• John Doe
    84
    Why do you think he is he doing metaphysics? How can phenomenology be metaphysics? Phenomenology and metaphysics are strongly opposed I thought...bloodninja

    I'm not sure I can answer the question straight-off like that because my sense is that he fails to live up to his stated goal of moving beyond metaphysics. So I could probably only give a reasonable reply if you explain to me how you think he manages to do away with metaphysics; that is to say, philosophize in a way that is free of implicit metaphysical commitments.

    I'll just list the sort of concerns one might have: Dasein appears to be a sort of metaphysical entity, insofar as it seems to be an entity that can be characterized and justified on unhistorical, acultural, a priori grounds; there's nothing in the text to suggest that Dasein could not be conceived as a sort of super-entitly -- akin to Hegel's Geist -- which we all participate in (each human being is a "bit" of Dasein). Heidegger's characterization of Dasein is justified on the sorts of grounds which would mean that it must apply to any rational creatures living three galaxies away. So at this point we're moving beyond a limited explanation or description of how our particular humanistic forms of life appear from inside the world (as is the case in Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, etc.) and going towards a more Kantian metaphysical picture about the necessary conditions for the emergence of rationality as such.
  • bloodninja
    235
    characterized and justified on unhistorical, acultural, a priori groundsJohn Doe

    I agree with this.

    there's nothing in the text to suggest that Dasein could not be conceived as a sort of super-entitly -- akin to Hegel's Geist -- which we all participate in (each human being is a "bit" of Dasein).John Doe

    I don't agree with this. I am dasein. I am not a "bit" of dasein, I am dasein as a whole. Dasein characterises the being of the entity that is us. You could only misconceive it as a "super-entity".

    Dasein is justified on the sorts of grounds which would mean that it must apply to any rational creatures living three galaxies awayJohn Doe

    Okay... what sorts of grounds. What does rationality (or rational creature) have to do with the meaning of dasein?

    and going towards a more Kantian metaphysical picture about the necessary conditions for the emergence of rationality as such.John Doe

    I have no idea where you are getting this from. The emergence of rationality? Are you serious?
  • John Doe
    84
    I don't agree with this. I am dasein. I am not a "bit" of dasein, I am dasein as a whole. Dasein characterises the being of the entity that is us. You could only misconceive it as a "super-entity".bloodninja

    That's fine, interpret however you like, but it's one very prominent reading of the text. There's nothing in the text which rules this reading out, and I take that to be inherently problematic for any assertion that there's no metaphysics at work in B&T, at least in the absence of someone providing an explanation of how s/he reads Heidegger as getting beyond metaphysics.

    Okay... what sorts of grounds. What does rationality (or rational creature) have to do with the meaning of dasein?bloodninja

    Being-in-the-world is the condition of the possibility of present-at-hand knowledge. The care-structure of Dasein enables a creature's rational capacities. No creature can, without this care-structure, engage in concept-application or discursive conceptualization.

    I have no idea where you are getting this from. The emergence of rationality? Are you serious?bloodninja

    I am serious. We can dig into the text if you want, but I'm getting this, I think, pretty transparently from the history of philosophy and Heidegger's response to that history. His gripe with Kant is that the Zuhanden is categorically distinct and epistemically prior to the Vorhanden. And I'm not sure what you think the "present-at-hand" relation to objects is supposed to be if not the capacity for rationality built on conceptualization.
  • bloodninja
    235
    Heidegger's characterization of Dasein is justified on the sorts of grounds which would mean that it must apply to any rational creatures living three galaxies away. So at this point we're moving beyond a limited explanation or description of how our particular humanistic forms of life appear from inside the world (as is the case in Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, etc.) and going towards a more Kantian metaphysical picture about the necessary conditions for the emergence of rationality as such.John Doe

    I think what I disagree with in the above is that you seem to be saying, in shortened form, "if rational then dasein". Especially when you say "it must apply to any rational creatures living three galaxies away". Heidegger does not offer (or imply) an argument of this kind ("if rational then dasein"). If you can find one, please enlighten me :smile:
  • Akanthinos
    847
    Consciousness (being itself, not this or that subjective consciousness) has an object for Husserl,InternetStranger

    It is more accurate to say that for Husserl, consciousness is the object & the object is consciousness.

