Well, I prefer your account as it implies hope.

What I mean is, if the above statement is true, then good would be that which aids life and bad the opposite. — Kaplan

I guess as a presupposition I have generally subscribed to something similar - but the devil is in the detail. I have ususally held (something close to Sam Harris), it is better to be alive than dead, better to be well than sick, better to be happy than sad. My sense of morality follows from this.

I guess a good example of the first discussion would be when people discuss things like political and are open to actually listening to different view points. — Spencer Thurgood

Interesting. I generally see political conversations as amongst the most tribal and intractable, so I haven't often had the experience of common ground in those discussions. I would have thought simulation theory is much easier and more fun for people to talk about than right-wing versus left-wing political solutions.

Certain issues are just in themselves controversial, like abortion or taxation or gun ownership, which readily find people ranting and shutting down.

At the most basic level this would assist us with every single moral question as it is the foundation. What I mean is, if the above statement is true, then good would be that which aids life and bad the opposite. As to the exact permutations and combinations this would look like in specific moral questions and practical/applied ethics, that is not my goal here. — Kaplan

Living is not an obligation of life because life has no moral obligation to live regardless of needs and preferences. — Mark S

Agree.

The first is a discussion in which present day events and historical events are discussed and used as resources to create what could be argued as the perfect society. This is generally found in productive discussion of politics, ethics, morality, etc.

The second is a discussion that often revolve around the social sciences and even some of the psychological sciences such as "gender identity", "consciousness", "spirituality". These debate tend to be subjective in conception, ie "are we a simulations on a computer" and as a result are very difficult to have a productive conversation about. — Spencer Thurgood

I haven't noticed this. I've mostly noticed discussions about epistemology and metaphysics mostly. We seem to keep coming back to what it is we can say about knowledge/truth/reality and how we can know it. In the end most discussions or arguments hinge upon these matters as the fundamental building blocks for anything else we may go on to say about morality, science, the transcendent.

I don't think any discussion goes anywhere if people are too firmly attached to their presuppositions - doesn't matter if we are talking politics, cookery or bushcraft. But the curious thing is even zealots do change their minds and the debates they participate in can create significant shifts in their thinking, even as they fervently insist you are wrong. I've met many atheists, for instance, who are former religious fundamentalists and the process of change, when viewed from the outside by others most likely looked like complete resistance to new ideas. You just never know what will make a person change. Or when it might happen.

I don't associate aggressiveness with apologetics so much as naive confidence — wonderer1

I meant aggressive in the sense of super assertive and unassailably confident, not hostile.

The cultural gap is just too wide. — wonderer1

Probably right.

WLC is skilled at presenting arguments, and conveying the sense that any reasonable person must come to the same conclusions he does — wonderer1

He's definitely a very smart man but I find his style reminds me of a used car dealer, haranguing you to buy the product. For my taste he's too slick, too fast, too insinuating.

Interesting. There seems to be a similar performative contradiction in Donald Hoffman's idealist philosophy - if evolution is only about survival and does not support humans acquiring truth about reality, how does Hoffman ascertain that his metaphysics is true? I recall his response being something like - 'I don't, everything is wrong, even my theory.' Perhaps this is taking fallibilism too far.

Thanks.

The premises of arguments for God depend greatly on intuitions, and intuitions (key to making the arguments seem like sound arguments) tend to get reinforced on Sunday mornings. — wonderer1

I hear you. I agree that some Christians are good at reason. And often they feel they need to be in a world that privileges reason and evidence over faith and feeling. When I think of defensive, perhaps even aggressive reasoning, I tend to think of apologists. Especially the presuppositionalists. Most atheists I know (certainly those who are not in America and don't have to face fundamentalists) are complacent and don't care much about the arguments for or against god. Their atheism is often a kind of lazy cultural scientism. You know the kind of thing - 'science makes sense, god's don't.'

