The implication being, it is possible experience is not in the brain, which is the same as outside the brain, or in a place where the brain is not. — Mww
Why would the brain represent the world to you if you weren’t to view the representation? — NOS4A2
I don't like the idea that we have no direct access to the world. — AmadeusD
Think how much greater than five sigma confidence people would have to have in all those distal objects such as measurement instruments, computers, and a bunch of scientists, to have a reason to believe a five sigma level confidence for the Higgs Boson. — wonderer1
Either we see distal objects, or we see mental phenomena. It cannot be both.
— creativesoul
Yes it can. I feel pain and I feel the fire. I see cows and I see colours. — Michael
I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. — Michael
Yes, we experience distal objects like cows. — Michael
A [veridical experience] depends on a [distal object] but the [distal object] is not a constituent of the [veridical experience]. The constituents of the [veridical experience] are just [mental phenomena]. — Michael
A painting depends on a painter but the painter is not a constituent of the painting. The constituents of the painting are just paint and a canvas. — Michael
They are what's being perceived in every veridical and illusory case
— creativesoul
Which means what? — Michael
I have been trying to explain that when naive realists claim that some distal object is (directly) perceived they mean that the object is a literal constituent of the experience and that when indirect realists claim that some distal object is not (directly) perceived they mean that the object is not a literal constituent of the experience. — Michael
Since all three kinds are existentially dependent upon distal objects, but hallucinations do not include distal objects, there are differences in their constitution
— creativesoul
That doesn’t follow. That X depends on Y is not that Y is a constituent of X. A painting depends on a painter but the painter is not a constituent of the painting. The constituents of the painting are just paint and a canvas.
You seem to be confusing constituent with cause. — Michael
The indirect realist claims that we do not have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are (interpreted) mental phenomena, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the indirect realist, perhaps cumbersomely, says that we smell and taste and see mental phenomena. — Michael
The direct (naive) realist claims that we do have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are constituents of experience. The constituents of experience – smells, tastes, colours – are mind-independent properties of distal objects, and I smell smells, taste tastes, and see colours. So the direct realist says that we smell and taste and see mind-independent properties of distal objects. — Michael
You (and others) seem to be getting unnecessarily lost in the grammar of "I see X", but this is a red herring. The relevant concern is the reasoning that precedes such a claim, i.e. are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience and so do we have direct knowledge of distal objects and their properties. If you accept that they're not and that we don't then you're an indirect realist, even if you don't like indirect realist grammar and would rather continue to say "I see distal objects". — Michael
Experiences, whether veridical or hallucinations, are reducible to (or supervene on) brain activity. Therefore anything that exists outside the brain cannot be a constituent of experience. Do you not accept this reasoning? — Michael
Yep. Was a great night. For a while I even had a split mind which was weird. — Michael
I don't understand what you think indirect realism has to account for. — Michael
There is no difference between the constitution of an hallucination and a veridical experience. Their difference is in their causes. — Michael
So at least according to his meaning, your use of the word "because" above is a non sequitur. — Michael
Yes, I do believe that the existence of the tree I see is not in question. If I decide to question it and then accept an answer, then, and only then, has belief come into play. In other words, of course all doubt concerning the veracity of our vision is belief based, but I am speaking about the situation prior to any doubt about the veracity of our vision. — Janus
It leads to a whole network of philosophical garden paths in which, absurdly, the self is forever "cut off" from the world in which it lives. — Banno
It makes sense to say that you interact with the room by way of a complex of representations, but how is the model equal to you interacting with the room? — frank
I don't think believing the tree is there is necessary for seeing it. I see the tree there, and the question of whether or not it is really there (answering that question being the point where belief enters into the picture) doesn't arise, certainly doesn't have to arise.
You can say that seeing the tree presupposes believing it, (like the old adage "seeing is believing") and that is one way of speaking about what is happening; I just happen to see that way of speaking as redundant. I think believing comes into play when there is doubt and we decide to go with one possibility or another. — Janus
We have direct perceptual knowledge of our body's response to stimulation. — Michael
I see the tree in the yard but do not believe it's there.
— creativesoul
I don't believe it is possible to actively disbelieve in something you see in front of you. Well, I know I can't at least. I also don't see that as supporting the notion that active belief is necessary in those situations. That said, I don't deny that you can talk about believing that the tree you see is there, rather than simply saying you see it there, but I think the former way of speaking is less parsimonious, even redundant... — Janus
I see the tree in the yard but do not believe it's there.
— creativesoul
I don't believe it is possible to actively disbelieve in something you see in front of you. Well, I know I can't at least. I also don't see that as supporting the notion that active belief is necessary in those situations. — Janus
What defines them as being indirect realists is in believing that we have direct knowledge only of a mental representation. — Michael
I've had to resort to memory aids even in areas where I used to be articulate
— Vera Mont — BC
What are hallucinations if not an experience of a distal object without a distal object? — flannel jesus
The relevant disagreement between direct and indirect realism concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the external world and its nature. Our scientific understanding is clear on this; it doesn't. Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences. — Michael
None to me. I'm trying to make sense of the conclusion that the heater grate six feet to my left is not what I see.
— creativesoul
I'm not saying that it's not what you see. I'm saying that distal objects are not constituents of experience. — Michael
Yes, distal objects are not physical constituents of experience, which is why knowledge of experience is not direct knowledge of distal objects, hence the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael