Fair enough. Richard Rorty once said in an interview, something like, “We can talk all about justification, but about truth we can say very little. “ No doubt a contestable and controversial claim.

I may not have done much of a job of articulating this and have tried to be more precise as I go, But philosophy is @Leontiskos interest and so he has more tools at his disposal . He’s probably pretty good at it. I wasn’t trying to offer a conventional relativist position but maybe that’s what I did earlier.

Thanks for your forensic analysis of my summary of anti-foundationalism. I’ll mull over what you wrote. Maybe someone else will chime in with a view on it.

I’m arguing that in anti-foundationalism all justification occurs within our own systems, even for statements about justification itself. You seem to be saying that this implies that truth itself is context-dependent, which is not what I am claiming. Your point is valid but misdirected, my focus is on justification, not the nature of truth.

My wording may well have been sloppy, given this is not an area of expertise, only a matter I’m interested in and trying to articulate. As you said before, I’m also short on style and rhetoric.

The word 'meta' originally meant 'after', but I think it has subsequently come to mean the above. — Clarendon

I thought “meta” referred to self-referential discourse.

I had a reality crisis when I was young where I realized I have no way to determine if what I'm experiencing is real. — frank

Interesting. I had a similar experience when I was 15 or 16.

My current position is that I have no choice but to accept the reality I’m in and that humans are sense-making creatures who use language (and other tools) to manage their environment. It's likely we don’t have the capacity to access a Capital-T Truth, and philosophy is perhaps best avoided, as it tends only to lead to 1) convoluted attempts to justify seemingly impossible beliefs or 2) endless confusion and self-reflexivity. :wink:

Isn't almost everything founded on metaphysics? Science presupposes that there is access to reality and truth about it. Knowledge. Science is founded on metaphysical axioms; realism, causality, rational intelligibility, etc. First principles would generally be the axioms or foundations of your thinking. So realism might be one of these.

A naturalist is just as committed to an unjustifiable metaphysical scheme. — frank

Yes, that's true. Have you come to any metaphysical conclusions yourself?

He was like "meh." Or something like that. — frank

Funny.

You can understand why people find theism attractive in all this, since it seems to effectively provide a grounding that resolves the confusions and tautologies created by anti-foundationalist views.

Thanks. I thought the argument and above statement avoided the relativist fallacy because it doesn’t say “all opinions are equally true” or that truth is random. Instead, it’s saying that whenever we justify something, we do it using the tools and standards we already have: and that’s true even for this statement itself. This makes it self-aware and not self-contradictory. It also leaves room for debate within those frameworks, rather than claiming there’s no way to judge anything. That’s why I thought it was anti-foundationalist, not relativist.

But yes, the issue of self-reflexivity seems to be a real problem. Hilary Lawson, a minor British philosopher, argues that we can’t avoid the problem of self-reflexivity in modern philosophy, our theories and claims inevitably turn back on themselves. His reponse is to say, so what!

Your response is to try to tidy up Y, but the nature of Y is irrelevant to the objection. Again, it is the word "always" that causes you to contradict yourself. If "always" involves "every context" then you are contradicting yourself, regardless of what X and Y are.

(You are attempting to exempt yourself from your own rule, hence the self-contradiction. In effect you are saying, "No one can make claims of this sort, except for me.")

Another way to put it:

1. X is always Y
2. Therefore, every X, in every context, is Y
3. Therefore, the truth of (1) is not context dependent

The person who utters (1) is committed to at least one truth which is not context dependent. — Leontiskos

Here I am assuming I have avoided stating the relativist fallacy. Either I suck at expressing this or I failed to properly “tidy up” Y.

@Joshs is the account of antifoundationalism I sketched earlier too simplistic?

Nothing we justify ever rises above our own ways of justifying and that includes this statement.

Nicely put, I’m not sure what this means for me, however. How do you see this sitting with phenomenology and Thompson’s descriptions of us enacting reality?

Much of philosophy seems to be a desperate scramble for foundational justifications that will 'beat' the other guy’s argument. The best one, of course, being God. If we can say a position we hold is part of God’s nature or the natural order of a designed universe, then we ‘win’ the argument (assuming winning means anything).

