I'll skip a lot mostly because of a time limit, but this seems promising, as this seems to be where our perspectives mainly differ:

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else?
— creativesoul

When I think of a thought, I think of what's currently present in the mind and how it presents itself to the "thinker" in question. So, yes, it's about "how meaningful the mat is to the cat," but not only as a generalised object, also how relevant it is in the current situation. What about the mat is represented in the cat, so to speak, and what about the situation draws the attention to the mat. It is entirely possible that whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat-in-general is entirely in the background for the present situation. To believe that "the mouse is on the mat" is to draw a connection between the mat and the mouse that may be entirely a potential. The cat *can* have such a belief, but currently doesn't. — Dawnstorm

If I understand this correctly, I'd agree that the importance that the mat plays in the cat's thought and/or belief is determined by its relevance to the cat in the current situation(at that time). So, if I understand you correctly, I think you're saying something like the mouse can be on the mat, and the cat can have a belief about the mouse that doesn't include the mat. I would agree.

The mat is meaningful to the cat in the sense of being an integral part of where the mouse is located. That's about all I meant by claiming the cat can believe the mouse is on the mat. Although, as you've suggested and I've mentioned, the mat could be much more meaningful than just that to the cat.

But here we stand perpendicular to the situation: whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-cat is not automatically the same as whatever-the-mat-means-to-the-human, though I expect there to be sufficient overlap for comparison. — Dawnstorm

I agree and may put that a bit stronger. Whatever the mat means to the cat is never exactly the same as whatever the mat means to the human.

Now, I think that we might - methodologically - assume a "hunting situation" that we assume we both understand. What then is the minimal overlap we'd expect, what are the opportunities for misunderstanding. The question about the mat then becomes to what degree does the cat have cause to form believes about what the human thinks of as a mat, in this very situation. This goes beyond the situation down to the bits of the cat's world-view that's inaccessible to us, but it always has the hunting situation at its core.

In short, we methodically assume a commonality, so that we don't have to assume commonalities outside of that context (hunting). But that also means we must attempt to scale back what we take for granted about mice and mats - and often the result of that is more a discovery about how we view the world than it is about how the cat views the world.

It's a methodology of controlled estrangement, if you will. The cat will not see anything but a mouse, in the sense that the mouse is there. But the mouse's mouse-ness is called into question - methodologically - by not assuming more commonalities than we must (and we must assume some commonalities, if we are to think at all).

So how to mats and mice correlate here? We can question mats, and we can question mice, and that's comparatively easier to questioning "mats and mice" at the same time. This assumes that there's no particular way any one individual (whether human or feline) might see anything else, though there's probably a set of restrictions of what's possible on the side of what becomes a mouse or a mat when presented to a consciousness.

I'd understand if this is hard going. You said earlier, you don't accept phenomenology (or something to that effect?), and this is definitely somewhat in the vicinity of Husserl, though viewed through the lense of sociology (say Alfred Schütz, or even Helmut Plessner). It's probably fine to drop that angle, if it gets in the way. But it'd be good to bear in mind the difference (if there be one), as I can't excise the influence easily, and it'll come up from time to time.

On the whole, we don't seem so far apart? — Dawnstorm

No, I do not think we're so far apart in that we seem to both understand that there are differences and similarities between the cat's point of view and our own, in addition to recognizing the need of a terminological framework capable of setting those out.

I'll single this line out:

"Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility."

Unsure. I'm fairly sure that it's at least possible that that formulating some beliefs is what brings to your attention what you've implicitly believed so far. That is: sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and forgrounded beliefs are perceived more at risk. People might think they formed a belief, but really what happened is that - for the first time - they have cause to defend it. A conscious belief has entered the social arena, so to speak, and needs to be defended or modified or even abandoned. — Dawnstorm

Yes. That sounds about right, but I do not find that any of this is inevitably contradictory to what I've been saying, although it could be in its underpinnings. I agree that sometimes formulating a belief is raising it from background to foreground status, and in doing so one may have cause to defend it - for the very first time. However, I'm arguing that belief formation is required prior to that belief later becoming a part of the background. In this case, the belief candidate under consideration is/was an attitude/disposition towards the following proposition:

"Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon propositions. All attitudes/dispositions towards propositions are existentially dependent upon language. That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to it. Thus, there are no such things as "prelinguistic" propositional attitudes/dispositions.