But mortals are haunted by opportunity cost, to name just one ghost. Is it better to be Beethoven or Kant ? — plaque flag

Interesting point. In the finite amount of time and brief attention span of my life, I've never considered pursuing an intellectual or cultural project of consequence. It's more likely: do I sleep in or do I do the shopping? And I suspect that no matter how many years most of us are given to live, we are never going to be Beethoven or Kant. I doubt talent like this is just waiting for time to unleash it. And I suspect that's a blessing. Maybe being Peter the electrician, or Mary the accountant is a finer and more rewarding experience in the living of it (certainly compared to Beethoven). Even as a half-baked romantic, I think I would much prefer an 'enjoyable' life to an influential, or prodigious one. The question of a realist theory of language and all that this might imply may well be a decadent and nugatory pursuit. :wink:

Everything here is lost to history within about three posts. This is a safe space for misplaced confidence. :grin: — apokrisis

I'm glad I'm not the only one. Sometimes I find myself in a discussion with someone and I can't for the life of me remember the point we were exploring.

I wish I could understand this. If only I had spent my life doing some interesting reading instead of drinking in bars.. :wink:

To be sure, there is some interesting stuff in the philosophy of religion, but it seems very rare for it to actually change people's opinions or even influence theology much. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Agree. I don't think reason counts much in the god debates. You either buy the idea or you don't. I personally have no sensus divinitatis (to borrow from Calvin) so the notion of god is incoherent from my perspective, no matter how it is spun.

How can death and suffering exist without life? Something has to be alive in order for it to die, right? That's all I was getting at. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No - that's not the point I am making. I'd say you're overlooking the obvious. This is not just death and suffering exist; this is creation as a orgiastic instantiation of chaos, death and suffering. Specifically the mechanism of predation is predicated on extremes of cruelty and violence. This is built into the fabric of creation - survival is not possible without this. Now why would a 'good' god who could do anything specifically chose a creation built upon predation - suffering and chaos as a way of life?

Is there? When people talk about "the laws of physics," or "natural laws," I don't think they're generally presupposing any sort of "lawgiver." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Indeed they do - read anything by any Islamic or Christian apologists - its a key line 'a law implies a lawgiver'. William Lane Craig, a big name Christian philosopher maintains this in most of his work. This is one of the reasons why many atheists no longer refer to the 'Laws of logic' but prefer the 'logical axioms'. Our language influences our arguments. But I agree with you that this shouldn't be the case. Laws are metaphors.

My point is that this sort of argument runs into the problem of then having to explain why the multiverse only creates certain types of universes, that is, ones with "physical laws." — Count Timothy von Icarus

My problem is we don't know enough about the universe, the earth or even human perception and consciousness to make any totalizing claims about design. There isn't even agreement about idealism vs materialism. But what we do see, for what it's worth is that the universe seems mostly good at spawning black holes. :smile:

But the relationship between consumerism and industrialism (production) is reciprocal: a radical drop in consumption means less production; less production means fewer jobs, fewer incomes, fewer meals, fewer everything, — BC

We'll never know until we try and it looks very much like we have to try. :wink:

But my would-be minimalism isn't motivated by the environment, it is just about my relationship to stuff.

So, since a limitless power (let’s say that also includes limitless imagination) isn’t limited as we are, couldn’t we say that it can also do everything we call impossible?

What do you think? :smile: — leo

I think it seems incoherent.

Maybe you could start by defining power. What does power look like as the limits are removed?

Religion can be a route to minimalism--asceticism. 150 objects with no car, no computer, that one dim light bulb. Grim but holy. And very good for the environment and the soul.

Asceticism has a huge downside: Were it to be widely practiced, it would send the world's economies into free-fall from which there would be much chaos and many deaths. — BC

I wouldn't take the ascetic versions of 'hard' minimalism as its only expression. I think the world can easily manage a radical drop in consumerism. Most of the people I know own way more than 150 objects and don't count their things. But they don't have cars or kitchen appliances, or many clothes or useless furniture. And for the most part they shop in thrift shops. Some of these folk are comfortable financially. I include myself in this group. They still eat out and buy coffees and travel and spend - it just isn't on 'useless' stuff. But we can find faults in any lifestyles. Nothing is perfect.

I have no kitchen appliances - no toaster, kettle, processors, etc. Just an oven and some kitchen tools like a knife, grater, cutlery. No mugs or cups, just a few heatproof glasses. No couch or sofas. No coffee tables or side tables. A couple of years ago I got rid of 2000 books - they were the only things I purchased, mainly second hand. I have about 1000 left. I still own paintings and art - some of which are my parents. These I have struggled to ditch. I still have a long way to go.