    "Husserl’s epistemological insight is that there is no such distinction between consciousness and object, as had been assumed by Descartes and subsequently taken up in a slightly different form by Kant. In Husserl’s thought, the terms “noesis” and “noema” do not so much identify distinct items set over against each other (e.g. consciousness and object) as much as they provide a linguistic vehicle to speak about the interpenetration of each by the other as aspects of a more inclusive whole, the Life-world—understood in its broadest sense. A key point made by Fink in his article for the neo-Kantians is that when we think of the world, it is always a world already containing us thinking it; this fact is overlooked by the Kantian picture of the world; a picture which assumes a perspective that is neither consciousness nor world but which sets each over against the other. For Kant, this imagined perspective is what gives us access to the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds; ironically, it is also this perspective that makes the transcendental deduction necessary, since the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal is a state of affairs to which we do not have direct access and must, of necessity, deduce it."

    - https://www.iep.utm.edu/phen-red/
  • Corvus
    59
    Is it not the case for MH, he doesn't care about either Phenomenology or Metaphysics for Dasein?

    What is meaningful for Dasein is that it is aware of itself as being in the world, which keeps dealing with daily lives solving problems, and keeps living realising his temporality of being, being towards death?
  • Dan123
    25
    But then, they say that MH's Ontology is not Metaphysics, but is Existentialism.Corvus

    In my opinion, is seems from the little I know that, for Heidegger, metaphysics is a covering up of the phenomena.bloodninja

    ↪John Doe Why do you think he is he doing metaphysics? How can phenomenology be metaphysics? Phenomenology and metaphysics are strongly opposed I thought...bloodninja

    Heidegger is doing Ontology, Phenomenology, and Existentialism all at once. To ask what something is (ontology) is to ask about beings only insofar as they meaningfully 'show up' to Dasein (phenomenology). There is no asking about what lies 'behind' the phenomena: it is a meaningless impossibility to reach behind the horizon that we ourselves are so as to unveil how entities could be as they could be without being disclosed to us. Grounding the disclosure of the phenomena is Being-in-the-world. There is no man without world, and no world without man. Man and world are fused together as one: finite and temporal Dasein always-already 'transcends' towards a socially-shared world of meaning and significance, á la Being-in-the-world. To be a human-being is to be an opening of sense, a clearing or light (das Lichtung or Lux) through which the phenomena are 'dis-closed' as such and such to Dasein.

    Dasein's way of being essentially related to the world - Dasein's way of being-in-the-world - is largely in terms of concrete ways of who Dasein itself is to-be ["Dasein is in each case mine."]. Dasein's Being matters to it, and this 'mattering' is constitutive of the being that Dasein is. Dasein presses-ahead towards possibilities, and lives life in terms of these possibilities for itself that it has been thrown into ("Potential is higher than the actual."). As fundamentally Care (Sorge), Dasein always-already concernfully transcends towards an arena or world of sense that is opened through Dasein's way of Being-possibility or being a "potentiality-for-Being".

    The structure of Dasein's way of being-immersed in-the-world or transcendence towards the world - an immersion that is one of concern or Care - is largely existential in nature. For example, Dasein is forever in-a-mood - such as inauthentic being-anxious as Dasein flees from itself in anxiety, and (more generally) the myriad of ways Dasein already 'finds itself' in a world that matters to it (in which certain things are attractive, or insufferable, or threatening, or boring, etc.). As Being-towards-death, authentic Dasein anxiously grapples with the inevitability of its ownmost death, which shockwaves the way things and itself typically matter to it. So, to say Dasein is existential is not to say that Dasein is kind of being who has to intensely deal with issues in its life that matter to it, rather, it to say that Dasein is existential in its way of being immersed in the world: Dasein dwells mood-wise, Dasein understands and lives through in terms of possibilities that matter to it, entities within-the-world are disclosed in terms of the possibilities that I am thrown into and concernfully navigate life by, etc.