Basically, the "possibility" needn't be articulated to act on it without a hiccup in social situations, and it's the hiccup in the social situation that causes you to formulate your belief. An attitude about a possibility is often part of the unacknowledged social praxis. We formulate possibilities to the degree that our beliefs have become problematic. We act on them without formulating them all the time. — Dawnstorm

Well, in our case, the possibility under consideration was whether or not it was/is possible for all belief to be prelinguistic. It was formulated like this: "Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic".

While I agree that we act on our beliefs without formulating them all the time, that's not what was in question here, nor do those facts pose any issue with what I've been setting out. I now think that you may have meant something strikingly different than me when qualifying belief as "prelinguistic".

There's no doubt that most people hold all sorts of background(foundational) beliefs. I would further say that many people have never really identified, named, and/or talked about those background beliefs as subject matters in their own right. I think our views are commensurate regarding these matters.

I would further claim that these beliefs have efficacy(which returns to the OP's concerns).

I think that our views diverge when it comes to ontological concerns; what beliefs consist of.

For example, all native speakers of English "know" that English is a "nominative-accusative language", in the sense that they use it like that without trouble. But among native speakers of English, you rarely need to formulate this: linguists are one systematic example. They know, too, that one alternative is the "ergative-absolutive language", and they can talk about the difference. A native speaker of English might have trouble understanding what's going on while learning, say, Basque. You now need to go back and formulate what you've always been instinctively doing, so you can then get back at the difference. But you certainly don't need to be able to explain the difference (or even know it exists) to speak English.

We're seeing the same mismatch currently around the gender topic, I think. — Dawnstorm

I am not one who holds that knowledge of the rules governing language is shown by correct usage(following them). Knowing how to use language does not require knowing how to talk about the rules governing such language. Knowing that English is a nominative-accusative language requires both, knowing how to use English, and knowing what counts as being "a nominative-accusative language"(knowing which descriptions set that out and which do not). Knowing how to use English does not.

I do not find it at all helpful to say that all native English speakers know that English is a nominative-accusative language. That's simply not true, even if it is the case that they'd assent to such a description after understanding what that means.

I'm currently working on a reply to the rest of that post. I wanted to address it separately, for it invoked meaning, and we both find it promising.

I'll address your response sometime tomorrow. Looks promising to me in many ways. :smile:

We have differences in, I think, terminology... — Dawnstorm

Yes, we certainly do. I think that those differences could be causal in nature in a certain sense similar to what the OP has been talking about. All of us share the pursuit to remain consistent in our respective positions. Hence, the differences themselves cause us to think a bit differently as a result.

What is interesting to me is that we share the same target. The thought and/or belief of non-human creatures. The key, it seems to me, is understanding what that target consists of.

The challenge is to better understand what we can say, philosophically, about the other kind(s). — J

Indeed, it is. I've found that this particular pursuit can challenge one's basic ontological underpinnings in unfamiliar ways that can result in cognitive dissonance.

Methodological approach seems key here. I'm thinking that there are a few things we need to carefully consider, in addition to any inevitable consequences. This basics of this pursuit are incommensurate with many conventional positions. That explains the broadly held denial of language less creatures' having thought or belief, on pains of coherency alone.

All belief is meaningful to the creature forming, having, and/or holding the belief.<----That seems like an undeniable basic tenet.

Would you agree?

What's important here is that the overlap between worldviews seems stronger when it comes to "mouse", then when it comes to "mat". Or not. Maybe the mat is the place where it's not cold in winter, so there's a sense of "territory" in the situational background that the human lacks specifically for the mat, as it's relevant for the entirety of the house? — Dawnstorm

All sounds fine with me.

As the above paragraphs show, I think that humans and cats have comparable "thoughts". Language isn't irrelevant, but it's not where I would draw the line (given relevance to thought). — Dawnstorm

All looks fine here as well. Hopefully "the line" is a bit better understood after the past couple posts.

