno,

Philosophy is not science, yet, by a process of strict logic, it may tell us what science is and is not. This is the philosophical problem of demarcation. Popper tells us that falsification and not verification gives logically irrefutable truth. A very simple example of the logic of falsification follows:

(1) Take the proposition, “All swans are white.” Note that this is a categorical statement. It is either true or false. There is no middle ground.

(2) For centuries, the proposition was believed to be true, for no one had ever encountered a swan that was not white. Yet the proposition cannot have been called unquestionably true, for no one knew what the future would hold regarding swans of a different color.

(3) Black swans were discovered in Australia. This falsified the proposition, “All swans are white.” There is no way the proposition can now be true. It has become absolutely false for all time.

NOTE: THIS IS NOT A MATTER OF OPINION BUT RATHER OF PURE IRREFUTABLE LOGIC.
However, this holds true only for categorical propositions. Pooper tells us that such statements are the backbone of science, for only categorical propositions are falsifiable.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Section 3. The Problem of Demarcation) presents a somewhat more technical explanation:

“Popper accordingly rejects the view that induction is the characteristic method of scientific investigation and inference, substituting falsifiability in its place. It is easy, he argues, to obtain evidence in favour of virtually any theory, and he consequently holds that such “corroboration”, as he terms it, should count scientifically only if it is the positive result of a genuinely “risky” prediction, which might conceivably have been false. In a critical sense, Popper’s theory of demarcation is based upon his perception of the asymmetry which, at the level of logic, holds between verification and falsification: it is logically impossible to verify a universal proposition by reference to experience (as Hume saw clearly), but a single genuine counter-instance falsifies the corresponding universal law. In a word, an exception, far from “proving” a rule, conclusively refutes it.”

Xtrix,

Centuries of experience in the law have taught that expert opinions are a very low grade of evidence. Popper, the greatest philosopher of science of the 20th Century, has shown that unfalsifiable opinions are no part of the scientific method. This means that climatology is only pseudo-science. The disposition of some climatologist to falsify their data only emphasizes this point.

In the western world, the doctrines of Neo-Marxism are treated by some as a kind of religion. Chief among these doctrines is anthropogenic climate change. Those who question this “religion” are personally attacked--as many of the posts herein have amply demonstrated. However, the truth has a surprising way of showing its face.

Anyone who takes the trouble to read the various opinions of climatologists will realize that the code cracks itself.

Tim Wood,

“The fault…is in yourself, that you are an underling.” [From Julius Caesar by Shakespeare]

Tom Storm,

Carbon dioxide is not a toxic gas. In fact, it is necessary for all life on the planet. As I pointed out in my OP, toxic material released in the atmosphere is harmful to all animal life. Ironically, it also lowers the temperature. So that if climate cooling is to your liking, a nuclear conflagration would give you a fine ice age.

TClark,

If consensus is agreeable to you, fine. Just understand that it has nothing to do with the scientific method.

The opinion of so-called experts is admissible in murder trials, for example, but with an instruction to the jury that such testimony is an inferior grade of evidence that should be received with caution.

[Sadly, after prosecuting hundreds of murder cases, it has been my experience that the character of the opinion depends on who is paying the expert.]

jgill,

Unfortunately, climatology remains a “basket weaving course."

Prisnhon,

If what you say about chaos theory is true, perhaps we should blame climate change on the butterflies who have the temerity to flap their wings.


Banno,

Seeking a peer review from climatologists who promote human-caused climate change is like asking the Taliban for its position on women’s rights.

Boethius,

I can only suggest that you reread my post with a view to comprehending it. You just do not get it.

I cite six references. It is apparent that you have read none of them.

TClark,

In the portion of my work that you cite, I make the Popper argument. Karl Popper rejected the notion of consensus in matters of science, insisting that a scientific postulate can only be based upon experimentation and is formulated with such particularity that it is subject to falsification. Like psychology, he would rank climatology as pseudoscience.

Consensus is a political process having nothing to do with the scientific method.

Xtri,

You are a closed-minded fool who believes that anyone who disagrees with you deserves to be dead. I will not wish the same for you, even though you do not agree with the freedom of speech enshrined in the First Amendment--the most basic of all human rights. Actually, I pity you.

I will reduce the question of consciousness (C) to its basic form without the use of obscure jargon.

Questions:

(1) How do we know that the brain produces C?

When the body is infused with certain chemicals (which are material and tangible) unconscious (un-C) results. Blunt impact to the head can cause un-C. If a surgeon damages a certain part of the brain a predictable effect can be un-C or else the elimination of certain kinds of conscious experiences. C is part of the physical world, because, when we walk about, we do not leave our C behind. If C were a different order of existence from the physical, it could not attach itself to a physical object.

(2) How does the brain, a physical object, produce C, something that is experienced as purely intangible?

This is the “hard problem” of C. No one has thus far given a convincing answer to this question. I might add that it is a problem for science and not philosophy.

Some Features of Consciousness

(1) C cannot exist independently of a human or animal brain.

(2) Free will cannot exist without C; for, to act freely, one must be aware of what he is doing. However, one can consciously experience a reflex action while, at the same time, being aware that the action was not the product of his will.

(3) No conscious experience can have a duration of nil. Indeed, any experience without some duration, however brief, is no experience at all. Events outside the body similarly must have some duration, else they would not exist.

(4) Accordingly, every perception must be spread over time in order to provide an experience of external reality. If it were otherwise, one would “forget” the beginning of an event before he got to the end. The faculty that allows the extension of an experience over time is called memory.

(5) A bit of reflection will reveal that C is itself a special kind of memory.

(6) Conscious experiences, like all of reality, are temporally continuous in the ontological sense. That is, there are no temporal points in either reality or the perception of it and consequently no perfect intervals; for time is not a series. [McTaggart
notwithstanding]

(7) The contents of C are subjective in the sense that they are more or less limited to the spatial extent of the brain and can really only be known by a subject who experiences them. This makes the contents of C private, in that they are not directly accessible by others.

(8) However, we have every reason to believe that C is experienced the same by all humans. C is not empirical, because it does not necessarily require the intercession of the senses. When one uses the expression, ”conscious,” everyone knows what it means. Indeed, one cannot communicate with another unless both are conscious. In this sense, C may be called objective.

(9) C was naturally selected because it is necessary for the will, and the will has great value in the struggle for existence, for it allows deliberation and planning.

(10) One cannot be conscious without being conscious of something, whether it be a current perception, a more distant memory, a feeling such as pain or joy, a language, a mathematical formula, a plan, a musical composition, and so forth.

(11) One can properly say that a perception does not correspond to some external reality [whatever that may be] but one cannot properly say that C itself is illusory, for an illusion presumes a conscious subject who experiences the illusion—just as a deception requires someone who is deceived. In other words, a deception or an illusion cannot exist independently of a conscious mind.

Joshs and Gnomon,

I think we have reached the stage of beating a dead horse. However, I will make just a few more observations, first as to Kant’s ontology:

1. Kant considered reality to consist of material things (noumena) [note the plural]. He denied that he was an idealist, calling himself instead an empirical realist. His sole claim to that title lay in his belief that reality consisted of material things that were real in there own right.

Kant contrasted himself with Berkeley who denied the reality of matter and believed that the real world consisted of souls.

[Plato states in the Dialogues what he claimed were the ontology and epistemology of Socrates. We will take it that they were in fact Plato’s own views and set them down hereinafter in simplified and abbreviated form.

The ultimate reality consists of a world of ideals or “forms” These are generalities, like the good and the beautiful, as well as the axioms of geometry. They have a discrete realty independent of the human mind, and are outside of time and space, unchanging, eternal and without weight and size. They are perfections and not sense impressions, for the latter give us only “shadows” of the real world, the world of ideals. Thus, the latter is not accessible to us by way of the senses. The ideals can only be understood by the use of pure reason.]