Death, suffering, chaos, etc. all only make sense in terms of living things so those issues seem anterior to life existing, more in the bucket of "the problem of evil." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure this is correct - for evil to exist, this seems to require free choice. How can something be evil if it is the necessary requirement for existence, built into it by the creator/evolution? The notion of predation, so much a part of the natural world of animals, must then imply that the natural world is evil. Do you subscribe to this? Manichaeism holds to this view. Earthquakes, fire and floods are built into how nature functions, how can they be evil? Are black holes evil?

When some people attempt to quarantine suffering and pain caused by natural processes as being somehow separate from a 'good' or 'balanced' creation, it seems manipulative or selective.

That PSR is a far assumption for our world has no doubt be challenged, but I think those challenges still are a small minority viewpoint. And that makes sense to me, after all, we don't see pigs materialize out of thin air, second moons appear in the night sky, chop a carrot and have one half turn to dust, etc. There are law-like ways to describe the behaviors of the universe at both the macro and microscales. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I'm not sure this works for me. You talk about 'law-like'. But even in using the term 'laws' this implies a lawgiver - there's a prejudice built into the language. Would it not be fairer to argue that there are various regularities we have observed in our world (let's ignore QM). Do these say anything about a creator or about purpose? Not really. All they say is we have observed regularity. Maybe worth noting that Kant and others hold that our notion of space/time is not really 'out there' in the universe but inside us as part of our cognitive apparatus. Could not many of our accounts of the world be more about us than the world itself? Future accounts/discoveries may see some of those regularities we see be replaced in time. We just don't really know.

mean, if I made the counter claim "whatever is natural is right", how would you show me I'm wrong about that? Would you point to intuition, language use, the canon of ethics...? — Isaac

I wouldn't show you that you are wrong, I would say simply that the case hasn't been made. Why would I accept this claim? What is it about the natural that entails the good? Can this be demonstrated?

Well, is there not a paradigmatic value system that makes such vocabulary intelligible? Is not each fact flowing out of this system of thought framed with expectations and anticipations? Is not each assertative empirical statement a form of question put to experience, an expectation that subsequent events will validate rather than invalidate it? — Joshs

Can you tie this more robustly to is/ought for me?

Now I am still working through refining my thoughts in the above paragraph, but I think the is/ought problem, or the naturalistic fallacy, are unassailable gaps perhaps from one paradigm, but not from another which is just as viable. — Kaplan

The issue here might be that anyone can argue that their paradigm is better than another paradigm - isn't this what creationists do when they poo-poo evolution in favour of the Biblical paradigm? But we still need a demonstration that one paradigm should be privileged over another.

Life by definition wants to live. There is no life otherwise and no discussion of anything. — Kaplan

Even if this is true, can you demonstrate how this assists us with morality as per my earlier question -

Also nothing you have argued seems to go to morality as such. What does this say about homosexuality; drug use; the role of women; capital punishment, poverty, etc? — Tom Storm

because living is the first 'thing' an organism does and is what makes it an organism. Living is an obligation for life. Therefore one ought to live, as being a being implies this by default. — Kaplan

Further to my above response - it doesn't matter how deep you go into the process of life, the point is you are still committing the naturalistic fallacy (which is close to the is/ought fallacy). Just because something is the case in nature does not make that something right. The natural is not the same as the good.

You can't get an ought from an is. Oh, I see Jesus got there before me. Just because you have determined that something is nature doing its job does not make it ipso facto right. One could argue that cancer is just nature efficiently doing what it does. Does that make cancer good?

Also nothing you have argued seems to go to morality as such. What does this say about homosexuality; drug use; the role of women; capital punishment, poverty, etc?

It reminds me of Rorty, who'd call it philosophy's inheritance from the Romantics. — plaque flag

Looks like we were heading in the same direction. :wink:

Agree with most of your feedback to BF.

Poetry has high status.
— apokrisis

I'm not sure it enjoys as high a status today as it did at other times, speaking generally of course. — Janus

Indeed. Poetry now inhabits a cultural backwater, like bocce or folk dancing - there's a cognoscenti for it, but it's only a shadow of what used to be.