I'd say result-based concepts are thing we interact with, but are largely ignorant about and thus don't think of as processes. The light-switch is a thing I use. I have limited process-awareness of it, compared to the electrician who fixes the circuit when the switch doesn't work. The light switch is a thing that works or doesn't. I'd say that's pretty much the relationship between the cat and the mat (except that it might serve less of a function in the current activity).

I see language as an activity, much like switching on the light (but much more complex). It's related to thought, because usually when we utter a sentence we mean something by it. It is possible, though, to utter a sentence in a language we don't understand, maybe focusing on the aspect of getting the pronunciation right. It's hard to get foreign pronunciations right because of acquired speech habits. That is: language itself isn't only a possible tool for thought, it also always a target of thought (we monitor for mistakes, for example).

So the putative difference between a langauge-having and a language-less creature is mostly that a language-less creature cannot and does not have to think about language. But puzzling out what the difference between language-accompanied and language-less thought is seems at the core of this thread.

It occurred to me, while reading the current discussion, that it might be relevant that I grew up bilingually. I grew up in Austria, with my mum being Austrian and my dad being Croatian (which would have been "Yugoslavian" when I was a kid). I'd almost exclusively talk German, even when spoken to in Croation by my dad. Maybe that's why I never associated words and thoughts quite as closely as others, and in turn why I also don't think language is quite as important a creature feature during species distinction. Maybe? (Just an aside.)

Sure. I've no problem with this.

:smile:

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat. The content of the cat's thought/belief includes the mouse(which is not existentially dependent upon language) and the mat(which is).
— creativesoul

To what degree does the "mat" feature? There are other questions: to what degree is the "mouse" a mouse? Is there a sequence of: movement over there; focus attention; prey; plan: pounce. Now? Now? Now? Now! — Dawnstorm

I don't know if I understand the first question, but I think you're asking something along the lines of how meaningful the mat is to the cat. That would all depend upon the sheer number of correlations that the mat had been a previous part of in the cat's thought, in addition to the content other than the mat. That's generally the case for all 'degrees' of meaningfulness, on my view. If you meant something else, perhaps you could rephrase the question?

I do not understand the second question at all. A mouse is a mouse. One hundred percent. If you're asking me whether or not the cat sees the mouse as a mouse, I'd defer to my last post which briefly discusses such manners of speaking, and ask if it is possible for a cat to look at a mouse and see something else?

I'm sure there's movement involved(part of the correlational content), physiological sensory perception is necessary, the autonomous drive to eat(hunger pangs could very well be part of the correlation content), possibly previous experiences with hunting mice, etc. that all play a potential role in the current correlational content. I'm not at all keen or fond of the idea that we can read non-human animals' mind with any amount of well-grounded accuracy or precision. We, generally speaking, have a difficult enough time reading the minds of other humans, unless we know them very well. To the contrary, I think we can only provide a well-grounded basic outline for all cases. There are some cases, depending upon specific circumstances that garner a narrower scope of greater detail, but it is on a case-by-case basis.

Some ducks used to have me as their source of food and water. They definitely drew correlations between me and getting fed and/or watered. Did they believe they were about to be fed when I opened the sliding glass doors at the downstairs portion of the back of the house? I think they did based upon all the past correlations. They exhibited behaviours unique to eating. Did they believe they were about to be fed after hearing the food container lid being opened and/or the rustling of the synthetic fabric just before the sound of the plastic food dispenser being plunged into the food? Seems to me that they did. They'd come from everywhere within earshot and exhibit the aforementioned eating behaviours.

I know that they learned how to get fed when they were hungry. They would approach me, come very close, sometimes nipping at my basketball shorts, and exhibit all the feeding behaviours. By my lights, if they drew connections between their own behaviour(approaching me with open mouths) and me getting them food, then that would count as shared meaning between them and myself. A plurality of creatures drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations/associations between the same things. They were telling me they wanted to eat.

Some thought, I do think, relies on language, as language supplies a retrievable label that stands in for a sub routine. If there isn't a word for something, we can still talk about it but it takes longer. If there's a word for it, we just say one word, but mean the same thing (wasting less time). And that process is iterative. "Hm, what do we call this reverse track ball? Kinda looks like a mouse, doesn't it?". There's grammatical crossreference that's quite common: the verb to marry, its participle form "married" ending up ambiguous between verbal and adjectival usage (an ambiguity striking in the analysis of passive voice...) — Dawnstorm

It seems to me that "Some thought relies on language" is undeniable. The content of some language less thought relies on language as well. Hence, such language less thought relies on language.