Many people would say there’s a difference between holding some axioms as pragmatic foundations and having access to facts or truths which transcend our quotidian lives. I guess for them the difference is between foundations which are provisional and tentative and ultimately evanescent, versus those which are eternal and True. You and I have doubts about the latter.

Yes but the point is that Platonists appeal to a mind-independent order/realm to ground values like goodness, while antifoundationalists hold that we have no access to anything outside our historically situated human practices.

No, they are merely noting that no one has ever produced a context-independent truth claim. And that noting is itself not context-independent because it is made in relation to and within the context of human experience, language and judgement. — Janus

Philosophy is divided into camps - some of which believe humans have access to facts or truths outside of human experience (eg, Platonism) and those who think we don't. How do we ground our knowledge? I don't think we can except though communities of intersubjective agreement.

Thanks. Jesus, it's bloody complicated.

Well, what do you mean by "anti-foundationalism"? Is it just something like, "Truth claims are always context dependent"? If so, then we're right back to the original argument. — Leontiskos

That there is no final or ultimate ground for our knowledge, meaning, or justification. I think that's how philosophers like Rorty, Lawson, or Brandom might have it. And I appreciate that anti-foundationalism is disparaged by many.

Let's not lose sight of the central argument which is this:

But if you are speaking from a single context, and that single context does not encompass all contexts, then you are not permitted to make claims about all contexts. And yet you did.

You contradict yourself because you say something like, "Truth claims are always context dependent." This means, "Every truth claim, in every context, is context dependent." It is a claim that is supposed to be true in every context, and therefore it is not context dependent. If you want to avoid self-contradiction you would have to say something like, "Truth claims are sometimes context dependent." But that's obviously less than what you want to say.
— Leontiskos — Leontiskos

As I understand it, this objection misunderstands the claim. Saying "truth claims are always context-dependent" is a way of describing how claims function within particular social, historical, and conceptual contexts. This description is itself situated and arises from those contexts. I'm, nto sure there's a contradiction in making this statement because it does not claim to exist outside or above context. The objection only seems persuasive if one assumes that all claims must be judged from a perspective beyond any context, but anti-foundationalism does not make that assumption.

From our observations of animal behavior it is undeniable that animals perceive all the same things in the environment as we do, but we can safely infer in (sometimes very) different ways according to the different structures of their sense modalities. — Janus

Indeed although they clearly don’t understand them the way we do, so while they might recognize the same shapes and perhaps risks as us, I’m not sure what that tells us about shared meaning. Thompson is not an idealist as I udnertand him.

But saying “everything comes from social practices and chance factors” doesn’t mean we’reclaiming to stand outside of all that.
— Tom Storm

It would be a bit like the fish saying, "Everything is water." If the fish knew that everything was water then he would not be bound by water. The metaphor about fish and water has to do with the idea that what is literally ubiquitous is unknowable. — Leontiskos

This is getting very meta. :wink:

Doesn't your fish and water objection assume that being immersed in something makes it unknowable? Doesn't Thompson’s view suggest the opposite? That our immersion is what makes understanding possible. We are always situated within social practices and contingent factors, but this situatedness doesn’t block insight, it creates or enables it. (I assume this is basic to phenomenology?) Recognizing that “everything comes from social practices and chance factors” is a reflective awareness that arises through our engagement with world, not from standing outside it. Being “bound by water” does not make the water invisible; it is the medium through which we come to know it. Or something like that?

I'm now getting dizzy with the curlicues of argument.

The broader question to me seems to be, is anti-foundationalism a foundation? Is it a performative contradiction? I suspect it isn’t on the basis that anti-foundationalism is more a lens or a stance toward foundations than a foundation itself. It discourages the search for an ultimate grounding, but offers no ultimate principle to stand on.

I'd be interested to hear your take on this particularly.

Thanks. Nicely articulated. I’m not done yet, but I have a meeting.

if he’s right, that’s great, I like different views to my own even if I can’t get on board.

But saying “everything comes from social practices and chance factors” doesn’t mean we’reclaiming to stand outside of all that. It actually denies that anyone can stand outside it.

