C1: Therefore, a belief cannot make a proposition true or false. — Bob Ross
You can't play it in reverse — fishfry
I believe you have agreed with me. — fishfry
No, once again you recited the natural numbers in ascending order. — fishfry
It means that is isn't a finite sequence of operations. — noAxioms
By definition, the sequence completes by having every operation occurring before some finite time. — noAxioms
If you mean that it doesn't complete, it by definition does in a finite time. If you mean that it has no terminal step, then you're making the mistake I identify just above since the definition does not require one. — noAxioms
You also wield the term 'ad infinitum', — noAxioms
That's all very well. But it also takes us back to the question what this "operation" actually is. — Ludwig V
I've given solid a mathematical argument that your 60 second puzzle guarantees that all the numbers will be spoken. — fishfry
7/8 will do just fine. I necessarily had to jump over all but finitely members of the sequence. — fishfry
I go 1 at 60, 2 at 30, etc.
Name the first number that I fail to count
Third time I'm asking you the question.
This is a standard inductive argument. If it's impossible to name the first natural number at which a property fails to hold, the property must hold for all natural numbers.
Please give this argument some thought. — fishfry
In your opinion. But you have no proof or evidence. On the contrary, the mathematics is clear. — fishfry
But counting backward from infinity is always finite! I showed you how that works, counting backward from 1 in the ordered set <1/2, 3/4, 7/8, ..., 1> — fishfry
Did I not move you, surprise you, convince you, that if you count 1, 2, 3, ... successively halving the time intervals, that you will indeed count every single natural number in finite time? If not, why not? — fishfry
But counting backward from infinity is always finite! I showed you how that works, counting backward from 1 in the ordered set <1/2, 3/4, 7/8, ..., 1> — fishfry
It's easy, I'll do it right here on a public Internet forum.
1, 15/16, 7/8, 3/4, 1/2. Done.
That's because the first step backward from any limit ordinal necessarily jumps over all but finitely members of the sequence whose limit it is. — fishfry
I don't know what you mean that supertasks are nonterminating by definition. — fishfry
You did lose me when you said that counting 0, 1, 2, ... is "counting down from infinity." I did not understand that example when you gave it earlier. Mathematically, the ordered set <1, 2, 3, ...> exists, all at once. Its counting is completed the moment it's invoked into existence by the axiom of infinity. — fishfry
Well ok, then why don't I complete a supertask when I walk across the room, first going halfway, etc.? Can you distinguish this case from your definition? — fishfry
* You have not convinced me or even made me understand your reasoning that supertasks are "metaphysically impossible" or that they entail a logical contradiction. — fishfry
He does. Most of the paper focuses on rationalizing low probabilities for the first two premises to the point of 3 being likely. — noAxioms
A technologically mature “posthuman” civilization would have enormous computing power. Based on this empirical fact, the simulation argument shows that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) The fraction of human‐level civilizations that reach a posthuman stage is very close to zero; (2) The fraction of posthuman civilizations that are interested in running ancestor‐simulations is very close to zero; (3) The fraction of all people with our kind of experiences that are living in a simulation is very close to one.
If (1) is true, then we will almost certainly go extinct before reaching posthumanity. If (2) is true, then there must be a strong convergence among the courses of advanced civilizations so that virtually none contains any relatively wealthy individuals who desire to run ancestor‐simulations and are free to do so. If (3) is true, then we almost certainly live in a simulation. In the dark forest of our current ignorance, it seems sensible to apportion one’s credence roughly evenly between (1), (2), and (3).
Point is, you are misstating Bostrom's premises. Item 3 doesn't follow from the premises as you word them. — noAxioms
Could you give me an example of two incompatible mathematical systems? — Tarskian
But I couldn't see why Bostrom thought that one of those three must be true. — Ludwig V
I find both these to be highly unlikely, for the reason stated in this topic and mine. Bostrom of course has motivation to rationalize a higher probability for both of these, but rationalizing is not being rational. — noAxioms
I'm only asking how far 1,1 is from 1,2 in a discrete space system. As far as I can tell, it's 0 units, right? — Hanover
The problem is adjacency. If object A is adjacent to object B on a finite grid, what is the distance from A to B? If it's 0 units, then A and B occupy the same space and A = B. — Hanover
However, the thing measured is the passage of time which occurs. — Metaphysician Undercover
If it's at L-1 at T-1 and L-2 at T-2, how long did it take to get from L-1 to L-2? — Hanover
Assuming at the most microscopic level, the object is on an 8x8 chessboard. The pawn moves from e2 to e3. There is no e2.1 or other smaller increments in this finite world. At T1 it's at e2 and T30 it's at e3. The assumption is that at some point in time, it was no where while transitioning (moving?) from e2 to e3. — Hanover
Acquaintance primarily concerns knowledge. — Luke
The direct/indirect realism dispute primarily concerns sensory perception — Luke
My usage is consistent. Indirect realists equivocate over the meaning of "perception", using it to mean both the sensory perception of external objects and the Russellian acquaintance of mental representations. — Luke
Except your explanation of what indirect realists believe is that our perceptions of material objects are not mediated by the perception of some other entity, which is therefore not indirect realism. — Luke
That our perceptions of material objects are mediated by the perception of some other entity, such as sense-data. — Luke
It's something I do not accept.
According to what I mean by it, it is that we have sensory perceptions of sense-data. but you have been telling me that that's not what you mean by it. — Luke
As I've stated several times now, it is over part (2) of Fish's definition: — Luke
Otherwise, I don't know what indirect realists mean by indirect perception. — Luke
I don't think there's much point in continuing since you refuse to acknowledge that my position is even possible: that one can reject naive realism without being an indirect realist. — Luke
Light is color. — creativesoul
Arguing for them both results in saying incompatible things when compared to one another. Have you been arguing for both throughout this thread, at different times arguing for one, and then the other later? — creativesoul