Cross referencing is a complex manner of drawing correlating/associating/connecting different things. As is naming. I'm curious if you'd agree with that?

What I'm ending up with in the current conversation is the question of what even is a "language-less creature"? — Dawnstorm

That's a great question. Thank you for asking it! A language less creature is one that has never drawn correlations/associations between language use and other things. In this discussion, I'm speaking a bit loosely as "language less creatures" are meant to denote those that do not draw correlations between our language use and other things.

Now, strictly speaking(and part of why I liked the question so much), if we were to begin talking about potential language use of creatures other than humans, I would definitely argue in the affirmative for the idea that some animals use language amongst themselves. Such language also consists of correlations/associations drawn between different things. While that language is starkly different than ours in many ways(all involving the complexity of the correlations and their consequences), it is also strikingly similar enough in its basic elemental constituency(what makes it a language) to ours.

One key point is that the candidates using language do so in precisely the same basic way that we do; language emergence/use by virtue of a plurality of individuals drawing the same(or similar enough) correlations between the use(basic ostension/sounding of alarm/calling/warning all come immediately to mind) and other things.

With respect to thought language is some kind of mental activity. And it seems clear to me that there isn't a clear-cut distinction between humans and other animals to be found. At some point we arrive at complexity we don't see in other creatures, sure. But the basics seem to cut across species.

Indeed. The basics do seem to cut across capable creatures, which makes perfect evolutionary sense. It's the complexities that distinguish us and our thought/belief/language from other animals.

Beliefs, for example, might all be pre-linguistic...

I find that this quandary undermines itself. My attitude/disposition about the suggestion required first reading the suggestion. Hence, clearly not before it. I believe that the suggestion is not true. Your attitude/disposition about the possibility first required articulating the possibility. Again, clearly not before language, assuming you believe it to be true.

I would readily agree that prelinguistic beliefs are sometimes formed by creatures prior to their capabilities for language acquisition. I have argued that language is impossible without prelinguistic beliefs. Unlike what you've suggested may be the case, it seems to me that belief begins prior to language acquisition and continue afterwards.

...they might be about things that couldn't exist if we didn't trick our limited attention spans with shortcuts, and then embed those shortcuts in thoughts that again get short-cutted, until we've got a thought-habit no longer reliant on the original thought process. In other words, we can switch on the light without knowing how to fix the circuits in the wall should they break.

Here the difference between animals and humans seems to break down: it's not so much about being "language-less". It's about not being an expert in the origin and nature of the generative concept. I'd argue it's more about result-based perception vs. process-based perception.

I don't see how the last statement follows from what preceded it. Although, I agree that there's a difference between result based thought/belief and process based, I would argue that it's not a difference in kind, but rather it's a difference in the complexity level necessary for forming/having it. All result-based thought/belief is process based. Furthermore, it seems to me that avoiding danger and gathering resources is results based. So, I do not see the value in the distinction here.

I could be being swayed by all the baggage that comes with the notion of "perception" as well. I've yet to have witnessed an acceptable sense of "perception" other than when it picks out the autonomous abilities sometimes called "sense perception". (Physiological sensory)"perception" is much better used, on my view, to talk about the autonomous biological structures that are necessary preconditions for drawing certain kinds of correlations/associations between specific things as compared/contrasted to being used to pick out the correlations/associations themselves, which conflates necessary biological preconditions for thought/belief with thought/belief.

"Seeing an ant hill as an ant hill" is guilty of the latter. "That's how s/he/they perceive the situation, but I perceive it differently" is another.

Of course, this is what makes sense to me, given what I hold to be true about thought and belief. I'm certain that I'm missing something. I'm not certain that what's missing matters, but I'm certainly not beyond reproach.

I'm addressing the rest in a separate post. Thanks again for the interesting additions!

:up:

Nice additions. I'd like to give your post the attention it deserves. That's my intent...

Manana!