I don't see why mechanistic reason could not deliver a point of view on feelings and values that is suitable for modern life. — Janus

Indeed and (this is only a minor point) I find it interesting how often pejorative language (like 'mechanistic') is employed to describe reason or science. It seems to me that a form of romanticism still has us (perhaps postmodernism is a type of romanticism too) and it seeks to elevate the personal, the emotional, the relationship, the experience, as contrasted with the mechanical, the impersonal, the rational, the transactional, the disenchanted. But I suspect we don't have to use these words to characterize any way of seeing. It depends upon the individual seer.

For example, I'm 99% sure TS would agree (though he is free to correct me if I am wrong) that he didn't develop the intuitive recognitions he has (e.g. that someone has a weapon) from reading a book. Instead those intuitions came from years of interactions with, and observations of, people. Attentiveness to body language and other nonverbal signals undoubtedly played an important role. — wonderer1

Quite right. No reading or study involved. I'm fairly sure the intuition I know is acquired by paying attention to experience and being able to recognize key indicators, which are not necessarily consciously available to me.

:up:

Consider:

"If God is omniscient then God cannot forget anything and cannot create a truth that God does not know. Thus, God is constrained and not omnipotent."

Or:

"God can/cannot create a rock so heavy that God cannot lift it."

Plantinga argued that these turn out not to be real contradictions. The first is logically equivalent with "if there is a truth, God knows it." The second is logically equivalent with "God can lift all rocks." God only doing good things based on God's desires is equivalent with "all of God's actions are good and God only does what God wants to do," which is the same as "God is omnibenevolent and God can do or not do anything God desires." — Count Timothy von Icarus

If God is real, why would human reason or our conceptual frameworks even begin to describe or understand what god can or cannot do? Or what god is. These sorts of questions are likely irrelevant and a bit like trying to teach card tricks to a dog. The notion of god is itself almost incoherent to human comprehension, completely outside our understanding of cause and effect, physics and behavior. Just what we are doing trying to project the known world on an unknowable deity is beyond me.

I guess what we are attempting to do here is imagine god as a kind of personality who is part of our world, but has super powers or magic which can be described and contextualized, based on what we already think we know. We are attempting to constrain or limit the idea and mold it to our presuppositions, our limited understanding of things. But I don't think the concept of god is a crossword puzzle to be solved over the weekend, with cups of tea and some hard thinking. If reason, time and space emanate from god's nature (and who is to know if this is the case?) then god presumably transcends such strictures and as such is likely unintelligible.

What are the chances that our world should be a rational one? To put the question more concretely in the terms of physics: is it likely for a universe evolve from state to state, such that past states dictate future ones? Or, is the apparent rationality of our world evidence for a designer? — Count Timothy von Icarus

As presuppositions go, I don't see overwhelming evidence that the world we think we know is rational or ordered. Humans impose reason and order because we are pattern seeking machines. One could just as well argue that the universe specialises in black holes and chaos and kills most of the life it spawns, often with horrendous suffering. Life on earth is one of predation - for many creatures to eat, suffering and death are required. Why would a universe be designed to produce such chaos and suffering and a natural world which wipes out incalculable numbers of lifeforms with earthquakes, fires and floods? Why would a universe of balance have within it so many meaningless accidental deaths in nature, along with endless horrendous diseases and concomitant wretchedness?

Roughly (or so I claim) the meaningful structure of reality is exactly the kind of meaning in language, so 'the world is all that is the case.' The (intelligible) structure of the world is the meaning of all true sentences, or something like that. There's a surplus in humans though, an ability to hypothesize, lie, and be mistaken. — plaque flag

Yes, I see that. It's not cats on mats or plumbs in iceboxes that are the main problem, it's the very values we live by and for. When someone says, 'There is a God' - there is almost nothing that maps onto any reality I understand or is available to us the way cats or plumbs might be. What does 'there is' mean here? What does 'a God' mean or even 'God'. These four words are like a hall of mirrors.