Doesn’t this objection get contingency wrong? Calling something “contingent” doesn’t mean you’re looking at it from some perfect, fixed viewpoint. You’re just using the language and ideas that come from within the same messy, changeable world you’re talking about. You don’t need a god-like perspective to say things are contingent.

We now arrive at the question, is antifoundationalism itself a foundation?

Thanks. Do you recall if there was a thread on intuition? I seem to have a memory of this.

Yes, I would say connected. Everything arises from social practices and contingent factors; the possibilities of our experiencing anything, perception, our bodies, and the way we experience the world are all shaped by these conditions. But this is not my area of expertise I think @Joshs is a professional on these matters. My interest/knowledge is limited.

More simply, if you say, "Truth claims are always context-dependent," then you've contradicted yourself, because you are uttering a truth claim that you believe is not context-dependent. This sort of self-contradiction is inevitable for anyone who tries to make reason non-universalizing. — Leontiskos

You make a common enough criticism of Thompson's position (and I guess that of many pragmatists and post-modernists) and it is a good one. All I can say is I don’t see it as a contradiction, because I’m not claiming (nor would Thompson) to step outside all contexts while saying this. I’m saying it from inside my own experience, and the claim includes itself. For me, truth isn’t something we reach from a perfect, universal viewpoint; it’s something we work out from where we stand. So when I say truth claims are context-dependent, I’m also saying this one is too. That doesn’t make it collapse, it just admits that I’m part of the same situation I’m talking about. The supposed contradiction only appears if we assume every truth claim has to speak from nowhere and apply everywhere, and I don’t accept that assumption. I’m trying to identify how truth actually shows up for us in lived life, not to lay down a rule that pretends to escape that life.

My understanding is that Thompson sees reason as emerging from our everyday experience and the ways we engage with the world, not from a detached, universal viewpoint. We develop our thinking through action, conversation, and the practices we inherit. He rejects the notion that this makes him a relativist: being aware that reasoning is 'situated' doesn’t mean all ideas are equally valid or that anything goes. On the contrary, some ways of thinking are better than others, and we can test, refine, and improve our ideas through experience, dialogue, and careful reflection. Thompson would probably acknowledge that reasoning is grounded in context but this doesn’t weaken it, it makes it more honest, responsible, and connected to how we actually understand and navigate the world.

Now I understand well that if a person holds an essentialist view of the world, in which reason accesses certain universal truths, then this view will be unsatisfying. This would be your view?

I’m not a philosopher, and I don’t mind being a creature of my time. Can you explain in simple terms why Thompson might be wrong? I suspect we don’t share certain key axioms, which might make a discussion difficult to navigate.

:up: :up:

I need to listen to those.

I find what I can understand of his perspective very sympathetic to my own intuitions, but that only speaks to my own prejudice. It is hard material to fully comprehend, like most phenomenology. I am happy to lurk on the outer boundaries, occasionally catching an insight.

I always loved the opening title sequence too.

I'd probably share Evan Thompson's view that reason is situated, embodied, enactive and emerges from our lived, affective engagement with the world. Reason is not a detached faculty that can apprehend universal truths on its own; it’s shaped by biology, culture, experience. Truth claims therefore are always embedded in context, practice, and perspective.

Ha! Well, reason is just a tool, the atheists and the theists often assume they can demonstrate the superiority of their metaphysics with reason. They can certainly use it to give a sheen to their prejudices, but to what extent is it merely a post hoc rationalization of affective commitments? But I am not saying we can avoid its use, as this paragraph partly demonstrates.

Ha! We don’t need a structured show for this. It’s probably more about putting cameras in real world hot spots. For a tame example, look at what YouTube makes of Philadelphia.

I think human beings are always ready for barbarism, it’s one of our capacities, along with empathy and compassion. Some of the biggest criminals I have met have been among the most generous. Sentimentality and cruelty go together. Anyway a lot of sci fi stories seem to have taken this plot as a modern day version of the coliseum.

Interesting points. Do you hold a similar view about reason? I fell out of love with reason some years ago.

I think life is more complicated for many people than you do. Which is fine. I'm not going to change your mind, so there is little point in bothering. — Malcolm Parry

Good point. Some people are happy to judge others from the warm fug of ignorance. I’ve certainly done this myself.