It's worth mentioning here that I reject many an historical dichotomy when it comes to the ontological basis for my position; they're found sorely lacking in their ability to take proper account of that which consists of both and is thus neither one nor the other. Thought and belief are such things. Belief content matters. The inadequate dichotomies include subject/object, physical/nonphysical, material/immaterial, internal/external, objective/subjective, linguistic/nonlinguistic.

Convention has been employing these for centuries. If they were capable of taking adequate account of thought and belief, they would have done a better job by now.

Does it matter if we include some non-artifactual objects in the list of things that are existentially dependent upon language? I don't think so. We can add sand dunes and the like without changing your schema. — J

Not according to the position I argue for/from.

On my view, sand dunes are not existentially dependent upon language. "Sand dunes" is. Sand dunes are not equivalent to "sand dunes".

That which is existentially dependent upon language cannot exist prior to language. Sand dunes existed in their entirety prior to language use. "Sand dunes" did not. Sand dunes consist of grains of sand. "Sand dunes" does not. "Sand dunes" consists of meaningful marks. Sand dunes do not. You can find "sand dunes" in some books/literature. You cannot find a sand dune in any book.

"Sand dunes" is existentially dependent upon language use. Sand dunes are not.

The human intention to see it as a dune -- because we have uses for which the term "sand dune" is needed -- can't be ignored. — J

If I may...

In the above quote, does the term "it" refer to a sand dune? I think it must, because we do not see the term "sand dune" as a dune.

Substitution results in the following:

"The human intention to see a sand dune as a dune --- because we have uses for which the term "sand dune" is needed --- can't be ignored"

While the manner of speaking/writing I'm critiquing seems innocuous to many. I do not find a need for it. I'd rather not equivocate the term "see", because our visual capacity plays an integral role in the formation of thought and belief. Some content of thought are things we see. This holds good regardless of whether or not we've developing naming and descriptive practices about those things.

We use language(naming and descriptive practices) to talk about, learn about, and think about sand dunes, including knowing what "sand dunes" picks out of this world. <-----On my view that's much better than 'seeing sand dunes as dunes'. We use our eyes to see sand dunes - before and after - naming and describing them.

That's the point I want to return to. How does the question of whether a belief concerns a) something that is existentially dependent on language, or b) something that is not so dependent, affect whether a non-linguistic animal can be said to have linguistic beliefs or not? — J

I'm not okay with saying language less animals have linguistic beliefs.

Do you simply mean that we ought to extend the normal meaning of "linguistic belief" so that it can also mean "A belief about something that is existentially dependent on language"?

No, that's not what I mean. I reject the dichotomy for the reasons already explained. In addition, the terms have baggage I'm not willing to carry or explain away as a result of not practicing the normal usage. I find it's much better for me to employ a different framework. As above, I'm not okay with saying that a language less animal is capable of having linguistic belief. I'm okay with saying that language less belief can consist of some things that are existentially dependent upon language(assuming a shared world of course).

Yes, a bit clearer. One thing first, though: Is the reason that "some things are existentially dependent upon language (like mats, tables, cars, etc.)" because those objects are human artifacts? — J

Probably, unless there are human artifacts which are somehow not existentially dependent upon language. It's the existential dependency upon language that matters.

If it's the human-made aspect that makes the difference, how would a language-less animal know about it or be aware of it? — J

They wouldn't, but the language less creatures' awareness(or lack thereof) regarding what their own belief consists of is irrelevant.

I'm a little puzzled about why a mat, e.g., would depend on language for its existence. — J

I suppose I'm claiming that the technology involved in textiles is impossible without shared meaning. I haven't tried to prove it, but I'm okay with that. There may be arguments for it, if need be. I don't see the need, because there's no good reason to doubt it, and I cannot imagine a sound argument against the idea. Of course, I may be mistaken and given that none of us are capable of knowingly believing a falsehood or knowingly holding false belief, it would take another to point it out, should there be a mistake with claiming that textile technology is existentially dependent upon language and mats are existentially dependent upon textile technology.

This notion of existential dependency is not to be confused/conflated with subsistence. It's better understood as initial emergence requirements.

If I make an object but don't give it a name, does it exist in some lesser way? Probably I'm just not seeing what you're getting at. — J

It's not whether or not the candidate under consideration has been named that matters. We name things that are not existentially dependent upon language, and some unnamed things are existentially dependent language.