Kant’s epistemology can properly be called antirealist. He argued that the nature of material things real in themselves was completely inaccessible to us. When the senses, principally sight, encountered such a thing, the perception of it was conditioned in the mind by intuitions such as time, space and causation. Although this process yielded a percept sensible to us, it did not re-present the thing as it was in itself. Thus, Kant denied us any window to reality.

Kant maintained that time, space and causation were not things real in themselves, nor were they conditions of things real in themselves. They were real to us because of the particular way the human mind deals with reality. Thus, the world that we experience is not the real world but a world of our own making.

Joshs,

I disagree slightly with your interpretation of Kant. It is true that he held that ”the physical exists but is unknowable in itself,” as you put it. However, to him, physical things were empirical realities and not ideals.

The percepts arising from encounters with such realities, on the other hand, did not exist outside of the mind and accordingly could be called “ideal.”

Kant insisted that the percepts in no way resembled the realities. He did not maintain that real things caused the percepts; for if they did, they would reveal some aspect of those realities. Instead, Kant argued that the percepts arose from encounters with real things in such a way that they in no way resembled real things. Further, Kant had maintained that causation was a thing of the mind that represented nothing real in itself.

Thus, the percept and the real thing were completely separable. The latter would exist without the former, but the former would not exist without the latter. None of this makes a great deal of sense to me, and I am not alone in this. Many have questioned the validity of Kant’s aesthetic.

Kant also denied that time and space, (and therefore motion and change) were real in themselves. To him they were pure creations of the mind.

Kant argued that thought was not at all as it seemed. Our experience of time is based upon the impression that one thought follows another. However, Kant argued that thought was in reality a perfection wherein all thinking was unified without any unfolding of successive thoughts. This explanation is hard to swallow. Apparently, Kant painted himself into this corner, because there seemed no other way to deny the reality of time.

To All,

Consciousness is a special kind of memory. It is memory, because it is not possible to have a conscious experience in only an instant (in the sense of a spatial point). There is no consciousness without temporal extension. Indeed, anything that “exists” without temporal extension (duration), however brief, simply does not exist. So that, any action of the body, conscious or unconscious, is possible because of memory

But, what is the special kind of memory that makes the actions of the body what we call “consciously made”? Unconscious actions, such as reflex action and so-called muscle memory, we know are not consciously made. But, what exactly does this mean? Simply put, it means that these actions occur “automatically” (without the intercession of consciousness).

Yet, we know that we can consciously dictate our bodily actions. This we call the will. We also know that without consciousness, there can be no will [simply because we cannot make a decision of any kind unless we are conscious].

Thus, we may be confident in saying that it is consciousness that makes the will possible. We may say further that consciousness was naturally selected to allow the exercise of the will. The latter gives us the capability to do one thing and not another when we have the power to do either. We can weigh the alternatives and plan our actions. Who can deny that such a thing has great evolutionary value? Indeed, it has allowed us to dominate the earth.

It does not define consciousness to declare that it is “irreducibly subjective,” for this means only “self-centered.” [Not in the sense of selfish but rather in the sense of self-generated.] Thus, for example, the actions of a cockroach are subjective, in the sense that they are generated by its own nervous system and not that of any other cockroach--even though we know are all such insects are fundamentally similar. However, their similarity does not prevent them from acting individually.

In humans, subjectivity means essentially the same. The conscious experiences of any particular person are limited to the spatial extent of the brain. Thus, those experiences are private in the sense that they are not directly accessible by others. However, this state of affairs reveals a feature of consciousness [subjectivity] but does not explain exactly what it is. Indeed, such a thing is impossible.

One cannot give an objective account of consciousness; for any such account can only be expressed and understood through language. Yet consciousness in presumed in all linguistic intercourse. In other words, individuals cannot communicate through language without being conscious in the first place. One cannot give a meaningful account of a thing necessarily presumed in the explanation itself.

One can only know consciousness by experiencing it, and one can speak of consciousness only to those who are conscious. In such case, the use of the expression, “conscious,” is meaningful to all, because all have experienced it. One cannot, for example, express consciousness to a computer; for this device is not conscious and experiences nothing.