I’ve known many career criminals, some bikies and gang members. Many of them, from what I have seen, didn’t have much of a chance from the start. Would I hesitate to shoot one if I had to? Probably not. But that doesn’t remove my feelings of sympathy, even if it’s qualified.

So how do you understand an ideology that says a certain race or group of people must be wiped out for the good of the world? Is this merely a point of view? Does it only become evil when the ideology is put into practice?

I can see why you went in this direction, but that wasn’t exactly what I intended. What I was really trying to say, albeit unclearly, is that reason is often used as a post hoc justification for how people feel. When other factors like destiny, religion, or politics are added, it can become dangerous. But what I really wanted to highlight is that the Nazis reasoned their actions were in the world’s best interests; they believed they were the good guys.

Is it really that simple, though? The partially-disrobed homeless dude on the corner believes he has reason and destiny on his side. So, respectfully, it's far more complex and substantial than that one requirement of self-confidence or self-delusion. — Outlander

No. I am not arguing that delusion is an issue. I said reason and destiny. Not madness and destiny.

By the way, Hitler was a homeless dude (in your words) in Vienna for some years and used to rant in public spaces, much to the embarrassment of others (Ian Kershaw's great book Hubris). Amongst other things, it was his reasoning that eventually made him attractive to others.

Why are libraries full of lifetimes of wisdom and virtue empty yet arenas of combat and near-death cheap entertainment full at any given moment? Ask yourself that. And you'll find out something about yourself you did not wish to know. — Outlander

It's best not to presume what others here know or don't know about themselves on a forum. My local library is massively busy, and I am not sure what you mean by an 'arena of conflict'. But the idea that people prefer circuses to intellectual pursuits is perfectly reasonable and conventional notion. How does this relate to my point?"

Not sure if this is relevant, but I've often held that the notion of evil depends heavily on perspective and motivated reasoning. Many years ago, I met a couple of old former Nazis. They told me how, in their view, the world had been taken over by great evil, and how those “forces of evil” had destroyed Hitler’s beneficial plan to transform humanity into a great force for good. “One day our time will come again,” one of them concluded, followed by a sermon about how truth and goodness will always win out over evil (and other heavily derived Christian notions).

Clearly, most of those who think they are serving reason or truth, God or science believe they are doing good, no matter how harmful their actions may be in practice. Which reminds me that the most dangerous people in the world are probably those who think they have reason and destiny on their side.

I resent I'm not as metaphysically street smart as they are. — baker

It almost sounds like you resent the fact you are not immoral in an immoral world?

How about we follow the money and suggest that what is going on is not a politization of institutionalized religion, nor a corruption -- but a correct, exact, adequate presentation of religion/spirituality.

That when we look at religious/spiritual institutions and their practitioners, we see exactly what religion/spirituality is supposed to be. — baker

Does this mean you are anti-relgion?

I think that’s actually a keen insight.

Thank you; that’s very succinct and helpful.

If one wishes to be an excellent human being then they must have the virtues, and the virtues are had by practice or familiarity. Then, for Aristotle happiness is had via excellence, but excellence is not sought as a means to the end of happiness. It's almost as if Aristotle would say that happiness is excellence seen in a particular light. For a simple example, the man who is an excellent soccer player is brought joy by playing soccer, but the joy and the activity of playing soccer well aren't really two different things. It's not as if he plays soccer well and then goes to the sideline to wait for someone to bring him his joy as a reward. — Leontiskos

Nice.

I'm not sure I would call Aristotle a "naturalist." That seems not only anachronistic, but perhaps also incorrect. I don't see a lack of transcendence in Aristotle, even if his idea of God was not the Christian God. He does admittedly distinguish the practical man and his moral virtues from the philosopher and his contemplation, but the contemplation of the philosopher looks to be "transcendent." — Leontiskos

This is a very interesting point. For Aristotle, how does the practical man provide a foundation for his virtue if not through contemplation?”

I can see why you’d say that, but as it says in Matthew, “Ye shall know them by their fruits.” That sentiment applies equally to politics and religion. It’s a fair question to pose: if religion is a superior alternative to the secular, where might it be found operating in a way that appropriately demonstrates this? And I am open to the fact that this can be demonstrated.