I was making the case for rejecting the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy as a means for taking account of thought and belief. And now I've just went through a process I tried to avoid earlier by mentioning the rejection. It's a bit disheartening that you say what you said at the end.

Sigh.

Edited to remove a comment that harmed the quality of the discussion.

First of all, I do not talk in terms of "non-linguistic belief" for reasons already explained. — creativesoul

To be fair, the above words are mine, and they're misleading at best, and downright false at worst. I have now explained it, so. My apologies for what's directly above. Brief mentions are not explanations.

Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

I have no burden regarding that terminological use. You first invoked it. I rejected it.
— creativesoul

But you said:

I reject the idea that language less animals' belief(s) have propositional content.
— creativesoul

So if a language-less animal has a belief -- moreover, a belief without propositional content -- isn't it by definition a non-linguistic belief? I'm confused. — J

The confusion is understandable. The position I argue for/from is quite unusual/unconventional in some ways and includes subtle details that are crucial for understanding.

To the question: What counts as "by definition" depends upon taxonomy/terminological framework. As we both know, this particular subject matter, is extremely nuanced(theory laden).

If there is such a thing as language less thought and/or belief, and evolutionary theory is given a modicum of credence/applicability here, then it only follows that we're attempting to set out/discover/understand that which existed in its entirety(in some form or another) prior to our accounting practices. Thus, our definitions thereof are quite capable of being wrong, particularly regarding the elemental constituents therein/thereof.

On my view, if a language less creature has a thought and/or belief, then that thought and/or belief is - by definition - language less belief, i.e. the thought and/or belief of a language less creature. One aspect of such belief is that they cannot include language use as part of their content. That is one of the defining features. In other words, and circling back to what I've been setting out, language less belief are correlations drawn between different things, but language use is never one of the things(or "stuff") the creature draws correlations between.

However, and this is the subtlety, because language less belief can include(consist of) some things that are existentially dependent upon language(like mats, tables, cars, etc.) and all things that are existentially dependent upon language could sensibly/rightly be called "linguistic" things, the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is found sorely lacking in its ability to further draw and maintain the distinction between the belief of language users and the belief of language less creatures, particularly when it comes to the content of those.

When we call language less belief "nonlinguistic belief", and then we take further account of the content therein, we will inevitably arrive at the incoherent conclusion that nonlinguistic belief has linguistic content. That serves as ground to reject the dichotomy as a means to draw and maintain the distinction between language users' and language less creatures' thought and/or belief.

That's about as plain as I'm able to put it. Hope that helps.

It sounds to me, if I can say this without giving offense, that you've grown used to your own views in this area (and that happens to us all, of course) and you may not realize how un-obvious they are without further explanation. — J

No offense taken. No worries. I'm very well aware of how unorthodox my views are. I've been working out the kinks for nearly two decades. Further explanation is to be expected. I welcome shouldering any burden they may require. I welcome germane questions about my claims, and any inevitable logical consequences thereof. However, I'm not shouldering any burdens borne of words and claims I've not made.

I'm also quite short on time nowadays. The only reason I've been on here as frequently as I have the past few days was due to being in a state of recovery time limiting my own physical abilities.

It's a topic that interests me, and I'm genuinely curious to see if we can put together a picture of how non-linguistic creatures may or may not engage in a rudimentary form of reasoning.

You, me, and so many more. There's a ton of work necessary to reach that goal. "Thesis worthy" doesn't even begin to appropriately describe the endeavor.

First of all, I do not talk in terms of "non-linguistic belief" for reasons already explained.

But you have re-interrogate each of the terms you're using and try to say exactly what they mean. Perhaps start with "non-linguistic belief"? That's the one I find most puzzling.

I have no burden regarding that terminological use. You first invoked it. I rejected it.

A correlation is a relationship and/or association that is attributed/recognized/inferred/drawn between different things by a creature so capable. In our example, the creature touching the fire associated/correlated their own behaviour(touching the fire) with/to the subsequent pain, hence attributing/recognizing a causal relationship between the behaviour and pain.