    Metaphysics, as understood by Heidegger, 'conceals' or 'covers up' the essential nature of Dasein as Being-in-the-world and Dasein's essential relation to entities or beings. There are several metaphysical understandings of what it is to be a thing, person, and related to things and other people that have already been covered in this forum that I won't recite here. To understand what it is to be in any of those purported ways miss the above picture all together. I think.
  • bloodninja
    235
    I totally agree with everything your wrote! Have you read William Blattner's commentaries? e.g. A Reader's Guide & Heidegger's Temporal Idealism. You seem to have a very similar "take" on Heidegger's Being and Time to Blattner... and myself.
  • Dan123
    25
    ↪Dan123 I totally agree with everything your wrote! Have you read William Blattner's commentaries? e.g. A Reader's Guide & Heidegger's Temporal Idealism. You seem to have a very similar "take" on Heidegger's Being and Time to Blattner... and myself.bloodninja

    Other than Being and Time itself, I've read alot of Dreyfus and Sheehan, among others. Not sure I'd like Blattner though, since I don't think the early Heidegger falls into solipsism/idealism, if that is what Blattner's Temporal Idealism ultimately means. But I should still read it!
  • Dan123
    25
    Dasein appears to be a sort of metaphysical entityJohn Doe
    as a sort of super-entitly -- akin to Hegel's Geist -- which we all participate in (each human being is a "bit" of Dasein).John Doe

    You're right that Dasein is an entity. But a super-entity? Dasein is certainly a special kind of entity insofar as it is a clearing, an open-space of revealing, temporal, a sense-maker, a world-disclosure, etc. Other entities - such as rocks, chairs, movies, animals, atoms, myths, and god - certainly are not that. [However, see Graham Harman's Tool-Being for a philosophy that interestingly argues that those entities are.] Though, in a sense, you are right when you say that "Dasein... [is that] which we all participate in." But it would be a critical mistake that betrays everything Heidegger was arguing for to say that Dasein is a kind of monolithic metaphysical-thing that is other than us that we each participate in. I think the vast majority of scholarship would deny you on this point, if that is the kind of thing you are arguing for. So, Dasein is me. Dasein is you. (I think) It is true that multiple Daseins are immersed-in shared matrixes of meaning to which multiple Daseins are constitutive of and make sense of their lives through. But, such immersion-in-worlds is constitutive of Dasein itself - the being that each of us are - not of something other than me and you that we each "participate" in called 'Dasein'.

    Heidegger's characterization of Dasein is justified on the sorts of grounds which would mean that it must apply to any rational creatures living three galaxies away.John Doe
    Okay... what sorts of grounds. What does rationality (or rational creature) have to do with the meaning of dasein?bloodninja

    The fact that a being is "rational" does not necessitate that that being is Dasein. Though it is difficult to respond to your claim here because it's not clear, at least to me, what you mean by "rational." For Heidegger, Dasein is not essentially a rational-animal. Dasein can certainly think, calculate, understand things 'rationally', in a sense. But any such rationality presupposes a way of Being that Dasein has taken up and pressed-ahead into life through. Only because things already matter and are intelligible as such and such can Dasein comport itself so as to make sense of things in a rational kind of way. Heidegger associates rationality with Dasein's disclosure of present-at-hand entities, which is not Dasein's primordial way of dealing with things, others, and itself in the world. For Heidegger, 'pure rationality' or a 'purely rationally being' is not possible without a horizon of sense or world of meaning to which one is constitutively immersed-in. So if there were "rational creatures living three galaxies away" they would only be Dasein if they essentially belong to a world of meaning that matters to them that delimits the ways they understand things, themselves, and contextual situations they find themselves in. Now of course, the way such a creature understands might be radically different in content (and maybe transcendental and existential structure, not sure though) then human-Dasein. But, for Heidegger, any "worldless" rational being or subject is not Dasein: it cannot disclose Being. So Dasein cannot be deduced from the fact that a being appears or acts rationally, as you do when you say
    Heidegger's characterization of Dasein is justified on the sorts of grounds which would mean that it must apply to any rational creatures living three galaxies away.John Doe