For everyday practical purposes, language mirrors what we see is going on well enough to be a practical tool for issuing instructions, passing along information, and so on. — Janus

Yes, and isn't it interesting that this is the best we seem to be able to do? Most of us posting here have come up with variations of this frame and often from different backgrounds. All roads lead to utility...

There's also the issue of metaphor itself. What exactly is a metaphor ? If human cognition is fundamentally metaphorical, it's an important question. Roughly I relate it to analogy. I sometimes try to open my front door (where I live) by pushing a button on my car keys. The mind exploits skill in one domain in a new domain. Something like that. — plaque flag

Good point. I tend to think of metaphor as a kind of pattern matching process. Interestingly when people have object recognition deficiencies in dementia, they start to use remote controls as telephones and see the kitchen as the bathroom, etc. The metaphors begin to blur and yet you can often see the patterns which inform them. It makes me wonder just what it is that allows us to keep things straight. Someone with dementia can speak like a poet - 'Turn the sun down, my feelings are burning.' This means, switch off the light, it's too bright. (My dad said this at 97)

No. Hinge propositions need not be agreed on, nor need agreement depend on hinge propositions. They are distinct notions.

The remainder of what you say in that paragraph relies on the notion that beliefs must be "rational", whatever that is, apparently something like having a justification. But there is no reason to think this so. Indeed, the point of hinge propositions it that they are believed and yet need not be justified. — Banno

Hence the point is not to understand language but to use it. — Banno

Isn't this leading towards anti-realism? It also sounds a bit like 'shut up and calculate'. That said, this has generally been my utilitarian or pragmatic approach to language.

Isn't one understanding of later Wittgenstien that he was an anti-realist? I am no expert of course, but doesn't he seem to argue that language is social practice? This seems close to a constructivist understanding of how language works. No doubt there are debates amongst the cognoscenti.

But I'm a little confused why he cast this in terms of language and how the claims are made. Presumably because verification is off the table from the start? And the claim that there is something wrong with the very words in which idealism, say, is proposed -- that *is* the old logical positivist diagnosis, that you're not even really saying anything.

On the other hand, if you don't think of language as the home of claims about reality, there's no particular problem with metaphysics. If your endorsing panpsychism gets you a job or gets you laid, it's just another day at the office for language. — Srap Tasmaner

Nice conclusion. Of course logical positivism is untenable based on this too. In the end what all this seems to amount to (as I read it) is that for a non-realist our conversations are doomed, regardless of all the facts and rationalism we seek to muster in favour of our particular fancies. Our language doesn't mirror reality, it is just a tool which humans use to communicate and while it has many useful applications to get things done - metaphysical truth isn't one of them.

Interesting that you raise getting laid - one could almost summarise this by saying - if naturalism and evolution are accurate, they highlight what it takes for a species to thrive. Truth doesn't play a key role in evolution - it's fitness and survival (as per Donald Hoffman's recent theories). This could take us to the venerable evolutionary argument against naturalism. But that's a digression. :wink:

Anyway, I'm sure there's little stomach for political discussion in what's otherwise a nice bit of effete curiosity... — Isaac

I think the beauty of Lawson’s promise (which I still don’t understand) is that if there’s no realist theory of language then discussions about effete topics like idealism and panpsychism bite the dust for good. That would be an interesting development.

We don't seem to be gaining any ground against Wayfarer's statement that "there is no countervailing ideology to consumerism". — BC

As I wrote earlier, minimalism (simple living) is defiantly one example. It's a significant, worldwide anti-consumerist philosophy and I know quite a few folk who follow this practice. I met one person recently who refuses to own more than 150 objects - including clothing. She is a successful writer. YouTube has many videos on minimalism, from personal journeys in anti-consumerism, to lengthy documentaries on the benefits of minimalism. Some of it is virtue signalling tosh, but you'll find this anywhere. I've been a minimalist myself in a modest way for many years.

So, I'm sorry to intervene. — Alkis Piskas

Not at all, I enjoyed your contribution. We're all in this together.

I can't believe you wrote about something w/o having anything in mind! — Alkis Piskas

I'm generally interested in philosophical ideas - these often have no bearing on what I believe. Nor should they. I'm simply interested in what ideas are out there.