Your objections are very much in line with Rödl's concerns. He's a tough read, but Self-Consciousness and Objectivity has a lot to recommend it. There was also a long thread jumping off from his re-evaluation of what a proposition is; I believe it's the thread called "p and 'I think p'". — J

Yeah. I read that thread, and followed it fairly closely. It was an interesting thread.

But you're just re-asserting all this. I'm asking why you believe it's true, and what such thoughts or beliefs consist of, if not words? Does the cat perhaps think in images? Can she believe using images? I'm not trying to be difficult, or imply that there are no good answers to my questions, but we need a lot more clarity on what's being proposed. What is the "stuff" that allows this account to go forward? — J

Interesting reply given the context.

What are you wanting to know? :brow:

Are you looking for an ontological basis or terminological framework upon which to build an 'updated' conception/understanding of thought/belief... human thought/belief notwithstanding?

All thought and belief reduce to correlations drawn between different things.

But at this very moment (or so goes the usual story) there are propositions about all sorts of things, which are either true or false, yet unarticulated. — J

Yup. I'm aware of this dogma. So much the worse for convention. In what sensible way can an unarticulated proposition be said to exist?

What does a proposition consist of?

What does an unarticulated proposition consist of?

the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof.
— creativesoul

Say more about that? Do you mean, the dichotomy is too rigid?
— J

Sort of. The content of a language less creature's thought and belief can include/consist of stuff that is existentially dependent upon language. — creativesoul

OK, but I still wish I understood what the "stuff" was. — J

A cat can think/believe that a mouse is on the mat. The content of the cat's thought/belief includes the mouse(which is not existentially dependent upon language) and the mat(which is). Both are elemental constituents of the cat's thought/belief. The cat is a language less animal capable of forming thought/belief consisting of elemental constituents that are themselves existentially dependent upon language.

...propositions have the peculiar property of being true or false (for example) regardless of whether anyone asserts them... — J

What does an unarticulated proposition consist of? — creativesoul

Right, that's the question. — J

I would ask that question to anyone claiming that there is such thing as an unarticulated proposition. By my lights, it exposes an emaciated ontological framework.

If propositions are existentially dependent upon language use(being proposed), and language use is existentially dependent upon shared meaning, then it only follows that propositions are existentially dependent upon shared meaning. If the capability of being true/false requires saying something meaningful about the world(which is usually held by such positions), and saying something meaningful about the world is language use, then it only follows that in order for a proposition to be capable of being true or false, they must say something meaningful about the world via language use.

There is no such thing as an unarticulated proposition.

How can I think through a thought without breaking my own structure of thinking or undoing my own reasoning? — GreekSkeptic

Establish and maintain consistency/coherence(lack of self-contradiction).

the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof.
— creativesoul

Say more about that? Do you mean, the dichotomy is too rigid? — J

Sort of. The content of a language less creature's thought and belief can include/consist of stuff that is existentially dependent upon language.

The theory laden nature of these discussions you mentioned as necessary in the OP is showing up here.

What does an unarticulated proposition consist of?

Given the direction of our discussion, it's worth saying that the linguistic/nonlinguistic dichotomy is incapable of taking proper account of language less thought and belief, particularly in terms of the content thereof.

Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Where there has never been language, there could have never been propositions. I'm not sure if I rightly understand what the W3 sense is.

Can you say more about what that would be, phenomenologically? — J

I reject phenomenology.

What is a conclusion that is not put into words? — J

In this example, the creature recognizes/attributes causality; recognizes and/or attributes a causal relationship between their own behaviour and the subsequent pain. — creativesoul

On my view, thought and/or belief cannot be reduced in/to purely physical terms or mental terms. That is because thought and belief consist in part of both and are thus not properly accounted for by either a purely physical or a purely 'mental'(non-physical) framework.

Feeling pain after touching fire causes an animal to infer/conclude that touching fire caused the pain
— creativesoul

But if we agree that this does not occur in the space of propositions, then what do you mean by "infer" or "conclude"? What is a nonlinguistic conclusion?

That's the problem I want to home in on. — J

A non-linguistic inference/conclusion is one that is arrived at via a language less creature. In this example, the creature recognizes/attributes causality; recognizes and/or attributes a causal relationship between their own behaviour and the subsequent pain.