    The existence of any particular cannot be justified by 'the fact that a being is rational', unless you are first presupposing that 'rational' is a way of Being of Dasein. While it is true that yes rationality presupposes Dasein, the fact that a creature acts, behaves, or appears rational does not necessitate that that being or creature is in fact Dasein. So there is a crucial difference between concluding that rational beings are Dasein by way of grounding rationality in Dasein's way of Being vs inferring that a creature of being is Dasein by observing that it acts or behaves rationally. It's difficult to talk about this subject without falling into a Cartesian understandings of having epistemic access to the rational competencies of a inner subject, which should be avoided.
  • John Doe
    84
    You're right that Dasein is an entity. But a super-entity? Dasein is certainly a special kind of entity insofar as it is a clearing, an open-space of revealing, temporal, a sense-maker, a world-disclosure, etc.Dan123

    Yes. Dasein is a formal ontological structure. So a reasonable concern can be made that any formal ontology of the sort being undertaken in B&T implies that Dasein is a Form which each individual Dasein participates in. And my suggestion here is very close to later Heidegger's own critique of his early work.

    But it would be a critical mistake that betrays everything Heidegger was arguing for to say that Dasein is a kind of monolithic metaphysical-thing that is other than us that we each participate in.Dan123

    Monumental mistake how? A misreading of his goals or his execution? Because obviously that's not his goal, but I believe my concern about his method and execution is entirely legitimate. I worry that he slides into a metaphysics of Dasein, which is certainly different from the metaphysics of substance, but still: how can he derive a transhistorical noncultural formal structure of Dasein from within the lived experience of Dasein unless he's merely giving us one particularly fruitful interpretation of what it is to be a human being?

    For Heidegger, 'pure rationality' or a 'purely rationally being' is not possible without a horizon of sense or world of meaning to which one is constitutively immersed-in. So if there were "rational creatures living three galaxies away" they would only be Dasein if they essentially belong to a world of meaning that matters to them that delimits the ways they understand things, themselves, and contextual situations they find themselves in.Dan123

    Exactly. When you strip everything away Heidegger is still arguing that Dasein is the condition of the possibility of rationality. That of course doesn't imply any commitment to the idea that Dasein is a rational subject -- quite the contrary, Heidegger is arguing that quite a lot is necessary to get to any conceptual rationality -- but at the end of the day any concept-using creature will have the form of Dasein, so Heidegger is making a broad formalistic claim about rationality as such.

    So Dasein cannot be deduced from the fact that a being appears or acts rationally, as you do when you sayDan123

    No, I don't say this! I am saying that, on Heidegger's view, the formal structure of Dasein presents the conditions necessary for the emergence of rational concept-application. You guys seem beholden to the notion that if I raise concerns about Heidegger then I must be some arch-rationalist who has not read him carefully enough.

    The existence of any particular cannot be justified by 'the fact that a being is rational', unless you are first presupposing that 'rational' is a way of Being of Dasein. While it is true that yes rationality presupposes Dasein, the fact that a creature acts, behaves, or appears rational does not necessitate that that being or creature is in fact Dasein. So there is a crucial difference between concluding that rational beings are Dasein by way of grounding rationality in Dasein's way of Being vs inferring that a creature of being is Dasein by observing that it acts or behaves rationally. It's difficult to talk about this subject without falling into a Cartesian understandings of having epistemic access to the rational competencies of a inner subject, which should be avoided.Dan123

    This is genuinely interesting. Heidegger distinguishes human from animal life by saying that humans have a world and animals merely have an environment. I take it that language - thus concepts - are necessary for a world, an awareness of one's 'pressing into possibilities', of death, and so forth. This does not mean that when we turn a door-knob this means-end rational activity involves concepts or rational mindedness. Indeed, animals can also exhibit means-end rationality. But what I think you miss is that the capacity for language and concepts play a hugely important role in this whole story. There is no Dasein without language and concepts, just as (due to the formal ontological structure) there can be no language and concepts without Dasein. His anti-Cartesian account of language, concepts, rationality, Zuhanden relation to objects, etc. is interwoven with the whole account.
  • Corvus
    59
    There is no Dasein without language and concepts, just as (due to the formal ontological structure) there can be no language and concepts without Dasein. His anti-Cartesian account of language, concepts, rationality, Zuhanden relation to objects, etc. is interwoven with the whole account.John Doe

    What about then disabled people like deaf and dumb? Do they get excluded from Dasein?
  • Dan123
    25
    There is no Dasein without language and concepts, just as (due to the formal ontological structure) there can be no language and concepts without Dasein. His anti-Cartesian account of language, concepts, rationality, Zuhanden relation to objects, etc. is interwoven with the whole account.
    — John Doe

    What about then disabled people like deaf and dumb? Do they get excluded from Dasein?
    Corvus

    I'd say no. For Heidegger, language is not 'the totality of words or utterances that belong to a standard way of verbally communicating.' Language obviously gets interpreted as such a way, but this is a 'deworlded' interpretation. The Word-Things (specific words) of a 'language' are already embedded within the world as ready-to-hand significations, rather than terms used to denote mental pictures or ideas that may or may not correspond to their real or ideal thing beyond one's perception. This latter way of understanding word-things is a possible kind of interpretation though, but it is a deworlded, presence-at-hand way of relating/Being/understanding.

    Language as such (and more broadly, Discourse) is the way an already operative field of significance gets "Articualted" or "expressed" as Dasein navigates life. But meaning can get articulated in many, many ways, depending on the context (or milieu of meaning to which Daseins co-consitituve belong to). For example, silence, in a sense, speaks. It means something to be silent in given situations. Hand-shakes, yelling, ways of speaking, enunciations, laughter, ways of dressing, cleaning, supporting a friend, stopping at a red light etc,etc,etc, are all ways of navigating and expressing meaning. This, rather than being-able-to-verbally-or-coherently-speak-a-language, is constitutive of Dasein. So, since the "dumb and deaf" person navigates life through meaning and the possibilities in terms of which meaning is given, the disabled person is Dasein despite it's lack of ability to verbally and coherently speak a language such as french or english. T

    Though I am not sure that every person with a psychological disorder is Dasein. That would be a big topic though. I'm not trying to go down that path here.
  • Corvus
    59
    Mr PhiOsophy is banned? Why? I wasn't aware of it.
    His B&T chapter summaries were very good.

    Perhaps someone else should take up the task?
    And the reading B&T should be continued to the end in this thread?
    So we could keep asking questions and debating based on the B&T?
  • Corvus
    59
    What I feel about MH's being is that, even if he does Ontology, Phenomenology and Metaphysics, they are totally different nature from that of Descartes, Husserl and Plato and Kant.

    MH's being is based on everyday lived existence, and that's where his Ontology, Phenomenology and Metaphysics is based, which is unique?

    But I feel that Everyday Lived Existence is totally different mode of existence from Metaphysical mode. I am not sure how one lives daily ordinary life, and be able to think in metaphysical, phenomenological and ontological way.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MqkLrQMhZVk
  • Dan123
    25
    Is their a reading schedule that everyone here is following?
  • John Doe
    84
    Mr PhiOsophy is banned? Why? I wasn't aware of it.Corvus

    Is their a reading schedule that everyone here is following?Dan123

    There was a reading schedule until Mr. PhilOsophy asked a moderator to ban him because he was spending too much time on this site. Three cheers for Mr. Phil, wherever he is -- we appreciate your service, buddy. :party:

    I think that anyone who feels competent enough to take up a reading schedule and summaries should feel free to do so. Although the thread does seem to be dying out, and I have a ton of work that limits my ability to post regularly, so it might be better to let sleeping dogs lie, or convert this into a general discussion thread, or something.
  • John Doe
    84
    What about then disabled people like deaf and dumb? Do they get excluded from Dasein?Corvus

    I'm not sure what the intellectual threshold is for Dasein, though it is a question worth asking, especially (sorry to say folks) given his Nazi affiliation and the horrible things they were doing to the mentally challenged. (We know from the Black Notebooks that he put the notion of "worldhood" to work as a noxious justification of his anti-semitism; justifying his anti-semitism by calling jews "wordless".)

    But I think that what I meant by "concepts" being integral to Dasein is at the level of world, not at the individual level. Concepts and Present-at-Hand conceptual knowledge of the universe are necessary to create, say, an IPhone, which is then reintegrated into our worldly dealings as ready-to-hand use-objects (not that Heidegger is a great fan of technology). I can then in certain circumstances sit and ponder a thing, in this case an IPhone, conceptually and rationally from a scientific viewpoint, in other circumstances I can integrate it into my life and use it as a tool nonconceptually.
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