I also see that you switched the focus to idealism. — Alkis Piskas

I didn't really. It's in the original quote from Lawson in the OP. The reason this question about language is interesting (if I understand it properly) is in determining whether it is even possible to talk meaningfully about ontology.

And that never actually changes. Language, world, self --- we never achieve full understanding of any of these, so we go on our entire lives in with this partial understanding, just as when we were infants. And it works. — Srap Tasmaner

Probably right, similar to @plaque flags take.

How does language map onto the world? The obvious place to look is children, who have to learn how they work, how the world works, and how language works, and figure out how it all connects. — Srap Tasmaner

Agree, but I guess this is a pragmatic understanding of language, which doesn't address the question of realism. It seems to say, just get on with living and perhaps this takes us back to your statement above.

On the reality issue, I think you already said something valuable -- that it tends to function religiously in certain contexts. IMO, examining the meanings of 'real' is great part of the greater examination of meaning. How do these power words function ? We could also talk about the meaning of 'God' or 'truth' or 'reference' -- endlessly. I started a thread about 'semantic finitude' on this topic, as you may recall, because I don't think we can escape the fog, get a perfect grip, only a better one, or at least a new one, so that we don't get bored. — plaque flag

Yes, good points. I tend to keep coming back to similar notions of 'semantic finitude' too.

What is it to say ? This may get us in Heidegger territory. What is being ? What is meaning ? It's like trying to make darkness visible, but maybe it's just a ghost story. Are humans hilariously ignorant in all of their hubris about fundamental things ? Or are they high on the fumes of not-exactly-questions ? I don't know, but I lean toward some fundamental ignorance and vulnerability which it mostly pays to ignore (or doesn't pay to not ignore) (unless you were a existentialist who sold some books.) — plaque flag

This may well be the case, which either amuses me or makes me sad, depending on my mood.

As someone how holds imperfect knowledge in this realm (in all realms, actually), at this point in our history I find the quoted argument for the most part valid. — javra

Cool.

Nevertheless, for those of use don't remove the objective idealism from out of Peirce's metaphysics of objective idealism (with his notion of Agapism, for example, very much included), his is one example of a description of reality which can - I so far think - at the very least facilitate a "a credible realist theory of language" that thereby makes sense of the very metaphysics addressed - one wherein the physical world is effete mind in relation to which propositions can either be true or false. — javra

I have no idea what any of this huge sentence means. Sorry.

When you ask "How Does Language Map onto the World?" what kind of "world" you have in mind? — Alkis Piskas

I have no world in mind. I am simply interested in what others think of this matter. If this means they need to describe a particular world before they talk about the mapping process, so much the better.

Now, you have said the you have made some modest reading about this subject. And you have selected the views of Hilary Lawson as most appealing to you. Yet, these views only lead to a kind of impasse making you wonder if the problem of creating a realist(ic) theory of language is insurmountable. — Alkis Piskas

I chose Lawson because he put what he thought was a key problem for ontology in plain English - as per below -

metaphysical frameworks, such as idealism and panpsychism, which were derided as baseless nonsense by the positivists of the past, are back in new forms. But such claims cannot be taken as a true description of an ultimate reality for there is no credible realist theory of language that would make sense of such claims. — Tom Storm

I am wondering what people who study philosophy think of this claim as it strikes me as an interesting argument and might breathe some new life into debates about idealism.

I have no commitments to Lawson - I think he is interesting because he comes at this after reading Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Rorty, and others and he has put forth a non-realist metaphysics, which I happen to find intriguing. I am curious about phenomenology and post-modernism. On matters of philosophy, I am interested in what others think and why. This is not about me trying to formulate my own ontology.

Interesting. I see you and ↪T Clark as both talking about intuition as it has developed for each of you. Could you elaborate on what key differences might be? — wonderer1

I don't think so. For me intuition is just a type of sense making. It brings me no joy. It's just a brute fact of interacting with others. It reminds me a little of watching a movie you haven't seen before but knowing where the story will go and who will do what. No doubt this is based on identifiable patterns (gained by experience) that we can interpret quickly without fully understanding the process. Having worked closely with people for many years, I tend to be able to read them quickly and understand their process. But it is not foolproof and sometimes I am wrong.