• Alexandre Harvey-Tremblay
    My understanding is that a lot of modern physics is sadly divorced from empirical reality. Your theory is in that same spirit, I gather. Physical laws are contingent and could be some other way in some other universe. People take this kind of reasoning seriously. Maybe they're right. I think the problem is that we've gotten to the point where experiments are just too expensive, so physicists go looking for mathematical trouble.fishfry

    When I started this program, I was under the impression that once I get it 'right' most of the laws of physics, as we know them would be revealed to be wrong and replaced by less 'arbitrary' construction. I did not anticipate that the current laws would be already be so close to it. QM needs a tiny (conceptual space) but large (mathematical space) generalization for instance.

    As minimal as the axioms required to formally define the practice of science are, they are nonetheless sufficient to induce a structure in which the laws of physics emerge as the rules which preserves this structure, and that may make them appear as non-contingent, they are in fact contingent on the practice of science being possible.
  • cjameskeller

    Following your work with close interest. You were able to get an endorsement from Gregory Chaitin on one of your recent submissions to Academia. Would it be possible to coordinate with him to carry out the experiment outlined in section 4.8?
  • Kenosha Kid

    Full disclosure, not fully absorbed this yet. But while I'm grappling with the rest, can you explain your employment of entropy a little more? You don't seem to be deriving or merely defining it, rather introducing it as... a law.
  • Kenosha Kid
    I submit that there is a fundamental problem with considering that the world is made of things rather than facts, and I believe the problem is insurmountable.
    I have tried to explain it before using a different formulation, however using universal facts now makes it incredibly difficult (I believe) for anyone not to see
    and understand it.
    1. Universal facts constitute the set of all infallible-justified-true-beliefs.
    2. Person A claims to hold a conception of the world which is not supported by universal facts alone (e.g. ice cream is a thing, not a fact).
    3. It thus follows, necessarily, that person A’s conception of the world cannot be an infallible-justified-true-belief.

    This doesn't hold up. If, for instance, "there is a dog in the field" is a fact, there is no contradiction with there also being a thing (a dog). In fact, any universal fact that states there are things must be true.
  • Alexandre Harvey-Tremblay
    there is no contradiction with there also being a thing (a dog)Kenosha Kid

    Correct, there is no contradiction and I did not claim such: simply that the 'dog as a thing' is a fallible belief, as one could always claim solipsism to argue that the dog does not exist as a thing. Whereas universal facts are infallible-justified-true-beliefs.
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