↪creativesoul I'd like to understand this thought better. I think you're saying that I can have a belief without also having a propositional expression or equivalent of that belief? Thus, a non-linguistic animal can form a belief about, say, pain and fire, without entertaining any propositions about it? — J

The summary above points towards the general thrust. Not all belief is propositional in content.

If I've got that right, I don't think it's tangential at all. It raises the extremely interesting question of what to do with beliefs, in the taxonomy of Worlds 2 and 3. If we're going to use causal language, as I'm suggesting we might do, what causes a bear to believe that fire will cause pain, and how does that belief in turn cause whatever mental process results in the bear's steering clear of smoke? Is all this happening in the world of psychological events, local to the bear, and explainable in terms of brain processes? Or is there a shadow, so to speak, of propositional content, such that the bear might be said to conclude that smoke is to be avoided?

I think we can get some insight by consulting our own mental behavior when beliefs arise, but I'll stop here. — J

There's a lot packed up in there. The taxonomy of beliefs is an interesting subject matter, to me, all by itself. I reject the idea that language less animals' belief(s) have propositional content.

Feeling pain after touching fire causes an animal to infer/conclude that touching fire caused the pain, which in turn forms the belief that touching fire causes pain. That belief will then affect thoughts and effect behaviors, causing the animal to avoid fire.

entailment are 'logical rules', which could only be said to 'cause'(scarequotes intentional) someone to infer certain conclusions, if they know and follow the rules.
— creativesoul

Sure. "Knowing the rules" is a background condition, just like "all things being equal at room temperature and normal gravity etc." is a background condition for many statements of physical causation. My questions was/is, Given that the mind in question does know the rules, do they actually have a choice about following them? — J

My own objections to Gettier's Case I and II, as well as the cottage industry cases, serve as prima facie evidence that one can know the rules and not follow them.

Did I have a choice in the matter? I don't think so.

There is a large number of bright interesting people here.

I apologize for any inconvenience or distraction, my friend. I just wondered if Russell's approach was applicable to the issue I raised regarding what happens in Gettier's by following the rules of entailment. To my mind, that is the very reason that it seems so counterintuitive to nearly everyone who first encounters the paper(the undisclosed change in meaning/truth conditions). That is the sleight of hand Gettier had gotten away with, by following the rules nonetheless.

If you wish to return to what you were working on before I entered, please do! I was just stopping in to see if the new approach by Russell was applicable to what I've hinted at here.

So for the purposes of any extensional model we might use, the two propositions do meant the same thing. — Banno

And yet, the two have very different truth conditions Banno. "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" is true regardless of which man gets the job, so long as he has ten coins in his pocket. Whereas, "Jones will get the job and has ten coins in his pocket" is true, if and only if, Jones gets the job and has ten coins in his pocket.

A change in truth conditions is a change in meaning.

Awww. I'm sorry.

I had it backwards(again), but corrected it while you were replying. I suppose it's hard for me to accept that Smith would count the coins in Jones' pocket! :lol: Anyway...

I made a point to mention the lack of need for a language speaker because it seemed germane to the commonly held belief that propositions are equivalent to belief. That point's probably too tangential, but it's true and has a very broad scope of far-reaching consequences which place many a common understanding and/or position under overwhelming direct scrutiny.

I would hesitate at that. I'm not a huge fan of the so called 'logical rules of entailment', because they do not preserve truth(as a result of allowing a change in meaning).

Setting that aside, and addressing the question above directly, entailment are 'logical rules', which could only be said to 'cause'(scarequotes intentional) someone to infer certain conclusions, if they know and follow the rules. I think that's what you're getting at.

Gettier comes to mind. Funny, I'm also discussing the paper with Banno in his Russell thread.

I don't have much time nowadays, which is good, but what I had in mind fit into the truth as satisfaction aspect as well as being germane to issues with entailment. In the first case Gettier invokes the rules of entailment to move from d to e.

from the paper...

Case I:

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition : (d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago.

Proposition (d) entails : (e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.

The satisfaction issue, it seems to me, is that those two conjunctive propositions do not mean the same thing. That is obvious because they have different truth conditions. Does Russell's approach find itself capable of addressing that?